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Abstract 
Between 1934 and 1936 various organisations of the French left joined forces to 
create the Popular Front, an alliance borne of an antifascist imperative. After 
winning the May 1936 legislative elections, and in a climate of growing opposition 
from conservative and far right forces, the left-wing coalition came to power. By 
the end of 1938, the Popular Front had collapsed and the right was back in power. 
During this period (1934-1938), the right and far right repeatedly challenged the 
left-wing alliance‟s legitimacy and attacked its constituent political parties. This 
conflict between left and right intensified France‟s political and social tensions and 
polarised French politics and French society into supporters and opponents of the 
Popular Front.  
This thesis examines the role of the right within the context of the Popular 
Front and seeks to answer the following question: how did the right act in 
response to the Popular Front between 1934 and 1938?  The thesis focuses on 
the Moselle, a border département returned to French sovereignty after forty-
seven years under German domination (1871-1918). By 1934, the Moselle had 
developed a distinctive political character sympathetic to the right and hostile, or at 
best indifferent, to the left. By drawing parallels between Parisian and Mosellan 
events and using new archival material, the thesis demonstrates the originality of 
the Popular Front in the Moselle, and the responses of the local, and essentially 
Catholic and particularist, right. No scholarly work has yet examined the conflict 
between the right and the left within the context of the Popular Front in the 
Moselle. This thesis demonstrates how the département‟s distinctive historical, 
social, linguistic, cultural, political and religious context shaped the Popular Front 
and the right‟s responses to it.  
4 
 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................ 5 
Abbreviations .................................................................................................. 7 
List of Figures and Tables .............................................................................. 8 
 
 
Introduction..................................................................................................... 9 
 
 
Chapter One - Society and Politics from the German Empire to the 
Third Republic, 1871-1934 ........................................................................... 34 
 
 
Chapter Two - The Formation of the Popular Front,  
February 1934 - March 1936 ........................................................................ 87 
 
 
Chapter Three - Elections, Strikes and l‟affaire d‟Alsace-Lorraine,  
April 1936 - October 1936 .......................................................................... 142 
 
 
Chapter Four - Counter-offensive and Divisions,  
October 1936 - February 1937 ................................................................... 170 
 
 
Chapter Five - Domestic and International Challenges: the Return 
of the Right and the Fall of the Popular Front,  
February 1937- November 1938 ................................................................ 210 
 
 
 
Conclusion.................................................................................................. 278 
Appendices................................................................................................. 285 
Bibliography ................................................................................................ 291 
5 
 
Acknowledgements 
First and foremost, I would like to thank Dr Robert Boyce of the International 
History department at the London School of Economics who supervised this thesis 
with great care and provided invaluable advice, guidance and support. Also at the 
London School of Economics, Dr Heather Jones of the International History 
department provided me with insightful comments and useful advice. Various 
institutions helped bring this thesis to completion: the London School of 
Economics, the Department of International History, the University of London‟s 
Central Research Fund and the Society for the Study of French History. I am 
particularly indebted to Jean Jameson of the LSE‟s Teaching and Learning Centre 
for providing help in the difficult times that most PhD students encounter at one 
time or another.   
I wish to thank the many archivists and librarians who helped with the 
research in France and England. But I would like to mention Jean-Pierre Lallement 
at the Archives Départementales de la Moselle, Philippe Wilmouth at 
ASCOMEMO, Dominique Parcollet at the Centre d‟Histoire de Sciences Politiques 
and the staff at the British Library of Political and Economic Science, particularly 
the Interlibrary Loan team. I would also like to thank Hughes de la Rocque for 
granting me full access to François de la Rocque‟s papers at the Centre d‟Histoire 
de Sciences Politiques.  
I am in debt to many friends and colleagues for their help and support: 
Marie Burner, Sonia Charro-Perez, Christelle Forli, Nicola Mackenzie-Dodds, 
Elizabeth Benning, Gil-li Vardi, Chris Millington, Sevasti-Melissa Nolas, Stuart 
Walker, Stephanie Hare and Francoise Basch. Special thanks to Bella and Kit 
Brown for their kindness and help. I also wish to thank Dr Ian Forjacs from King‟s 
College Hospital, London for looking after me and providing great care over the 
last eleven years. Most of all, I would like to thank my family, my parents 
Mohamed and Ferroudja for believing in me, and my brothers and sisters; to 
Rabah and Malika, thank you for your precious help in Paris and Strasbourg, to 
Nadia, thank you for always being there. 
6 
 
Finally, I am grateful to my daughter Ruby who joined me during the PhD. 
Although she does not realise it, she helped me put things in perspective and 
remain focused on the thesis. My final and greatest debt goes to William Brown, 
for having encouraged me to write this thesis and supporting me financially, 
morally and emotionally. My debt to him is such that words cannot describe it. This 
thesis is dedicated to him and our little Ruby.  
7 
 
Abbreviations 
Political and social organisations 
CGT Confédération générale du travail 
CGTU Confédération générale du travail unitaire 
PCF Section française de l‟internationale communiste (French Communist party) 
Radicals/Radical-Socialists Parti républicain, radical et radical-socialiste  
SFIO Section française de l‟internationale ouvrière (French Socialist party) 
 
 
Archives 
ADBR Archives Départementales du Bas-Rhin 
ADM Archives Départementales de la Moselle 
ADSSD Archives Départementales de la Seine Saint-Denis 
AN Archives Nationales de France  
APPP Archives de la Préfecture de Police de Paris 
ASCOMEMO Association pour la Conservation de la Mémoire de la Moselle 
CHSPo Centre d‟Histoire de Sciences Politiques 
8 
 
List of Figures and Tables 
Figure 1  Alsace and Lorraine looking towards France ........................................ 14 
Figure 2 Le Souvenir  in Nancy ............................................................................ 15 
Figure 3 The Moselle and the Meurthe before 1871 ............................................. 35 
Figure 4 The Moselle and the new Meurthe-et-Moselle after 1871 ...................... 36 
Figure 5 The linguistic geography ........................................................................ 42 
  
Table 1 Level of unionisation in 1931 ................................................................... 83 
9 
 
Introduction 
In the 1890s, Raymond Poincaré, the French Minister for Public Instruction and a 
leading representative of the French right, visited a school in Commercy in 
western Lorraine. In his speech at the end of his visit, Poincaré, who originated 
from that corner of France, stated, „Ce n‟est pas ... sous le ciel de Lorraine que 
pouvaient germer et fleurir les doctrines vénéneuses et internationalistes.‟1 At the 
time of this declaration, a border separated the historic region of Lorraine between 
two separate political entities. By moving parts of eastern Lorraine from French to 
German sovereignty, the treaty of Frankfurt of May 1871, ending the Franco-
Prussian war, gave a political meaning to what had hitherto been only a linguistic 
reality: the division of Lorraine between the Lorraine française, which was largely 
Francophone, and the Lorraine allemande where French speakers cohabited 
amidst German and dialect speakers.2 The latter, which is the subject of this thesis 
and which the Germans called Lothringen, changed sovereignty five times 
between 1870 and 1945: firstly, in 1871, when France ceded Alsace and parts of 
eastern Lorraine to Germany; secondly, after the Great War, when the French 
recovered the provinces and the territory of Lothringen became the Moselle 
département; thirdly, in July 1940 with the de facto annexation of the provinces 
into the Third Reich; and lastly, when France recovered the territories from 
Germany in May 1945. 
Though Poincaré‟s speech was made during a trip to French Lorraine, his 
declaration could well have been made in Lothringen, German Lorraine. There, 
left-wing internationalist political groups struggled to mobilise the growing number 
of blue-collar workers that accompanied the region‟s mass industrialisation in the 
1890s. By the time Lothringen returned to France and became the Moselle 
département in 1919, the region had become largely conservative, clerical and 
practically immune to „les doctrines vénéneuses et internationalistes‟, as Poincaré 
                                            
 
1
 Serge Bonnet, Sociologie Politique et Religieuse de la Lorraine, Paris: Armand Colin, 1972, p.19.  
2
 Though the term Lorraine allemande had been widely used to describe the dialect and German-
speaking area of eastern and southern Lorraine, it took a different meaning after the region 
became German in 1871. 
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asserted. The political party that represented the conservatism of the region was 
the Union Républicaine Lorraine, a party created by local clergymen, politicians 
and influential notables in March 1919. During the years of the Moselle‟s 
annexation to Germany‟s Second Empire, Catholics and the clergy organised 
politically and created two parties: the Elsass-Lothringisches Zentrum and the Bloc 
Lorrain. The Elsass-Lothringisches Zentrum was particularly popular in the 
Germanic zone in the east and south-east as well as Alsace, while the Bloc 
Lorrain found most of its supporters in the Francophone zone in western 
Lothringen. The two parties gathered politicians from various socio-economic 
backgrounds including businessmen, lawyers, clergymen, farmers, and engineers, 
railway workers, while continuing to share one common principle: the defence of 
the Catholic Church‟s doctrine in the temporal world. Additionally, they rejected 
interference from Germany‟s Catholic party, the Zentrum, and defended the 
region‟s cultural and religious distinctiveness by mobilising the population against 
German assimilation.  
The Union Républicaine Lorraine, which largely dominated interwar politics, 
was their direct political heir and developed a closely similar agenda until Germany 
annexed the Moselle in July 1940. This dual German and French heritage 
pervaded the Catholic right as well as the Mosellan left. Between 1871 and 1918, 
the German Socialist party, the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), 
tried to establish roots in the Moselle. Though it was particularly active in the 
region‟s industrial centres, a series of factors, examined in chapter One, prevented 
the SPD from establishing itself successfully in the region. The local section of the 
SPD focused largely on challenging the German annexation of the provinces and 
developed, much like the Union Républicaine Lorraine‟s political ancestors, a 
particularist political culture that rejected the German central power as well as the 
ascendency of the SPD on the grounds that it was German. After the war, the 
French Socialist Party, then formally known as the Section Française de 
l‟Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO), enjoyed some success in Alsace, the other region 
that alternated between France and Germany, but it remained feeble in the 
Moselle département. As Alison Carrol has noted in her study of Socialism in 
interwar Alsace, „In Alsace they enjoyed a considerable proportion of the vote in 
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the legislative elections, as well as significant municipal success, yet in the 
Moselle the Socialists had limited presence.‟3 Meanwhile, the local section of the 
French Communist party (PCF) continued the pre-war tradition of particularism, 
rejecting French imperialism on the grounds of economic and national oppression 
and maintaining difficult relations with the party‟s national Central Committee. 
By the mid-1930s, the period which is the chief focus of this thesis, France 
experienced a grave economic, social and political crisis. Though the Great 
Depression affected France more gradually than Britain or Germany, it took longer 
for France to recover from it.4 The effect of the crisis on French domestic politics 
and society was evident: not only did it exacerbate the anti-democratic current 
which had been present in French politics since the early years of the Third 
Republic and was embodied in the right-wing paramilitary ligues, it also 
contributed to tensions between conservatives and progressive forces. These 
tensions reached a climax, when, on 6 February 1934, thousands of protesters, 
mostly right-wing, took to the streets of Paris to demonstrate against the 
government. The demonstrations, which occurred near the buildings of the French 
National Assembly, led to bloody riots between protesters and police forces 
leaving seventeen dead and hundreds injured.5 For most contemporaries on the 
centre and left, the riots were nothing short of an attempted fascist coup against 
the Republic. Determined to protect the Republic against the fascist threat, the two 
parties of the left, the SFIO and the PCF, joined the main centrist party, the 
Radical-Socialists (Radicals), in a Popular Front which won the 1936 legislative 
elections. By the time the new Popular Front government took office in June, the 
country was paralysed by a nation-wide strike movement.  
The conviction that the Popular Front‟s recent electoral victory and the 
strikes presaged an imminent Communist revolution in France had the effect of 
                                            
 
3
 Alison Carrol, „The SFIO and National Integration: Regional Socialism and National Identity in 
Interwar Alsace‟, unpublished PhD thesis, Exeter University, 2008, p.17.  
4
 See Julian Jackson, The Politics of Depression in France, 1932-1936, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985.  
5
 Chambre des Députés, Rapport Général fait au nom de la commission d‟enquête chargée de 
rechercher les causes et les origines des événements du 6 février 1934, Tome 1 Paris: Imprimerie 
de la Chambre des Députés, 1934, p.226. 
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radicalising the political right, which sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to unite its 
forces against the „reds‟. At the same time, as a consequence of the Popular 
Front‟s ban on paramilitary ligues, new right-wing parties emerged. These new 
parties, and in particular the Parti Social Français, challenged the older right-wing 
parties by competing with them for the support of the conservative masses. By 
attacking both the left and the right, they also shifted the historic left-right axis on 
which the French political model rested further to the right. This thesis is a study of 
the right in the Moselle within the context of the Popular Front. Its aim is to 
investigate how local right wingers, whose political culture differed from that of the 
national right, viewed and reacted to the formation, victory and downfall of the 
Popular Front and how they organised at the local level. By comparing the right‟s 
responses nationally and locally with those of the left, the thesis examines how 
political groups who stood for the preservation of the established social order 
reacted to the social and political changes introduced by the Popular Front. 
The Popular Front represented a decisive period for both the Mosellan right 
and left, which struggled to adapt to France‟s political culture for most of the 
interwar period. While the right-wing Catholic Union Républicaine Lorraine 
campaigned for a gradual and partial assimilation into the Republic that took into 
account the département‟s particularity such as the place of the Catholic faith in 
society, the regional federation of the PCF until 1935 insisted upon the creation of 
an independent state of Alsace-Lorraine. The position of the Mosellan section of 
the SFIO was somewhat more ambiguous and revealed its dual German-French 
heritage: it campaigned for assimilation on the grounds of national unity, but 
supported bilingualism and confessional schools because of its roots in German 
social democracy. The autonomist Heimatbund, which emerged in the mid-1920s 
and which found far less resonance in the Moselle than in Alsace, crossed party 
divisions and threatened the unity of both the Union Républicaine Lorraine and the 
PCF. Organisations de l‟Intérieur – the term used by Mosellans and Alsatians to 
describe anything and anyone originating in France beyond the Moselle or Alsace 
– such as the Action Française and the Croix de Feu - did not represent a serious 
threat to indigenous political formations in the Moselle until the electoral victory of 
the Popular Front in 1936. After the latter won the national legislative elections, 
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however, the Moselle‟s political character underwent a radical change. New 
parties de l‟Intérieur emerged and proved successful in mobilising the local 
population into political action against the common enemy, Communism. The shift 
became even more apparent when the left-wing coalition disbanded in late 1938. 
By then, local political parties followed the national left-right divide, and the issue 
of assimilation and regional particularism, which had hitherto shaped local politics 
and society, lost momentum. The period of the Popular Front, which saw the 
culmination of the polarisation of French society and politics, thus accelerated the 
integration of the Moselle into France‟s political culture.   
Historiographical review  
Alsace-Lorraine has long been the focus of intense research by historians 
interested in the themes of borderland, politics, language, regionalism, regional, 
national and transnational identity, nationalism and the relationship between the 
central state and the region. Since the provinces changed national sovereignty five 
times between 1870 and 1945, this interest is hardly surprising. By and large, 
contemporary authors tended to offer biased accounts of Alsace-Lorraine, either 
celebrating or condemning the provinces‟ change of national sovereignty. Their 
views were largely influenced by political and, even more, national allegiance.6 In 
contrast, the Moselle received almost no attention from scholars, who by and large 
considered it French or treated it as a mere extension of Alsace. There is also a 
                                            
 
6
 Some German authors justified the annexation of the two provinces by using language and 
culture: Georg Wolfram und Werner Gley, Elsass-Lothringischer atlas: Landeskunde, Geschichte, 
Kultur und Wirtschaft Elsass-Lothringens, dargestellt auf 45 Kartenblättern mit 115 Haupt- und 
Nebenkarten, Frankfurt Am Main: Selbstverlag des Elsass-Lothringen-Instituts, 1931. In his studies 
on pan-Germanists in Alsace-Lorraine, the French and Alsatian journalist Charles Beckenhaupt  
concluded that language was by no means a decisive factor in defining one‟s race; in  
Beckenhaupt, Race, Langue ou Patrie?, Strasbourg: Libraire Istra, 1930. Other French authors 
celebrated the return of the provinces to France by retorting that despite the use of German in 
some parts of the provinces, the latter belonged to the French nation. They put forward the 
Republican principle that one does not need to speak French to feel French. Frédéric Eccard, 
„L‟Alsace et la Lorraine sous le Commissariat Général et après sa suppression‟, Revue politique et 
parlementaire, novembre 1925, pp.197-237. See also Georges Weiss, L‟Alsace: problèmes 
actuels, Paris: les Presses Universitaires de France, 1929. This is a deceiving title that hides the 
fact that the book also deals with the Moselle.  
14 
 
persistent popular perception in France that Alsace somehow shielded Lorraine 
under German rule.  
Graphic or artistic depictions of Alsace-Lorraine produced between 1871 
and 1940 tended to represent Alsace as the big sister of a somewhat more 
vulnerable Lorraine. For example, a poster to commemorate the two provinces 
printed during the Great War depicted Alsace as a self-confident character looking 
determinedly towards France with a fragile-looking Lorraine on her right side 
(Figure 1). While Alsace looks resolutely westwards, symbolising its desire to 
rejoin France, Lorraine looks downwards, an indication of its implicit dependence 
on Alsace.  
Figure 1  Alsace and Lorraine looking towards France 
 
Likewise, the statue erected in honour of the two provinces in Nancy shows a 
confident Alsace consoling a smaller sorrowful Lorraine. This statue, sculpted by 
French artist Paul Dubois, is part of a group of sculptures produced in the early 
1900s, and carries the evocative title of Le Souvenir and La Lorraine pleurant sur 
l‟épaule de L‟Alsace (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2 Le Souvenir  in Nancy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This popular perception might explain why until recently scholarship on 
Alsace-Lorraine has centred on Alsace and largely ignored Lorraine or the 
Moselle, thus obscuring the heterogeneous nature of the two provinces. More 
recently, however, scholars have acknowledged the differences between and 
among the component parts of the region.  In his study on fascism in interwar 
Alsace, Samuel Goodfellow notes that,  
[A]lthough Alsace-Lorraine has become a commonplace, the linking 
of the two provinces is, for the most part, arbitrary. The term Alsace-
Lorraine did not originate until 1871 when the Germans annexed 
them. When the Germans rolled in again in 1940, the two were ... 
separated. In short, Lorraine was different.7  
Similarly, in her unpublished thesis on interwar Alsace, Alison Carrol states that a 
new generation of scholars accepts the need to study Alsace and the Moselle as 
                                            
 
7
 Samuel H. Goodfellow, Between the Swastika and the Cross of Lorraine: Fascism in interwar 
Alsace, DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1999, p.163, n1. 
16 
 
separate regions. As she writes, „This is a reflection of an increased recognition of 
the differences in the experience and development of the two [regions].‟8  
The most comprehensive work on the Moselle during the period of the 
Reichsland Elsaß-Lothringen – the official German term to describe Alsace-
Lorraine between 1871 and 1918 - remains François Roth‟s published doctoral 
thesis La Lorraine Annexée: Etude sur la Présidence de Lorraine.9 Roth has 
written extensively on Lorraine and the Moselle between 1871 and 1940.10 While 
some of his studies are general accounts of politics, economics and society in the 
Moselle, others focus on particular events and local political figures.11 More 
recently, Carolyn Grohman‟s doctoral thesis presents an impressive account of the 
difficulties faced by the French state and the local population during the early 
years of the reintegration of the Moselle into French sovereignty.12 Joseph 
Schmauch‟s doctoral thesis, Les services d'Alsace-Lorraine face à la Réintégration 
des Départements de l'Est (1914-1919), sheds light on the administrative bodies 
that organised the return of the „chères provinces‟ to France and the problems 
arising from their assimilation into the French Republic.13   
                                            
 
8
 Carrol, op.cit., p.36. 
9
 François Roth, La Lorraine Annexée: Etude sur la Présidence de Lorraine (1870-1918), Nancy: 
Presses Universitaires de Nancy, 1976. 
10
 His works include inter alia Les Lorrains entre France et l‟Allemagne, Metz: Editions 
Serpenoises, 1982 and La Vie Politique en Lorraine au XXe siècle, Nancy: Presses Universitaires 
de Nancy, 1986.  
11
 Roth, La Guerre de 70, Paris: Fayard, 1990 and Raymond Poincaré: un Homme d‟Etat 
Républicain, Paris: Fayard, 2000. His latest work is a biography, Robert Schuman 1886-1963: du 
Lorrain des Frontières au Père de l‟Europe, Paris: Fayard, 2008. Roth focuses on Schuman‟s 
heritage as a Lorrainer and „un homme des frontières‟ to explain his ability to develop his political 
career in France and in Europe. 
12
 Carolyn Grohmann, „The Problems of Integrating Annexed Lorraine into France, 1918-1925‟, 
unpublished PhD thesis, University of Stirling, 1999. From the same author, see also „From 
Lothringen to Lorraine: Expulsion and Voluntary Repatriation‟, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 16, 3, 
September 2005, pp.571-587 and Paul Lawrence, Timothy Baycroft and Grohmann, „‟Degrees of 
Foreignness and the Construction of Identity in French Border Regions during the Interwar Period‟, 
Contemporary European History, 10, 1, January 2001, pp. 51-71. Laird Boswell‟s „From Liberation 
to Purge Trials in the “Mythic Provinces”: the Reconfiguration of Identities in Alsace and Lorraine, 
1918-1920‟ French Historical Studies, 23, Winter 2000, pp.129-162 concentrates on both Alsace 
and Lorraine and provides a valuable complement to Grohmann‟s studies.  
13
 Unless stated otherwise, all the dissertations and doctoral theses cited here are unpublished. 
Joseph Schmauch, „Les services d'Alsace-Lorraine face à la réintégration des départements de 
l'Est (1914-1919)‟, Ecole des Chartes, Sorbonne, 2004.  
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A few dissertations (Mémoires de Maîtrise) from the Université de Metz and 
the Université de Nancy address specific political issues in interwar Moselle. R.H. 
Kieffer‟s dissertation, Les Elections Législatives de 1919 et 1924 en Moselle, 
describes the first two legislative elections after the return of the Moselle to 
France. Based on archival sources at the Archives Départementales de la Moselle 
and local newspapers, Kieffer focuses on the population‟s electoral behaviour to 
demonstrate the département‟s conservative character.14 Jean-Daniel Durand‟s 
Les Catholiques en Moselle, 1924-1926, explores the resurgence of organised 
political Catholicism in the region in the wake of the French government‟s plans to 
introduce the Republic‟s secular laws in Alsace and the Moselle.15 Durand 
provides invaluable information on the events surrounding the radicalisation of 
political Catholicism in the Moselle in the 1920s, but largely omits the local socio-
political context in the immediate post-war period. Other dissertations that have 
proved useful for this thesis include Valérie Mangenot‟s Les Syndicats Ouvriers en 
Moselle de 1919 à 1934 and Didier Kompa‟s La Formation du Front Populaire en 
Moselle, 1934-1936.16 Though they provided an essential starting point for the 
present author‟s research, they approach their respective topics in a largely 
uncritical manner, which is normal in French dissertations. 
Chantal Thiebaut‟s doctoral thesis, La Moselle dans le Contexte Politique 
Lorrain 1919-1929, offers a rich account of local politics in the post-war decade.17 
By focusing on the results of the numerous local and national elections in the four 
départements of Lorraine (Moselle, Meurthe-et-Moselle, Meuse and Vosges), 
Thiebaut gives an overview of Mosellan politics within a wider regional context. 
Jean-François Colas‟s doctoral thesis uses the same geographical framework but 
                                            
 
14
 R.H. Kieffer, „Les Elections Législatives de 1919 et 1924 en Moselle‟, Université de Nancy, 1967.  
15
 Jean-Daniel Durand, „Les Catholiques en Moselle, 1924-1926: Rôle Politique et Défense du 
Statut Religieux et Scolaire‟, Université de Metz, 1993. 
16
 Valérie Mangenot, „Les Syndicats Ouvriers en Moselle de 1919 à 1934‟, Université de Metz, 
1995, Didier Kompa, „La Formation du Front Populaire en Moselle, 1934-1936‟, Université de Metz, 
1985. Other dissertations that examine issues relevant to this thesis include: Gerard Diwo, „Le 
Communisme en Moselle, 1925-1932‟, Université de Metz, 1983 and Marc-Pierre Gontard, „Le 
Francisme en Moselle, 1933-1936‟, Université de Metz, 1982.  
17
 Chantal Thiebaut, „La Moselle dans le contexte Politique Lorrain de 1919 à 1929‟, Université de 
Paris-Sorbonne, 1977. 
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concentrates his study on the right in the 1930s.18 By drawing parallels between 
the various rights (les droites) that existed in Lorraine, Colas highlights the 
Mosellan right‟s distinctiveness within a regional and national context, which he 
attributes to the département‟s past in the Reischland. Notwithstanding the quality 
of the works cited above, none of them devote attention to the central theme of 
this thesis: the relationship between the left and the right during the interwar period 
and the effect of the Popular Front on the right in a contested border region with 
particular cultural and linguistic conditions.   
By comparison, literature on the French Popular Front is plentiful. By and 
large, scholarly studies of the Popular Front examine events at the national or 
Parisian levels.19 Similarly, those studies that focus on particular aspects of the 
Popular Front (its origins, its constituent political organisations, the strike 
movement and so on) more often than not do so in the national or international 
context. Two examples are Gerd-Rainer Horn‟s European Socialists Respond to 
Fascism and Helen Graham and Paul Preston‟s The Popular Front in Europe.20 
Because the Popular Front was a social, political and cultural movement, it offers 
many avenues of exploration. Julian Jackson‟s The Popular Front in France: 
Defending Democracy 1934-1938, which examines all three dimensions of the 
movement, remains an essential point of reference for any historian interested in 
the period.21 Though new sources have emerged on the PCF since the publication 
of the book, it offers a unique insight into the workings of the Communist party and 
its relationship with the Comintern.  
                                            
 
18
 Jean-François Colas, „Les Droites Nationales en Lorraine dans les Années 30: acteurs, 
organisations, réseaux‟, Université de Paris X-Nanterre, 2002. 
19
 Jacques Kergoat, La France du Front Populaire, Paris: La Découverte, 1986, Serge Wolikow, Le 
Front Populaire en France, Bruxelles: Editions Complexe, 1996,  Danielle Tartakowsky, Le Front 
populaire, La vie est à nous, Paris: Gallimard, 1996. 
20
 Gerd-Rainer Horn, European Socialists Respond to Fascism: Ideology, Activism and 
Contingency in the 1930s, New-York: Oxford University Press, 1996, Helen Graham and Paul 
Preston (eds.), The Popular Front in Europe, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987. See also Martin S. 
Alexander and Helen Graham (eds.), The French and Spanish Popular Fronts: Comparative 
Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.  
21
 Julian Jackson, The Popular Front in France: Defending Democracy 1934-1938, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988.  
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After the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the Popular Front seemed to fall out of 
fashion among historians. But with the restitution of some of the PCF‟s archives 
from Moscow and the recent commemoration in France of the Popular Front‟s 
seventieth anniversary, the subject has received renewed attention.22 A number of 
local studies of the Popular Front have appeared, including Michel Brot‟s Le Front 
Populaire dans les Alpes-Maritimes, as well as the numerous dissertations on the 
subject, which inevitably vary in quality.23 Brot underscores the distinctiveness of 
the Popular Front in the département of the Alpes-Maritimes where, as in the 
Moselle, most of the local economy belonged to a group of right-wing notables 
involved in politics. He demonstrates how, despite management‟s authoritarian 
style and resistance to left-wing social and political activism and the left‟s 
organisational and financial difficulties, tens of thousands of workers organised 
politically and participated in the national labour movement.  
Considering the large concentration of blue-collar workers in the Moselle in 
the interwar period (60 percent of the Mosellan workforce worked in industry in 
1931), the lack of interest in it among students of the Popular Front is surprising.24 
After all, similar concentrations of workers provided strong support for the forces of 
the left in other parts of France such as the coal-mining districts of the Nord or the 
Paris industrial suburbs, commonly known as the Paris red belt. The only two 
dissertations on the Popular Front in the Moselle are Kompa‟s La Formation du 
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Front Populaire en Moselle (mentioned earlier) and Laurent Mousnier‟s study of 
the collective contracts in the Moselle in 1936-1938.25 The latter provides essential 
information on the implementation of the collective contracts in the Moselle and 
the disagreements between the patronat and the workers‟ representatives. The 
most up-to-date archive-based work on the Popular Front in the département is 
contained in Philippe Wilmouth‟s Front Lorrain contre Front Populaire and Pierre 
Schill‟s Visages et Figures du Front Populaire en Moselle.26 Notwithstanding the 
fact that neither is an academic study and both display a clear ideological bias in 
favour of the left, they effectively demonstrate that, despite popular belief, the 
Popular Front existed in the Moselle. Both authors also argue, no doubt correctly, 
that by instilling a generation of workers with a new political consciousness, the 
Popular Front planted the seeds of the future resistance movement that would 
fight German occupation forces between 1940 and 1945.   
Studies of the right in the interwar period have been largely preoccupied 
with the ongoing debate over the definition of French fascism. Rene‟s Rémond‟s 
Droite en France de 1815 à nos jours, which has been updated many times since 
its first publication in 1954, sparked the debate by categorising the French right 
into three different elements: Légitimisme, Orléanisme and Bonapartisme.27 His 
theory posits that since the fall of Napoleon I‟s regime and the restoration of the 
monarchy in France in 1815, any right-wing movement or party can be fitted into 
one of these three „droites‟. As he writes, „C‟est de ces trois traditions, d‟inégale 
ancienneté et d‟importance variable avec le temps, que la conjonction forme le 
faisceau appelé inexactement au singulier la droite française.‟28 In maintaining that 
the paramilitary ligues that appeared in France at the turn of the century and 
reappeared in the interwar period belonged to the third category (Bonapartisme), 
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Rémond suggests that France was practically immune to fascism and that by 
extension the ligues were the expression of a longing for social conservatism and 
order. He accepts that fascism existed in France, but it was the work of marginal, 
revolutionary, therefore left-wing, elements. Several eminent scholars have 
published studies supporting Rémond.29 But others have rejected his theory, 
claiming that by pigeon-holing the French droites into three well-defined traditions, 
Rémond radically understates the existence of fascism in France and ignores 
French conservatives‟ complicity with fascism which, as Robert Soucy writes, 
occurred „when they believed that their social and economic interests were 
seriously threatened by the left.‟30  
This thesis examines the right in only a single French region and does not 
attempt to assess whether it was fascistic. Instead, like Jessica Wardhaugh‟s 
recent publication on the representation of the people by the left and the right in 
the period of the Popular Front and Sean Kennedy‟s study of the Croix de Feu and 
the Parti Social Français, it assesses the nature and tactics of a section of the 
French political class and the extent to which local right-wingers were prepared to 
assimilate or reject national politics.31 In doing so, it examines the local right‟s 
origins and actions within a regional context in a period of particularly heightened 
social and political tensions. It offers corroboration of Rémond‟s argument that 
there were many droites in France – though the Mosellan Catholic right‟s 
ideological tradition did not fit comfortably into any of his three categories - but it 
also agrees with William Irvine and Kevin Passmore, two of Rémond‟s most 
persuasive opponents, that local right wingers collaborated with fascist or anti-
parliamentarian movements which sought to establish, whether legally or not, a 
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new regime in France.32 In the Moselle, these movements included the Action 
Française and the Jeunesses Patriotes in the 1920s and Francisme, Neue Front, 
the Croix de Feu and the Parti Social Français in the 1930s.  
Despite the fact that right-wing Catholicism and movements such as 
Francisme and the Parti Social Français were particularly active in the Moselle, 
there is no in-depth scholarly study of the right in the département. Passmore 
acknowledges the lack of studies of right-wing movements in French regions; in 
his words, „Little has been published on regional conservative politics‟.33 
Goodfellow, in his study of fascism in interwar Alsace, explains the importance of 
studying regions that lie at cultural and linguistic crossroads. As he states, „Alsace 
is a particularly useful region for the study of fascism because it is one of the few 
areas where different nationalist strands – French, German, and regional – met.‟34 
Despite the fact that Alsace and the Moselle presented many similarities, the 
Moselle was nonetheless different from Alsace. Like Alsace, the Moselle was 
situated on the border of two great cultures and powers, but many Francophones 
in the département rejected Alsatian supremacy during the period of the Second 
Reich. This anti-Alsatianism was particularly evident among the Francophone 
notables who controlled the local press and the economy. Additionally, unlike in 
Alsace where the French-speaking elite was forced out of the Catholic Union 
Populaire Lorraine in the 1920s - a party which initially shared some common 
principles with the Union Républicaine Lorraine - Francophones dominated right-
wing politics in the Moselle.  
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Primary sources 
The main sources for this thesis are the records of the French administration 
between 1918 and 1938. Those documents are held in the Archives 
Départementales de la Moselle in Metz, the Archives Départementales du Bas-
Rhin in Strasbourg and the Archives Nationales de France in Paris. The three 
archives hold a wide variety of records ranging from police reports, statistics and 
correspondence between local state representatives and the central government. 
The origins of those records reflect the various administrative bodies that 
managed the affairs of the recovered provinces in the interwar period.  
After France recovered Alsace and Lorraine, it created various institutions 
to manage the provinces‟ reintegration into the state. In the Moselle, the 
commissariat de la République was established in Metz in 1919. It managed the 
transfer from German to French rule and subsequent départemental affairs; similar 
administrations were established in Strasbourg (Bas-Rhin) and Colmar (Haut-
Rhin). The three commissariats de la République were under the authority of the 
Strasbourg-based haut commissariat de la République. Administrators such as the 
Commissaire de la République de Metz produced reports which were sent 
simultaneously to the offices of the Prime Minister in Paris and the haut 
commissariat in Strasbourg. The latter was replaced by the direction générale des 
services d‟Alsace et de Lorraine in October 1925. Alongside the direction 
générale, whose offices were in the Grand Palais in Paris, the French government 
created three préfectures départementales in Metz, Strasbourg and Colmar. The 
suppression of Alsatian authority over the three départements increased Metz‟s 
autonomy vis-à-vis Strasbourg. At the same time, however, by placing the 
provinces under the responsibility of a Paris-based body close to the offices of 
other ministries, the national government ensured greater control of the provinces. 
The records of the direction générale des services d‟Alsace et de Lorraine (98AL) 
located in the Archives Départementales du Bas-Rhin provided essential 
information that has been used widely in the thesis. This series is commonly 
known as Fonds Valot. Paul Valot was the conseiller d‟état in charge of the 
direction générale from 1925 to 1941. This series holds records pertaining to 
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political organisations, trade unions, the press, strikes and other social and 
political activities in Alsace and the Moselle. Only 77 metres of the 194 metre-long 
Fonds Valot have so far been classified. The remaining 117 metres, though 
accessible to researchers, are in such a disorganised state that they have not 
been consulted.  
The Archives Départementales de la Moselle hold various official records. 
The most relevant for the thesis is the series M (Fonds de la préfecture), which 
spans the period from 1925 to 1940 and includes police and prefectural reports on 
political organisations, the press, trade unions, demonstrations, strikes and 
elections. Given the département‟s history and France‟s troubled relations with 
Germany in the interwar period, particularly in the 1920s with the French 
occupation of the Ruhr and controversy over German war reparations, France kept 
a very close watch on political activity in the Moselle. In the immediate post-war 
period, reports focused on the activities of the Neutralists‟ movement and the 
short-lived Parti Fédéraliste as both demanded the creation of an independent 
state of Alsace-Lorraine. Later reports focused on the activities of the autonomist 
Heimatbund and the PCF. These reports are marked by an almost uniformly 
hostile tone towards the Autonomists and the Communists in particular; the latter 
were regularly described as „terroristes‟. This reflects the fear of local 
commissaires spéciaux that Communists were separatists seeking the creation of 
a soviet republic of Alsace-Lorraine. The role of local Communist leaders in the 
German revolution of November 1918 (see chapter One) and the French 
administration‟s continuing suspicions of Communists also explains this hostility. 
The series Z covers reports from commissaires spéciaux and sous-préfets.  
The Archives Nationales de France in Paris hold police records in the series 
F7 and documents pertaining to the administration of Alsace-Lorraine in the series 
AJ30. Records in the F7 series have been particularly useful in covering the gaps 
in the records held in Metz and Strasbourg; local archivists attribute the missing 
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reports to the German officials in charge of the archives between 1940 and 1945.35 
Because the Union Républicaine Lorraine did not leave any papers, it was 
particularly difficult to retrace its activities. But thanks to a carton held at the 
Archives Nationales (F7/14614), devoted to the Action Catholique Lorraine, it has 
been possible to reconstruct some of the history of the party. The Action 
Catholique Lorraine was a départemental association of Catholics which openly 
supported the Union Républicaine Lorraine. Its members included all the leaders 
of the Union Républicaine Lorraine, which provided the Catholic party with a useful 
platform. Its membership far surpassed that of any other organisation in the 
département. Under the heading BA, the Archives de la Préfecture de Police de  
Paris hold a wide collection of police records on political and social organisations, 
trade unions, demonstrations, strikes and politicians in the interwar period, all of 
which are highly relevant to this thesis. The records proved particularly helpful in 
their description of Parisian and national events such as the riots of 6 February 
1934 and the activities of the national committee of the Popular Front.   
  Besides the Union Républicaine Lorraine, certain other key political 
organisations are largely missing from the archives. In particular, there is little 
information available on the local sections of the SFIO in the 1930s. This may be 
due to the fact that the Socialist party was a small organisation in the Moselle: 
barely 200 members in the mid-1930s and no more than 7 percent of the total vote 
at national elections (see chapter One). The Office Universitaire de Recherche 
Socialiste (OURS) holds the archives of the national SFIO, but there are practically 
no sources on the Moselle sections in the interwar period.36 Sources on the 
Mosellan Radical-Socialists are even rarer. This is due to the fact that the party 
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was quasi-inexistent in the Moselle and played a small part in the local committees 
of the Popular Front. Despite the party‟s efforts to establish some roots in the 
region of Thionville in the early 1920s, it was not until 1937 that its first section was 
created, in Dieuze, in the west of the département. At the 1936 elections, it 
managed to present only a single candidate for the whole département. Archival 
sources for the parties of the right are scarcely better. To circumvent this lack of 
information the author consulted the private papers of some of the national 
leaders.   
The private papers of national party leaders consulted at the Archives 
Nationales in Paris include Léon Blum (570AP) from the SFIO who headed two 
Popular Front governments; Edouard Daladier (496AP) from the Radical-Socialists 
who engaged his party on the path of the Popular Front in 1935, and in 1938, as 
Prime Minister, ended his party‟s participation to the left-wing alliance; Maurice 
Thorez (626AP), the leader of the PCF. These papers provided an essential 
insight into developments at the national level, but offered little information at the 
départemental level. As the PCF was the driving force behind the Mosellan 
Popular Front, the party‟s papers held at the Archives Départementales de la 
Seine Saint-Denis in Bobigny provided precious information. The archives hold a 
large collection (3Mi6/1-44) of propaganda material, internal reports and 
correspondence between the party‟s central offices – including the Central 
Committee and the Politburo – and leaders in Alsace-Lorraine. The PCF papers in 
Bobigny are in microfilm form: the Russian State Archive of Social and Political 
History (RGASPI) based in Moscow has kept the original documents as well as 
almost 1,200 files pertaining to the PCF; the archives in Bobigny hold 865 files. 
The party‟s official publication, Les Cahiers du Bolchévisme, contained a large 
source of documents and articles relating to the regional section of the PCF and 
the party‟s position within the Popular Front.  
Other private papers consulted at the Archives Nationales include those of 
Louis Marin (317AP), the leader of the right-wing Fédération Républicaine de 
France. Marin‟s party never had representatives or sections in the Moselle but his 
papers include private letters, party congresses reports and other documents that 
highlight the Fédération Républicaine‟s radicalisation against the left after 1934. 
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The papers of Alexandre Millerand (470AP) covering his position as Haut-
Commissaire de la République in Strasbourg provided an overview of the 
difficulties the French faced in Alsace and the Moselle in the immediate post-war 
period. Surprisingly, it seems that scholars studying Alsace-Lorraine have never 
used the papers of Henri Cacaud (485AP), the commissaire de la République in 
Strasbourg between 1920 and 1924. Yet, they hold essential correspondence, 
reports and other official documents pertaining to various aspects of the 
reintegration of the provinces including the deportation of German nationals, 
detailed documents on the transfer of German-owned businesses, properties and 
bank accounts to the French, reports on the Autonomist movements in Alsace-
Lorraine as well as in the Rhineland and the Saarland, two territories coveted by 
the French after 1918. At the Centre d‟Histoire de Sciences Politiques in Paris, the 
author consulted the papers of François de la Rocque (LR), the leader of the Croix 
de Feu and the Parti Social Francais, two organisations that played a significant 
role in interwar Moselle. The papers contain little information of activities at the 
local level but were nonetheless helpful in describing the activities of the two 
movements at the national level. Roger Genebrier, a close associate of Daladier in 
the 1930s – he became his personal secretary in 1938 – left a wide range of 
documents on the Popular Front, the Radical-Socialist party and the Munich crisis 
(GE). A variety of memoirs have also been consulted, though they provided little or 
no information at the local level.  
In addition to public and private papers, the press provided a useful source 
of information. The regional press was found in the Archives Départementales de 
la Moselle, the Bibliothèque Nationale de France and ASCOMEMO (Association 
pour la Conservation de la Mémoire de la Moselle), a history association based in 
Hagondange in the Moselle. The regional titles included right-wing political 
newspapers such as the Union Républicaine Lorraine‟s official dailies Le Lorrain 
and Die Lothringer Volkszeitung and the nationalist Le Messin; left-wing papers 
such as Die Volkstribune and the bilingual L‟Humanité d‟Alsace-Lorraine, which 
were local versions of the national communist paper L‟Humanité, the short-lived 
Socialist La Bataille and various publications of the regional federations of 
France‟s two largest left-wing trade unions - the Confédération Générale du 
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Travail (CGT) and the Confédération Générale du Travail Unitaire (CGTU) - such 
as Der Hütten-Prolet and Le Travailleur de la Moselle. The national and 
international press used in the thesis were consulted at various libraries in Paris 
and London.  
There are a number of gaps and limitations in the sources for the thesis. 
Mosellan party leaders left no personal papers relevant to the thesis. Though the 
Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères hold some of Robert Schuman‟s 
papers, they focus on his post-1945 career and provide no information on the 
interwar period. The same applies to the papers currently held at the Archives de 
la Maison Robert Schuman situated in Scy-Chazelles in the Moselle (series RS) 
and at the Archives Départementales de la Moselle (series 34J and 36J). The 
Catholic Church and the diocese of Metz played a significant political role in the 
Moselle but evidence is fragmentary. The author consulted the records of the 
bishopric of Metz (series 29J) and those of the Petit and Grand Séminaire de Metz 
(series 18J and 19J) at the Archives Départementales de la Moselle but neither 
provided information relevant to the thesis. Thus, the author relied on the local 
Catholic press and official police records consulted in Paris, Metz and Strasbourg. 
The author was denied access to the de Wendel private papers held at the 
Archives Nationales in Paris (189AQ). These include the private papers of Guy de 
Wendel, a central figure of the Union Républicaine Lorraine and of the local 
patronat. Guy de Wendel occupied many political functions under the banner of 
the Union Républicaine Lorraine: deputy (1919-1927), senator (1928-1940) and 
president of the départemental assembly (1924-1936). The de Wendel family 
owned many factories and mines in the département including Les Petits-Fils de 
François de Wendel et Cie, run by Guy de Wendel, who also happened to be the 
cousin of François de Wendel, the Fédération Républicaine senator for the 
Meurthe-et-Moselle and régent of the Banque de France who became one of the 
prime targets of the Popular Front propaganda campaign against the 200 Familles 
(see chapter Three).  
In absence of access to the de Wendel papers and due to the lack of other 
private records for the patronat, the author sought the public records of the 
Chamber of Commerce of the Moselle. However most of the records pertaining to 
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the interwar period were lost during the Second World War. They were lost after 
the French moved them to Poitiers in western France in June 1940, the Germans 
having requisitioned the building housing the Chamber of Commerce in Metz. The 
Archives Départementales de la Moselle hold a limited number of records in the 
series 308M but they provided no information relevant to the thesis. The author 
consulted the records of the Comité des Forges, a professional organisation 
founded in 1864 to defend industrialists‟ interests, held at the Archives Nationales 
de France in Roubaix (series 62AS) but found no sources relevant to this study. 
The author also visited the Espace Archives located in Sérémange-Erzange, the 
original birthplace of the de Wendel industrial and financial empire near Thionville, 
but apart from photographs of the 1936-1937 strikes and detailed records of the 
negotiations over the collective contracts in the industrial sector in 1936-1938, the 
archives provided no information. To understand the role of the patronat nationally, 
the author found Ingo Kolboom‟s La Revanche des Patrons and the national press 
particularly useful.37  
A brief section of the thesis discusses the history of the Moselle during the 
German Second Empire (see chapter One). The national archives in Koblenz hold 
a large collection of documents on the Reichsland including police reports on 
political organisations and the Catholic clergy. But since the primary focus of the 
thesis is the period of the Popular Front when the Moselle was under French rule, 
the author deemed it unnecessary to devote time to the Koblenz material. The 
same applied for the brief section on the Heimatbund. German agents participated 
in the Autonomist campaign in the Moselle and Alsace and the Koblenz archives 
hold documents pertaining to these events, but since the author sought only to 
highlight the significance of Autonomism as a divisive factor of départemental 
politics, the examination of these documents seemed unnecessary.  
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Chapter outline 
The thesis is organised chronologically. In order to situate events within a broader 
context, it offers a comparative study of local and national events. Similarly, in 
order to situate the events within a longer-term context, the first chapter (1871-
1934) gives an overview of Mosellan politics and society when the region was 
under German domination up until the formation of the Popular Front. Though the 
thesis‟ main focus is the period of the Popular Front, it seemed essential to 
introduce the distinctive characteristics of the region, namely its cultural and 
linguistic divisions, its particularism and the role played by religion. These four 
characteristics largely shaped local politics until 1918, and continued to do so after 
the region returned to French sovereignty. The chapter is divided into three 
separate sections. The first part focuses on the history of the Moselle as it 
transferred from French to German and back to French domination including the 
effect of the change of sovereignty on the local population. The second section 
considers the linguistic, religious and socio-economic factors which largely 
contributed to shaping the Moselle‟s political character between 1918 and 1934. 
The third and final section examines the activities of the right and the left. By 
exploring the development of political Catholicism during the period of the 
Reichsland and its intrinsic role in the construction and expression of Mosellan 
identity in both the pre- and the post-1918 periods, the chapter explains how the 
Catholic right succeeded in dominating local politics between 1918 and 1934. It 
also demonstrates how local political parties were largely influenced by their 
German roots. This was particularly true of the Union Républicaine Lorraine and 
the regional federation of the PCF. 
Chapter Two (February 1934-March 1936) is a detailed analysis of the 
formation of the Popular Front nationally and locally. By comparing events at the 
national and local levels, the chapter demonstrates the Moselle‟s distinctiveness 
within the national context. It opens with a brief examination of the events of 6 and 
12 February 1934. The second part demonstrates that despite obvious limitations, 
left wingers, including the CGT and the CGTU trade unions, succeeded in uniting 
their forces in the Popular Front coalition. At the départemental level, those 
31 
 
weaknesses included the unabated mistrust between Socialists and Communists, 
the PCF‟s leading influence in the coalition despite a series of internal crises that 
threatened its unity and the left‟s inability to mobilise workers in left-wing socio-
political action. The final section considers how the national and local right reacted 
to the formation of the Popular Front and the rising popularity of the ligues. 
Additionally, by examining the results of the 1934 cantonal and 1935 municipal 
elections, the chapter underscores the Union Républicaine Lorraine‟s clear 
domination of local politics. 
The third chapter (April-October 1936) analyses the 1936 legislative 
elections, the ensuing strike movement and the PCF‟s campaign in the Moselle in 
October 1936. The first part opens with an examination of the actions of the left 
and the right in preparation for the elections and shows the divided state of the 
national and local right against a left which largely followed the strategy of the 
Popular Front. It closes with a detailed analysis of the election results in the 
Moselle. The second part considers the national strike movement which paralysed 
France in the summer of 1936 and which was largely followed in the Moselle, 
despite having been hitherto largely immune to left-wing political militancy. As the 
research reveals, this was largely due to the emergence of a new political and 
social consciousness which was reflected in the CGT‟s rapid and unmanageable 
rising membership. Eager to capitalise on the rise of an organised labour 
movement, the PCF mounted a large propaganda campaign in the Moselle and 
Alsace in October 1936. The Popular Front government‟s decision to limit the 
number of meetings to 10, instead of the 127 sought by the PCF, led to friction 
between the party and the government. Nonetheless, even the constrained 
Communist campaign contributed importantly to the radicalisation of the local right, 
which had hitherto remained largely quiescent. The political party that came to 
embody this radicalisation was the Parti Social Français, the fastest-growing 
organisation in France and the Moselle.  
Chapter Four (October 1936-February 1937) examines the local right‟s first 
collective counter-offensive against the Popular Front and the left‟s increasing 
difficulties in maintaining the internal unity of the Popular Front. Fuelled by their 
success in driving the Communists out of Metz on 10 October 1936 (see chapter 
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Three) – including party leader Maurice Thorez - and united in a local anti-Marxist 
bloc known as Front Lorrain, the Mosellan right appeared, at least on the surface, 
to have finally achieved unity. The first part of the chapter demonstrates that 
despite the Front Lorrain, right wingers remained largely divided because of 
personal and political rivalry. The second part explores the first overt signs of 
division within the Popular Front and its constituent parties. The Spanish Civil War, 
which began six weeks after Léon Blum took office as France‟s new Premier in 
June 1936, tested the unity of the national and local Popular Front. While the PCF 
supported French intervention in aid of the Spanish Republican forces, the Popular 
Front government opted for non-intervention. At the same time, the PCF sought to 
capitalise on the rising membership of the CGT by trying to colonise it. Thus, while 
attempting to organise support for the Spanish Republic and continuing to appear 
as the guardians of the unity of the Popular Front, the PCF also sought to 
destabilise it by seeking control of the CGT, one of the coalition‟s main associates.   
The fifth and final chapter (March 1937-November 1938) considers the 
downfall of the Popular Front and the right‟s return to power up until the fateful 
strike of 30 November 1938. The first section examines the right‟s radicalisation 
and attempts at uniting its forces in the Front de la Liberté as well as the growing 
divisions within the Popular Front. It also examines how the government‟s decree 
to reform education in the Moselle in 1936-1937 did not lead to the spontaneous 
mass protests which occurred when the Radical-Socialist government planned to 
secularise the Moselle and Alsace twelve years earlier. This particular issue 
revealed the Mosellans‟ changed attitude towards the central government‟s plans 
to extend France‟s legislation into the département and the politicisation of the 
religious issue by two competing right-wing parties, the Union Républicaine 
Lorraine and the Parti Social Français. The second section concentrates on the 
international context and demonstrates how the emergence of the German threat 
affected national and local right wingers and undermined the Popular Front. 
Additionally, it explores how the Popular Front, which was born of an antifascist 
imperative, failed to prevent the resurgence of a xenophobic and antisemitic 
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current not seen in France since the Dreyfus affair at the turn of the century.38 In 
the Moselle, which received large waves of German immigrants fleeing the Nazi 
regime, antisemites and xenophobes attacked Jews on racial and cultural grounds 
and increasingly for economic reasons. They included right wingers but also 
supporters of the Popular Front including Communists and Socialists. 
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Chapter One - Society and Politics from the German Empire to the 
Third Republic, 1871-1934 
Introduction 
In February 1934 the movement began to unite progressive forces in France into 
an antifascist Popular Front. On the face of it, the Moselle seemed likely to provide 
strong support to this movement. Germany had only the previous year turned to 
fascism, and the Moselle, near the frontier with Germany, one might imagine, 
would rally to the defence of the Republic, which had liberated the Moselle from 
forty-seven years of German annexation and continued to protect it. There was 
also the issue of the separation from the Fatherland which could have meant a 
strong attachment to France and its republican values. Other factors include the 
concentration of heavy industry and industrial workers who elsewhere usually 
supported one or more of the parties of the left. In the Nord, the Paris red belt, for 
instance, large-scale industry had been a cradle for left-wing trade unions, and in 
the Moselle workers‟ solidarity seemed likely to be further encouraged in reaction 
to the authoritarian management which resisted unionisation and workers‟ rights. 
An examination of the Moselle‟s distinct historical, cultural, social and political 
aspects indicates, however, that these factors were by no means decisive in 
shaping the political character of the département. As this chapter will 
demonstrate, factors such as a peculiar linguistic inheritance and regional identity, 
forged in earlier times, contributed to making the right the dominant force in 
interwar Mosellan politics.  
In order to demonstrate this, the chapter will first offer a brief account of the 
département under the domination of the German Second Empire and its return to 
French sovereignty. It will then examine how particular linguistic, cultural and 
social dynamics shaped the Moselle‟s political character. The third part will explore 
the formation and development of the political parties that emerged after the 
Moselle‟s return to France in the years leading to the formation of the Popular 
Front.    
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Part one: From Reichsland to Département 
Following the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian war and despite the protests 
of the deputies of Alsace, the Meurthe and the Moselle, the French ceded to a 
victorious Germany part of its territory on its eastern frontier: the Alsace region and 
the eastern part of Lorraine which consisted of the southern area of the Meurthe 
département with the cantons of Château-Salins and Sarrebourg, and the whole of 
the Moselle département with the exclusion of the canton of Briey.39 By ratifying 
the cession of the territories to Germany on 10 May 1871, the Frankfurt Peace 
Treaty reconfigured the administrative and political geography of Lorraine (Figure 
3 and Figure 4). 
Figure 3 The Moselle and the Meurthe before 1871 
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Figure 4 The Moselle and the new Meurthe-et-Moselle after 1871 
  
 
Henceforth Lothringen was administratively attached to Alsace, despite previously 
having had no substantial historical, political or cultural relations with it. It became 
part of the Reichsland Elsaß-Lothringen province of the new German Reich, and 
remained under German rule for the next forty-seven years. As the new rulers 
began germanising the provinces, they required the local population to choose 
between French and German citizenship. Those who opted for French citizenship 
had to leave the territory by 1 October 1872. According to Grohmann and Hélène 
Sicard-Lenattier, only 6 percent of Lorrainers opted for French citizenship.40 Metz, 
which had been Francophone for centuries, lost 20 percent of its population mainly 
businessmen, civil servants and notables.41 By and large, those who emigrated 
settled in neighbouring Meurthe-et-Moselle or went to Algeria.42 With the onset of 
mass industrialisation in the region in the 1890s, large waves of German workers 
migrated to take up employment in the steelworks situated around Thionville and 
the coal mines near Forbach. By 1895, 22 percent of the population was of 
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German extraction.43 In Metz, the centre of the new civil and military authorities, 
the ratio was even higher with 50 percent of the population coming from Germany. 
This influx of German nationals in Lorraine, which surpassed the 14 percent 
average in the Reischland, would result in mass departures after 1918. 
First governed by local civil servants reporting directly to Germany‟s 
emperor Wilhelm I, the Reichsland slowly acquired a measure of political and 
administrative independence.44 Germany appointed a local Statthalter (governor) 
in Strasbourg who was assisted by an appointed council (Landesausschuß). The 
decision to transfer some of the powers from Berlin to Strasbourg meant however 
that Metz came under the authority of Alsace; something the Metz notables were 
far from satisfied with.45 Later, the Constitutional Laws of May 1911 changed the 
status of the region from Reichsland to Land with delegates sitting in the 
Bundesrat. The Landesausschuß in turn became the Landtag with upper and 
lower houses.46 Half the Landtag‟s upper house was selected by the Emperor, with 
the rest chosen by local assemblies and socioeconomic groups such as farmers 
and artisans. The lower house comprised sixty representatives elected directly by 
the people of Alsace-Lorraine and serving for a five-year term. Alsace had forty 
representatives, Lorraine twenty. Although much of the legislative power remained 
in the hands of the Emperor, the Landtag provided the provinces a certain 
autonomy that later proved difficult to reconcile with the French conception of 
centralised powers and administration.  
After Marshal Ferdinand Foch‟s troops entered Metz in November 1918, 
events moved swiftly for the Moselle. In the French National Assembly, Georges 
Clémenceau, France‟s Premier, proudly announced „l‟évacuation immédiate des 
territoires envahis y compris l‟Alsace-Lorraine dans moins de quinze jours.‟47 Soon 
after, the recovered territories of Alsace-Lorraine were put under the 
                                            
 
43
 Grohmann, „The Problems of Integrating Annexed Lorraine into France‟, p.11. 
44
 For a comprehensive description of the Reichsland‟s administrative organisation see Roth, La 
Lorraine Annexée, 1870-1918, pp.48-91. 
45
 The Germans established presidencies (Bezirkspraesidium) in Lorraine and Lower and Upper 
Alsace. They closed them in 1879.  
46
 AN, Millerand papers, „Notice Spéciale à l‟Alsace-Lorraine‟, 1913, 470AP45.  
47
 JO, Chambre, Débats 11 novembre 1918, 12 novembre1918, p.8. 
38 
 
administration of the War Ministry headed by Clémenceau (decrees of 15-16 and 
26 November 1918). A further decree of 21 March 1919 placed the three 
provinces in the care of the haut-commissariat d‟Alsace-Lorraine based in 
Strasbourg, which reported directly to the office of the président du Conseil (Prime 
Minister) in Paris. Three départemental commissions were set up in Metz, Colmar 
and Strasbourg to assist the haut commissariat. It soon became apparent that the 
French government favoured a progressive rather than an immediate assimilation 
into the Republic. Regarding the provinces‟ specific legislation, the decree of 6 
December 1918 and the laws of 19 October 1919 and 1 January 1924 stipulated 
that local law (droit local) would continue to apply in the recovered territories until 
1934. A subsequent law passed in December 1934 delayed the introduction of 
French legislation by another eleven years until 1 January 1945.  
When Alexandre Millerand took office as Haut Commissaire in Strasbourg 
in March 1919 he knew of the various problems facing the three départements and 
their reintegration within French sovereignty as he wrote, „It is certain that the 
transition from one rule to another, and from one code of laws to another will 
cause many problems. For it must be remembered that half a century means 
much in the life of a people.‟48 Because he realised the effect of forty-seven years 
of different regulations, laws, currency and language on the provinces, he was a 
keen supporter of a transitory regime that should use persuasion to bring Alsace 
and the Moselle into the French Republic. He recommended, in his own words, „de 
ne pas précipiter les choses‟.49 Like General Charles Mangin and Marshall Foch 
before him, he promised the Mosellans that „la République respectera vos 
croyances, vos coutumes et vos traditions.‟50 
After the signature of the Versailles Treaty in June 1919, the Reichsland 
was officially returned to France in its 1871 boundaries and Lothringen became 
the Moselle département; the two regions of Alsace, known as Bezirk 
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Oberelsaß and Bezirk Unterelsaß under German control, became the Haut-Rhin 
and Bas-Rhin départements. The French, who had kept alive the myth of the 
amputated Republic and made the return of Alsace-Lorraine to French sovereignty 
one of their favourite propaganda topics during the Great War, had hoped for a 
painless return of the provinces. But after the first few weeks of euphoria that 
followed the liberation, relations between the Moselle and Paris deteriorated and 
Mosellans grew anxious over the integration of their region into the French central 
state. The first signs of malaise between the indigenous population and their new 
rulers emerged when the French began to send German nationals to Germany as 
part of the region‟s francisation.   
In her study of the francisation of the Moselle, Carolyn Grohmann reveals 
that between December 1918 and late 1921 the French organised the removal of 
approximately 100,000 Germans as well as native Mosellans and Alsatians who 
had worked as civil servants or held political appointments under German rule – 
roughly 20 percent of the total population.51 Indeed, soon after the Armistice the 
French set up commissions, known as commissions de triage, whose role was to 
identify and expel the unwanted Germans and local collaborators. The French 
allowed them to take goods or cash to a maximum of 10,000 marks per family 
while confiscating the rest of their possessions including property and bank 
accounts. In order to identify the level of „Frenchness‟ or „Germanness‟ of the 
population, the French put in place a four-tier system: card A was given to those 
who had once held French citizenship, card B was granted to those born in 
Alsace-Lorraine with at least one parent entitled to card A, card C was issued to 
foreigners from non-enemy states, while card D was distributed to the 
undesirables, those from enemy states such as Germany or Austria-Hungary. This 
four-tier system, based on the blood origins of the individuals rather than their 
place of birth, went against traditional Republican principles of citizenship. 
According to the Republican credo, as Tim Baycroft writes, „To belong to the 
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French nation, individuals did not need to be born French, but could be assimilated 
into it through an acceptance of the principles of the Republic encapsulated in the 
revolutionary slogan “liberty, equality, fraternity”.‟52  
Although the majority of the 100,000 who left the region did it of their own 
accord, some Mosellans began to feel ill at ease with what they considered an 
unjust and arbitrary system that had condemned not only Germans but also 
Mosellans to exile. As Grohman writes, the commissions „caused untold damage 
to the reputation and perceived integrity of the new French regime.‟53 Jean Stuhl, 
the Mosellan senator for Bitche, wrote to Henri Cacaud, the secretary-general of 
the commissariat de la République in Strasbourg, recommending leniency in the 
treatment of German nationals. He warned that should Germany annex the 
provinces again it would promptly expel French citizens. In such an event, „c‟est 
l‟expulsion sans merci et la confiscation des biens pour tous les Français 
originaires de ce pays.‟54 The euphoria that had welcomed French troops in the 
streets of Metz in November 1918 was thus replaced by a disaffection that even 
had its own name: le malaise mosellan. Corinne Bonafoux-Verrax writes of this 
malaise,  
Si les Alsaciens-Lorrains dans leur immense majorité considèrent la 
France comme leur mère patrie et la retrouvent avec un sentiment 
ardent de joie et de patriotisme, il n‟en demeure pas moins que, 
durant les mois et les années qui suivent leur réintégration, des 
froissements  d‟amour propre, des susceptibilités, de vraies craintes 
sont à l‟origine d‟un réel malaise.55 
The euphoria of November 1918, intensified by the ending of the harsh 
martial law imposed by the German army for over four years, thus proved short-
lived, and in the ensuing malaise a strong regional identity reappeared in the 
Moselle, formed of linguistic, social, political and religious elements. Charles 
Beckenhaupt, a contemporary journalist who studied the Autonomist movement in 
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Alsace in the interwar period, argued that this malaise was a reaction to the 
German annexation in 1871. As he wrote, „c‟est à 1870 et non à 1918 que 
remonte l‟origine du malaise‟.56 This view is shared by François Roth who affirms 
that Mosellans developed a regional identity after 1871 when their patriotism 
based on local customs and myths devoid of any Teutonic reference was 
repressed by their new German rulers. Like Grohmann, he argues that this 
regional identity resulted from a strong resentment towards Germany and France 
but also towards Alsace.  
After 1871, many Mosellans became resentful of the central powers of 
Strasbourg and Berlin, but instead of turning to Alsace which shared the 
experience of annexation, they protested that there was no Alsace-Lorraine and 
that it was merely Bismarck‟s artificial creation. Grohmann argues that an Alsace-
Lorraine identity never developed after German annexation and that, as she puts 
it, „instead of turning to Alsace and drawing upon the shared experience of 
annexation, Mosellans had grown to resent Alsatian dominance‟.57 In support of 
this claim she quotes the local right-wing nationalist newspaper Le Messin, which 
asserted in 1920, „there is no Alsace-Lorraine; this word only exists in the Treaty of 
Frankfurt.‟58 Indeed, many Mosellans felt that after being abandoned by Paris, they 
were forced by Berlin to submit to Alsatian authority. This resulted in 
disillusionment and a sense of isolation which, after the liberation, manifested itself 
in a particularisme mosellan. 
Part Two: Language, Culture and Religion 
During the interwar period, this particularism, which had its roots in the region‟s 
distinct linguistic, social and religious context, manifested itself in the Moselle‟s 
distinctive politics. To determine the extent of its influence on local politics, it is 
essential to explore it in more details.  
                                            
 
56
 Charles Beckenhaupt,  Race, Langue ou Patrie?, Strasbourg: Libraire Istra, 1930, p.10. 
57
 Lawrence, Baycroft and Grohmann, op.cit., p.64. 
58
 Ibid. 
42 
 
Unlike Alsace, which presented a rather homogenised linguistic landscape 
with largely German and dialect speakers, the Moselle was split into two large 
linguistic zones: German and Platt-speakers on the one side - Platt being the 
Frankish dialect used in the Moselle - and Francophones on the other. Figure 5 
outlines the linguistic geography.  
Figure 5 The linguistic geography 
 
Many observers have acknowledged the fundamental importance of this linguistic 
frontier. For Jean Lanher, the region‟s linguistic divide represented „non seulement 
deux modes d‟expression linguistique mais encore ... deux modes de vie ou deux 
types de pensée.‟59 Maurice Toussaint similarly claimed that the linguistic frontier 
separated the département into two distinct linguistic and cultural entities, thus 
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resulting in a strong community spirit on both sides of the barrier.60 Metz, the 
capital of the département and Francophone for centuries, was in the French 
zone. Forbach, the Moselle‟s second largest town, was in the German and Platt-
speaking zone. As for Thionville, situated in the north-east of the département, it 
was split: French speakers in the western part of the town and Platt or German 
speakers in the east. Interestingly, Germany used the presence of German 
speakers in Lorraine to justify the annexation of the region in 1871, despite the fact 
that Metz and Chateau-Sâlins had been French for centuries and their population 
considered German a foreign language. If anything, this demonstrates that the 
annexation of Lorraine into the German Reich was motivated not by cultural and 
linguistic affinity, as Bismarck had claimed, but by political, economic and strategic 
advantage.61  
This linguistic divide was not a consequence of the German annexation in 
1871. It had existed for centuries and varied little between the repetitive cycles of 
French and German conquests that occurred in Lorraine. Roth traces the origins of 
the frontier to the Middle Ages. As he writes, „Une ligne presque invariable depuis 
la fin du Moyen Age, court du Luxembourg au Donon. Elle est … d‟une très 
grande netteté car on passe directement du village de langue française à celui de 
langue allemande.‟62 As for Dan P. Silverman,  
Many nineteenth-century German studies indicated a larger German-
speaking area than actually existed, but German exaggeration 
should not obscure the fact that in nearly two centuries of French 
rule, the French language had made only minimal gains in ... 
Lorraine.63 
Despite his warnings of „German exaggeration‟, Silverman uses German studies to 
establish the number of people who spoke French, German or both in the late 
1870s. And even according to these studies, by 1879, only 50 percent of the 
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Moselle spoke German compared to the average 80 percent for the whole of the 
Reichsland.64 Approximately 30 percent spoke French in the Moselle and 12 
percent in the whole of the Reichsland. The Moselle‟s remaining 17 percent could 
communicate in both French and German. These figures clearly indicate that the 
Moselle comprised more French speakers than the rest of the Reichsland and that 
despite the Germanisation of the Moselle in the wake of the German annexation, a 
large proportion of the population still used French. Not surprisingly, following the 
departure of around 100,000 individuals between 1918 and 1921, the first French 
population census conducted in the Moselle reveals that the number of French 
speakers had substantially increased: by the mid-1920s 45 percent of Mosellans 
spoke French and 34 percent spoke only French.65 The rest of the population, 33 
percent, spoke German or Platt.  
The linguistic divide caused many difficulties for the new French civil 
servants who came to the Moselle after 1918. Unable to communicate with a large 
section of the indigenous population, whom they wrongly considered 
Germanophile, the linguistic obstacle deepened the malaise between the new 
rulers and the local population. On the one side, the French, who had expected to 
find Mosellans staunch patriots eager to re-join the Republic, anticipated that the 
assimilation of the Moselle would be a seamless process and did not anticipate 
such a wide linguistic gulf. On the other, the local population had been led to 
believe that the French would respect their traditions and customs and resented 
the French lack of understanding and consideration for their linguistic practices. 
After all, as indicated earlier in this chapter, Millerand, Mangin and Foch, 
representing the French state, had proclaimed that the Republic would respect 
local beliefs and customs. Faced with zealous civil servants keen to quickly 
remove any trace of German control, Mosellans began to feel anxious at the 
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central state‟s assimilation process. A sense of disillusionment and deception thus 
emerged on both sides. As Grohmann writes,  
A sense of deception on both sides undoubtedly lay at the heart of 
the matter. Wartime propaganda had led the French to expect a 
region full of staunch patriots who had heroically resisted 
Germanisation. Equally, they were not prepared for the linguistic gulf 
which lay between them and the majority of the native population.... 
The indigènes, on the other hand, had been led to believe that a 
return to French sovereignty would be accompanied by respect for 
[their] special religious practices, local dialects and laws...66   
On the Mosellans‟ side, this sense of deception remained largely quiescent 
in the immediate post-war period but entered the public and political domains 
when France sought to impose the Republic‟s secular laws in the département in 
1924. As Haut-Commissaire, Millerand blamed the pre-1870 French authorities for 
not broadening enough the use of French in the region.  As he wrote in The Times, 
„France did not even think before 1870 to teach French in every school.... It now 
finds this linguistic difference an obstacle to a rapid assimilation.‟67 Henri Cacaud 
commented on the linguistic issue: „Il n‟en est [de question] qui ait fait l‟objet 
d‟études plus attentives, qui ait soulevé plus de polémiques.‟68 He recommended 
the French be patient : „Peu à peu, à mesure que la fusion des trois départements 
avec les autres se fera plus intime, à mesure que les jeunes générations feront 
nombre, le français se généralisera.‟69 Cacaud was proven right when the 
population census of 1936 indicated that 70 percent of the population spoke 
French.70  
Interestingly, the two linguistic zones also followed a socio-economic divide 
that split the département in two distinct zones. By and large, those who spoke 
French only were the urban, rural and industrial white-collar elites in the west of 
the département. They included the Francophone notables of Metz who after 
being freed from Alsatian influence created the conservative and Catholic Union 
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Républicaine Lorraine, the Moselle‟s most influential party in the interwar period 
which shall be discussed later in this chapter. Those who communicated mainly in 
German or Platt were found among the industrial and rural working masses or 
small landowners in the eastern and southern cantons. They formed the backbone 
of the Germanophile, clerical and autonomist movement, which shall also be 
discussed later in this chapter. To be sure, there were exceptions as many could 
converse in both languages, but they were mainly found among the affluent and 
educated strata of Francophone society. This economic and linguistic divide 
existed prior to the German annexation. As Pierre Brasme demonstrates in his 
study of nineteenth-century Mosellan demographics, the German and Platt 
speaking parts of the region lagged behind the Francophone zone both 
economically and socially. He quotes the words of a sous-préfet who wrote in 
1853: „Tandis que la partie française ... voit fleurir dans ses villages le travail et 
l‟aisance, la partie allemande n‟est que trop souvent le théâtre d‟une misère 
honteuse.‟71  
Another distinct characteristic of the Moselle was the presence of a large 
number of foreign immigrants, which deepened the cultural and linguistic rift. 
Despite the departure of around 100,000 individuals after 1918, the Moselle 
experienced a steady rise in population in the post-war period. In 1919 the 
population stood at roughly 550,000. It reached 630,000 by 1926 and 695,000 by 
1931.72 The rise was due in part to the arrival of French people from the 
neighbouring Meurthe-et-Moselle and beyond, known as Français de l‟Intérieur - 
mostly civil servants called in to process the assimilation of the département into 
the Republic - new notables such as doctors and lawyers, but more importantly to 
the arrival of foreign immigrants. These new comers had left their countries for 
economic reasons and were attracted to the Moselle on account of its strong 
economy based largely on steel-making around Thionville and Metz and 
                                            
 
71
 Pierre Brasme, La Population de la Moselle au XIXe siècle, Metz: Editions Serpenoises, 2000, 
p.42. 
72
 Statistique générale de la France, Résultats Statistiques du Recensement Général de la 
Population effectué le 8 mars 1931, Tome I, Troisième partie, p.133. 
47 
 
coalmining in the French Saarland. A first wave of foreign immigrants, mainly 
Italians, arrived in the German Lothringen at the turn of the century, which 
coincided with the boom years of the region‟s industrial revolution and the 
development of large-scale industries.  
According to Brasme, there were roughly 50,000 foreigners in Lothringen in 
1905, over half of whom were Italians.73 The second wave arrived after the 
restoration of French sovereignty in 1918. Their numbers grew from 85,500 in 
1921 to 111,000 in 192674 and to 131,000 in 1931.75 With the Depression and the 
slump in commercial exchange with Germany and the Saarland in particular, 
Mosellan workers faced large-scale unemployment. Foreigners, the first to lose 
their jobs, decreased to 91,700 in 1936, almost a third in five years.76 Of a total 
foreign population of 130,000 in 1928, 16 percent were Germans (mainly 
Saarlanders), 24 percent Poles and 25 percent Italians.77 In the early 1930s, the 
Moselle counted twenty-two foreign nationalities who made up 20 percent of its 
total population.78 Within the total workforce the ratio of foreign to native worker 
was one in five but it was in large-scale industries, where left-wing political 
activism was most likely to develop, that the ratio reached its highest at one in 
three.  
The main consequence of this cultural and linguistic heterogeneity was the 
division of the industrial workforce along linguistic and socio-cultural lines which, 
as shall be examined later in this chapter, hindered the development of the 
socialist doctrine of class homogeneity and identity. Indeed, workers in the Moselle 
rarely identified themselves according to political class but rather according to their 
linguistic and cultural background. Police sources reveal that foreign workers 
generally preferred to join associations that focused on the protection of their own 
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national interests. For instance, Polish associations in the mining districts around 
Metz and near the Saarland, where Poles outnumbered other immigrants, 
organised regular social events that centred on national activities such as Polish 
dance and music. Few Polish workers associated with their fellow workers in trade 
unions or political organisations. What is more, even if they wished to join political 
organisations, few foreigners, with the exception of the predominantly German 
element in the railway sector, were prepared to do so from fear of being deported 
for political reasons. 
The third and perhaps the most important factor in the construction of the 
particularisme mosellan was the presence of a well-organised and highly 
politicised Catholic clergy. In the first years of German domination, the bishop of 
Metz, Paul Dupont des Loges, advised the clergy to remain apolitical and 
concentrate on their ecclesiastical duties. But as the Germans launched the 
Kulturkampf, a series of policies aimed at uniting Germany and counteracting the 
influence of the Catholic Church in the new empire including the Reichsland, the 
Mosellan clergy became more and more involved in political action.79 By the 
1890s, the local Catholic clergy became, as Silverman puts it, „one of the strongest 
political forces operating in ... the Reichsland.‟80 While the Kulturkampf contributed 
to the radicalisation and politicisation of the clergy, it can be said that after the 
French political elites, especially the Republican ones, fled the region in 1871, they 
left a vacuum behind them which the clergy filled. As Brigitte Favrot writes,  
L‟une des conséquences directes des événements de 1870 a été 
l‟émigration massive des classes dirigeantes lorraines qui ont fui la 
tutelle allemande…. Ce fut donc au clergé, dès lors seul Pouvoir 
influent demeuré en place, qu‟incomba un rôle particulier dans la 
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société: à ses fonctions morales traditionnelles se sont ajoutés un 
devoir et une mission politiques…. [L]e clergé est ainsi devenu le 
principal représentant et défenseur des intérêts lorrains.81  
 
This was a view shared by François de Wendel, the French industrialist and 
right-wing politician whose family lost mines and factories to Germans after the 
annexation. As he declared at the National Assembly, „après 1871, à cause de 
l‟émigration d‟une large partie des élites dans les territoires annexés, le clergé seul 
était resté pour défendre et représenter les intérêts moraux et politiques de la 
France.‟82 For Silverman, on the other hand, the most decisive factor in the 
politicisation of the Reichsland‟s clergy was the rise of social democracy. As he 
states,  
it was only when the threat from the rising tide of social democracy 
became acute in the Reichsland during the 1890s, that the Catholics 
were challenged sufficiently to form a regular political organization 
which might compete with the Socialist political machine.83 
Though both Favrot and Silverman‟s interpretations are valid, it should be 
noted that the rise of political Catholicism in the Reichsland coincided with a major 
event that would have repercussions throughout the Catholic world: the publication 
of Pope Leo XIII‟s encyclical letter Rerum novarum in 1891. In keeping with Leo 
XIII‟s writings, the Church condemned socialism as ungodly, promoted social 
solidarity over the accumulation of private and personal wealth, and organised 
politically in order to insulate the working masses from the spread of socialism. 
The fact that the large majority of the population in the provinces was Catholic 
made the task easier for the local clergy. Indeed, quoting an article published in 
the newspaper Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung in 1872, Silverman suggests that 
political Catholicism drew its support from „the three quarters of the population of 
the Reichsland [that] are devoted sons of the Church‟.84  
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Interestingly enough, two clergymen from the Moselle paved the way for the 
creation of social Catholicism in nineteenth-century France. Following the rural 
exodus that drained the Mosellan countryside of its population in the first half of 
the nineteenth century, Jean Loevenbruck, a révérend Père from a small village 
located east of Thionville, founded in 1822 L‟Œuvre de Saint-Joseph, France‟s first 
association designed to help blue-collar workers freshly arrived in the French 
capital.85 The aim of the association was to provide workers with what 
Loevenbruck called „une tendre sollicitude et les secours d‟une charité toute 
chrétienne.‟86 This Christian charity included the provision of housing and health 
care as well as leisure activities on Sundays so that, as Loevenbruck stated, „les 
ouvriers ... sans expérience ... trouveront divers moyens de passer ces jours 
saints sans qu‟il en coûte ni à leur santé ni à leur bourse.‟87 The second pioneering 
clergyman was Louis Bervanger, an abbé from the French Saarland. He took over 
from Loevenbruck when the latter became ill and founded L‟Œuvre des Apprentis 
de Saint-Nicolas in 1827. His association aimed at educating poor children and 
placing them in the care of Catholic bosses. The Moselle‟s devotion to the Church 
was not only present among its clergymen. Figures from the population census of 
1866 – the last survey by the French state before the cession of the provinces to 
Germany – indicate that in the Moselle the proportion of Catholics was 97 percent 
of the total population: the highest percentage in the whole of France.88  
Determined not to let the German Catholic Zentrum interfere in local affairs, 
Catholics in the Reichsland created the Elsass-Lothringisches Zentrum in 1906. 
Despite a doctrine close to that of the national Zentrum, the Elsass-Lothringisches 
Zentrum refused to associate formally with the German party precisely because it 
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was German.89 While most German-speaking Catholics in German Lorraine joined 
the Elsass-Lothringisches Zentrum, Francophone Catholics in 1902 formed the 
Bloc Lorrain in Metz. Francophone Catholics in Lorraine rejected the Elsass-
Lothringisches Zentrum on the basis that it was dominated by German-speaking 
Alsatians who cared little for Lorraine. The Bloc Lorrain, less clerical and more 
liberal, was led by an influential clergyman from Metz, Canon Henri Dominique 
Collin, a well-known Francophile who acted as the director of the Metz-based 
Catholic newspaper Le Lorrain.90 Using Catholicism as a pillar of Lorrainer identity 
against Germany and to some extent Alsace, the Bloc Lorrain posed as the 
defenders of local identity and conditioned the region‟s political character for 
decades to come. In the interwar period, its political heir, the Union Républicaine 
Lorraine, acted in a similar manner and epitomised Mosellan particularism and 
identity. Until the onset of the Great War, the Catholic parties, whether 
Francophone or German-speaking, dominated the political scene and won the 
majority of seats, both locally and nationally.  
Indeed, results from the 1911 Landtag elections indicate that the two 
Catholic parties, the Elsass-Lothringisches Zentrum and the Bloc Lorrain, won 60 
percent of the seats.91 The rest of the seats were taken by Liberals (16 percent), 
Socialists (18 percent) and Independents (5 percent). At the Reichstag elections in 
1912, they won all the seats but one, which was taken by Socialist Georges Weill 
in Metz. Thus, the Mosellan political scene was dominated by two parties which 
shared common principles but a different approach to clericalism in politics as well 
as a different language. During the Great War the Germans banned all political 
activity, but Francophone Catholics based in France, such as Collin, remained 
active. After the departure of the German civil and military authorities in late 1918, 
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the Catholic clergy emerged once more as the sole remaining elite. By then, 
Catholicism and the political clergy had become intrinsically bound up with 
regional identity and the particularisme mosellan. As it had done during the 
German annexation, so in the 1920s and 1930s the local clergy acted as 
defenders of Mosellan identity against the French policies of assimilation.  
Part Three: Politics in Interwar Moselle  
Before examining the role of Catholics towards the new French rulers, it is 
necessary to examine the creation of political parties in the wake of the Great War 
and their development in the years leading up to the creation of the Popular Front. 
As will be seen, most of them, whether left-wing or right-wing, owed much of their 
traditions to their German predecessors, which created difficulties for their 
integration into French political culture. This third part will offer an account of the 
creation and development of the parties of the right and then the left between 1918 
and 1934.  
The Right 
By far the dominant political party in interwar Moselle, the conservative Catholic 
Union Républicaine Lorraine was the result of the fusion of the Elsass-
Lothringisches Zentrum and the Bloc Lorrain in March 1919. Vetted by the diocese 
and Monseigneur Jean-Baptiste Pelt, the new Bishop of Metz, and headed by 
Collin, the Union Républicaine Lorraine was resolutely Catholic and particularist. 
Upon the creation of the party, Charles Ritz, the Metz-based abbé who later 
became the region‟s most influential political journalist, wrote in Le Lorrain, „La 
Lorraine ne veu[t] pas et n‟acceper[a] jamais le bénéfice des lois laïques, qu‟il 
s‟agisse de la séparation des Eglises et de l‟état ou de l‟école sans Dieu.‟ As well 
as Le Lorrain, which disseminated the party‟s message to the Francophone 
Catholic masses, the German newspaper, Die Lothringer Volkszeitung, focused on 
the German-speaking Catholics found mainly in the southern and south-eastern 
cantons of the département. The two newspapers reflected the origins of the two 
organisations that founded the Union Républicaine Lorraine: the Elsass-
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Lothringisches Zentrum and the Bloc Lorrain. Described by Roth as less an 
organised political party than a loose association of like-minded notables, the 
Union Républicaine Lorraine, „s‟appuyait sur les notables, les quotidiens messins, 
Le Lorrain et Le Messin, une fraction du clergé, le patronat local et en particulier la 
famille de Wendel.‟92 
At the French legislative elections in November 1919, the Union 
Républicaine Lorraine list won 65 percent of the vote and all eight deputy seats 
allocated to the Moselle.93 It also won all five seats at the 1920 senate elections. In 
the subsequent legislative elections, the party maintained its strong position as it 
won all the seats at the Senate and the majority of deputy seats in 1924, 1928 and 
1932. The remainder of the seats were won by the French Communist party 
(PCF), which shall be studied later in this chapter. With an average turnout of 80 
percent at each election, Mosellan voters demonstrated not only their 
understanding and respect of French democracy, but also their attachment to the 
Catholic faith and those who advocated the protection of Mosellan traditions and 
identity. Although it has not been possible to determine the party‟s membership, it 
is clear that its close relation with the clergy and the département‟s Catholic 
association, the Action Catholique Lorraine, was a key factor in its success 
throughout the interwar period.  
In a speech made during a meeting of the Action Catholique Lorraine in 
May 1927, Robert Schuman, a leader of the Union Républicaine Lorraine, affirmed 
the intimate relationship between his party and the Catholic association. He 
declared, as a police informer put it: „L‟Union [Républicaine Lorraine] … sera 
toujours la force de l‟Action Catholique Lorraine.‟94 For Schuman, whose political 
career began in the Elsass-Lothringisches Zentrum, the Union Républicaine 
Lorraine was a political window through which to express the Action Catholique 
Lorraine‟s views. And despite its claims to be apolitical, the Action Catholique 
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Lorraine was largely involved in politics. So close was the relationship between the 
Action Catholique Lorraine and L‟Union Républicaine Lorraine that the Thionville 
sections of the two organisations agreed to deposit their money at the same bank. 
As an inspecteur spécial reported from an Action Catholique Lorraine meeting in 
Thionville, „Une discussion s‟engage au sujet des fonds de l‟Action [Catholique 
Lorraine] et de l‟Union Républicaine Lorraine et l‟accord se fait pour la désignation 
de la Banque populaire.‟95 Though this is no evidence that the other sections of the 
Action Catholique Lorraine and the Union Républicaine Lorraine operated in a 
similar fashion, the close relationship between them was clear. Similarly, even 
though it has not been possible to learn about the financial backing of the Union 
Républicaine Lorraine, there is every reason to think that the Action Catholique 
Lorraine, the newspaper Le Lorrain and the patronat who supported it largely 
contributed to its financing.  
With regards to the political links between the two groups, a police report 
stated that during the 1928 general assembly of the Action Catholique Lorraine in 
Metz, Monseigneur Pelt congratulated the Union Républicaine Lorraine deputies 
for their work in defending Mosellan traditions and urged the 900-strong audience 
to vote for them at the forthcoming legislative elections. As the report stated,  
Monseigneur Pelt a pris la parole pour remercier les … députés de la 
Moselle pour leur dévouement et leur activité, et a recommandé à 
l‟assistance de leur accorder à nouveau confiance à l‟occasion des 
prochaines consultations électorales législatives.96 
As a clergyman, Collin attended many of the Action Catholique Lorraine‟s 
meetings. Alongside Schuman, the young Union Républicaine Lorraine deputy for 
East Thionville, he and the Action Catholique Lorraine participated actively in the 
organisation of the 1919 Semaines Sociales de France in Metz.97 Another police 
report stated that during the same assembly, Robert Sérot, the Union 
Républicaine Lorraine deputy for the constituency of Metz Campagne, declared 
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that his party was in complete agreement with the Action Catholique Lorraine‟s 
position on the issue of the Concordat and school education in the Moselle.98 
Because these two issues resurfaced regularly in interwar Mosellan politics 
and contributed to the re-introduction of the religious question in the French 
political debate in 1924, a few words about them seems essential. Since 1905 the 
process of separating church and state was largely complete in France, yet after 
its return to France in 1918 the Moselle continued to live under the Concordat 
Laws set up by Napoleon in 1802. This meant that whereas in France religious 
orders were prohibited from participating in state affairs, the Mosellan clergy still 
played a public role. Here the clergy worked for the French state and the French 
government selected the head of the diocese, the Bishop of Metz. Additionally, 
clergymen and women were allowed to provide Mosellan children with religious 
education as permitted by the 1850 Loi Falloux, which the Germans maintained 
during the period of the Reichsland.   
For many Mosellans, the issues of the Concordat and religious education 
were intrinsically linked. The fact that 90 percent of the population were Catholic 
and considered the Concordat and the presence of the clergy in the public sphere 
constituents of their identity made the laicising of the region a daunting challenge 
for any French government. All too aware that religion was a sensitive issue in the 
recovered provinces, successive French governments maintained the Concordat 
and religious education. But when the Radical-Socialist Edouard Herriot took office 
in June 1924 and announced his intention to introduce the laws of the Republic in 
the provinces, he provoked the fury of Catholics and right wingers against non-
Catholics and the left in general. The antagonism between the proponents of 
secularism and their opponents, mainly right-wing Catholics, which had lain 
dormant for almost twenty years, thus resurfaced once more in French politics.   
The clash began after Herriot declared at the National Assembly on 17 
June, 
Le gouvernement est persuadé qu‟il interprètera fidèlement le vœu 
des chères provinces enfin rendues à la France en hâtant la venue 
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du jour où seront effacées les dernières différences de législation 
entre les départements recouvrés et l‟ensemble du territoire de la 
République. Dans cette vue, il … préparera les mesures qui 
permettront … d‟introduire en Alsace et en Lorraine l‟ensemble de la 
législation républicaine. 99 
 
Shortly afterwards, thousands of protesters gathered and demonstrated 
spontaneously in Metz, Thionville and Forbach calling for Herriot‟s dismissal. The 
Action Catholique Lorraine, the right-wing press, mayors, local councillors as well 
as the Union Républicaine Lorraine deputies and senators formed committees 
(comités d‟action) in order to organise the protest. According to a commissaire 
spécial, the mayor of Bitche, fully supported by General Jean Stuhl, a Union 
Républicaine Lorraine senator and départemental councillor, urged all the mayors 
in his canton to protest against the government‟s plans to secularise the 
Moselle.100 In a resolution written in German and translated by the commissaire 
spécial, a mayor from Stuhl‟s canton stated,  
Les Maires du pays de Bitche … [croient] devoir remplir un devoir 
patriotique, en attirant l‟attention de Monsieur … [Herriot] sur le 
danger créé dans la région frontalière, par le projet relatif à 
l‟introduction des lois laïques. La majorité de la population de la 
Lorraine répugne complètement la laïcité.101 
In his column in Le Lorrain, Ritz, who by then occupied the function of 
départemental councillor for the Union Republicaine Lorraine as well as his clerical 
and journalistic roles, warned the government of the Catholics‟ determination. As 
he wrote, „que M. Herriot le sache: ceux qui n‟ont pas craint de résister aux 
boches, même au prix de leur liberté, ne céderont pas devant le bloc des 
gauches.‟102 Ritz‟s „même au prix de leur liberté„ referred to his experience as a 
political prisoner at the Ehrenbreitstein Fortress in Germany where a number of 
Francophile Mosellans and Alsatians were interned between 1914 and 1918. In 
Metz, a large meeting organised by Emile Boiteux, the president of the Action 
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Catholique Lorraine who also happened to be the vice-president of the 
départemental Chamber of Commerce, gathered the local Catholic elite: deputies 
Schuman and Guy de Wendel, Louis Marin, deputy from Nancy and president of 
the conservative Fédération Républicaine de France, Paul Vautrin, the 
conservative mayor of Metz, the bishop of Metz as well as senators and numerous 
local councillors.103 Before a 3,000-strong audience, Schuman warned of some of 
the consequences of secularism such as the suppression of the bishopric and the 
end of religious education in schools. Alongside Marin, he promised to fight the 
introduction of the secular laws at the National Assembly. Despite the 
undiminishing number of demonstrations on the streets and at the National 
Assembly, Herriot initially refused to back down and repeated declarations such as 
this one made in Strasbourg:  „lorsque j‟élève mon verre en l‟honneur … de 
l‟Alsace, j‟honore la république entière, qui, aujourd‟hui, comme au temps de 
Kléber, demeure la République une et indivisible‟.104 
But after the right-wing deputies from Alsace and the Moselle left the 
parliamentary debates in protest on 13 November 1924 and pressure from 
Catholics continued, Herriot on January 1925 announced that the Concordat 
would be maintained in the Moselle and Alsace. Likewise, his plans to close the 
French Embassy to the Vatican, which met with the French Catholic clergy‟s 
strong opposition, were rejected by the Senate in March. By then, Catholics had 
had the opportunity to organise effectively. In the Moselle, the Action Catholique 
Lorraine collected 80,000 signatures in a letter of protest in 1924.105  By 1927, its 
membership rose to 30,000 members.106 German and Platt-speaking Catholics 
located in the eastern cantons of the Moselle, founded the Volksbund, an 
association which, like the Action Catholique Lorraine, claimed to defend the 
interests of Mosellan Catholics in an apolitical manner. Known in French as Action 
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Populaire Lorraine, the association was conservative, clerical and autonomous. 
Although little is known of the true reasons for the formation of the Volksbund, it is 
highly probable that it was created in order to capitalise on the population‟s 
dissatisfaction with the French central government and support the new 
Autonomist party that  favoured the creation of an autonomous region of Alsace-
Lorraine.  
Herriot‟s plans also led to protests in the rest of the country, even though, 
as Bonafoux-Verrax writes, „c‟est en Alsace-Lorraine que le vent de la révolte se 
leva d‟abord et souffla le plus fortement.‟107 Indeed, French Catholics organised 
under the sponsorship of the Fédération Nationale Catholique which General de 
Castelnau created in November 1924. De Castelnau, known for his fervent 
Catholicism and mistrust of the Republican regime, once declared, „on ne peut 
être républicain et Catholique à la fois.‟108 Even though Boiteux regularly attended 
the Fédération Nationale Catholique‟s annual general assemblies and the Action 
Catholique Lorraine joined, albeit informally, the Fédéderation Nationale 
Catholique, the Mosellan association remained largely independent.  
It is clear that this episode allowed the debate over secularism and the 
place of the Catholic Church in society to take centre stage. Additionally, it 
provided the Union Républicaine Lorraine and the Action Catholique Lorraine with 
the opportunity to appear as the chief guardians of the region‟s identity and special 
legislation. Above all, it re-ignited the quiescent religious argument that had 
contributed importantly to the left-right and right-wing divide in the first decades of 
the French Republic. Consequently, one of the groups most eager to capitalise on 
the new religious conflict and the thousands of discontented Catholics in the 
Moselle, were the anti-Republican right-wing ligues. 
Pierre Taittinger, whose family had left the Moselle when it was annexed by 
Germany in 1871, founded the Jeunesses Patriotes in December 1924. Created 
as an offshoot of the Ligue des Patriotes, which had once been led by Maurice 
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Barrès,  the nationalistic author from Lorraine who campaigned for the return of 
Alsace-Lorraine to France before 1918, the ligue counted roughly 3,000 members 
nationally in 1925; ten years later, its membership shot up to 100,000.109 Patriotic 
and nationalistic, the ligue was also fiercely anti-Communist. Its followers included 
people from various socio-economic classes. But as Robert Soucy points outs, „If 
the leadership of the [Jeunesses Patriotes] clearly came from upper-middle-class 
and aristocratic backgrounds, the rank-and-file of the movement was lower middle 
class.‟110 In the Moselle, the Jeunesses Patriotes was not particularly successful at 
attracting members. Though the département‟s exact membership remains 
unknown, the leader of the Metz section complained of the poor membership and 
a chronic lack of interest among the region‟s youth. At the ligue‟s general 
assembly in Metz in November 1926, the police reported twenty attendants. And 
Testulat, the leader of the Metz section, was reported to have stated that „étant en 
si petit nombre, nous ne pourrons jamais nous considérer comme étant l‟Etat-
major des [jeunesses] de la Moselle.‟111 
Despite its low membership, the ligue could nonetheless rely on the support 
of influential right-wing politicians such as Ritz, Guy de Wendel and the new head 
of the Union Républicaine Lorraine, the senator General Edouard Hirschauer. All 
three attended private meetings of the Jeunesses Patriotes and the Ligue des 
Patriotes. Hirschauer became president of the Ligue des Patriotes in July 1925, 
which shows that some politicians were able to lead a mainstream political party 
as well as an anti-Republican organisation; just as it was entirely possible to be 
Catholic, particularist and Republican. Ritz was also a fervent supporter of the two 
organisations. Largely influenced by the writings of Maurice Barrès, he advocated 
the ligue‟s values of the celebration of family, the preservation of one‟s roots and 
the cult of the dead. During a private meeting of the Jeunesses Patriotes, he 
quoted the words of Frédéric Mistral, the famous regionalist poet from Provence, 
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„J‟aime mon village plus que ton village, j‟aime ma province plus que ta province 
mais j‟aime ma patrie au dessus de tout.‟112  
The other ligue that sought to develop in the Moselle was the Action 
Française. Founded in 1898, the organisation was overtly anti-Republican, 
antisemitic and nationalistic. It later became monarchist under the influence of the 
author and political essayist Charles Maurras. Posing as the defender of the 
Catholic Church in France and the Communists‟ arch-adversary, the Action 
Française counted 30,000 fee-paying members nationally in 1924.113 The ligue did 
not wait for the wave of Catholic protest in 1924 to establish itself in the Moselle. 
Imported into the département by M. de Marmier, an aristocratic landowner who 
moved to the Moselle after 1918, the organisation was particularly active during 
the 1924 election campaign. But due to a lack of candidates and followers, it 
quickly abandoned its political agenda. Initially attached to the Alsace-Lorraine 
regional section of the Action Française, an independent Mosellan section was 
created in 1930. The leader of the Metz section‟s sole public explanation for the 
separation from Alsace was, as a commissaire noted in a report, „pour des raisons 
internes‟.114  
Following Herriot‟s declaration on 17 June 1924, it developed an active 
propaganda campaign against the left-wing Cartel des Gauches. As the 
commissaire général based in Strasbourg noted in a report,  
depuis les élections, la propagande de ce parti est devenue de plus 
en plus intense; la campagne déclenchée contre l‟introduction des 
lois laïques … et la suppression de l‟école confessionnelle a amené 
un regain d‟activité et de propagande.115  
It is impossible to give an accurate figure of the number of activists and followers 
of the Action Française since sources pertaining to the activities of the ligue in the 
Moselle do not provide this information. To add to the difficulty, the Action 
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Française created fake membership lists designed to hide the names of its 
numerous members who preferred to keep their membership secret. These fake 
lists also existed in the Moselle.116  
Of particular interest to this study was the ligue‟s position on regionalism. 
During a meeting of the Sarreguemines section, Joseph Ehrmann, a local activist, 
supported, as a police informer put it, „le régionalisme, le rétablissement des 
anciennes provinces avec la représentation des corporations professionnelles ... 
et les Etats Généraux‟. The Action Française‟s support for the pre-1789 class-
based Etats Généraux system, where the clergy and the aristocracy were over-
represented compared to the rest of society, should come as no surprise from an 
organisation advocating the restoration of the monarchy and Catholicism as the 
state religion. Its position on regionalism, however, is particularly interesting as it 
highlighted the recognition of different cultural and historic regional entities within 
the French nation; a point which the regional Autonomist movement made the 
basis of its doctrine. But while the Action Française favoured the creation of a 
federative monarchy that would include the regions in a national collective, the 
Autonomists opted for the separation of Alsace-Lorraine from France. This 
difference was fundamental as by the mid-1920s the Autonomist movement known 
as the Heimatbund became the Action Française‟s arch-enemy. 
The French government‟s decision to replace the old haut-commissariat 
d‟Alsace-Lorraine with a new direction générale des services d‟Alsace et de 
Lorraine in October 1925 – mainly for budgetary reasons – had significant 
consequences for those who favoured self-rule for Alsace and the Moselle. Before 
July 1925, the haut-commissariat had perpetuated to some extent the role of the 
Reichsland‟s Statthalter and granted the provinces a certain administrative 
autonomy vis-a-vis Paris. With the new direction générale, Strasbourg lost much of 
its administrative autonomy as well as its institutional and political authority over 
the provinces.117 Indeed, the central offices of the new institution were based in 
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Paris and three new préfectures, similar to those that existed in the rest of France, 
were also created: one for each of the département‟s capitals, Metz, Colmar and 
Strasbourg. Certain that the creation of the direction générale and the préfectures 
was the French government‟s first step towards complete assimilation, local 
autonomists organised politically and formed the Heimatbund. 
As a movement that sought to capitalise on the local population‟s malaise 
and resentment against France‟s assimilation process, the Heimatbund turned the 
issue of regional identity, also known as la question nationale or la question 
d‟Alsace-Lorraine, into a national and public issue. Though most contemporary 
observers associated the separatist movement with Alsace only, Autonomists 
were present in the Moselle and like their Alsatian counterparts they demanded 
autonomy for Alsace-Lorraine. A movement that transcended the traditional divide 
between left and right, the autonomist movement affected organisations such as 
the Action Française and even more so the Union Républicaine Lorraine.  
The Heimatbund first came to light when it published a manifesto in the 
local press on 7 June 1926. In it, its founders, Alsatians for the most part, 
proclaimed themselves the true guardians of the region‟s identity and 
particularism. The manifesto did not speak of Reichsland or département but used 
the German word Heimat (homeland). In their manifesto, the men behind the 
Heimatbund commended „les qualités de notre race et de notre langue ... le 
caractère, l‟âme et la civilisation même du peuple alsacien-lorrain.‟118 In order to 
end what they saw as France‟s methodical spoliation of local customs and 
traditions, they demanded „l‟autonomie complète dans le cadre de la France‟. They 
supported the creation of an elected local assembly which would legislate on 
budgetary matters. A board of executives, selected by the people of Alsace-
Lorraine, would sit in Strasbourg. Only they would be able to contact the French 
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parliament or government „pour les questions françaises d‟ordre général.‟119 Even 
if the Autonomists denied harbouring anti-French sentiments and nostalgia for the 
system under German rule, the institutional organisation of the autonomous 
Alsace-Lorraine resembled that of the Reischland. As an article in Le Messin 
noted, „Ce que veulent les autonomistes, c‟est tout d‟abord maintenir le 
«Reichsland» d‟Alsace-Lorraine tel qu‟il était délimité par le Traité de Francfort.‟120 
 The Heimatbund‟s message was by no means new, for other organisations 
had raised the issue of an independent state of Alsace-Lorraine in the past. In 
November 1918, the Neutralistes, comprised largely of former members of the 
German Socialist party, favoured the creation of an independent state of Alsace-
Lorraine that would act as a buffer state between France and Germany. In the 
words of Socialist and Alsatian Charles Hueber, „Du Jura aux rives de la Moselle 
ne doivent exister qu‟un peuple libre et un seul pays libre.‟121 In 1919, the short-
lived autonomous party, the Parti Fédéraliste, also sought „la création d‟une 
république autonome d‟Alsace-Lorraine‟, as the future Autonomist Jean Dumser 
wrote in Le Journal de Thionville.122 Finally, as shall be examined later, the PCF 
also called for the independence of Alsace-Lorraine in 1925. The Heimatbund had 
its own publication, Die Zukunft (The Future), and many of its leaders had 
occupied high-ranking positions during the period of the Reichsland. For example, 
Alsatian Georges-Eugène Ricklin, the leader of the Heimatbund, had been the 
president of the Reichsland‟s Landtag and a deputy at the Reichstag. Though 
expelled from Alsace in 1919 for having collaborated with the Germans during the 
Great War, he somehow managed to return in 1920. In the Moselle, the movement 
was led by Victor Antoni, a local councillor and a former member of the Union 
Républicaine Lorraine from Fénétrange, a village located near Sarrebourg in the 
German-speaking zone. Though far more popular in Alsace, the Heimatbund was 
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briefly active in the southern and south-eastern rural cantons of the Moselle where 
it attracted a small number of loyal followers.123  
The Action Française was among the first to attack the Autonomists 
publicly. According to a commissaire spécial, the ligue announced its decision to 
disrupt all the Autonomist meetings in the Moselle two days after the publication of 
the Heimatbund‟s manifesto.124 It also organised a meeting in Strasbourg where it 
hoped to gather between 15,000 and 18,000 supporters from the Moselle and 
Alsace.125 The  meeting, according to a police report, was organised by „les chefs 
royalistes de Paris qui [sont] opposés à l‟esprit autonomiste [et qui] escomptent 
produire une forte impression en faveur de leur parti.‟126 The départemental 
section of the ligue also sought to combat the influence of the Heimatbund: M. 
Laugel, the president of the Metz section, proposed the formation of a group of 
German-speaking orators who would operate in the German-speaking cantons, 
precisely where the Autonomist movement existed.127 But the Action Française did 
not have to fight the Heimatbund for long as the French government soon banned 
it and arrested its leaders on charges of high treason and conspiracy against the 
state. The accused, which included twenty-two Alsatians and no Mosellan, were 
tried in the criminal court of Colmar in May 1928.128 While some of the accused 
were acquitted, others such as Ricklin received long prison sentences; Ricklin was 
finally amnestied by the French government in 1929.   
The Union Républicaine Lorraine‟s attitude towards the Autonomists was 
more ambiguous than that of the Action Française. Despite its solid particularist 
and Catholic foundations, the Union Républicaine Lorraine was essentially 
Republican and rejected the autonomous ideas harboured by some within the 
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party. But mirroring the party‟s historical divide between Francophone and 
German-speaking Catholics, friction between the two groups eventually led to a 
scission of the Union Républicaine Lorraine in 1927. On the one side, the party‟s 
Francophone leaders and Le Lorrain vigorously condemned the Autonomists. As 
Ritz wrote in a column in Le Lorrain,   
les revendications présentées par la ligue de la « Zukunft » 
constituent le plus pur séparatisme. Il n‟existe pas de peuple 
alsacien-lorrain. Les Lorrains, même de langue allemande, n‟ont 
nulle envie d‟être les cireurs de bottes des autonomistes 
allemands.129 
On the other, many Union Républicaine Lorraine members from the German-
speaking zones sympathised with the Heimatbund. Following months of 
disagreement and before the Union Républicaine Lorraine‟s leadership‟s refusal to 
accept Autonomists within its ranks, a group of secessionists created the dissident 
Christlich-Soziale Partei (Social-Christian party), also known as Union Chrétienne. 
Once the voice of the Union Républicaine Lorraine in the German-speaking 
cantons, Die Lothringer Volkszeitung joined the Christlich-Soziale Partei. It was in 
fact in the Metz offices of the newspaper that the secessionist party was officially 
created on 10 November 1927, just in time for the April 1928 legislative 
elections.130  
Led by Antoni, the party, which had its central offices in Sarreguemines, 
never succeeded in establishing itself in Metz and the rest of the Francophone 
zone. As the 1928 election results indicate, the party won its highest scores in the 
rural zones around Forbach, Sarreguemines, Sarrebourg and Boulay, all of which 
were located in the German-speaking half of the département. It presented no 
candidate in the Francophone zones of Metz and Château-Salins or in the semi-
Francophone industrial and rural areas surrounding Thionville. Though it is more 
than likely that the party found no suitable candidate to present in those areas, it is 
also possible that Antoni struck a deal with the Union Républicaine Lorraine‟s 
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leaders in those parts of the département. Though it has not been possible to find 
any evidence supporting this claim for the 1928 elections, sources reveal that the 
two Catholic parties came to an agreement in 1932. Indeed a commissaire‟s report 
noted in 1934 that 'M. Antoni … a exprimé l'espoir que l'[Union Républicaine 
Lorraine] respecterait la signature de ses dirigeants, et, restant fidèle à l'accord de 
1932, [que] la question de la solidarité chrétienne' would be maintained.131  
It is interesting to note that while the French attempted to modernise the 
administration of the three recovered départements by creating a central office in 
Paris and three local préfectures, one of the main and perhaps unanticipated 
consequences was the return to the Moselle of an old political model. As many 
local contemporary observers noted, by the late 1920s the département‟s right-
wing political landscape reverted to the model that had existed during the period of 
the Reichsland: a clerical German and Platt-speaking party on the one side and a 
more liberal Francophone party on the other.132 Additionally, it is clear that the rise 
of Autonomism and the subsequent creation of German-speaking clerical groups 
such as the Volksbund and the Christlich-Soziale Partei reflected the Moselle‟s 
divisions along linguistic and cultural lines. This suggests that despite the Union 
Républicaine Lorraine‟s initial plan to unite Francophone and German-speaking 
Catholics in a single party in 1918, linguistic and cultural divisions as well as a 
particular historic context proved an insurmountable obstacle to the conservatives‟ 
ambitions. As shall be demonstrated later in this study, the period of the Popular 
Front largely contributed in flattening these divisions but only by creating new 
divisions along political and socio-economic lines. Until the formation of the 
Popular Front, the two Catholic parties remained largely autonomous and refused 
formally to ally against the left. In the areas surrounding Sarreguemines, the 
supporters of the two parties regularly fought each other verbally and even 
physically. Indeed, the opposition between the two groups was so severe in some 
areas that during a meeting of the Volksbund in Sarreguemines, the Christlich-
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Soziale Partei announced it would support the PCF candidate against the Union 
Républicaine Lorraine‟s at the next legislative elections. Although ideologically 
opposed, the Christlich-Soziale Partei and the PCF shared one characteristic for 
most of the interwar period: the call for the independence of Alsace-Lorraine.  
The Left 
Like the right, the left in interwar Moselle drew its traditions and culture from its 
German predecessors. In the case of the left, these originated from the 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), a party described by Donald 
Sassoon as „the most successful socialist party‟ in Europe in the pre-1914 era.133 
As will be explained here, however, in the Moselle neither the SPD nor its post-
1918 political heir were particularly successful.   
Four years after the Frankfurt Peace Treaty, German Socialists united to 
form the SPD. Following two failed attempts on the life of Emperor Wilhelm I in 
early 1878, which Bismarck attributed to the Social Democrats, the conservative-
led Reichstag voted the anti-Socialist laws aimed at the SPD. These anti-Socialist 
laws (Sozialistengesetz) had a mixed effect, including the imprisonment of many 
party activists but also increased militancy and effective exploitation of the 
Reichstag as a platform for propaganda. However, the SPD faced an almost 
insuperable obstacle in its efforts to gain support among workers in Alsace-
Lorraine because it was regarded as a German party, and as Silverman writes, „for 
the people of Alsace-Lorraine this was more important than the fact that it was 
also the party of the working man.‟134  
Initially, French and German Socialists both claimed the Reichsland their 
exclusive territory and feuds occurred. But at the International Socialist Labour 
Congress in 1891, the delegates of the SPD and the French Socialists appeared in 
agreement over the question of Alsace-Lorraine. Both Wilhelm Liebknecht, 
representing the SPD, and Edouard Vaillant, speaking on behalf of the French 
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delegates, declared that the question of Alsace-Lorraine was artificial and only 
provoked difficulties between French and German Socialists. Their solution, as 
reported by The Times correspondent, was „the spread of Socialism‟, which „would 
sweep away the difficulty about Alsace and Lorraine.‟135 Daniel Ligou affirms that 
as neither party offered a solution to the issue both tacitly agreed to stop their 
operations in the Reichsland, which enabled a new generation of Mosellan-born 
Socialists to lead the movement. Being born after 1871, these new leaders knew 
little of French socialism and were suspicious of the SPD for being German. 
Consequently they developed a particular political consciousness that mixed 
themes of economic exploitation and national oppression.136  
By the eve of the First World War, the Mosellan Socialists had become well 
organised. With their Alsatian counterparts they created the Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Elsass-Lothringen in 1905. They had their own Central Committee and 
sections (Ortsvereine) in every corner of the département. In preparation for the 
1911 Landtag elections, the region‟s Central Committee issued a propaganda 
leaflet that condemned „la tutelle prussienne‟, glorified „le peuple d‟Alsace-
Lorraine‟ and demanded the independence of the „terre d‟empire‟.137 Unlike the 
Elsass-Lothringisches Zentrum and the Bloc Lorrain, which broadly accepted the 
fact that the Moselle was a part of the German Reich, Mosellan Socialists rejected 
the annexation. Indeed, Schleicher, Lothringen‟s leading Socialist figure, sustained 
the demand for the independence of Alsace-Lorraine by denouncing the German 
annexation up to 1914.138 This demand, in one form or another, would become a 
feature of the Mosellan PCF between 1925 and 1935. But despite the local SPD‟s 
methodical organisation and its numerous pre-election meetings, and despite the 
blundering provocations of German army units in neighbouring Alsace, the party 
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failed to mobilise Lothringen blue-collar workers.139 It gained no representative in 
the municipal assemblies, and its first and only deputy in the Reichstag was the 
Alsatian Georges Weill who won in Metz in 1912.140  
In November 1918, a few weeks before French troops entered Lorraine, 
French and Russian ex-prisoners of war and German workers and soldiers joined 
the German revolution. Amidst the confusion produced by the departure of the 
German civil and military authorities they formed councils (Soldaten und Arbeiter 
Räte) and took control of the municipalities of Metz and Thionville. Led by Charles 
Becker they proclaimed the free soviet Republic of Metz on 8 November 1918 and 
occupied the town hall for nine days.141 In the coal mining district of south-eastern 
Moselle, revolutionaries formed councils in Sarreguemines, Petite-Rosselle and 
Saint-Avold. Upon learning that Foch‟s armies were heading towards the region, 
they abandoned the town halls they had briefly occupied and made for the newly 
created German Republic. With regard to the Thionville occupation, French police 
refused to believe that French soldiers and workers were responsible for attempts 
at sovietisation. As a commissaire reported, „Un sentiment commun les a réunis 
[les membres de ce mouvement avorté] et ce n‟est pas un sentiment français.‟142 
Although he did not see „dans l‟organisation des SOVIETS de la première heure 
trace d‟une inspiration ou d‟une aide exclusivement allemande‟, he warned his 
superiors that „Il pourrait en être autrement dans l‟avenir.‟ For Pierre Schill, 
however, the influence of German revolutionaries in the Moselle‟s southern 
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cantons was evident. As he wrote, „Ces conseils, souvent animés par des 
Allemands, sont en fait très liés au mouvement révolutionnaire qui touche la 
Sarre.‟143 
In early 1919, the Mosellan Socialists joined the SFIO under the leadership 
of Charles Becker. It is unclear how many members the party counted at the time, 
but during an SFIO conference in Strasbourg in February 1919, party delegates 
issued an ordre du jour which confirmed their policy towards Mosellan regionalism: 
La conférence des délégués des fédérations Socialistes du Haut-
Rhin, du Bas-Rhin et de la Moselle salue le retour à la France des 
départements arrachés à la nation par l‟acte de violence contre 
lequel avait déjà protesté, en 1871 … la démocratie socialiste du 
monde entier…. La conférence estime qu‟Alsaciens et Lorrains 
doivent être placés le plus rapidement possible sous le régime du 
droit commun à tous les Français…. Elle s‟élève, par conséquent, 
contre tout projet … qui pourrait aboutir à créer un esprit de 
particularisme….144 
Consistent with some of the SPD‟s previous statements, the Mosellan Socialists 
denounced the German annexation, but the endorsement of a rapid assimilation 
within the French Republic and the rejection of any particularisme were new to 
their rhetoric. From a doctrinal point of view, this was not entirely surprising as the 
SFIO was a loyal supporter of the French Republic and its accompanying values 
of secularism and indivisibility. What remains unclear, however, was why the 
Mosellan Socialists so readily agreed to follow the French party‟s line. After all, 
they had demanded independence for the region throughout the annexation 
period, denouncing both German and French imperialism, and many had also 
actively participated in the November 1918 German revolution.145 Although very 
little is known about the shift from SPD to SFIO doctrine, a plausible factor may 
have been the fear many members must have had of being deported for allegedly 
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harbouring anti-French sentiments. Another factor may have been the 
disorganised state of the party in the immediate post-war period.  
This disorganisation was reflected in the division between the party 
leadership and the rank and file, since the two seemed to have had different 
agendas. Indeed, an army informer reported a radicalisation of the Mosellan 
working classes in 1919 in favour of a pro-German revolutionary and secessionist 
line. As he stated: „il existe en ce moment en Lorraine une propagande neutraliste 
et une propagande révolutionnaire. Toutes deux sont d‟origine allemande et sont 
soutenues par les éléments allemands du pays.‟146 But, according to the same 
informer, the Germans were not the only ones to blame : „Dans le bassin de l‟Orne 
(région de Metz) ... ce sont des éléments allemands et alsaciens qui dirigent les 
grèves et agitent tout le monde ouvrier. Ces alsaciens anciens soldats allemands 
… sont bolchévistes et anti-francais.‟ A note at the bottom of the report indicates 
that  „L‟incompatibilité d‟humeur des Alsaciens et des Lorrains est connue.... La 
présence de ces Alsaciens qui sont très violents est pénible pour ces derniers.‟ By 
contrast, the author describes the working-class population of the Moselle as 
„sage, modérée, française et très patriote‟.  
The anti-Alsatian sentiment among the Mosellan population and in Metz in 
particular was indeed strong. As Roth writes, „„Parmi les Messins et les Mosellans 
il y avait à l‟époque un fort mouvement anti-alsacien‟.147 But when it came to social 
unrest it appears that the French authorities were all too quick to equate German 
and dialect-speaking Alsatians and Germans with Socialism and political 
instability. Because the French expected to find Mosellans staunch patriots 
imbued with a spirit of revanche, and because any activity, political or otherwise, 
from Germany was considered hostile to French interests, military observers and 
officials in charge of the administrative reintegration of the département generally 
failed to grasp the complex relations between the Moselle, Alsace and Germany, 
and wrongly associated Francophone and German or Platt-speaking individuals 
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with respectively Francophile and Germanophile sentiments. Similarly, the French 
blamed violent left-wing Alsatians for arousing an otherwise quiescent Moselle 
working class. This grossly inaccurate perception of events reflected the French 
view that Mosellans were French who had been held captive by Germany with the 
complicity of Alsace. It also led by extension to the belief that, as mentioned 
earlier, the assimilation of the Moselle would be easy compared to that of Alsace. 
 For Millerand, the haut-commissaire for Alsace-Lorraine, the situation with 
regard to social unrest was different and his perception was closer to reality. He 
believed that those responsible for the strikes of 1919-1920 were not foreigners 
but Lorrainers who, in his words, thought: „on nous a débarrassé des allemands, 
maintenant il faut nous débarrasser des français, de ceux, du moins, qui ne 
parlent pas allemand, de manière que tous les postes nous reviennent.‟148 In his 
view, the strikers were opportunists who aimed at saving jobs for German-
speaking Mosellans and Alsatians. This was particularly evident in the state-
owned railway sector where Mosellan workers resented the arrival of French civil 
servants and others, who according to Autonomist Jean Dumser „[ne] connaissent 
[pas] nos langues et nos moeurs [et] ... dont nous espèrons qu‟ils retournent chez 
eux aussi tôt que possible.‟149 Many workers in the railway industry were so intent 
on saving jobs for German-speaking locals that they joined the Heimatbund. 
Significantly, the latter‟s manifesto included the following demand: „Nous exigeons 
... l‟autonomie complète du réseau des Chemins de fer d‟Alsace et de Lorraine‟.150  
Fifteen years after its creation, the SFIO, meeting in Tours in December 
1920, fatefully divided over affiliation to Lenin‟s Moscow-based Third International 
rather than rejoining the Second International. Having unanimously voted in favour 
of the Third International, all seventy-six representatives of the Mosellan section 
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joined the new Communist party which required them to obey the directives of the 
Comintern, the Third International‟s governing body. Becker, who later rejected the 
radicalism involved in this switch of allegiance, lost the leadership of the party to 
Emile Béron. The latter did not fully explain the reasons behind the Mosellans‟ 
decision to back the Third International, but he affirmed that „les camarades [de la 
Fédération de la Moselle] ... ont voulu, par ce vote, reconstituer l‟unité du parti‟.151 
The Mosellan secteur of the new Communist party was attached to the Alsatian 
federation with regional headquarters in Strasbourg. But in order to strike a 
balance between Strasbourg and Metz, the latter hosted the operations necessary 
for the publication and distribution of the section‟s daily newspaper Die 
Volkstribüne. 
Across France, the SFIO successfully recruited many new members after 
the split and soon surpassed the PCF as the largest party of the left. In contrast, 
the Mosellan Socialist federation failed to recover its lost activists and voters. At 
the May 1924 legislative elections, the Radical-Socialist and Socialist Entente des 
Gauches received a mere 7 percent of the votes while the Communist Bloc 
Ouvrier et Paysan gained 23 percent. Even in the late 1920s, the Metz section of 
the SFIO numbered only 86 members.152 Meanwhile, a police report from 
Sarreguemines confirmed that „la section locale était complètement désintégrée et 
il est difficile aux Socialistes de recruter de nouveaux membres.‟153 By then the 
ideological gulf separating the Socialists and the Communists seemed irreversible 
and the latter, by endorsing the Comintern‟s new sectarian tactics of class against 
class in 1928, launched a sustained attack on the SFIO as the „parti de trahison, 
toujours aux côtés de la bourgeoisie contre la Révolution‟.154  
By the late 1920s the issue of Autonomism separated the two parties even 
further. An SFIO leader of the Mosellan federation firmly rejected any form of 
separation from France, declaring, „Pour nous la question d‟Alsace-Lorraine est 
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résolue par le retour des trois provinces à la France, ratifié par le Traité de 
Versailles.‟ The Communist party in contrast supported the idea of an independent 
state of Alsace-Lorraine. Indeed, in September 1925, almost a year before the 
publication of the Heimatbund‟s manifesto, delegates of the regional section of the 
Communist party issued a programme that called for „la libre disposition des 
masses populaires d‟Alsace-Lorraine jusqu‟à la complète séparation d‟avec la 
France‟, and claimed that the region suffered national oppression.155 They called 
for the immediate evacuation of French civil and military authorities followed by the 
organisation of a plebiscite on the future of Alsace and the Moselle. Following the 
publication of the Heimatbund‟s manifesto in June 1926, the regional section of the 
PCF reiterated its call for independence and offered the Autonomist movement its 
full backing. Rod Kedward suggests that the PCF‟s separatist ideas and its 
sympathy towards the Heimatbund was not surprising since the party was 
„responsive to autonomous ideas as an expression of working class discontent‟ 
and economic exploitation.156 This may be true, but by advocating independence 
for the Moselle and Alsace, the party was also responding to what local 
Communists saw as national oppression and dismissal of their particular heritage. 
As Samuel Goodfellow maintains, with the call for independence the PCF 
„endorsed the position that [Alsace-Lorraine] suffered under the dual oppression of 
the French nation and the bourgeoisie‟.157 
But though the regional section of the party backed the Heimatbund, the 
Comintern‟s adoption of class against class tactics abruptly ruled out any 
association with bourgeois parties. In opposition to this line, delegates at the 
regional congress in Strasbourg in March 1929 concentrated their debate on the 
question of an electoral alliance with the Autonomists. They criticised the Central 
Committee‟s obsession with the class against class tactics and insisted that the 
elections in the Moselle would be played between what an unnamed local 
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Communist described as „le front national et le front anti-impérialiste‟.158 In 
agreement with his Alsatian colleagues, principally from the Bas-Rhin, Béron 
suggested „des possibilités de manœuvre plus larges, avec des groupements 
autonomistes, petit-bourgeois radicalisants‟.159 Perhaps because an alliance 
between Communists and Autonomists was used with success in Strasbourg - 
Communist Charles Hueber won the municipality from Socialist Jacques Peirotes 
with the support of the Autonomists – a schism developed between orthodox 
proponents of the party‟s line which rejected an electoral alliance and dissidents 
who favoured an alliance. Expelled from the party, the latter formed in October 
1929 the dissident Kommunistische Partei-Opposition under Hueber‟s 
leadership.160  
The Mosellan Communists generally followed the party‟s line and Hueber‟s 
new party failed to gain many supporters in the département. As a party official 
stated after the regional conference, „Dans la plupart des questions se forme un 
bloc de la Moselle … à peu près sur la ligne du Comité Central.‟161 But there were 
some such as Béron who, like Hueber, favoured a rapprochement with the 
Autonomists. For Béron, striking an alliance with the Autonomists offered the party 
a chance to defeat what he thought were its real enemies: the Catholic right 
embodied by the Union Républicaine Lorraine. By playing the national minority 
card and sanctioning the question of national oppression, he hoped to attract the 
département‟s industrial workforce, who comprised largely Platt-speaking and 
German-speaking natives of the region.162 Indeed, in the mines surrounding Metz, 
Alsatians and Mosellans accounted for 75 percent of French workers; the rest 
were Français de l‟Intérieur. In the large steelworks of Rombas and Hagondange, 
the rates were higher still: 82 percent for the first and 90 percent for the second. 
But, despite Béron‟s efforts, the Central Committee refused to alter its line. As 
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Charles Friedrich explained in the regional edition of L‟Humanité, „Tout le discours 
de notre camarade Béron est animé par cette grande idée que l‟Alsace-Lorraine 
est une minorité nationale. Le fait est que la question d‟Alsace-Lorraine est une 
question de classe.‟163  Whether from conviction or more likely for tactical reasons, 
the party‟s Central Committee took the decision that the question of Alsace-
Lorraine was simply a matter of class identity and economic oppression rather 
than national oppression and regional identity. Hence it would not sanction an 
alliance with a bourgeois party. 
As the Strasbourg Communists allied with the Autonomists, the Metz section 
formed an alliance with the SFIO and the Radicals in order to defeat the Union 
Républicaine Lorraine list of Paul Vautrin at the May 1929 municipal elections. For 
Emile Fritsch, leader of the Metz section of the PCF, the victory of a left-wing 
alliance justified some compromise of party tactics. The Communists from Metz 
proclaimed that „Pour battre Vautrin, il faut se réveiller plus tôt. Il a ses 
organisations politiques, religieuses, patriotiques et économiques‟.164 With this 
announcement, the Metz section affirmed that its loyalty lay not with the partisan 
class against class tactics but with all the less well off in the département. As in 
Alsace, the national party responded decisively by expelling Fritsch from the party. 
As Charles Friedrich wrote in L‟Humanité d‟Alsace-Lorraine: 
Le mot d‟ordre classe contre classe interdit toute négociation 
électorale avec d‟autres partis et groupements électoraux. C‟est là 
l‟infraction à la discipline, le délit contre les décisions du parti, contre 
lequel les instances du parti doivent sévir avec une sévérité 
impitoyable.165 
 
It would appear that in Metz the source of disagreement between local and 
national Communists had little to do with the question of national oppression. 
Instead, the Metz section acted against what it considered to be a tactical error 
that would ultimately lead to the victory of the right. On the eve of the 1929 
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elections, Fritsch had complained of the lack of support from the national party: 
„De Paris, aucun appui, ni aucune directive‟166 and in an internal report an 
unnamned official declared,  
Le niveau idéologique des membres de la région d‟Alsace-Lorraine 
est en général assez bas pour les raisons suivantes: la région a été 
jusqu'à 1930 complètement coupée de la vie de l‟ensemble du 
parti.167  
The party demonstrated its awareness of the situation by creating an office 
in Paris devoted to strengthening links with the Alsace-Lorraine federation. Yet 
despite the presence of Jacques Doriot, a leading member of the Central 
Committee, in the governing body of the new office, the party closed the office 
barely a year after its creation.168 The two main reasons it gave for its decision 
were the continuous lack of communication between Metz and Paris, and the 
financial costs of translating every document from French to German. The decision 
proved disastrous for the Mosellan Communists‟ confidence in the Parisian 
leadership. As Friedrich noted after the closing of the Paris office: „pas un seul 
rapport concernant l‟Alsace-Lorraine n‟a été discuté par le Bureau Politique, le 
représentant de la région était complètement séparé du Comité Central‟, and 
„nous avons eu des frais importants vu qu‟il fallait tout traduire et imprimer en 
allemand. La même chose se reproduit à chaque élection, chaque événement 
politique, chaque manifestation.‟169  
The linguistic issue represented one of the main obstacles to bridging the 
gap between Paris and the Mosellan sections. Because many local Communist 
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leaders had grown up using German as their native language, it became difficult 
for the party to disseminate its message in the département. As Friedrich wrote in 
1931, „La centrale du parti ne pouvait pas nous aider à cause du problème de la 
langue. Nos dirigeants ne connaissent pas suffisamment le français pour pouvoir 
travailler les documents de la centrale.‟170 In order to franciser the Mosellan 
leadership and forestall another schism of the party, the PCF decided to merge the 
Communist-backed Mosellan Confédération Générale du Travail Unitaire (CGTU) 
trade union with that of neighbouring Francophone Meurthe-et-Moselle. But the 
fusion of the two organisations into the CGTU Région de l‟Est, which was intended 
to strengthen the link between Metz and Nancy and remove Metz from the 
influence of Germanophile elements, aroused many complaints from Mosellan 
members. The latter rejected their separation from German-speaking colleagues in 
Alsace, and after one year of what Friedrich described as „l‟impossibilité de 
communiquer ... entre les syndicats lorrains et ceux de Nancy‟, the party dissolved 
the union.171  
Weary of what they considered a lack of understanding and interest, the 
Mosellan Communists addressed a letter to the executive committee of the 
Comintern in Moscow, asking for the total independence of the Communist 
federation of Alsace-Lorraine:  
Nous adressons la demande au Comité Exécutif de l‟Internationale 
Communiste de nous accorder l‟indépendance  à la région d‟Alsace-
Lorraine, l‟indépendance politique, organisation financière, avec un 
Comité Central propre, une liaison directe avec l‟IC avec le maintien 
d‟une meilleure liaison avec le PCF.172  
Because they believed the PCF ignored or failed to appreciate the 
Moselle‟s particular context, Mosellan Communists thought that by establishing a 
regional party free of the PCF‟s direct authority they might have more success. 
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Although audacious, as it challenged the party‟s line of unity and strict obedience 
to the Comintern‟s directives, the request for independence had formed part of 
Socialist discourse in both the pre and post-Versailles era and was therefore 
scarcely novel. During both periods, the Socialists, and later the Communists, had 
called for the creation of an independent state of Alsace-Lorraine that would act as 
a bridge between France and Germany. The Communists‟ request of 1931 was 
essentially similar: by creating an independent national party, they hoped Alsace-
Lorraine would serve as the link between French and German Communists. 
Although the Comintern‟s response to the letter does not appear in the party  
archives, its substance need not be doubted for no regional party was ever 
founded.  
The Mosellan Communists‟ call for independence or secession is significant 
to this study as it reveals their troubled and somewhat desperate situation in the 
late 1920s and early 1930s. More than a decade after the return of the 
département to French sovereignty and the formation of the French Communist 
party, the issues of language and the associated crisis of national identity 
remained unresolved. Similarly, the request for the creation of what was in effect a 
German-speaking party within the recovered provinces challenged the PCF‟s view 
that the question of Alsace-Lorraine was solely a matter of class exploitation and 
remained a subject of disagreement between local and national party 
representatives until the introduction of the Popular Front strategy. Although the 
Mosellan federation continued to follow the party‟s class against class tactics, the 
disagreement led to what an unnamed party official described as sabotage.  
Indeed, the same official reported how not a soul attended the public party 
meetings he organised in the industrial towns of Aumetz and Merlebach in late 
1931: „A Aumetz, j‟ai convoqué une réunion à laquelle beaucoup de mineurs 
étaient avertis, mais personne n‟y vint.... A Merlebach, une réunion avait été 
prévue le dimanche à 10h, mais après 1h30 d‟attente il n‟y avait personne.‟173 The 
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official concluded: „J‟ai l‟impression que les responsables locaux ont 
intentionnellement saboté la réunion pour prouver qu‟il était impossible de faire 
quoi que ce soit dans la contrée.‟ If his explanation was correct, it would indicate 
that some local Communists were so disaffected as to be willing to sabotage the 
PCF‟s official propaganda work. While the Aumetz and Merlebach episodes 
suggest a genuine disagreement between Paris and the Moselle, however, it did 
not produce a total rupture between the Mosellan federation and the national 
party. And despite Jean Maitron‟s justified claims that „les Communistes d‟Alsace-
Lorraine étaient en disaccord avec la tactique « classe contre classe »‟174 there 
were enough loyal activists to follow the party‟s line in attacking verbally and 
sometimes physically the SFIO leaders.175  
But in April 1932, the Mosellan Communists faced yet another crisis when 
the PCF expelled the deputies Emile Béron and Victor Doeblé from the party. 
Coming barely a month before the legislative elections, this was a risky decision, 
especially as they were the only two Communist deputies in the département. The 
official explanation was that they were expelled for delaying the payment of their 
cotisations parlementaires to the party. Although little is known of the party‟s true 
motives, it is likely that Emile Béron and Victor Doeblé, who both came from an old 
Socialist and particularist background, disagreed with the bolshevisation and 
Stalinisation of the party in the early 1930s. It was during this period that Maurice 
Thorez became the party‟s secretary-general with the task of imposing the 
Comintern‟s directives in the strictest manner. Both Béron and Doeblé were 
popular figures among local Communists and were re-elected in their respective 
constituencies under the banner Gauche Indépendante in May, thus depriving the 
PCF of any parliamentary representation in the département and almost halving 
the Communist vote. Béron was re-elected with 8,446 votes; René Schwob, his 
Communist opponent and a leader of the CGTU, received merely 147.176 In 
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Forbach, Deoblé was also re-elected with 6,349 votes against Philippi‟s 380.177 
Mirroring the bleak situation of the party at the national level, the dismissal of the 
two deputies also led to a sharp decline in party membership in the 
département.178 The dismissals, the decline in membership and the workers‟ 
continued refusal to join the party left the Mosellan PCF in a serious crisis. In his 
monthly report to the préfet, a commissaire spécial from Metz wrote,  
A Metz et dans sa banlieue, le parti Communiste traverse une crise; 
les plus convaincus montrent de l‟indifférence et ne s‟intéressent que 
fort peu à la vie du parti. Les réunions, très espacées, ne réunissent 
que quelques désœuvrés qui manquent … d‟enthousiasme.179  
But despite a period characterised by internal tensions and conflicts and 
crises, the PCF nonetheless remained the largest left-wing political force in the 
Moselle in terms of votes. Why was the PCF even now much stronger than the 
SFIO? Firstly, the workers probably identified more with the Communist party. Like 
most of the workers, the party leaders originated from the Moselle and 
neighbouring Alsace.180 Besides, while French was reintroduced into schools and 
institutions in 1919, the majority of the adult working population had grown up in a 
German-speaking environment, and local Communist leaders, who lived in the 
industrial areas between Thionville and Metz and who wrote extensively in the 
bilingual but mostly German L‟Humanité d‟Alsace-Lorraine, were predominantly 
German or Platt speaking. Secondly, the PCF made the question of Alsace-
Lorraine and national oppression one of its key tenets. This was probably intended 
to reassure the workers who were anxious during the period of integration into 
France. In particular, this was almost certainly true for the railway workers of 
Montigny-lès-Metz who supported the PCF and the creation of an independent 
                                            
 
177
 Ibid., p.176. 
178
 The party‟s membership decreased from 109,000 in 1921 to 31,500 in 1930 and 28,800 in 1933; 
in Jean-Jacques Becker et Gilles Candar (dir.), Histoire des gauches en France, Volume 2, Paris: 
La Découverte, 2004, p.55.  
179
 ADM, Rapport mensuel du commissariat spécial Gare Centrale Metz, 12 octobre 1932, 
301M56. 
180
 The main leaders of the Mosellan section were Alsatian-born and Mosellan-bred Emile Fritsch, 
Mosellan Marcel Kirsch and Mosellan Charles Friedrich nicknamed l‟homme de Moscou because 
of his intransigent loyalty to the Comintern.  
82 
 
railway company of Alsace-Lorraine to replace the existing state-owned one; a 
demand that the Communist départemental section and the Heimatbund shared.  
By contrast, the SFIO eschewed support for all forms of regional 
particularism. This had its origins with the pre-war leader, Jean Jaurès, whose 
model of society incorporated Socialist and democratic practices. Paul Féry, the 
secretary-general of the post-war Mosellan federation, was a Francophone 
Français de l‟Intérieur, born in Sedan. The sections were located mostly in the 
urban areas around Metz, Thionville, Forbach and Sarreguemines, and the party‟s 
monthly publication La Bataille, while formally bilingual, was written chiefly in 
French.181 Despite advocating bilingualism in schools the party‟s agenda was 
unequivocal: assimilation of the département into the French Republic.182 Like the 
PCF, however, the SFIO faced a crisis that destabilised its already weak Mosellan 
section, when the Néo-socialistes broke with the party in 1933.183 Despite the 
party‟s claim that „le départ des Néos n'avait en rien troublé la fédération de la 
Moselle‟, various police sources reveal that the split did in fact destabilise it.184 
One report stated that „Il y a désaccord au sein [du parti Socialiste] depuis la 
création du parti des Socialistes de France‟185, and another that „les scissions qui 
se sont produites depuis la constitution du parti des Socialistes de France … [ont] 
jeté la perturbation parmi les membres des sections mosellanes‟.186 
With regards to local trade unions, their membership after 1918 fared hardly 
better than the PCF‟s and the SFIO‟s. By the end of 1918, Eugène Imbs, the 
secretary of the carpenters‟ trade union of Alsace-Lorraine in the Reischland, 
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organised the adhesion of the regional trade unions to the French Confédération 
Générale du Travail (CGT).187 After the 1920 Tours congress, the federation of 
Lorraine of the CGT chose to follow the PCF and joined the CGTU in 1922.188 But 
despite an active propaganda campaign on the part of the CGT and the CGTU 
throughout the 1920s and early 1930s and while the départements of the Nord, the 
Seine and the neighbouring Meurthe-et-Moselle, with similar levels of 
industrialisation, claimed almost half a million members in those three areas alone 
in 1931, Mosellan workers showed almost no interest in joining trade unions 
(Table 1). 
Table 1 Level of unionisation in 1931 
Sources: (1) Statistique Générale de la France, Annuaire Statistique, 48e Volume, 1932, 2
e
 partie, 
p.114. (2) Statistique générale de la France, Résultats statistiques du recensement général de la 
population effectué le 8 mars 1931, Tome I, Troisième partie, p.176 
Police officials often reported local trade union leaders‟ concerns about this 
state of affairs. According to a commissaire spécial from Metz, René Schwob, 
secretary-general of the Ouvriers Métallurgistes de Lorraine (metalworkers union), 
complained that „trop peu d‟ouvriers métalliers participent aux réunions‟; and 
Marcel Kirsch, secretary-general of the Syndicats Unitaires de Lorraine, affiliated 
to the national CGTU, repeatedly acknowledged the „manque d‟activité et 
d‟initiative des camarades‟.189 A Communist official described the failure of the 
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Département 
Total 
industrial 
workforce (1) 
Total 
industrial workers 
in trade unions (2) 
Percentage 
Nord 427,000 150,000 35% 
Seine (Paris 
& suburbs) 
910,000 295,000 32% 
Meurthe-et-
Moselle 
130,000 17,000 13% 
Moselle 157,000 3,600 3% 
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party‟s propaganda campaign to recruit new members for the metalworkers‟ union 
in 1928: „parmi les ouvriers français il y a une certaine indifférence vis-à-vis de 
l‟organisation syndicale…. [A]u cours de cette tournée, nous avons touché 10,000 
ouvriers, mais n‟avons obtenu que 40 adhésions.‟190   
On the face of it, the Moselle, with its 170,000-strong industrial workforce 
(60 percent of the total workforce) seemed an ideal place for left-wing political 
activism to thrive.191 How then did the conservative Union Républicaine Lorraine 
manage to emerge consistently and comfortably victorious in a region that counted 
such a large industrial workforce? And how despite the presence of numerous 
large steelworks and mines, workers took little part in left-wing social and political 
movements? Firstly, the Moselle‟s linguistic barrier combined with the presence of 
a large number of foreign immigrants led to the deepening of the aforementioned 
cultural and linguistic rift. The main consequence of this rift was the division of the 
industrial workforce along linguistic and socio-cultural lines which hindered the 
development of the left-wing goals of class homogeneity and identity. Indeed, 
workers rarely identified themselves according to political class but rather 
according to their linguistic and cultural background. As indicated earlier in this 
chapter, police sources reveal that foreign workers generally preferred to join 
associations that focused on the protection of their own national interests. The 
PCF was aware of the disadvantage of such a large immigrant workforce. As a 
party report observed, „la concentration de la main d‟œuvre étrangère [résultait 
dans] un manque de perspective de lutte‟.192  
The second and without doubt the most important factor was the influence 
of Catholic doctrine and the local Catholic clergy upon the workers and the 
population in general. Precisely because it was closely associated with the 
Church, the Union Républicaine Lorraine won a majority of the seats at the 
                                            
 
190
 ADSSD, „Rapport sur le travail effectué dans le bassin métallurgique de la Moselle‟, unsigned, 
1928, 3Mi6/45 séquence 305. 
191
 Statistique générale de la France, Résultats Statistiques du Recensement Général de la 
Population effectué le 8 mars 1931, Tome I, Troisième partie, p.13. 
192
 ADSSD, „Co-rapport du camarade Barette sur la région, 9 novembre 1935‟, 3Mi6/117, séquence 
741.  
85 
 
National Assembly and the Senate between 1919 and 1932. It also won control of 
the départemental assembly (Conseil Général) at every local election and just over 
90 percent of the municipalities (707 out of 764) at the 1935 municipal elections. 
These electoral victories are highly significant for the present study, for they 
indicate firstly that nearly half a century of industrialisation and the accompanying 
changes in the Moselle‟s socio-economic landscape had practically no influence 
upon the region‟s political character, and secondly that the Catholic faith and 
clergy had become intrinsically bound up with Mosellan cultural and political 
identity. They also reveal to some extent that a left dominated by the extremist and 
sectarian PCF had little chance of attracting mass support among the electorate. 
This makes it easier to understand how the concepts of class consciousness and 
class struggle, which formed the basis of the left‟s doctrine, made so little headway 
among Mosellan workers. The Mosellan Communist leadership, while recognising 
the linguistic and particularist obstacles, could not persuade the national 
leadership or the Comintern of their importance, and faced the additional problem 
that its rival for influence among the working classes, the SFIO, favoured national 
integration and hence could contribute little within a regional united front. Only the 
right-wing Union Républicaine Lorraine was able consistently to concentrate on 
the questions of regional identity and particularisme, a question that crossed class 
and party divisions, and reaped the rewards for doing so.  
Conclusion 
 In 1934, when the first steps were taken to form the Popular Front, the right still 
dominated the local political scene. On the one hand, the Union Républicaine 
Lorraine, which epitomised the region‟s particularisme, took advantage of the 
population‟s anxiety and malaise towards the French assimilation process. Able to 
reach a large section of the population through the Action Catholique Lorraine and 
a loyal network of priests, it tackled issues most dear to all Mosellans such as the 
Concordat and religious education. Above all, its approach to social and political 
issues based on the writings of the Church facilitated the adhesion of a population 
loyal to the Catholic faith. As it had done during the German annexation and after 
the province‟s return to French sovereignty, the clergy and Catholicism acted as 
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defenders of Mosellan identity. In other words, the Moselle‟s distinct historical 
context and the presence of an organised clergy largely conditioned its political 
character. 
On the other hand, the left failed to mobilise the Moselle‟s large population 
of blue-collar workers. From the outset, the SFIO had little chance of succeeding. 
Indeed, as it was formed on the basis of the French Republican model, its doctrine 
had little appeal in a region with almost no Republican tradition. As the largest left-
wing political force in the département, at least in terms of votes, the PCF had the 
potential to mobilise the working classes. But, as indicated above, the division of 
the Moselle‟s multi-layered society along linguistic and cultural lines prevented the 
penetration of the concepts of class homogeneity and consciousness; two 
concepts necessary for the development of the Communist doctrine. What is 
more, neither the indigenous nor the immigrant workers displayed much interest in 
left-wing political activism. A commissaire spécial‟s report offers an explanation as 
to the workers‟ lack of enthusiasm for left-wing political parties: „en dépit d‟une 
propagande active, les partis politiques de gauche ont beaucoup de difficulté à 
s‟établir. La majorité des votants sont conservateurs et excessivement 
cléricaux.‟193 For The Times correspondent, „[the people of Alsace-Lorraine] were 
stolid and solid, conservative and slow. It is not in their disposition to change. Their 
religion and their education have always been at the command at the clergy.‟194 
When the French left began to mobilise in the Popular Front in 1934 in order to 
stop the fascist threat that had threatened the Republic in Paris on 6 February, the 
Mosellan left was weak and in no position to unite to defeat the dominant Catholic 
right.  
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Chapter Two - The Formation of the Popular Front, February 1934 
- March 1936  
Introduction 
On 6 February 1934 thousands of right-wing demonstrators gathered in Paris to 
protest against the Republic and the government. In response to this violent 
demonstration, which many on the left considered a failed fascist coup, the PCF 
and the SFIO as well as the CGT and the CGTU organised separate 
demonstrations across the country on 12 February. Then, in a spontaneous and 
collective display of unity against fascism the Communist and Socialist rank-and-
file protesters shouted in unison „Down with fascism!‟ and „Unity now!‟ By 
examining these events and the effect they had both on the left and the right, this 
chapter will seek to answer two questions: 1) what was particular about the 
formation of the Popular Front in the Moselle? 2) What does it reveal about the 
Moselle after fifteen years under French sovereignty? 
Since the events of the 6th and the 12th contributed to the unification of the 
left in a Popular Front, the first part of this chapter will offer a summary account of 
those events and their significance at the national and local levels. Following the 
same model, the second part will examine the left‟s successes and difficulties in 
the creation of the Popular Front. Finally, the third part will explore the same 
events as viewed by the right. 
Part One: 6 and 12 February 1934  
Between 9 January and 6 February 1934, the Parisian police reported eleven 
major demonstrations organised by far-right ligues such as the Action Française, 
the Jeunesses Patriotes and the Croix de Feu.195 By and large, those 
demonstrations were due to the general malaise which characterised France from 
the early 1930s. The malaise was due to the global economic slump and the rise 
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of fascism in Germany, Austria and elsewhere. The effect was to increase 
insecurity in France and dissatisfaction with the apparently ineffectual Radical-led 
governments in France, which erupted into violence when the Stavisky affair 
raised suspicions of corruption as well as incompetence in high places. Alexandre 
Stavisky was a Ukrainian-born financier and a Jew, who emigrated in 1898 to 
France where he engaged in lucrative but dubious financial activity. In 1932, with 
the assistance of Radical-Socialist Joseph Garat, deputy and mayor of Bayonne, 
he again organised the selling of false savings certificates by the Crédit Municipal 
bank. Stavisky‟s career as a crook did not start with this affair but each time he 
had benefited from the support of the authorities and had his trials postponed. In 
July 1933, the police were informed of the fraud and arrested the director of the 
bank in December. They rapidly linked the affair to Stavisky and his Radical-
Socialist backers, and began to search for him. Eventually they found him in a 
chalet in Chamonix on 8 January 1934, where he died before he could be 
arrested. The police reported that he had committed suicide, but sceptical 
observers suspected a governmental cover-up. Le Canard Enchaîné‟s front page 
of 10 January mockingly read, „Stavisky se suicide d‟un coup de revolver qui lui a 
été tiré à bout portant.‟196  
The French, confronted with yet another political and financial scandal, 
appeared impatient for justice, but Camille Chautemps, head of the Radical 
government, refused to launch an enquiry that might shed light on the affair. The 
right and the ligues accused Chautemps of trying to protect his brother-in-law, the 
procureur général responsible for repeatedly delaying Stavisky‟s appearance in 
court since 1927, and they seized the opportunity to demand his resignation. On 
30 January, after a month of incessant violent protests on the streets of Paris, 
Chautemps presented his resignation to President Albert Lebrun, who invited 
another Radical, Edouard Daladier, to form a government.197 The right-wing press 
had successfully turned the affair into a political scandal and called for an 
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immediate change of regime. But some on the left accused Jean Chiappe, préfet 
de police of the Seine, of being too moderate with the ligues and criticised his 
friendship with Taittinger and right-wing members of Paris municipal assembly. On 
3 Febuary Daladier ordered Chiappe to leave his position as préfet. Chiappe 
angrily responded by warning Daladier, „Révoquez-moi si vous le désirez et vous 
me trouverez dans la rue.‟198 The ligues, outraged by his dismissal, claimed that 
the country was in danger and called for their members to gather in different 
places in Paris on the evening of the 6th in order to demonstrate against Daladier 
and his government. Police sources reported the presence of seven major political 
organisations,199 all right-wing but for the Communist-backed veterans‟ association 
Association Républicaine des Anciens Combattants (ARAC).200 After a night of 
violent clashes between demonstrators and police forces which saw the erection 
of barricades in the centre of the French capital, Paris counted its victims.  
Official reports confirm as well as hundreds of injured on both sides 
seventeen dead among the demonstrators and one from the police forces.201 The 
right-wing press widely condemned the government for having fired upon the 
demonstrators: La Libre Parole‟s headline of the 7th read, „On a tiré sur le 
peuple‟.202 Daladier came under pressure from Léon Blum, the Socialist leader, 
who encouraged him to resist demands to resign, and from Herriot and Radical 
ministers on the other side, who feared more violence if the government were to 
remain in place. He offered his resignation to President Lebrun in the afternoon of 
7 February. That same evening, Gaston Doumergue agreed to form a new 
government of national unity, which included the Radical Albert Sarraut, the ex-
SFIO and neo-Socialist Adrien Marquet and right wingers such as André Tardieu 
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and Philippe Pétain.203 In the name of the party truce, the Radicals supported the 
government. Broadly speaking nonetheless it marked the return of the right to 
power where it remained until January 1936 when the Radicals, under the 
influence of Daladier, decided to join the left-wing Communist-Socialist alliance in 
a Popular Front.  
The motives and objectives of the demonstrators on 6 February have been 
the subject of much controversy. Most contemporary observers believed they had 
witnessed an attempted coup d‟état. Despite the demonstrators‟ use of slogans 
such as „A bas les voleurs‟, „Démission‟ and „A bas la République‟, and their 
attempt to force their way into the National Assembly building, most historians 
reject the claim that this was an organised attempt by the right to overthrow the 
Republic. At most, the demonstrators were looking to replace the Radical-Socialist 
government with one of national unity where the right would have its place.  
According to Serge Berstein, those events were a political manoeuvre of the 
parliamentary right who sought through the protesters to bring down Daladier‟s 
government and install a right-wing government in its place. He interprets 6 
February as „une crise très profonde de la République parlementaire‟, but not „un 
complot fasciste contre le régime‟.204 As for Rod Kedward, „the violent protests of 6 
February were planned and orchestrated, but there was no strategy or even vision 
of a coup d‟état, and no leader waiting to take power.‟205 
To the contemporary observers nonetheless the threat to the Republic was 
real enough. When asked „was the Republic in danger?‟ the special commission of 
enquiry set up to look into the events of 6 February replied with a firm „Oui!‟206 
According to the commission, „la République était en danger parce-que le 
Parlement a été attaqué‟, and „chaque fois que la gauche gagnait les élections, la 
droite organisait des campagnes antiparlementaires‟ in order to discredit the 
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regime.207 It referred to the 1924 and 1932 general elections, which the left 
(Socialists and Radical-Socialists) had won and to the ensuing anti-parliamentary 
campaigns instigated by the ligues. Blum favoured the coup d‟état theory when he 
claimed that „les partis de réaction ... tentent aujourd‟hui le coup de force‟208 and 
that the attempt to overthrow the regime „n‟a pas atteint son but stratégique qui 
était d‟envahir la Chambre [des députés] et imposer … un gouvernement 
provisoire … que les ligues auraient … contrôlé et dominé.‟209 Daladier, in an 
unpublished „Appel au Peuple Français‟, claimed that „un coup d‟état a 
ensanglanté … PARIS…. [D]es factieux ont organisé un coup de force pour établir 
en France un régime de dictature.‟210 Edouard Depreux, the Socialist Minister of 
Justice in 1937-1938, wrote that „ceux qui n‟ont pas vécu cette période ne peuvent 
s‟imaginer ce que fut la violence des attaques déclenchées contre la démocratie à 
propos de l‟affaire Stavisky‟.211 The police claimed that the ligues had undertaken 
„une véritable organisation de [leurs] troupes‟212 and the apolitical League of 
Human Rights, which launched its own enquiry, concluded that the riots of the 6th 
were a serious attempt to overthrow the Republic.213 The riots of 6 February sent 
the left the wake-up call it needed. It was time to reconsider headquarters‟ 
strategy.  
If 6 February belonged to the right and the ligues, 12 February belonged to 
the left and in Kedward‟s words, „made instant history no less than the riots of the 
6th.‟214 Just a few days earlier the Communists had refused to unite with the Seine 
federation of the SFIO in a common demonstration and organised their own march 
against fascism.215 Through L‟Humanité, they encouraged all workers to 
demonstrate on the 9th in the Place de la République  against fascism and the 
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government.216 That evening, thousands of Communist protesters and a few 
Socialist activists gathered at République and on the surrounding boulevards, 
mixing cries of „A bas les fusilleurs Daladier-Frot!‟ with „Pour la dissolution des 
ligues fascistes!‟ and „A bas l‟Union Nationale Réactionnaire et Fasciste préparée 
par le Parti Radical et les Partis Socialistes!‟. But the Communists‟ demonstration 
was forbidden by the Préfecture and severely repressed by the police.217 Despite 
the party‟s hopes of promoting unity from below, that is to say drawing the rank 
and file away from their Socialist affiliation, and despite L‟Humanité‟s claim that the 
demonstration was a „magnifique manifestation de front unique‟, the 9th failed to 
bring the left together.218 It was the call of the CGT for a general strike on the 12th 
that marked the first real step towards unity.  
First the SFIO under the initiative of Blum and the left of the party, then the 
PCF and the CGTU decided to join the CGT on the 12th. On that day France‟s four 
largest political and social organisations united in a one-day strike and 
demonstrations comprising around one hundred thousand people in Paris alone. 
Two processions of demonstrators left from different locations: the SFIO/CGT from 
Place de la République and the CGTU/PCF from Place de la Bastille converged 
on Place de la Nation. Putting aside their enmity, activists from the two parties and 
the two unions met, shook hands and rallied to the cries of „Unité maintenant!‟ 
Léon Blum, speaking to demonstrators gathered in the Cours de Vincennes, 
declared,  
Citoyens, la preuve est faite. La province toute entière, Paris, 
rassemblées dans cette manifestation signifie aux hommes du 
fascisme et du royalisme qu‟ils ne passeront pas. La réaction ne 
passera pas. Vive l‟unité prolétarienne sans laquelle aucune victoire 
n‟est possible.219 
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In his memoirs, Blum described 12 February as the day that saved the 
Republic.220 The demonstration proved a remarkable success in numbers and in 
the political message it delivered. Party propaganda, ideologies and political 
strategies were all forgotten for one day and, according to Blum, „l‟instinct 
populaire, la volonté populaire avaient imposé l‟unité d‟action des travailleurs pour 
la défense de la République.‟221 This, it seems, was fair comment: unity came from 
the rank and file of the left, which decided it was essential to halt the rise of 
fascism. But those were very early days and it was to be a long and arduous path 
for all parties involved until the unification in the Popular Front and the national 
electoral victory of May 1936.  
In February 1935, Blum claimed that the great bipartisan gatherings of 12 
February in Paris had their counterpart in every city in France. 
L‟élan ne s‟est pas arrêté aux grandes agglomérations urbaines; il a  
gagné les petites cités tranquilles de la province, les villages de la 
campagne. La grande lame sortie du fond des volontés populaires 
s‟est étalée en un instant sur toute la France.222 
Julian Jackson broadly agrees, writing „the impact of 6 February was not restricted 
to Paris alone.‟223 And Serge Wolikow goes further by stating that „Pour la 
première fois se produit, dans le même moment, un mouvement étendu au pays 
tout entier avec des défilés le plus souvent unitaires.‟224 Events in the Moselle, 
however, took a different turn to those which occurred in Paris and elsewhere.  
In a letter to the Minister of the Interior on the 7th, the préfet of the Moselle 
reported that „le calme complet règne dans mon département où aucun incident 
n‟a été signalé.‟225 In Metz, the streets attracted more bystanders who had read 
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the local press and had expectantly gone out in the hope of seeing something 
happen. In order to prevent violent demonstrations in his département, the préfet 
ordered a state of emergency, which proscribed gatherings of more than twenty 
people. As a result, the ligues, which had planned to protest in support of the dead 
and injured of the 6th in Place de l‟Hôtel de Ville in Metz on the 9th, cancelled their 
demonstration at the last minute.226 Because of the ligues‟ decision, the 
Communists, the CGT and the CGTU, who had organised a counter-
demonstration on the same day, also abandoned their plan. Between 6 and 12 
February, therefore all was quiet in the Moselle. 
On the 12th, all the major political organisations of the Mosellan left called 
upon their forces to protest against the „fascist coup‟. At a meeting organised by 
the Communist party in Metz in the evening of the 9th, leaders of the CGT, CGTU, 
League of Human Rights, and SFIO called for the formation of a front unique and 
agreed to stop work on the 12th.227 At the end of the meeting, after condemning the 
Doumergue government and the ligues and singing the International in German, 
all parties agreed on the following resolution, „Les ouvriers réunis le vendredi 9 
février ... acclament la lutte antifasciste … acclament la grève générale pour lundi 
prochain pour l‟émancipation de la classe ouvrière.‟228 In Metz, the strike was 
general at the Manufacture des Tabacs and partial among primary school teachers 
and at the railworks.229 In the north-east of the département, where workers did 
not normally work on Mondays but were forced to do so by management, 6,000 
people peacefully demonstrated in the streets of Thionville.230 In the industrial 
town of Amnéville the Communist mayor failed to stop workers entering the 
factories. In the mining sectors of Forbach, Boulay, Saint-Avold and 
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Sarreguemines, the commissaires spéciaux reported that „le mouvement de grève 
n‟a pas été suivi par les diverses organisations syndicales.‟231  
It is difficult to give an accurate number of strikers as sources contradict 
each other. Those from the CGT affirm that over 6,500 factory workers went on 
strike, 3,000 in the Metz area and 2,000 in the de Wendel fiefdom of Hayange.232 
In contrast, the Préfecture gave a total of 2,000 strikers for the whole département, 
less than one third as many. But like in Paris, all demonstrators called for unity, as 
reported in the local left-wing press. L‟Humanité d‟Alsace-Lorraine described the 
„fraternisation des ouvriers CGT et CGTU contre le fascisme‟,233 the Socialist 
monthly La Bataille affirmed „la volonté d‟unité des prolétaires s‟est manifesté au 
grand jour‟,234 and Léon Jouhaux, leader of the CGT, was quoted in Le Travailleur 
de la Moselle saying, „une classe se dresse presqu‟unanime. L‟avenir nous 
appartient!‟235 
Thus, while the major organisations of the Mosellan left promptly and 
unilaterally reacted to the events of the 6th, the results were mixed. While the 
Francophone industrial cantons between Metz and West-Thionville responded to 
the calls of the left, the predominantly German-speaking mining cantons of 
southern Moselle remained quiet and did not take part in the strikes or the 
demonstrations. But in a département where, according to a police report, „les 
camarades montrent peu d‟intérêt dans les affaires politiques‟ and where political 
activism was quasi-inexistent, 12 February may nonetheless be interpreted as a 
relative success for the left.236 It was the first display of organised labour 
movement since the ill-fated strikes of 1919-1920 and it appeared that party 
leaders, like the base, genuinely wished unity. But, as shall be demonstrated, the 
path to unity was to be a very difficult one for the Mosellan left. This was partly due 
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to the predominant role of the right in the département and partly to the left‟s 
struggle, despite the 12th, to find its place in an area so loyal to a clergy essentially 
anti-Communist. In order to establish the role of each political organisation in the 
making of the Popular Front, the next section will begin with a study of the parties 
of the left followed by those of the right. 
Part Two: The Left 
The PCF 
In January 1934, the PCF‟s Central Committee declared,  
notre tactique de front unique est une tactique d‟action. Nous ne 
cherchons pas l‟accord impossible avec les chefs et organisations 
socialistes. Nous voulons combattre côte à côte avec les travailleurs 
socialistes contre l‟ennemi commun: la bourgeoisie.237  
 
Some years later, Thorez claimed that „dès le debut de 1934, nous soulignions 
l‟absolue nécessité d‟un vaste front unique qui engloberait républicains, 
démocrates, libéraux, socialistes et communistes.‟238 But as late as 15 June 1934 
the leader of the PCF wrote of the SFIO leadership, „ces gens-là restent les 
adversaires de l‟unité d‟action et de l‟unité tout court‟, thus implying that the class 
against class strategy still prevailed and that the Socialist leaders remained the 
party‟s prime political enemies;239 until the last week of June, when the party 
abruptly changed tactics known as the Grand Tournant and advocated joint action 
with the Socialists.240 On 27 July the SFIO and the PCF signed the pact of unity. 
The pact explained the motives for unity as follows,  
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Le comité central du Parti communiste et la commission 
administrative permanente du Parti socialiste sont animés de la 
volonté de battre le fascisme. Il est clair que ce but ne peut être 
atteint que par l‟action commune des masses.… L‟intérêt de la 
classe ouvrière exige donc que le Parti socialiste et le Parti 
communiste organisent cette action commune contre le fascisme.241   
 What motivated the PCF to abandon its sectarian position and unite with its 
arch-enemy? Donald Sassoon, writing of the Comintern, posits several reasons for 
its contemporary change of policy: „the lessons drawn from the Nazi accession to 
power; the USSR‟s fear of being isolated and facing a hostile capitalist world; 
pressures from other Western communist parties; the obvious dead-end into which 
the „Third Period‟ [class against class] policies had led‟ thus suggesting that Soviet 
foreign policy was the main reason behind Stalin and the Comintern‟s change of 
tactics.242 This combined with what Sassoon calls France‟s „special national 
conditions‟ (the struggle against fascism) led to the PCF adopting a national 
patriotic line and permitted, as he puts it, „the development of an antifascist 
popular front strategy aimed at renewing the links between Communists and 
Socialists‟.243 
After securing the collaboration of the Socialists, „la course pour la 
conquête des classes moyennes‟, as Thorez called it, began.244 On 21 September 
1934, at the Salle Bullier in Paris, Thorez used the terms Popular Front for the first 
time, urging the unification of all the forces of the left in a „front populaire pour le 
pain, la liberté et la paix.‟245 As the party of the middle-classes, the Radicals 
strongly opposed the PCF‟s positions on private property and capital, and initially 
any agreement between the two parties seemed impossible. But the Communists, 
having set aside their class against class tactics, were determined to build the 
widest political coalition. Accordingly, as a police report put it, they toned down „au 
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maximum la rudesse de leur doctrine afin de ne pas heurter les éléments 
modérés‟.246 By the summer of 1935, their efforts proved successful. On 14 July 
1935 the committee of the Popular Front gathered forty antifascist organisations 
on Place de la Bastille in Paris, and before hundreds of thousands of supporters 
PCF, SFIO and Radicals leaders declared in unison:  
Nous représentants mandatés du rassemblement populaire du 14 
juillet … faisons serment solennel de rester unis pour désarmer, 
dissoudre les ligues fascistes, de défendre et développer les libertés 
démocratiques, d‟assurer la paix humaine.247  
The final stage in the formation of the Popular Front came in January 1936 when 
the Popular Front‟s national committee obtained the official support of the Radical 
party. Thereupon the three parties signed a common electoral programme 
comprising broad political and economic demands.  
On 15 January 1934, the Communist party Central Committee reminded 
regional sections of the unchanged official line: „notre Comité Central a fait corriger 
les erreurs des organisations régionales et locales du parti et a condamné la 
cessation de la tactique classe contre classe.‟248 The reminder strongly suggests 
that at least some local activists, even before the Stavisky riots, had set aside the 
party‟s line in favour of joint action. This appears to have been the case for the 
Mosellan section. In mid-January 1934, in reaction to the increased activities of 
Neue Front (known as Force Nouvelle in French), a ligue linked to the Solidarité 
Française, Edouard Meyer, leader of the Communist section of Sarreguemines, 
constituted an antifascist front known as Antifabund or ANTIFA. The group 
included Radicals, Socialists, Communists and members of the League of Human 
Rights. The concept of joint action was so successful that a meeting organised by 
Meyer on 1 February 1934 in Sarreguemines attracted over 1,500 supporters. 
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Other meetings were organised and every time, the police reported, „ce sont les 
communistes qui se sont trouvés en majorité.‟249 
The threat to democracy and the Republic evidently looked as real to the 
Mosellan left as it did in Paris in the aftermath of the Stavisky riots, and the wind of 
panic that swept through the left rank and file in the capital hit the Moselle with a 
similar force. On 16 February 1934 the Communist mayors of Basse-Yutz, 
Amnéville and Rombas, in a joint meeting with Socialists and Radicals, called for 
action against the reunion of Francistes planned in Thionville for 25 February.250 
Although it was a Radical lawyer, Maître Breistroff, who convened the meeting, the 
Communists monopolised the discussions and pressed for the creation of an 
action committee as soon as possible. On 8 April, in reaction to another Franciste 
reunion, a fascist ligue explored later in this chapter, thousands of Communist 
antifascists gathered in Thionville. In the evening, after the Communists were 
accused of trying to break into the commissariat de police, violent clashes erupted 
between the police and the demonstrators. According to a PCF internal report, 
these events, which saw the police arrest 165 demonstrators including Fritsch, the 
mayor of Basse-Yutz, Friedrich, editor of L‟Humanité d‟Alsace-Lorraine, Barbian, 
the mayor of Rombas, and Schwob, leader of the CGTU-steelworks,251 „marquent 
l‟activisation du movement antifasciste de la Moselle.‟252 In late April, despite 
localised attempts to fight the fascist threat, the Mosellan Communists endorsed 
the party‟s decision to dismiss Doriot and reiterated their support to the Central 
Committee and the partisan class against class tactics. As they agreed in a 
resolution:  
après avoir discuté la plateforme contre-révolutionnaire du groupe 
Rolland-Barbé-Doriot sur la question du Front Unique, le groupe 
décide à l‟unanimité, tous les camarades étant présents, d‟affirmer 
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son attachement indéfectible à l‟Internationale Communiste et au 
Comité Central du PC.253 
Despite those obvious early signs of joint action against fascism, it was only 
after the Grand Tournant that the idea of a united front really gained momentum 
among Mosellan Communists as well. The local cells initiated the creation of 
antifascist committees in several towns: Sarreguemines, Sarrebourg, Metz, 
Thionville, Basse-Yutz, Hagondange, Rombas, Hayange.254 Some of the ANTIFA 
committees secured the alliance only of Communist-backed organisations, such 
as the CGTU, the ARAC, the Jeunesses Communistes, while others, such as in 
Metz, secured the alliance of the Communists, the CGTU, the SFIO and the 
League of Human Rights.255 But difficulties immediately arose. The Socialist 
section in Metz could not forget the Communists‟ attacks that took place since 
1928 and it found the idea of an alliance between the two parties very difficult. 
Days after the signature of the pact of unity, the préfet reported that the Socialist 
section of Metz had refused the Communists‟ invitation to a joint meeting.256  
At the end of 1934, Socialists in the Moselle still refused to join the front 
unique which the Communists promoted. A police report from Metz in December 
1934 described the antifascist front at the end of 1934: 
le nombre des adhérents au Front Commun Antifasciste … est 
certainement considérable, 3,000 a 4,000 pour le département. 
Cependant les partisans du front commun … sont en désaccord 
frequent…. C‟est le parti communiste qui, en fait, a toujours dirigé 
l‟action menée par l‟ANTIFA.257 
The idea that the Communists were trying to rob the SFIO of its supporters had 
been a constant theme in the turbulent relationship of the two parties since the 
scission of 1920. Had the PCF‟s strategy really changed? It is true that the 
Communists stopped their sectarian attacks on the Socialists, but the PCF‟s 
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unavowed aim was to control the coalition in order to consolidate its position as 
leader. In a meeting in Metz, one of the leaders of the Mosellan section declared „il 
faut que le front unique se réalise, il faut travailler de toutes ses forces à sa 
création, mais au sein du Parti Communiste.‟258 Throughout 1935 difficulties 
between the two parties remained and were further exacerbated by one particular 
point of contention which shaped Mosellan politics since the mid-1920s: 
Autonomism.  
Arguing that the workers of Alsace-Lorraine should have the right to decide 
their own future, the Communists had advocated independence for Alsace-
Lorraine since 1925. One might assume that because of its new strategy of uniting 
with the Socialists and the Radical-Socialists the PCF might have altered its 
position towards Autonomism, a concept which went against the Republican 
principles of unity and indivisibility. Remarkably, however, this was not the case. 
During the early months of the Popular Front, when Thorez was trying to change 
the image of the party from that of anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist and anti-
bourgeois to that of protector of Republican values, the PCF still supported the 
cause of independence in the Moselle. Before June 1934 and its change of 
strategy, the party leader regularly described the status of Alsace-Lorraine as a 
region at „un rang moral plus bas que celui de la dernière colonie française‟.259 But 
even after the party adopted the path of the Popular Front, Thorez declared that 
the principle of self-determination of the people of Alsace-Lorraine should be 
added to the party candidates‟ manifestos at the next elections. Why did Thorez 
engage on this line? 
By putting the issue of la question nationale on an equal footing with that of 
antifascism, the PCF was hoping to lead the working-class masses away from 
right-wing parties such as the Union Républicaine Lorraine, whose policies and 
political programme epitomised the region‟s identity and particularisme. 
Communist cadres from the regional federation of Alsace-Lorraine who gathered 
in Strasbourg in June 1935 wholly backed Thorez. They encouraged party 
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members and supporters to create Volksfront committees in which Socialist, 
Christian and dissident Communist workers should unite in order to intensify „la 
nouvelle lutte pour la liberation de notre peuple‟, as L‟Humanité d‟Alsace-Lorraine 
put it.260 Evidently the PCF in Alsace and the Moselle sought to exploit any 
possible source of influence including appeals to the separatist vote in order to 
turn the working classes away from the Union Républicaine Lorraine. This no 
doubt reflected the PCF‟s wish to build as wide a coalition as possible, but it was 
also a dangerous and divisive policy. For one thing, it enabled right wingers to 
penetrate the Volksfront committees. For another it threatened to split the regional 
section, with head office in Strasbourg in favour of self-rule and Francophile 
cadres in the Moselle wholly opposed.  
Since 1921, the Communist section of the Moselle was part of the regional 
federation of Alsace-Lorraine. Its headquarters were located in Strasbourg and the 
offices of its official bilingual newspaper, L‟Humanité d‟Alsace-Lorraine, were in 
Metz. The region, as described by Moscow, was of prime importance because of 
its large-scale industry and the political potential of its large working-class 
population.261 In an open letter, the Central Committee shared this view:  
L‟Est de la France n‟est pas une situation quelconque mais une des 
régions décisives … par suite du rôle de l‟industrie lourde de cette 
région dans l‟économie du capitalisme français, de l‟importance 
numérique de son prolétariat, de son importance stratégique et 
militaire.262 
In 1936 the Moselle produced no less than 42 per cent of France‟s iron ore, 
making this border département not only crucial to France‟s economy but also to 
its military and strategic decisions.263 But for a region so important in the eyes of 
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Moscow, why were the number of activists still desperately low after February 
1934? And was the party doing anything to reverse this situation? 
In December 1934, the préfet reported 1,040 communist activists, with over 
a third (395) in the coal-mining areas of Forbach and Sarreguemines.264 This 
figure of 1,040 actually decreased until January 1936 when it reached a low 
512.265 The préfet explained the decline by citing the internal crises that shook the 
Mosellan section in the first years of the Popular Front. As explained in the 
previous chapter, a series of factors had made it almost impossible for the 
Communists and the left to establish themselves in this highly-industrialised part of 
France, but one might have expected that after the political storm of 6 and 12 
February 1934 the active propaganda of the Communist Party to form antifascist 
fronts would meet some success. Could the party be held responsible for what an 
internal party report described as „effectifs squelettiques‟?266 And were party 
leaders really focusing on the new task on drawing all the progressive forces into a 
united front against fascism?  
The Central Committee was well aware of the problematic situation in the 
Moselle. As well as the operational and financial difficulties in translating every 
document from French into German, the party explained the problems facing the 
regional federation in 1935 thus:  
Le niveau idéologique des membres de la région d‟Alsace-Lorraine 
est en général assez bas pour les raisons suivantes : la région a été 
jusqu'à 1930 complètement coupée de la vie de l‟ensemble du parti. 
La question de la langue et l‟impossibilité de lire la littérature 
française et de suivre la vie du parti français ont empêché le 
développement du niveau idéologique. Il s‟y ajoute encore la 
faiblesse de la direction régionale, ses mauvaises méthodes de 
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travail qui ne lui ont pas permis de faire un meilleur travail 
d‟éducation au parti.267  
Mohn, the secretary-general of the regional union of the CGTU, offered a similar 
explanation: „les camarades sont venus trop tard. Ils ne comprennent rien à 
l‟Alsace-Lorraine.… Le PC régional est en crise … ce qui crée une situation 
pénible.‟268 Indeed, in 1934 and 1935 the regional section encountered crises that 
threatened the very existence of the party itself, let alone that of the left-wing 
coalition. 
The Central Committee correctly identified language as one of the primary 
challenges the party faced in the Moselle. But the PCF‟s financial difficulties 
played an equally important part. The low number of activists and the similarly low 
circulation of L‟Humanité d‟Alsace-Lorraine simply did not provide the necessary 
revenue the party needed for an active and effective propaganda. A police report 
in December 1934 blamed the party‟s financial difficulties on the economic crisis 
and the number of unemployed. Although Alsace-Lorraine ceased to exist as a 
separate political entity after the Treaty of Versailles, many political organisations, 
such as the Communist Party and the CGTU maintained organisational structures 
defined by the old German border. And despite the Mosellans‟ apparent rejection 
of Strasbourg‟s supremacy, the Communist party decided to centralise its services 
and moved the party‟s newspaper from Metz to Strasbourg in April 1935. This left 
the Moselle even more dependent on decisions taken in Alsace, and created 
tensions between the Alsatian headquarters and members in the Moselle. It is not 
clear whether this move alleviated the party‟s financial crisis, but three months 
later, in line with the party‟s national strategy of decentralisation, the Moselle 
separated from Alsace and created its own federation. These events are crucial in 
understanding the making of the Popular Front in the département since while the 
PCF was fervently working for unity in the rest of the country, the Mosellan 
Communists went through a series of crises. 
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Another event which damaged the Moselle section of the party in 1934-
1935 was the arrest and conviction of two of its central figures, Fritsch, the mayor 
of Basse-Yutz and the editor of L‟Humanité d‟Alsace-Lorraine, and Friedrich, a key 
figure of the Mosellan section in the interwar period. As a commissaire spécial 
from Metz reported, they were tried and found guilty „pour l‟espionnage à la suite 
de divulgations, par la voie de leur journal, de faits intéressants la défense 
nationale.‟269 They were fined 500 francs each and sent to prison for three months. 
Fritsch was a key figure in the running of the Moselle section as his offices in Metz 
operated as a secondary head office for the region and provided the missing link 
between Strasbourg and the Mosellan cells. Paris, however, seemed to think 
otherwise as it refused to provide the bail necessary for his release from prison. It 
was the Basse-Yutz section which, through collections, succeeded in gathering the 
necessary funds to release him.270 In December, French courts arrested another 
prominent leader of the party: Georges Kraus, one of the leaders of the Montigny-
les-Metz section, which had provided a large number of demonstrators and 
strikers on 12 February. He was arrested for forgery and sent to prison for three 
months. The party were not prepared to provide his bail and instead they swiftly 
substituted him for a new leader once the court had passed the sentence.271 Even 
though Fritsch and Friedrich argued in their defence that the information they 
published came from an article in a right-wing local newspaper, their arrest 
reflected the difficulties of the Communists in operating in the Moselle. 
These events proved a serious blow to the Mosellan section. They also give 
an invaluable indication as to the section‟s state of affairs during the first years of 
the Popular Front. Moreover, it had to battle against ex-Communists Béron and 
Doeblé‟s attempts to create their own front unique. Béron first won his seat of 
deputy for West-Thionville under the Communist banner in 1928. Despite his 
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exclusion from the party in April 1932, he ran as an Independent Socialist and kept 
his seat at the legislative elections that took place one month later. Doeblé first 
won his seat as a Communist in Forbach in 1928, and after he was dismissed from 
the party in April 1932 he was also re-elected as an Independent Socialist in 1932. 
As reported in a party report, it appears that both deputies fell in disgrace with the 
party‟s central offices as early as February 1932.272  The PCF subsequently 
treated them as renegades and enemies of the party, and despite Béron‟s efforts 
to reintegrate the party after his victory in May 1932, the Politburo ignored him.  
When the PCF embarked upon the path of unity in 1934, it made it clear the 
two renegades were not to be included, and in a situation reminiscent to that of 
Doriot in Saint-Denis both deputies sought to create their own front unique in 
1935. They began by publishing their own newspapers (Doeblé, Le Réveil and 
Béron, L‟action économique et politique), which later merged into one, and Béron, 
the incontestable leader of this other common front, organised a series of 
meetings, mainly in his fiefdom of Hayange, to demonstrate that the fight against 
fascism could be organised outside the PCF‟s influence. It is not clear how many 
supporters Béron attracted or what impact he had on the Mosellan Popular Front, 
but as the latter caught momentum, it became impossible for the PCF to ignore 
Béron and the thousands of loyal activists who supported him, and in late 1935, it 
welcomed him and Doeblé onto the coalition‟s départemental board.273 The local 
Communist cadres, however, remained suspicious of their ex-comrades, and 
despite their official directives which stipulated „aucune exclusive sur quiconque 
veut se joindre au Front populaire‟,274Eugène Anstett, the Moselle‟s secretary-
general the CGTU-Moselle, declared at a private party meeting in early 1936, „ils 
doivent être éliminés de la direction du Front populaire parce que renégats, et par 
conséquent, ennemis du Parti Communiste.‟275 
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The Communist party was by far the most successful left-wing political force 
in interwar Moselle, and as such controlled and led the Popular Front coalition. But 
the crises it faced seem to have diverted most of its energies and instead of 
working on the front unique, the party focused its resources and efforts on internal 
battles, reorganisation and normalisation exercises, which materialised in the 
move of its newspaper and the creation of the Section Française de 
l‟Internationale Communiste de la Moselle on 7 July 1935. But even after the 
creation of the départemental federation, the party still seemed disorganised. On 
14 July, one week after the creation of the Popular Front, Communists, Radicals 
and Socialists sang the Marseillaise in unison at the Paris gathering which 
cemented the coalition. No such event took place in the Moselle. According to one 
press report, 
la journée du 14 juillet s‟est passée à Metz et dans le département 
… sans aucun incident.  Il n‟y a eu aucune manifestation.… Il n‟y a 
pas eu de cortège…. En résumé la journée fut absolument calme … 
dans tout le département.276  
 
The SFIO  
Following the February 1934 events, the SFIO faced an internal crisis that tested 
the party‟s leadership and unity. Indeed, the tension 6 February caused in the 
Socialist camp only exacerbated previous disagreements and affinities within the 
party. Firstly, there was the rank and file who demonstrated their enthusiasm for 
joint action against fascism on 12 February. Secondly, to the left of the party, a 
faction led by the Parisian SFIO federations advocated reunification with the 
Communist party. Its leaders were Marceau Pivert and Jean Zyromski from the 
Seine, and Emile Farinet from the Seine-et-Oise. All three had in fact invited the 
Communists to a joint demonstration on 8 February, but the Communists rejected 
the invitation and instead held their own demonstration on 9 February at 
République. Thirdly, a group led by Ludovic Oscar Frossard and Marx Dormoy 
rejected the idea of unity of action with the Communists on the basis that the PCF 
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simply could not be trusted. The fourth group, comprising the moderate wing of the 
party, including Paul Faure and Blum, most of the deputies and the CAP, believed 
that by supporting Daladier‟s government, rejecting Doumergue‟s and remaining 
faithful to the Socialist dogma, they were fulfilling the party‟s mission. But the fall of 
Daladier and the subsequent formation of a right-wing government compromised 
the SFIO leaders, and at the national council meeting held in Pré-Saint-Germain 
on 11 March 1934 a majority of members (3,752 against 75) agreed that the 
political upheaval that ensued from the February events required a rethink of the 
party‟s strategy. At the same meeting, Blum declared: „La ligne directrice de nos 
résolutions doit être inspirée des événements de février. Instinctivement la classe 
ouvrière s‟unit pour se défendre. Nous voulons l‟unité.‟277  
Conscious however that the Communists‟ strategy had remained 
unchanged and that, „le bureau politique du parti communiste continuera à 
opposer les chefs aux militants, à essayer de briser les cadres de notre parti‟, 
Blum claimed that „la lutte contre le fascisme ne peut être conduite que sous 
l‟action socialiste‟.278  At the end of the meeting they decided to set up an interim 
commission that would present „un plan de rassemblement de tous les éléments 
prolétariens … en vue de l‟unité d‟action‟ at the next party conference.279  At the 
thirty-first party conference held in Toulouse between 20 and 23 May, little 
progress was made as internal dissensions and divergence of views within the 
party eclipsed the debates on antifascism and unity. By and large party members 
still agreed that 6 February had made the fight against fascism a priority as stated 
in the final motion: 
Depuis l‟émeute fasciste du 6 février … le Parti doit se considérer en 
état de mobilisation permanente. Toute activité du parti doit se 
concentrer publiquement vers ce double objet: Préserver contre les 
agressions fascistes sa propre existence. Organiser la défense de 
tout ce que le fascisme menace.280   
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Fearing another split of the party when a number of activists left to found 
the Parti Socialiste de France (néo-socialistes), the SFIO leaders compromised on 
a final motion that put the three following principles at the same level: the conquest 
of power, the economic crisis and the fight against fascism. The Times 
correspondent wrote that the conference showed „a complete lack of unity‟ and 
that „the authority of the leaders was being questioned in consequence of the 
sterility of the policy pursued by them.‟281 As for the Radical L‟Oeuvre, its front 
page described the Toulouse motion „un vide stupéfiant‟.282 One month after the 
conference, the Communists directed their new campaign of „unité à tout prix‟ 
towards the Socialist party, and on 16 July 1935, Le Populaire‟s headline read, „Le 
Conseil National du 15 Juillet 1934 accepte l‟unité d‟action‟.283  
In public, Blum celebrated the alliance of the two parties, but he was well 
aware of the difficult relations between his party and the PCF.284 This became very 
apparent on the subject of a common manifesto. On 24 November 1934, in a letter 
sent to the SFIO by the Politburo, the PCF asked for „l‟établissement d‟un 
programme d‟action revendicative commun à nos deux partis.… [Ce] programme 
d‟action pouvant servir de base à la formation d‟un front populaire du travail, de la 
paix et de la liberté‟.285 The manifesto as presented by the PCF offered a broad list 
of demands aimed at the proletariat and the middle classes - „les ouviers, les petits 
commercants, les artisans [et] les fonctionnaires‟- such as „la semaine des 
quarante heures‟, „l‟institution de la propriété commerciale intégrale‟, „la dissolution 
des ligues fascistes‟ and „la dissolution de la Chambre et de nouvelles élections 
immédiates‟. Despite the SFIO‟s initial refusal to accept the programme proposed 
by the Communists, the two parties published the Popular Front‟s electoral 
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programme on 11 January 1936. In the end, it was the Socialists who were forced 
to back down on some their more extreme demands as the Communists were 
eager not to scare the middle classes with anti-capitalist and nationalisation 
declarations. Four months after the publication of the common manifesto, the 
Popular Front coalition won the legislative elections, which gave the SFIO and the 
Third Republic its first ever Socialist président du Conseil. 
It is quite clear that throughout this period, the SFIO struggled to contain 
dissent within its ranks. But under pressure from its base, the party half-heartedly 
entered the coalition in July 1934, which by then the PCF was actively pursuing. It 
is however not true to argue that the Socialist hesitations hindered the progress of 
the antifascist coalition and that the party merely followed the PCF. While the 
Communists were still calling the SFIO sociaux-fascites and assassins, Socialist 
activists were already debating the idea of a common front as favoured by the 
Zyromski and Pivert camp. Probably because the party structure and leadership 
was so different from that of the PCF – the party did not receive orders from a 
foreign director - the Socialists had to have debates and battles before coming to 
an agreement. The SFIO‟s refusal to compromise on a common manifesto with the 
PCF for over a year should also be interpreted as a sign of the party‟s refusal to 
follow the Communists‟ lead. They only agreed on the common programme once 
the Radicals had made it clear that they would join the Popular Front as the third 
force, thus balancing the power of the PCF in the coalition.  
In his speech at Pré-Saint-Germain in March 1934, Blum had urged the 
federations to lead the movements of unity with the Communists:  
Il faut dire aux fédérations et aux sections: Vous devez favoriser le 
courant unitaire et même en prendre l‟initiative, sans pour cela 
tomber dans les pièges qui vous seront tendus. Sur le plan national 
on ne peut rien espérer actuellement. Sur le plan international, 
Moscou renverrait sans doute au plan national.286 
And again in May 1934, at the thirty-first party conference, the SFIO reiterated the 
same message: „[Le parti] compte sur ses fédérations pour exalter et discipliner 
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l‟énergie militante des travailleurs en leur fixant ce mot d‟ordre: «Lutte sans merci 
contre le fascisme».‟287 It was therefore at the local level that the Socialist party 
sought, at least at first, to promote joint action with the PCF. 
Notwithstanding the lack of sources pertaining to the Mosellan federation of 
the Socialist party, it has nonetheless been possible to assess the role it played in 
the formation of the Popular Front.288 Although there is no evidence to suggest 
that Socialist militants took part in the general strike and demonstrations of 12 
February, a police report described a joint meeting between Radicals, Communists 
and Socialists as early as 16 February in Thionville.289 The meeting, organised by 
a Radical lawyer, Maître Bresitroff, gathered forty people and discussed, as the 
report put it, „les mesures à prendre en vue de riposter à la provocation [franciste] 
de dimanche 25 février 1934‟.290 As demonstrated earlier, the Communists were 
leading the common front in the département and the joint meeting of 16 February, 
which resulted in a vague promise from all parties to organise a counter-
demonstration against the Francistes, seems to be the Socialists‟ sole participation 
following 6 February. On 7 July 1934, before the party‟s national authorities had 
officially agreed to join the PCF in the common front, Paul Féry, president of the 
party‟s départemental federation and the Metz section, argued the necessity to 
unite the two parties in the fight against fascism.291 
Even though Féry supported the idea of the common front, the relations 
between his party and the PCF were far from ideal. A few days after the signature 
of the pact of unity and a week before Marcel Bucard, leader of the ligue 
Francisme, embarked upon a well-publicised tour the Moselle, the Socialists 
rejected the Communist invitation to a meeting whose aim was to discuss the visit 
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of Bucard in the département.292 In September 1934, when all political parties 
were preparing for the October cantonal elections, the SFIO did not take part in 
the discussions with the PCF on the electoral strategy of the common front. 
According to a police report, „le parti communiste éprouverait certaines difficultés 
pour l‟établissement de listes uniques avec les Socialistes … pour le deuxième 
tour. Ces difficultés prouveraient le désintéressement … du parti SFIO.‟293 And 
later in the year another police report described the Socialist position with regards 
to the common front in the following terms:  
Les partisans du Front commun sont nombreux mais en désaccord 
fréquent. Si bien que les résultats obtenus sont médiocres. Les 
dirigeants communistes Friedrich, Noll et Kirsch ainsi que le 
Secrétaire Fédéral socialiste Féry se rencontrent encore quelquefois 
au siège de « L‟Humanité » de Metz… Mais ce dernier n‟est pas 
suivi par ses amis politiques … [les Socialistes] redoutent d‟être 
absorbés par [le parti communiste] qui resterait seul bénéficiaire de 
la conjonction socialo-communiste.294  
 
Unlike their leader Féry, who seemed to have embraced the cause of the 
common front, the local Socialists openly criticised it. They believed the 
Communists were using it as a means to absorb the Socialist masses in their 
party. Their suspicion of Communist motives is not surprising. What is less 
obvious is why the Socialists did not build, or at least try to influence, the 
département‟s antifascist movement. Firstly, it would appear that the federation of 
the SFIO experienced difficulties after the scission with the Néos in 1933. Despite 
the party‟s claim that „le départ des néos n'avait en rien troublé la fédération de la 
Moselle‟, various police sources reveal that the split did in fact destabilise the 
federation.295 One report stated that the Socialist party in the Moselle had been in 
turmoil since the creation of the Parti des Socialistes de France: „Il y a désaccord 
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au sein [du parti socialiste] depuis la création du parti des Socialistes de 
France‟296, and another that „les scissions qui se sont produites depuis la 
constitution du parti des Socialistes de France … [ont] jeté la perturbation parmi 
les membres des sections mosellanes‟.297  
Secondly, it is reasonable to assume that the SFIO simply did not possess 
the necessary numbers to shift the balance of power in the coalition.298 Whereas 
the party at the national level could rely on the large federations of the Seine, the 
Nord or the South-West and a large group of parliamentarians at the National 
Assembly, the Mosellan activists were far less numerous than the Communists. 
Due to this imbalance, they probably felt they could do little to resist a Communist 
takeover and consequently delayed as long as they could their participation to the 
coalition.  
The CGT and CGTU 
On the eve of the formation of the Popular Front, both the CGT and the CGTU 
were in decline. According to Antoine Prost, their national numbers had sharply 
declined since the schism of 1921 and by 1934 they totalled less than 755,000: 
491,000 for the CGT and 264,000 for the CGTU.299 Prost argues that the scission 
and the hostile relations between the two unions were partly responsible for the 
decline in French workers‟ unionisation. In 1934, the leaders were Léon Jouhaux 
for the CGT and Benoît Frachon for the CGTU. So different were their characters 
and political paths that the reunification of their unions seemed almost impossible 
to achieve from the onset. But after the successful general strike of 12 February, 
which Frachon called „une démonstration d‟unité d‟action révolutionnaire contre le 
fascisme‟ and the U-turn operated by the PCF in June 1934, the CGTU 
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bombarded the CGT with calls for unity.300 Frachon recalls in his memoirs: „La 
CGTU accorda le plus grand soin à l‟unité des rangs‟ before remarking „la CGT, 
pour sa part, s‟entêta à repousser nos propositions de discussion au niveau 
national‟.301 
For as long as he could, Jouhaux refused the CGTU‟s invitations. Just like 
the PCF had done with the SFIO, the CGTU had vilified the CGT as traitors, and 
Jouhaux could not forget the thirteen-year long antagonism which had existed 
between the two organisations. But the damage caused by Laval‟s deflationary 
policy was paralysing the economy and intensifying the demands of his own rank 
and file for unity. He therefore yielded and argued in principle to unity.  Whereas 
he held out for unity at the level of unions and federations, the CGTU insisted 
upon unity at the top. Even when Jouhaux conceded this, other differences 
remained on the structure of the unified CGT, its independence vis-à-vis political 
parties, its programme and its position towards the Popular Front.302 So 
determined were the Communists to complete the merger that they gave way on 
the principles of structure and political independence and Frachon was made to 
resign from the party‟s Central Committee.303 The merger, confirmed at the 
congress of the reunited CGT in Toulouse in March 1936, marked a significant 
leap forward for the French left.  
But fifteen years of antagonism could not simply be swept aside, and the 
internal battles between the ex-confédérés and the ex-unitaires outlived the united 
CGT. A police report of July 1936 commented on the struggle for power within the 
new CGT:  
l‟entente n‟est pas parfaite au sein de la CGT où des oppositions de 
plus en plus vives se manifestent entre les ex-dirigeants confédérés 
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et unitaires. Le Parti Communiste continue à jouer son rôle … et … 
ses éléments s‟emparent peu à peu des directives syndicales.304 
By uniting its forces into one single union, the new CGT instilled hope and 
confidence in the hearts of millions of workers. No sooner had those hopes 
materialised in May 1936 with the Popular Front‟s victory that the CGT was faced 
with a challenge that would test its leadership even more: the unexpected wave of 
strikes that swept through the country.  
In the Moselle, apart from the industrial districts between Metz and 
Thionville, the west of Thionville and Forbach, left-wing trade unions were rare.305 
In December 1934, the Mosellan CGT was known as the Cartel Départemental 
des Syndicats Confédérés de la Moselle and gathered various unions at the 
départemental level. The CGTU was still organised at a regional level and was 
attached to the Union Régionale Unitaire d‟Alsace-Lorraine with headquarters in 
Strasbourg. Until June 1934, the Communist trade union‟s position was 
unequivocal: „nous ne marcherons jamais dans la combine [du] front unique avec 
tous les éléments chauvins.‟306 The issue of an independent Alsace-Lorraine was 
still high on the agenda of the regional union of the CGTU in early 1934 and the 
CGT was often accused of chauvinism. But in June the CGTU followed the PCF‟s 
line and sent its first invitation for joint action to the CGT. At the latter‟s 
départemental congress in Metz two weeks earlier, the leaders had already posed 
the first condition for joint action: „la cessation de toutes les attaques et calomnies, 
soit sur des personnes, soit sur des organisations‟.307 
In August 1934, the workers at the Manufacture des Tabacs in Metz tried to 
merge their unions into a single CGT union but as they could not agree on a 
choice of leader the project was abandoned.308 By the end of the summer the 
reunification had made little progress and despite the CGTU‟s repeated calls the 
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police reported that „la campagne menée en faveur de l‟unité syndicale n‟a encore 
abouti à aucune fusion‟.309 The same report blamed the lack of progress on the 
slow negotiations at the national level: „on peut supposer … [que l‟unité] … ne se 
réalisera dans notre région qu‟au cas où un accord interviendrait entre les grandes 
fédérations respectives.‟ The slow process may also be explained by the lack of 
representation in some parts of the département. In the Thionville and Basse-Yutz 
railway unions, the CGTU dominated a quasi-inexistent CGT. A similar situation 
existed in the Communist strongholds of Amnéville and Montigny-lès-Metz where 
the CGTU dominated since 1919. In Metz, however, the CGT controlled many of 
the unions, particularly among civil servants and factory workers, and the CGTU 
never succeeded in establishing a base there. But despite these hurdles, the 
reunification process gained momentum in the second half of 1935.  
By mid-1935, the railways unions had made some remarkable progress and 
after what a commissaire spécial called „une intense campagne de propagande … 
menée en particulier par les cheminots unitaires‟, talks between the 
representatives of the two trade unions finally began.310 After painstaking 
negotiations, they merged into the Union Unifiée des Cheminots d‟Alsace et de 
Lorraine in Strasbourg on 1 December 1935. Joining forces with the CGT and the 
CGTU were two local left-wing unions, the Syndicat des Echelles 5 à 10 and the 
Fédération des syndicats professionnels des cheminots.311 Based in Strasbourg, 
the freshly-created union formed a Mosellan committee, headed by Stosse, an ex-
confédéré, and based in Metz. The achievement of the railway unions was 
exemplary and paved the way towards the unification of other unions.  
On 22 December, the representatives of the interim Union Départementale 
des Syndicats Confédérés et Unitaires met in Metz to finalise the details of the 
congress of unification planned for 5 January 1936. The only two remaining points 
of friction by the end of December were, according to the préfet, „la désignation du 
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futur secrétaire permanent départemental et sa rétribution éventuelle.‟312 On 5 
January, in Metz, in front of 150 delegates representing over 10,000 supporters 
and thirty-five unions, the two trade unions‟ representatives sealed the 
reunification process and elected Alphonse Rieth, an ex-confédéré from Forbach, 
new leader of the Union Départementale des Syndicats Unifiés (UD) and Schwob, 
an ex-unitaire from Thionville, new deputy leader. The ex-confédérés were by then 
more numerous than the ex-unitaires: 70 percent of the members of the new 
Union Départementale des Syndicats Unifiés were ex-confédérés. At the national 
congress of reunification of the CGT in Toulouse in March, Rieth represented the 
départemental union.  
More delicate than the union of the political parties, the fusion of the CGT 
was handicapped by serious issues. As at the national level, the local unions were 
faced with tactical issues: who would be new leader, a confédéré or a unitaire? 
What would happen to the dependence of the CGTU upon the PCF? What role 
would the union assume within the Popular Front and which program would it 
adopt? But mirroring the Moselle‟s distinct social and political legacy, the two trade 
unions faced other challenges such as geographical organisation, culture and 
language: should the union be organised at regional or départemental level? 
Where should headquarters be: Metz or Strasbourg? What language should be 
used in the official literature? What of the question of independence of Alsace-
Lorraine so dear to the CGTU: should it be sacrificed in order to support the 
reunification? Through the numerous meetings that occurred after the summer of 
1935, the unions overcame such impediments and notwithstanding the 
paternalistic and authoritarian management style of the local patronat and the 
workers‟ lack of interest in left-wing social and political representation, the two 
trade unions accepted that joint action was necessary and possible. Moreover, the 
reunification gave the Mosellan workers a taste of independence vis-à-vis 
Strasbourg with the creation of the UD; unions that had been dominated by 
Strasbourg came to exist in a départemental structure with central offices and 
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leaders based in Metz.313 On the eve of the May 1936 elections, only two trade 
unions remained: the aforementioned UD and the Christian Syndicats 
Indépendants d‟Alsace-Lorraine, which had the support of the Union Républicaine 
Lorraine and the Action Catholique Lorraine. 
Part Three: The Right  
By early 1934, the forces of the right were divided into numerous political parties 
and ligues. The political right had won a narrow victory in the legislative elections 
in 1928, but after the left‟s success in 1932, the right-wing parties remained 
divided. Among those were Marin‟s Fédération Républicaine, Auguste Champetier 
de Ribes‟s Christian Parti Démocrate Populaire, Pierre-Etienne Flandin‟s secular 
Alliance Démocratique and the Mosellan Union Républicaine Lorraine by then also 
known as Union Républicaine Démocratique.  As for the ligues, they were equally 
disunited. Notwithstanding a few doctrinal differences, they upheld principles of 
patriotism, authoritarianism and a profound dislike of Communism. Their forces 
were dispersed among several organisations such as the nationalistic Croix de 
Feu, the patriotic Jeunesses Patriotes, the monarchist Action Française and the 
self-proclaimed fascist Francistes.  
After February 1934 and the right‟s return to power, the political right and 
the ligues informally agreed on a truce as they collectively supported Doumergue‟s 
government of national unity. But by the end of 1934, owing to Doumergue‟s 
inability to resolve the economic crisis, the right entered a chaotic period. Indeed, 
an examination of the right in the period 1934-1936 reveals that as the formation 
of the Popular Front gained momentum the right refused to form alliances. 
Moreover, dissent increased the political parties‟ rank and file as many lost faith in 
traditional politics and turned to the more radical ligues. In light of all this, the 
purpose of this third part is to answer the following two questions: to what extent 
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did the emerging Popular Front unite or divide the forces of the right and the 
ligues? To what extent did it drive them to radicalise?  
In order to answer these questions, the first section will examine the case of 
the political right through a study of three parties that counted Mosellan deputies 
and senators within their ranks: the Fédération Républicaine, the Parti Démocrate 
Populaire and the Union Républicaine Lorraine/Union Républicaine Démocratique. 
The second section will explore the influence of the Mosellan Catholic clergy and 
the Action Catholique Lorraine on local politics. The final section will offer an 
account of the ligues‟ position and in particular the Croix de Feu, Francisme and a 
local ligue, Neue Front.  
 
The Parliamentary Right 
Until February 1934, relations between the two national Catholic parties, the Parti 
Démocrate Populaire and the Fédération Républicaine, had been difficult. The 
latter often described the former as a party of „rouges chrétiens‟ and „socialistes de 
droite‟, torn between their progressive followers and their conservative Catholic 
network of notables.314 The Parti Démocrate Populaire referred to Marin as „un 
égaré dans la politique‟ incapable of leading a party that was divided between its 
pro-Republican and its pro-fascist elements.315 The Parti Démocrate Populaire, 
whose doctrine rejected the ligues‟ antirepublicanism and extremism, had indeed 
adopted an ambiguous position towards the demonstrators of 6 February. Some in 
the right wing of the party sympathised with the rioters - mainly because of the 
presence of war veterans on the streets of Paris that night – while others wholly 
condemned their anti-democratic actions. As for the Fédération Républicaine, it 
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unanimously described the riots of 6 February as a „magnifique mouvement 
d‟opinion‟.316  
Immediately after those events the Fédération Républicaine tried to form a 
wide parliamentary coalition in order to support Doumergue‟s government, but the 
Parti Démocrate Populaire refused to participate. In July 1934, it was the turn of 
Champetier de Ribes to call for a large centre party that would include among 
others his own party, the Fédération Républicaine, the Alliance Démocratique and 
those Radicals who refused joint action with the SFIO. But his efforts proved 
fruitless since, as the police reported, the Parti Démocrate Populaire „n‟a reçu que 
des paroles évasives de la part de la plupart des chefs des divers groupes 
politiques.‟317 At the Fédération Républicaine, Champetier de Ribes was mocked 
and accused of playing a double game since only a few months earlier he had 
refused to join the coalition Marin had proposed. It is clear that by trying to form a 
centre party in which the Parti Démocrate Populaire would play a pivotal role 
between the Fédération Républicaine and the Radical-Socialists and by 
challenging the left‟s common front and the ligues‟ Front National, - which shall be 
discussed later - Champetier de Ribes was mainly hoping to reduce his losses at 
the next elections.  
In September 1934, André Tardieu from the Alliance Démocratique  and 
Marcel Déat, the Socialist defector who founded of the néo-Socialiste party, tried 
to promote unity by inviting all conservatives to enter their republican front which 
they described as a third way between a radicalised right and a united left. Fearing 
that French politics were being polarised further by the presence of the front 
unique on the left and the organisation of a Front National on the far right, they 
sought to create a large coalition of right and centre-right parties that would in 
effect „prendre position contre la politique des deux blocs, contre les perspectives 
de guerre civile et de dictature qu‟elle implique [et] s‟enfoncer entre le Front 
Unique et le Front National.‟318 The Parti Démocrate Populaire initially responded 
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favourably to Tardieu‟s invitation as it corresponded to its refusal of the two blocs‟ 
politics, but in the end, fearing for the party‟s independence and unity, it turned the 
invitation down.  
As for the Fédération Républicaine, it also rejected Tardieu‟s proposal but 
in preparation for the October 1934 cantonal elections it urged its départemental 
federations to „désigner les candidats dans les rangs du parti ou, en cas 
d‟exception, suivant le principe d‟un pacte de désistement mutuel entre partisans 
de la politique d‟Union Nationale‟.319 Although there were no clear guidelines as to 
which parties the „partisans de l‟Union Nationale‟ should belong to, the Council 
issued a motion which clarified its message:  
Fidèle à … l‟esprit de redressement national du 6 février … la 
Fédération Républicaine de France … considérant que le Front 
Commun prétend utiliser les élections cantonales contre le Président 
[du Conseil] Doumergue et la politique de trêve, réclame et exige 
qu‟on ne voie plus ses représentants officiels soutenir des candidats 
qui combattent la politique du Gouvernement.320 
Even though the motion indicates that the Fédération Républicaine acknowledged 
the significance of the truce among right-wing parties and the threat of a united 
left, it also highlights the party‟s limits as to how far it was prepared to go: yes for 
an informal electoral strategy but no to a formal electoral alliance. The Fédération 
Républicaine, just like the Parti Démocrate Populaire, was unwilling to take the 
truce any further.  
Another instance of the two parties‟ immobility occurred when the two 
parties failed to form an alliance with Flandin‟s Alliance Démocratique for the May 
1935 municipal elections. Marin was aware of the impact a united left could have 
on the French electorate. As a a police report noted,   
preoccupés du danger que l‟accord conclu entre les socialistes et les 
communistes fera courir, en Mai [1935], à un certain nombre de 
candidats nationaux … les secrétaires régionaux de la Fédération 
Républicaine … et du Parti Démocrate Populaire procèdent à des 
enquêtes dans les quartiers de Paris.321  
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Their „enquêtes‟ concluded that although „il faut prévoir des pertes de sièges … ce 
serait miracle … si [certains] conseillers nationaux pouvaient résister à la coalition 
des socialistes et des communistes.‟322 Even though both parties recognised the 
need for unity, their efforts did not materialise. Their inability or unwillingness to 
collaborate combined with the left‟s strategy of a Popular Front resulted in the 
highly-charged symbolic defeat of George Lebecq, one of the leading protesters 
on 6 February, and the victory of Paul Rivet of the Comité de Vigilance des 
Intellectuels Antifascistes (CVIA) in Paris‟s 5th arrondissement.323 Rivet won 
thanks to the second round agreement between the SFIO, the PCF and the 
Radicals after the Communist and Socialist candidates agreed to stand down in 
his favour. 
In the Moselle, the Union Républicaine Lorraine, considered by the préfet 
as „le plus puissant parti politique de la Moselle‟ remained more a loose 
association of local notables than a real political organisation.324 It did not possess 
a leader or a defined political agenda and relied on the Catholic Le Lorrain to 
spread its message. Because there was no party capable of challenging the Union 
Républicaine Lorraine‟s hegemony, the latter did not face the obstacles met by the 
Fédération Républicaine and the Parti Démocrate Populaire. Indeed, the results of 
the 1934 cantonal elections indicate that the Union Républicaine Lorraine easily 
secured the majority of seats in the départemental assembly. Out of the eighteen 
seats available for election, the Union Républicaine Lorraine/Union Républicaine 
Démocratique won fifteen and Antoni‟s Christlich-Soziale Partei the remaining 
three.325 It was therefore to its right and not to its left that the Union Républicaine 
Lorraine‟s hegemony was challenged. 
The three Autonomist seats were in Fénétrange, Sarralbe and Phalsbourg, 
three towns located in the German-speaking zone of the département. In the case 
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of Fénétrange, the préfet noted that collusion between some of the Communist 
electorate and the Christlich-Soziale Partei led to the victory of Antoni, the 
Autonomist candidate. As he wrote, „cette collusion a constitué le facteur 
déterminant du succès de M Antoni.‟326 Though is not clear why some Communist 
supporters voted for the Autonomist candidate (the PCF presented a candidate at 
the first and second round) their behaviour might have been motivated by rational 
thinking. By voting for the Autonomist candidate regardless of his political 
allegiance, they expressed their desire to see the Autonomist cause represented 
at the départemental assembly. Though there is no evidence to suggest this claim, 
it is also possible that the Autonomist party broke a deal with the Communists who 
supported them at the second round. Thus, the political colour of the newly elected 
départemental assembly of October 1934 remained unchanged: the assembly 
elected Guy de Wendel president and abbé Ritz secretary-general. A year later, 
Robert Sérot, the Union Républicaine Lorraine deputy for Metz Campagne, was 
elected vice-president.  
This was confirmed at the May 1935 municipal elections, which are seen by 
some historians as „le véritable acte de naissance électoral du Front populaire‟, as 
Yuan Combeau puts it.327 They are indeed fundamental in the understanding of 
the relations between the emerging Popular Front and the right. They were the last 
national consultation before the 1936 legislative elections and revealed a 
noticeable swing to the left, at least at the national level. In the Moselle, however, 
the Union Républicaine Lorraine‟s victory was unequivocal: it won 93 percent of 
the municipalities (707 out of 764). In his position as mayor of Metz and a leading 
member of the Union Républicaine Lorraine, Vautrin made public his position 
towards the Popular Front one month before the elections, 
Nous prenons l‟engagement sur parole d‟honneur de nous placer 
sans réserve sur le terrain national … [et] de répudier toute adhésion 
et toute collaboration à une liste communiste, socialiste ou associée 
dans un front commun. Nous ne permettons aucune distinction … 
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entre les partis politiques depuis l‟extrême droite jusque et y compris 
les Socialistes de France.328 
Vautrin‟s message echoed the local right‟s general attitude of hostility towards the 
common front‟s candidates and the rather sympathetic stance towards the far right 
and the Néo-socialists. It appears that Vautrin need not have worried by making 
such declarations as his list won all the seats in Metz.   
The Mosellan results revealed not only the poor performance of the left but 
also the right‟s lack of discipline in some parts of the département. The left lost 
Rombas and Basse-Yutz, two Communist bastions that had played a key role in 
the fight against fascism and the ligues.329 And in Hayange, despite the victory of 
Communist dissident Béron in the first round, Guy de Wendel‟s Union 
Républicaine Démocratique list won a majority of seats in the municipal council. 
The PCF preserved Amnéville, Hagondange and Saint-Julien-lès-Metz and won 
the industrial bastion of Mondelange, lost by the right because of its inability to 
resolve „des rivalités de personnes et la désunion des modérés‟, as a police report 
suggested.330 As for the Socialists, they conquered the town of Petite-Rosselle, 
situated in the de Wendel mining district in the French Saarland. On the face of it, 
the Popular Front secured one important victory: Sarreguemines with the election 
of Socialist Nicklaus. His list, comprising Communists, Socialists and Union 
Républicaine Lorraine dissidents, defeated the list presented by Henri Nominé, the 
town‟s Union Républicaine Lorraine deputy-mayor. Nicklaus‟s feat, however, 
should not be taken at face value. Indeed, it appears that his victory was only 
made possible thanks to the support of the Union Républicaine Lorraine 
dissidents. Nominé‟s list won eight seats, the dissidents Union Républicaine 
Lorraine‟s seven and Nicklaus‟s list twelve. These results suggest that had the 
Union Républicaine Lorraine remained united, the left probably would have been 
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defeated. The département‟s only Popular Front victory was thus due to the right‟s 
disagreement rather than the left‟s unity.  
The Sarreguemines election illustrates that even if the left had applied the 
strategy of a united front throughout the département it would have been 
extremely difficult to defeat the Union Républicaine Lorraine. As the préfet noted in 
a pre-election report,  
en dépit de multiples tentatives, pour rallier sous la bannière d‟un 
parti ou d‟une personnalité la masse … [des] électeurs, aucune 
formation politique n‟a réussi à triompher des tendances 
conservatrices et traditionnalistes … [de l‟Union Républicaine 
Lorraine].331  
This explains the right‟s firm hold over the département and raises the question of 
whether the emerging Popular Front had any hope of altering this situation. Was 
the left doomed to lose and remain in the right‟s shadow or would the next general 
elections provide the opportunity the left was hoping for? 
It is clear that by early 1936 the parliamentary right was divided. The Parti 
Démocrate Populaire and the Fédération Républicaine‟s political agenda, as well 
as those of other national right-wing political parties, were too contradictory to form 
an electoral or parliamentary agreement, and no party was willing to compromise. 
Although publicly they advocated a political truce and unity, they were too 
preoccupied with their own power struggle and failed to put their differences aside. 
They also failed to take the left seriously and consequently lost a few seats at the 
municipal elections. Perhaps a crisis similar to that of 6 February would have 
served the right by providing the catalyst it needed to join its forces; after all, it is 
highly probable that without the riots of the 6 February the left would never have 
engaged on the path to unity. The right was not unaware of the rising popularity of 
the Popular Front, but did the left represent a serious threat in 1934-1936? Or did 
the threat come from a decomposition of the right itself?  
Laval‟s unpopular deflationist decrees in July 1935 caused a wave of 
discontent throughout the country and angered many traditional supporters of the 
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right. In his monthly report, the préfet noted „les répercussions profondes‟ and „le 
mécontentement assez vif‟ among the département‟s fonctionnaires and 
throughout the summer many demonstrated against the decrees, mainly under the 
auspices of the fonctionnaire‟s trade unions.332 None of the demonstrations 
resulted in riots, but one of the indubitable consequences of the decrees was the 
radicalisation of many supporters of the right.333 In a letter to Jean Guiter, the 
Fédération Républicaine‟s secretary-general, a customs officer from the Moselle 
wrote, „si les décrets-lois sont votés … ce serait antifamilial et antisocial‟ and 
hoped politicians would find less radical ways to „équilibrer la solution difficile du 
déficit‟.334 In another letter, a member of the Fédération Républicaine wrote of his 
inability to accept the décrets-lois and „[a] l‟honneur de présenter sa démission de 
membre de la Fédération Républicaine‟.335 Many similar letters were received at 
the Fédération Républicaine‟s offices and among these several indicated the 
radicalisation of some of its supporters. Impatient before his party‟s support of 
such policies and its inability to solve the economic crisis, a party member from 
Saint-Etienne questioned Louis Marin‟s view of the Croix de Feu and asked why 
the Fédération Républicaine cast aside „ce mouvement [qui] répond bien aux 
sentiments de gens que nous aurions pu attirer chez nous.‟336 
The relations between the parliamentary right and the ligues took a singular 
turn in that period when many traditional right wingers, tired of traditional politics, 
turned to them. This trend confirms Kevin Passmore‟s view that „it was out of a 
crisis of conservatism that fascism emerged‟.337 In a letter to the Fédération 
Républicaine, a representative of the section of Vienne complained, „on déserte 
notre parti pour les ligues. Nos amis sont sceptiques sur l‟efficacité de l‟action ... 
de nos représentants au gouvernement‟ and added that he would like to see 
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„l‟intransigeance nécessaire pour barrer la route au front commun‟.338 At a meeting 
gathering the Jeunesses Patriotes, the Solidarité Française and the Action 
Française in August 1935, Philippe Henriot, deputy for the Gironde and a leading 
member of the Fédération Républicaine, summarised his position: „qu‟il soit 
république autoritaire, fascisme, roi, nous suivrons le régime qui aura sauvé la 
France‟.339 Even though Henriot‟s declaration did not meet with Marin‟s 
agreement, it nonetheless reflected the drift to the far right of a growing minority 
within the ranks of the political right. In the Moselle, the Union Républicaine 
Lorraine/Union Républicaine Démocratique had always entertained good relations 
with the ligues and important members of the party such as Ritz did not hesitate to 
openly support them (see chapter One).  
The Catholic Clergy 
By 1934 Mosellan Catholics were also divided between two blocs: the Action 
Catholique Lorraine, which counted roughly 35,000 members in 1934, and the 
Volksbund.340 While the first was chiefly found in the Metz area and was closely 
linked to the Catholic political right, the second had many followers in the south-
eastern cantons bordering Germany and Alsace and supported Antoni‟s Christlich-
Soziale Partei. Their poor relations notwithstanding, the two groups were, as 
reported by the police, united in their loathing of „les activités du gouvernement 
cartelliste, radical-socialiste et socialiste‟, Communism and other secular 
organisations „qui ont pour but la destruction de la morale et de l‟école chrétienne‟ 
and their support of the Doumergue government.341  
Due to the large number of Mosellans supporting the Action Catholique 
Lorraine and the latter‟s close relation with the Mosellan right, the Catholic 
association deserves particular attention. Although it publicly denied any political 
allegiance or role, the Action Catholique Lorraine claimed that as a religiously-
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focused organisation it had a moral obligation to educate the Catholic masses and 
guide them in their civic duty. Boiteux, president of the Action Catholique Lorraine, 
defined the association as „ni un parti politique, ni une organisation électorale mais 
un vaste organisme destiné à réunir tous les Catholiques dans la défense des 
intérêts de la patrie‟.342 Ritz‟s message echoed Boiteux‟s: „Le catholique se doit 
d‟être à la fois le bon citoyen de la Cité du Monde et de la Cité de Dieu … [son] 
devoir politique … est d‟aider au redressement de la France‟ regardless of the 
form of the regime.343 As long as the latter was not „incompatible avec la vie 
religieuse, l‟action catholique, la mission de l‟Eglise‟ Ritz and the Action Catholique 
Lorraine encouraged Mosellan Catholics to support their government, whether 
they be „republicain, royaliste, bonapartiste, fasciste ou autre‟.344 The Action 
Catholique Lorraine also believed that its duty was to guide its flock in the 
meanders of French foreign policy. Its message, full of nationalistic references, 
emphasised the need for a resolute and determined France vis-à-vis the Soviet 
Union and its rising German neighbour, which Ritz described as „exécrable par 
essence et [qui] doit être brisé sans pitié, sans remords‟.345 Ritz‟s nationalism was 
so virulent that he described himself as „le théologien du nationalisme‟.346 
Regarding the events of February 1934 and their effect on French politics, 
the Mosellan clergy clearly supported the rioters of 6 February and the right‟s 
return to power. In his newspaper, Ritz described the victims of 6 February as „les 
pauvres tués de la Concorde [qui] voulaient que la République française cesse 
d‟être un gouvernement de voleurs.‟347 Similarly, various police reports 
communicated the Action Catholique Lorraine and the Volskbund‟s strong support 
of the right‟s return to power.348 At an Action Catholique Lorraine meeting held in 
Metz on 25 February 1934, before an audience of 2,000 people comprising of 
prominent political and religious personalities such as Schuman, Monseigneur Pelt 
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(bishop of Metz), Guy de Wendel, Paul Vautrin and many local councillors, Boiteux 
publicly agreed with Ritz‟s sympathetic description of the rioters of 6 February and 
celebrated the fall of the Radical governments of Chautemps and Daladier.349 It 
was during this meeting that Schuman was appointed honorary president of the 
Action Catholique Lorraine because of his efforts to stop Guy de la Chambre‟s 
circulaire which proposed a change in the regulation pertaining to religious 
education in Alsatian and Mosellan schools. As Raymond Poidevin duly writes, 
„Dans l‟entre-deux guerres la bataille pour le maintien du Concordat en Alsace-
Lorraine est inséparable de la question scolaire. Schuman s‟engage à fond dans 
ce combat.‟350 Indeed, Schuman and the rest of his party posed as the defenders 
of the Church‟s special status and assured the Mosellan Catholics that, as 
reported by the police, „à aucun prix il ne laissera toucher au statut scolaire‟.351 
With regards to the left‟s common front and the fight against fascism, the 
Mosellan clergy‟s position was clear. Based on its intrinsic loathing of Communism 
and laicism, represented by organisations such as the CGT and the PCF, the 
Mosellan clergy wholly rejected the Popular Front. At the Action Catholique 
Lorraine‟s annual general assembly held in Metz on 15 February 1934, the canon 
Louis reminded his audience of the dangers of freemasonry „qui, sous des 
masques différents (socialisme, CGT, etc) cherche à tromper la bonne foi de gens 
non avertis‟.352 As for Ritz, he strongly encouraged his Catholic readership to fight 
the left and follow the parties of order such as the Union Républicaine Lorraine. As 
he wrote in February 1934,  
Il n‟est écrit dans aucun catéchisme qu‟un catholique français 
doive… faire le bon enfant de chœur … dans toutes les sacristies 
radicales et socialistes du régime. La conscience d‟un catholique ne 
pourra jamais lui imposer d‟accepter le rôle de valet que les partis de 
gauche lui font remplir.353  
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Likewise, the Volksbund warned its followers of what a police report described as 
„les conséquences politiques désastreuses … du marxisme au pouvoir… ce 
dernier [étant] l‟amalgame des partis radical-socialiste, SFIO et communiste‟.354 
According to Zentz, one of the main leaders of the Volksbund, only a stable and 
strong government based on the principles of Christian moral and religious ideal 
would avoid a victory of the left.  So strong and persuasive was the clergy‟s anti-
left message among the population that according to a police report, the May 1935 
electoral campaign „a fait ressortir l‟influence prépondérante des milieux qui se 
réclament de l‟Action Catholique.‟355 The report concluded with the following 
words: „Partout, l‟emprise du clergé demeure puissante‟.  
Detrimental to the left‟s efforts, the Mosellan Catholic organisations‟ 
propaganda among the working class masses seemed to be most effective. 
Instead of the class against class struggle advocated by the Communist doctrine, 
many clergymen and politicians sought to resolve the economic crisis with the 
advent of a new order based on social justice and cooperation as well as Christian 
charity. At the Associations Catholiques de la Jeunesse Française‟s regional 
congress held in Thionville in September 1935, Debray, president of the 
association, declared in front of a 2,000-strong audience, „nous nous organisons 
non pour une lutte de classe mais … pour une action basée sur les principes du 
Christ‟.356 And speaking in the name of the Belgian youth group, canon Cardijn 
proclaimed, „L‟ouvrier n‟est pas une machine, il ne doit pas travailler pour enrichir 
un patron mais, comme l‟a voulu le Christ, pour gagner son pain quotidien, il doit 
être considéré comme le fils et l‟héritier de Dieu.‟357 Based on the principles of 
Pope Leo XIII‟s encyclical letter Rerum novarum and reminiscent of the Parti 
Démocrate Populaire‟s programme, Christian socialism met with great success 
among the Mosellan working masses. As the police reported after the congress: 
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„Ces théories sociales sont accueillies avec sympathie par les populations de la 
Moselle, où le prestige et l‟autorité de l‟Eglise Catholique demeurent puissants‟.358  
It is difficult to evaluate the actual role of the clergy within the context of the 
formation of the Popular Front and the effect it had on the emerging left-wing 
coalition. All the same, it is impossible to ignore the political weight of its 
organisations, and it seems evident that, despite its claims of apolitical principles, 
the local clergy‟s close relationship with the local right-wing political elite played a 
decisive role in the 1934 and 1935 elections. What is more, the clergy could rely 
on the support of organisations such as the Volksbund and the Action Catholique 
Lorraine and the silent approval of hundreds of thousands of fervent Catholics. 
Although it has not been possible to establish the number of Volksbund members, 
a police report stated that the organisation counted among its supporters 87 
percent of the electorate in some parts of the département.359 The issue of the 
Concordat and the place of the Catholic Church in society are central in the 
understanding of the département‟s politics in the interwar years and it is therefore 
not surprising that Catholic politicians, journalists, businessmen and clergymen 
found themselves involved in the same organisations. Spirituality was not only part 
of their private lives; it had to be expressed in the public sphere and propagated 
whenever possible through their newspapers, public speeches and political action. 
But like right-wing political parties elsewhere in the country, the local Catholic 
clergy was divided.  
The issue of Autonomism and Germany were at the core of the division 
within the Mosellan clergy. The Volksbund, whose motto was „Religion first‟, 
advocated the use of German before that of French, favoured some form of 
administrative autonomy for the département and called for a revaluation of 
Germany‟s position on the international scene. According to a police report the 
Volksbund‟s position towards Germany in 1934 – one year after the Nazis‟ rise to 
power – was clear: it believed that the Versailles peace treaty „avait fait fausse 
route à l‟égard de l‟Allemagne et trompé l‟état actuel des esprits dans ce pays qui 
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était las de se voir relégué au second plan et maintenu dans un état 
d‟infériorité.‟360 It also criticised the League of Nations for maintaining „la 
suprématie de la France en Europe‟. As for the local political scene, the Volskbund 
blamed the Union Républicaine Lorraine‟s parliamentarians‟ deplorable attitude 
vis-à-vis the protection of the département‟s religious status and praised Antoni‟s 
efforts. The Action Catholique Lorraine, under the authority of the diocese, tried to 
pacify its relations with the Volksbund by calling for what a police report described 
as „l‟union de tous les catholiques dans l‟Action Catholique‟.361 But differences 
were too deep-seated and the two organisations remained divided. The Moselle‟s 
cultural and linguistic frontier which had shaped political Catholicism since the 
early 1900s continued to divide Mosellan Catholics.  
The tension between the two factions is reminiscent of the PCF‟s internal 
dissensions and eventual split in 1929, and highlights once again the importance 
of the German heritage and the issue of Autonomism. These two factors, which 
were intrinsically linked, split Mosellan society and politics throughout much of the 
interwar period. But regardless of the Catholics‟ lack of unity, the département‟s 
right wingers united against one common enemy: Communism. Exposed to the 
rise of a united left and the political right‟s inability to foster a sense of unity and 
action, many Mosellan right wingers radicalised and turned towards the ligues. 
Those Mosellans who grew weary of the Français de l‟Intérieur‟s politics and of the 
right‟s disagreements were to find their most vocal representative in Ritz and Le 
Lorrain.  When he asked himself in one of his articles, „Quand donc nos frères de 
l‟Intérieur auront-ils le sens de cette union? Comment voulons-nous gagner nos 
adversaires si nous saisissons… la torche de la discorde contre nos frères ?‟ he 
presented the ligues and de la Rocque‟s Croix de Feu in particular as „ce 
mouvement de réconciliation, d‟ordre et d‟honneur‟ that would rid France and the 
Moselle of freemasonry.362 
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The Ligues 
Neue Front, also known as Force Nouvelle, was founded in Strasbourg on 30 
September 1933 and was first introduced in the Moselle in the Sarreguemines 
area a few months later.363 It embraced the principles of Corporatism, held Nazism 
and Fascism as models and advocated „l‟établissement d‟un régime d‟autorité 
dans un sens nettement fasciste‟ according to a police report.364 It counted around 
400 members in Sarreguemines in February 1934, and although it initially 
supported the truce advocated by the right, it soon embarked on a violent 
campaign against the parliamentary regime.365 Considered very active and 
effective by the prefectural authorities, the movement‟s violent tactics - its 
paramilitary troops often clashed with local Communists - and its rising popularity 
in the French Saarland resulted in the creation of the Moselle‟s first ANTIFA 
committees.  
The first of the ANTIFA groups emerged in Sarreguemines in mid-January 
1934 and gathered Radicals, Socialists and Communists. As in the rest of the 
département the Communists led the ANTIFA movement, and despite its repeated 
campaigns against Neue Front, the latter spread its activities in the surrounding 
towns and villages and attracted growing numbers of supporters (830 at the end of 
April 1934), including followers of two rival ligues, the Jeunesses Patriotes and the 
Solidarité Française.366 Neue Front's remit never expanded beyond the French 
Saarland and because its programme resembled that of the Christlich-Soziale 
Partei (without the paramilitary and fascist elements), the latter prevented it from 
developing. A police report offered a plausible explanation as to why Neue Front 
failed to expand its base further:  
En général la population de notre région ne prend pas ses directives 
politiques en Alsace, mais suit plutôt les … idées de la capitale. 
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C‟est dire que Force Nouvelle n‟a pas beaucoup de chance de 
trouver de trouver des adhérents .… [I]l est combattu par le parti 
“chrétien-social”.367  
Founded by Marcel Bucard, a decorated war veteran, in September 1933, 
the ligue Francisme pledged to undertake France‟s second revolution. Its motto 
was Paix, Justice and Ordre, and the Francistes, the supporters of the ligue, were 
recognisable by their blue shirts. In the Moselle, Francisme gathered momentum 
after Bucard‟s visit in Metz on 26 February 1934 and soon appeared as the fastest 
growing ligue in the département.368 Indeed, according to a police report from 
Paris, „si le parti franciste ne recrute plus que rares adhésions à Paris … il n‟en est 
pas de même dans l‟Est où dans les régions de Metz et Thionville ses progrès 
sont assez marquants‟.369 In July 1934, the ligue opened the very first of its 
meeting place (maison bleue) in Basse-Yutz, a Communist stronghold, and Metz 
became the headquarters of the movement‟s Marne-Moselle regional federation – 
France‟s largest. Throughout 1934, Bucard‟s tours of the département attracted 
hundreds of sympathisers and the support of Metz‟s Francophone right-wing 
newspaper Le Messin, which saw in Bucard‟s ligue a shield against Communism. 
But despite its intense propaganda, Francisme never really established itself in the 
Moselle and by mid-1935 the movement was in serious decline. By then, despite 
Bucard‟s assertions and the fact that the Marne-Moselle federation was the largest 
in France, it appears that, as a police informer put it, „contrairement aux indications 
de Marcel Bucard … qui prétend que dans le l‟Est le nombre des adhérents ... 
serait de plusieurs milliers, l‟effectif dans la région Alsace-Lorraine-Vosges ne 
serait que de 800 à 900 membres, dont 500 réellement actifs‟.370  
 Why did Francisme fail to establish deeper roots in the département? Many 
factors worked against it, the first being its programme. On the face of it, 
Francisme may have appeared as an organisation close to the values of the 
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conservative and religious Mosellans: it was Catholic, regionalist but not 
Autonomist, anti-Socialist, anti-secular and anti-Communist; the subtitle of the 
ligue‟s newspaper Le Franciste‟s read Organe de Documentation et de Combat 
contre le Bolchévisme, and Bucard believed his movement‟s mission was to rid 
France of the Communists, „ces faux patriotes made in Moscou‟ as he called 
them.371 But two aspects of its programme would meet resistance and abhorrence 
among the local population: its call for a revolution and its support of Nazi 
Germany and Fascist Italy. Bucard openly described himself a revolutionary fascist 
and called for „une alliance totale avec l‟Italie mussolinienne et la paix avec 
l‟Allemagne hitlérienne‟ at the ligue‟s first national congress in June 1934.372 
During his tour of the Moselle in 1934, Bucard also called for what a police report 
described as „un resserrement des relations franco-allemandes‟.373 By and large 
Mosellans were not prone to revolutionary ideas and their vision of politics did not 
marry with one that identified itself with a foreign ideology whether it was 
Communism or Fascism. Likewise, they rejected Bucard‟s call to befriend 
Germany, a country where Catholics and conservatives were terrorised and 
submitted to the Nazi purge.  
Another factor which may have held back Francisme was its constant lack 
of funds. Possibly because of its revolutionary aspect, the ligue never attracted the 
financial backing of the wealthy donors who backed up ligues as the Jeunesses 
Patriotes and the Solidarité Française.374 Its main sources of revenue originated 
from the sale of its newspaper and its members‟ subscriptions, but these quickly 
proved insufficient and the ligue found itself in serious financial difficulties in July 
1935. This financial crisis coincided with the movement‟s decline in the Moselle 
and following a series of relatively unsuccessful meetings in the département, 
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which Bucard himself presided, the movement almost disappeared.375 The préfet 
compared this decline with the steady rise of the concurrent Croix de Feu who 
„progressivement étend ses ramifications sur tout le département‟.376  
Founded originally as a veterans‟ organisation in 1927, the Croix de Feu 
quickly became the largest political organisation in France under the auspices of 
Lieutenant-Colonel François de la Rocque who rose to leadership in 1931. By July 
1935 the French police estimated its membership at 240,000 and by January 1936 
the figure rose to nearly half a million.377 As Soucy points out, the Croix de Feu‟s 
programme was very similar to that of Francisme.378 On the one hand, it glorified 
war veterans, patriotism, discipline, authoritarianism, Catholicism and class 
collaboration, while on the other it rejected parliamentary democracy, left-wing 
principles of class struggle, the French Revolution‟s legacy of egalitarianism and 
secularism. With regards to the issue of Alsace-Lorraine, it rejected the 
Communists and Autonomists‟ call for independence and favoured a form of 
regionalism in administrative and economic affairs. But unlike Francisme, it 
rejected the attribute of fascist and denied any link or allegiance to a foreign power 
or movement and used the triptych Travail, Famille, Patrie as its motto.379 Because 
its programme was so vague, it attracted people from many different horizons.380  
In the Moselle, war veterans were not allowed initially to join the Croix de 
Feu because of their service in the German army during the Great War. By 1935, 
however, the ban was lifted and Mosellan veterans who had served as German 
soldiers were able to join the movement.381  In May 1934, the membership of the 
départemental section of the Croix de Feu was roughly 400; by March 1936 it rose 
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to 12,000.382  The ligue could rely on the support of the local notables such as 
business owners, the press, the Catholic clergy as well as politicians. The Croix de 
Feu‟s popularity was most noticeable in the urban and industrial cantons where its 
influence was further intensified by the support of management and large 
businesses. It would seem that the préfet himself was not indifférent to the Croix 
de Feu when he wrote in a report, „dans les milieux ouvriers, à l‟ardeur des 
convictions, vient s‟ajouter les efforts de persuasion raisonnée du personnel 
dirigeant, dont un des membres est, invariablement, a la tête de la section [Croix 
de Feu] locale‟.383  
The diocese, through Ritz, also supported the organisation and while the 
French National Assembly was debating the possible proscription of the ligues at 
the end of 1935, the local press and clergy rallied behind the Croix de Feu. The 
Sections Croix de Feu de la Lorraine, du pays de Bar et des Marches de l‟Est 
even used a series of Ritz‟s articles from Le Lorrain as propaganda material in 
leaflets handed out during their meetings. The leaflets featured articles in which 
Ritz described the Croix de Feu as „la saine opinion des forces saines, nationales 
… et catholiques du pays‟ and praised them as „les opposants au …  front 
commun [qui] veulent la réconciliation de tous les Français‟.384 In return for his 
support, Ritz was described by the Croix de Feu as a true patriot and a true 
Lorrainer. During a private meeting held in Metz, before an audience of 3,000, 
Andrès, president of the Mosellan section, described Ritz‟s „magnifiques pages 
consacrées au movement Croix de Feu‟ as significant; the audience responded 
with cries of „Vive l‟abbé Ritz‟.385  
Although de la Rocque repeatedly stated his movement‟s dissociation from 
the politics of the two blocs with his famous „ni droite, ni gauche‟ and „nous ne 
sommes à personne, nous sommes les Croix de Feu‟ statements, it appears that 
underneath its apolitical cover, de la Rocque‟s organisation often posed as the 
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most vocal defenders of the right against the rising left.386  Just before the 1935 
municipal elections, counting on the rising popularity of his movement, de la 
Rocque reminded candidates that they could not use their Croix de Feu 
credentials and in a document sent to all local Croix de Feu sections he wrote, „il 
est defendu aux dirigeants des Croix de Feu ... de se porter candidat aux 
prochaines élections‟.387 Instead, the Croix de Feu were encouraged to „former 
partout des commissions d‟arbitrage choisissant … les candidats d‟intérêt 
public‟.388  
Who did the Croix de Feu judge „d‟intérêt public‟, or rather who did they 
not? At the top of their list of the indésirables came the PCF and the Popular 
Front. For the 1935 elections de la Rocque encouraged his followers to support 
any candidate who made it his priority to „barrer la route au socialisme, au 
communisme et a [leurs] alliés, présents ou futurs‟.389 By early 1936, the national 
Croix de Feu were ready „de se lancer dans la bataille dont ils peuvent être 
l‟arbitre‟ promising „s‟il le faut, au moment propice, pour lutter contre le front 
populaire et même au besoin, [de] s‟emparer du pouvoir‟ as a Croix de Feu 
businessman from Le Havre put it.390 
After 6 February 1934, the Croix de Feu sought to win mass support and 
power by appealing to as large a population as possible. The ligue saw the void 
created by a chaotic right on the one side and an organised left on the other as a 
major avenue to power. Other minor ligues were present in the Moselle at the 
time, but none of them matched the membership or the magnetism of the Croix de 
Feu. Even the Front National, a coalition of the ligues initiated by the Solidarité 
Française in May 1934 and supported by the Action Française and the Jeunesses 
Patriotes, failed to attract the same numbers as the Croix de Feu. Incidentally, 
both Francisme and the Croix de Feu refused to join the Front National, an 
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organisation which, according to the préfet of the Moselle was „d‟une cohésion fort 
douteuse‟.391  
It is clear that the ligues‟ common aversion to parliamentary democracy and 
attraction to authoritarianism did not suffice to overcome their divergences, and 
just like the parliamentary right, from which they had won many new supporters, 
they struggled to unite their forces in joint action. In early 1936 they faced an 
uncertain future after the National Assembly introduced a law banning paramilitary 
groups, and they counted on a defeat of the left at the next legislative elections.392 
Since the Popular Front promised the suppression of the ligues in its programme, 
their own survival depended on a victory of the right. Hence de la Rocque 
promised to support any candidate who, in his own words, would work on 
„l‟élimination des influences socialistes, communistes et alliées‟ at the next 
elections.393 Did his efforts prove effective? At the national level, the answer is no, 
since the right lost the elections but in the Moselle, events took a rather different 
turn as the right won the elections; as the next chapter shall demonstrate, the 
Croix de Feu played a significant part in it. The election results, however, should 
not have come as a surprise since on the eve of the elections the local left and the 
PCF in particular were still disunited and embroiled in internal crises. In response 
to the Croix de Feu‟s growing popularity among the Mosellan population, the préfet 
reported „le manque de réaction des milieux d‟extrême gauche‟.394 Where were the 
PCF and the Popular Front if not fighting those they called „les ligueurs fascistes‟? 
According to the préfet, the PCF „s‟emploie activement à reconstituer ses cadres 
et à réorganiser ses formations‟.395    
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Conclusion 
Thus while 6 February was a Parisian event that belonged to the right, 12 
February was a nation-wide event that demonstrated the readiness of the left‟s 
rank and file to unite against the fascist threat. After the SFIO and the PCF signed 
the pact of unity in July 1934, events moved swiftly for the Popular Front 
nationally. In January 1936, the coalition had a common programme and could 
rely on the support of the newly-unified CGT. In the Moselle, local activists‟ joint 
actions against the ligues predated the union of the left nationally. After „l‟unité à 
tout prix‟ became the PCF‟s official doctrine in June 1934, the local Popular Front 
slowly came together under the leadership of the Communists.  
The formation of the Popular Front in the Moselle encountered a very 
singular fate because of the particular context in which it took place. Firstly, the 
coalition was not tripartite but dual. The Radical-Socialists, the party of the middle-
classes and one of the three major political forces behind the left-wing coalition, 
was quasi-inexistent in the Moselle. In the Sarreguemines area, where the 
Radicals tried to enter the coalition, they were reported to be too few to have any 
say in the common front committees. And at the 1936 elections, they were able to 
present a single candidate in the whole département, Gabriel Wagner in Metz.396 
Relations between the other two parties were far from harmonious. The Socialists 
feared a Communist takeover, which resulted in only nominal participation. The 
only distinct success of the SFIO in the département was in Sarreguemines where 
the charismatic leader of the section, Nicolas Nicklaus, became mayor in May 
1935 thanks to the strategy of the common front.397 As for the Communists, they 
were the unchallenged leaders of the coalition, and as such devised its strategy. 
But the fact that the coalition‟s driving force faced internal crises and restructuring 
at the same time gravely weakened the Popular Front from the onset.  
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Nonetheless, it might be said that in view of the left‟s long history of 
difficulties and failures in the region, local left wingers and the Communists in 
particular demonstrated dynamism and resourcefulness by creating a 
départemental committee. Local Communists also demonstrated their loyalty to 
the party‟s new line by welcoming the renegades Béron and Doeblé into the 
coalition after years of a turbulent relationship with the PCF‟s Central Committee; 
even if in private local party leaders still considered them enemies of the party. In 
February 1936, following the eighth party congress in Villeurbanne, the Mosellan 
PCF announced the creation of the Popular Front for the elections of May 1936. 
The strategy was clear: each party within the left-wing coalition was to present its 
own candidates at the first round of the elections and support the Popular Front 
candidates most likely to win at the second round. Marcel Cachin, freshly elected 
senator for the PCF, announced at Villeurbanne, „je dis aujourd‟hui que le parti a 
un tel rayonnement, un tel prestige que l‟échec de toutes les autres formations 
politiques françaises est très net‟.398 The Communist party did indeed win many 
new seats at the National Assembly, but for the Mosellan federation „l‟échec de 
toutes les autres formations politiques‟ proved to be wishful thinking. Once again, 
the right won a large majority of the seats , and the Mosellan Popular Front 
secured only one seat at the Palais Bourbon; that of the renegade Béron. 
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Chapter Three - Elections, Strikes and l’affaire d’Alsace-Lorraine, 
April 1936 - October 1936 
Introduction 
Amidst growing international tensions and domestic confrontation between the 
radicalised right and the newly united left, the French political class as a whole 
was far from enthusiastic about the legislative elections scheduled for late April 
1936.399 Nonetheless, with the PCF eager to attract electoral support across the 
social and political spectrum, the campaign gathered pace in the weeks preceding 
the first round of the elections. The Popular Front, formed by the PCF, SFIO and 
Radical-Socialist Party, narrowly won the election. But almost immediately after 
the election results were announced, and before the Popular Front could form a 
government, an unprecedented social explosion occurred when millions of workers 
went on strike. Although the government helped settle the conflict between the 
patronat and the workers, the scale of the strikes and the workers‟ new political 
and social consciousness alarmed many conservatives.  
In the Moselle, events took a similar turn. Despite the right‟s overwhelming 
victory in the election, the strike movement that hit the region led to an enormous 
increase in CGT membership as well as the birth of a new political and social 
militancy among workers. Thus, in October, just when the old social order 
appeared threatened - something many right wingers feared - the PCF launched a 
vigorous propaganda campaign in the Moselle. By examining events at the 
national level and in the Moselle, this chapter will seek to answer three main 
questions. Firstly, what did the election campaign and results reveal about the 
current political atmosphere? Secondly, how did the hitherto largely apolitical 
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Mosellan industrial masses respond to the strike movement? Finally, what were 
the consequences of the PCF‟s campaign in the region?    
In order to answer these questions, the first part of this chapter will examine 
the election at the national level and the local levels. Following the same model, 
the second part will examine the causes and effects of the social explosion that 
accompanied Blum‟s appointment as head of the Popular Front government and 
the subsequent Communist campaign in the Moselle. 
Part One: the May 1936 Elections  
At the national level, the 1936 elections produced remarkably little interest among 
the French electorate. The Times‟ Paris correspondent described the apathy as 
„greater than at any French election within memory.‟400 The elections took place 
under the uninominal system where only the candidates who obtained an absolute 
majority of votes in the first round were elected. Failing that, a second round was 
held a week later in the remaining constituencies between the two leading 
candidates. The electoral campaign, which began officially on 6 April, three weeks 
before the first round, was fought between two conflicting blocs: the centre-left 
Popular Front coalition and the right-wing anti-Popular Front bloc made up of all 
the parties and ligues united by a common fear and loathing of Communism. As 
the historian Jean-Michel Gaillard rightly notes, 'La France était coupée en deux 
lorsque vint le moment d'aller aux urnes, le 26 avril.'401 This does not mean, 
however, that the two blocs entered the electoral race in a disciplined manner. 
On the left, the Radical, Socialist and Communist parties published a 
common programme which stipulated that they would enter the first round 
separately and with their own programmes, but would not stand against each other 
if a second round was required.402 The Radicals, fearing a reaction of their 
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followers against the party‟s collusion with the PCF within the coalition, spoke very 
little of the Popular Front during the campaign. At a party meeting, Daladier 
referred to it as a reunion „des grands partis de démocratie‟ and declared, „le 
Rassemblement populaire n‟est pas un super parti. Il n‟est pas davantage une 
organisation électorale.‟403 He then affirmed, „Nous devons être résolus à affirmer 
partout, au premier tour de scrutin, la doctrine, le programme de notre parti.‟ Thus, 
he confirmed, candidates would enter the first round of the elections under the 
Radical banner. Similarly, the SFIO also differentiated its own programme from 
that of the Popular Front. Just before the first round of the elections it issued a 
Projet de Programme, which stated,  
Le Parti Socialiste a participé de plein cœur aux travaux du comité 
de Rassemblement Populaire…. Le Parti Socialiste fera donc de son 
adhésion au programme du Front Populaire la règle de ses 
désistements du second tour. Mais c‟est le programme du Parti 
Socialiste que les candidats socialistes exposeront et défendront 
devant les électeurs … au premier tour de scrutin.404 
Determined to gather as many votes as possible, the PCF was by far the 
most committed and consistent advocate of supporting the Popular Front. 
According to a police report, „M. Thorez a surpris par sa modération‟ during the 
electoral campaign, and during a speech he gave on Radio-Paris on 17 April 
Thorez presented the PCF as the creator of the Popular Front and called for the 
reconciliation of the French people.405 He made a special effort to attract some of 
the right‟s traditional supporters such as the Catholic masses and war veterans, 
even those who in their hundreds of thousands had joined the ligues. To the 
Catholics, he said: „Nous te tendons la main, catholique … parce que tu es notre 
frère‟, and to the ligueurs: „Nous te tendons la main … ancien combattant devenu 
Croix de Feu, parce que tu … souffres comme nous du désordre et de la 
corruption‟. The Communists reflected this move in their leaflets, which they 
                                            
 
403
 AN, Daladier papers, „Discours prononcé par Edouard Daladier à la séance plénière du Comité 
Exécutif du 18 mars 1936‟, 496AP6. 
404
 AN, Blum papers, „Projet de programme du Parti Socialiste pour les élections législatives de 
1936‟, nd, 570AP12.  
405
 AN, Rapport „Sur la stratégie électorale de la gauche pour les élections de 1936‟ 29 avril 1936, 
F7/13983. 
145 
 
distributed in their millions and in which they vowed to defend the interests of the 
working and the middle classes. Although they also promised to end the monopoly 
of the 200 familles and the diktat of the Comité des Forges, they deliberately 
abandoned their traditional references to anti-capitalism and internationalism and 
reiterated their party‟s adhesion to the common programme.406 
On the right, because of internal dissensions and hostility between the 
leaders of the Fédération Républicaine, the Alliance Démocratique and the Parti 
Démocrate Populaire, there was no agreement on a common platform nor an 
electoral coalition. By and large right-wing candidates ran on platforms devoted to 
anti-Marxist diatribes. While Flandin‟s Alliance Démocratique described the 
Popular Front as „une monstrueuse coalition électorale incapable d‟assurer une 
majorité de gouvernement homogène‟,407 Marin, leader of the Fédération 
Républicaine, affirmed in a radio speech, „une majorité de Front Populaire le 26 
avril serait … la catastrophe financière, la ruine économique, l‟émeute dans la rue, 
l‟anarchie mortelle pour la France‟.408 As for the Parti Démocrate Populaire, 
although its campaign was not as fiercely anti-Popular Front as those of the 
Alliance Démocratique or the Fédération Républicaine, the historian Jean-Claude 
Delbreil writes that „l‟aspect d‟élection “anti Front Populaire” a été fondamental‟.409 
According to The Times, the right‟s strategy was risky since it was „apt to fall on 
deaf ears at a time when the Franco-Soviet pact is felt to be … one safeguard for 
the future.‟410   
Even before the first round results were announced in the evening of 26 
April, many contemporary observers had predicted a victory of the left, albeit a 
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marginal one. The Times of 25 April affirmed, „it is … expected that the Left will 
come back to Parliament somewhat stronger than they left it and that the 
Communists (who had only 20 members of all shades in the late Chamber) will at 
least double their strength.‟411 The day after the elections Le Temps‟s headline 
read, „la première impression, après les élections d‟hier … est évidemment celle 
d‟une poussée communiste.‟412 But of the 618 seats contested, only 185 were won 
at the first ballot, leaving 433 to be decided in the second round. Although the 
candidates of the left - and the PCF in particular – who were still in the running had 
obtained promising results, a victory of the Popular Front still required the three 
parties to be loyal to the strategy of the désistement au second tour in order to 
emerge victorious on Sunday 3 May.  
At national headquarters level, party leaders reiterated their support for the 
Popular Front. A police report explained that despite a few points of contention on 
subjects such as devaluation and foreign policy, „les communistes et les 
socialistes se montrent résolus à appliquer la discipline du Front Populaire au 
second tour‟.413 Another report described how „l‟accord entre les communistes et 
les radicaux est parfait.‟414 The three parties‟ statements issued shortly after 26 
April echoed those affirmations. The PCF and the SFIO joint declaration read, „Les 
candidats des deux partis devront se désister mutuellement pour ceux d‟entre eux 
que le suffrage universel a placés en tête pour battre la réaction.‟415 The Radicals‟ 
statement issued on 28 April similarly stipulated,  
Partout où les suffrages des électeurs de gauche se sont divisés sur 
les noms de plusieurs candidats se réclamant du Rassemblement 
Populaire, ils devront, au second tour, faire bloc sur celui de ces 
candidats que le suffrage universel a mis en tête au premier tour.416 
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As for the right, it maintained its anti-Popular Front stance into the second round, 
and in an alarmingly ominous letter to party members, Jean Guiter, secretary-
general of the Fédération Républicaine, wrote, 
Si le Front Populaire l‟emporte, dimanche, au deuxième tour, ce 
sera, ET DANS TOUS LES DOMAINES, le signal de la catastrophe 
dont nul ne peut prévoir l‟étendue. La France, n‟en doutez pas, 
risque d‟avoir le sort de l‟Espagne…. Et vous savez que la guerre 
civile c‟est, en même temps, la GUERRE tout court.417 
Were all elements of the left loyal to the Popular Front strategy? Judging by 
the second-round election results, the electoral discipline seemed to prove rather 
efficient. Even if a few Radical candidates refused to ally with other Popular Front 
candidates in their constituency because of hostility towards the PCF, by and large 
the tactic stood its test since the Popular Front emerged victorious with a majority 
of 381 seats versus 237 for the right. Nevertheless, despite the left‟s vigorous 
campaign between the two rounds and the remarkably high turnout (82 percent of 
the electorate), the results did not mark the clear shift to the left that many had 
anticipated.418  
Compared to the 1932 legislature, the left gained roughly 400,000 votes 
while the right lost 180,000; a difference of only 220,000.419 As noted by many 
observers, the most significant outcome of the elections was the shift within the 
left. While the Radicals lost over 400,000 votes and the SFIO 10,000, the 
Communists more than doubled their 1932 results with more than 700,000 new 
votes. In terms of seats, the PCF gained 72 seats, 61 more than in 1932, the 
Socialists gained 131, down 16 from 1932, and the Radicals gained 106, down 51 
from 1932. There was thus a shift away from the centre and towards the extreme 
left. Nonetheless, the SFIO remained the largest political party within the coalition, 
and on 4 May Blum announced that he would lead the new government. As he 
wrote in Le Populaire,  
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Le parti socialiste revendique dans l‟action commune la 
responsabilité et la part qui lui reviennent…. Nous tenons donc à 
déclarer … que nous sommes prêts à remplir le rôle qui nous 
appartient, c‟est-à-dire à constituer et diriger le gouvernement de 
Front Populaire.420  
The right‟s results indicated a similar polarisation of its electorate. While the 
nationalistic Fédération Républicaine gained 350,000 votes, the moderate Parti 
Démocrate Populaire and the Alliance Démocratique lost 520,000. A few weeks 
after the elections, Charles Des Isnards, a Fédération Républicaine deputy for 
Paris, blamed the right‟s internal dissensions and its lack of socio-economic 
programme for its defeat: „Nous n‟avons pas su ou pas pu faire taire certaines 
rivalités et les ambitions personnelles‟.421 His appeal to the right against the new 
majority and Blum, whom he described as „le métèque [qui] va diriger un pays 
essentiellement catholique‟ was: „Groupons nous! Que ces elections nous servent 
de leçon‟.422  
It is worth noting that political leaders such as Marin promptly realised that, 
without the support of the 106 Radical deputies, the number of PCF and SFIO 
deputies barely exceeded those of the opposition, thus giving the right a chance to 
regain office. This explains why Marin called for a meeting of all opposition parties 
on 15 May 1936 in order to coordinate their attitude towards the new Chamber and 
the Radicals in particular. As a police report put it, he also asked the right-wing 
press to „abandonner ou modérer leurs attaques contre les chefs du parti radical‟, 
since he believed „après l‟échec attendu du gouvernement de Front Populaire 
pouvoir tenter vers la fin de l‟année la formation d‟un cabinet de concentration 
dans lequel les modérés [ndlr, the right] collaboreraient avec les radicaux.‟423 The 
meeting never took place.  
Flandin, eager to lead his own centre-right coalition against the Popular 
Front, announced that his party would not take part in such a project. Instead, 
according to a police informer, he held separate talks with leaders of the centre-
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right in order to „réaliser une formation centriste dont il serait le chef et qui pourrait 
avoir une mission d‟arbitrage après la chute attendue dans quelques mois du 
gouvernement de Front Populaire.‟424 It appears that, just as before the elections, 
personal ambitions and internal battles prevailed over political judgement, thus 
highlighting the right‟s propensity to divisions. Would the right be able to overcome 
these obstacles in the future or, as noted in a police report, would history repeat 
itself? „Sous la précédente Chambre il y eut aussi une proposition d‟inter-groupe. 
Elle n‟aboutit à rien.‟425 
In the Moselle, just as at the national level, one of the main characteristics 
of the 1936 elections was the existence of a deep division between the left and 
right, with the left dominated by the Popular Front and the right comprising a loose 
association of politicians, ligueurs and the press who believed themselves 
confronting a common enemy, Communism. Alongside the traditional themes of 
anti-secularism, the protection of the Catholic Church and the particularisme 
mosellan, the right-wing forces focused their energies on depicting the PCF as a 
foreign agent whose ambition was to take France to war.426 In a pre-election 
edition, Le Messin urged its readers to „voter Français‟, claiming, „Le Front 
populaire c‟est la guerre!‟427 But in contrast with previous legislative elections, the 
situation of the right appeared more complicated, and the slow decline of the once-
dominant Catholic right, represented by the Union Républicaine 
Démocratique/Union Républicaine Lorraine, seemed to be confirmed; at least 
during the legislative elections. Indeed, as mentioned in chapter Two, the results 
of the 1935 municipal elections clearly demonstrate the Catholic right‟s continuing 
domination in local elections; it won 93 percent of the cast votes.  
While some candidates ran under the banner of the Union Républicaine 
Lorraine, others chose to do so under the auspices of the Fédération 
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Républicaine-backed Union Républicaine Démocratique only, thus leading to 
multiple candidacies in a few constituencies. Nowhere was this more evident than 
in Château-Salins and West Thionville where the Union Républicaine Lorraine and 
the Union Républicaine Démocratique, having failed to reach an electoral 
agreement, presented their own candidates: Liard against Génois in the first, and 
Thomas, the Union Républicaine Démocratique candidate financially backed by 
the de Wendel family, against the Union Républicaine Lorraine‟s Paté. In 
Sarrebourg, Emile Peter refused the sponsorship of any party and ran as an 
independent conservative, although he was an active member of the Croix de Feu. 
In Boulay, Alex Wiltzer abandoned the Union Républicaine Lorraine for the 
Alliance Démocratique, and in Forbach the clerical conservative new comer Paul 
Harter backed up by the Christlich-Soziale Partei and the Croix de Feu appeared 
from the outset as the electorate's favourite. In Boulay and Forbach, it is worth 
noting, the Christlich-Soziale Partei fielded respectively Antoni, the party leader, 
and Harter. Both were well-known locally and had the support of the local clergy 
and the Croix de Feu. Neither the Union Républicaine Démocratique nor the Union 
Républicaine Lorraine were represented in these constituencies.428  
Did they agree on an electoral pact with the Christlich-Soziale Partei in 
those two areas? Although it has not been possible to find any evidence to support 
this claim, the fact that the two parties had previously come to such agreements 
makes it seem likely. Indeed a police report in 1934 noted that 'M. Antoni … a 
exprimé l'espoir que l'[Union Républicaine Démocratique] respecterait la signature 
de ses dirigeants, et, restant fidèle à l'accord de 1932, [que] la question de la 
solidarité chrétienne' would be maintained.429 As for Robert Schuman, he refused 
the sponsorship of the nationalistic Union Républicaine Démocratique and 
following his Catholic inclinations he entered the race under the twin Parti 
Démocrate Populaire and Union Républicaine Lorraine banners in East Thionville. 
Another interesting aspect of these elections was the introduction of the newly-
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created Franciste party represented by Etienne in East Thionville and Schmitt in 
West Thionville.  
By and large the right appeared to be more divided than at the previous 
elections, what with the Union Républicaine Lorraine and the Union Républicaine 
Démocratique largely dominating the political arena since 1919. One should not 
assume, however, that this brought confusion among the Mosellan electorate, as 
all right-wing parties could rely on the support of the two conservative elements in 
Moselle politics: the press and the Catholic clergy. Besides, ideology and political 
preference were not always decisive in the electorate's choices in local elections, 
and the successful candidates were often prominent individuals drawn from the 
world of the notables, with whom the voters were familiar. Thus far, isolated from 
traditional French politics by linguistic, historical and cultural barriers, the Moselle 
almost perfectly exemplified this French provincial model.  
Loyal to the PCF Central Committee's line, the Mosellan Communists set 
aside extreme demands and for the first time since 1919 abandoned their claim for 
the independence of Alsace-Lorraine. Their programme gave central place to 
moderation. As Anstett, the départemental federation's president, went so far as to 
declare at a pre-election meeting, 'il faut s'approcher des petits commercants … la 
situation actuelle des classes moyennes le permet'.430 Using the party's enormous 
propaganda machine, they distributed thousands of leaflets and organised 
meetings in several towns and villages. They also fielded a candidate in each of 
the nine constituencies. The PCF, due to its leading position within the local left 
and its determination to steer the Popular Front, largely dictated the electoral 
campaign on the left.  
The Socialists and the Radicals, who reluctantly agreed to support the left-
wing coalition, succeeded in presenting candidates in only three constituencies out 
of the nine available: the SFIO in three – Metz 1, Sarrebourg and Sarreguemines– 
and the Radicals in one, in Metz 1.431 Specific to the Moselle were the cases of the 
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two Communist renegades Doeblé in Forbach and Béron in West Thionville. Both 
ran under the banner of Independent Socialists and supported the coalition. 
Remarkably, the Communists treated them with respect, going so far as to stand 
down in their favour when they emerged the strongest candidates. Breistroff, one 
of the early supporters of the Popular Front, ran as an Independent Socialist in 
East Thionville, stronghold of Schuman.  
Interestingly enough, the left presented three candidates in Forbach. This 
means that outgoing deputy Doeblé, as well as facing a strong candidate from the 
right, supported by the clergy and the Croix de Feu, had to fight against another 
Independent Socialist and a Communist, thus reducing the left‟s chances to win in 
the first round. Alhough a commissaire spécial from Thionville reported that 'une 
propagande électorale va être entreprise sous l‟égide d‟un comité de liaison 
socialo-communiste‟,432 a few weeks before the elections began the préfet noted 
that „aucune décision définitive n‟a été prise … en ce qui concerne l‟union 
éventuelle au sein du front populaire'.433 By the end of April, the Popular Front 
became a reality and, as at the national level, all parties entered the first round 
separately while agreeing to support one or another in the second round.  
The elections, stimulated by the fierce campaign between the Communists 
and their opponents, brought out a larger proportion of Mosellan voters than the 
national average, as figures reveal that 85 percent participated on 26 April.434 The 
first round confirmed the strong position of the right, which won over 65 percent of 
the votes and secured four seats out of the nine available: Harter (Indépendant 
Conservateur) in Forbach, Sérot (Union Républicaine Démocratique) in Metz 2, 
Peter (Indépendant Conservateur) in Sarrebourg and Schuman (Union 
Républicaine Lorraine) in East Thionville; see tables and charts in appendix for 
more details. Because of its double candidacy in West Thionville, the parties of the 
Popular Front gained just over 30 percent of the vote, with the PCF alone 
receiving more than 55 percent of the left‟s votes and the Independent Socialists 
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35 percent. The results also confirmed the lack of support for the SFIO, which 
obtained only 1,471 votes or 4 percent of the left's votes, and the quasi-
inexistence of the Radicals, which obtained only 200 votes, 0.5 percent of the left‟s 
votes. But with five seats to be decided in the second round, both sides had to 
review their tactics. The right, caught up in the crisis between the Union 
Républicaine Lorraine and Union Républicaine Démocratique candidates and the 
emergence of new parties, had to agree on which candidates to maintain at the 
second round. The Mosellan left, whose results were promising compared to the 
previous elections in 1932, had now to put its unity and tactics to the test. 
In order to augment its chances of a victory against the Popular Front 
candidate Béron, the Union Républicaine Lorraine agreed to remove Paté and 
support Thomas in West Thionville. The failure of the right-wing parties to come to 
an agreement in the first round might have cost them the seat, as their candidates‟ 
combined total was only 7,822 votes against 6,695 for Béron.435 But such 
calculations are not to be trusted as it is impossible to say what the left's response 
would have been had the right agreed on a single candidate in the first round: 
Béron and the PCF, who received 1,659 votes, might also have agreed on a single 
candidacy to give the left a chance to win. Because the SFIO and the Radicals 
presented so few candidates in the département, the issue of withdrawal at the 
second round posed little problem to the coalition. In Metz 1 and Sarreguemines, 
the Radicals and Socialists, who obtained very poor results, withdrew their 
candidates for the Communists, and apart from West Thionville where the 
Communist candidate stepped down in favour of Béron, the party was able to 
maintain its candidates in the other two remaining constituencies, Boulay and 
Château-Salins.436  
The election results on 3 May confirmed the dominant position of the right in 
the Moselle. Comparing the Popular Front‟s victory at the national level and that of 
the Catholic right locally, Le Lorrain‟s editorial read, 'C'est une vague rouge qui a 
déferlé sur notre pays, faisant le maximum de ravages dans la région parisienne 
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et le midi. Heureusement l'Est … [a] tenu le coup.'437 The right won all but one of 
the constituencies, winning Forbach from Doeblé and losing West Thionville to 
Béron and the Popular Front. The election also confirmed the decline of the 
moderate right, which won five out of the nine seats (Boulay, Metz 1, Metz 2, 
Sarreguemines and Thionville Est): it had won seven in 1932.438 It also confirmed 
the emergence of more extreme men and parties in Forbach, Château-Salins and 
Sarrebourg. The first was won by Paul Harter (Indépendant Conservateur), the 
second by François Beaudoin (Parti Agraire et Paysan Français) and the third by 
Emile Peter who left the Union Républicaine Lorraine to run as an Indépendant 
Conservateur officially and a Croix de Feu unofficially. As at the national level, the 
victory of the new right (in the case of the Moselle, the Croix de Feu and the Parti 
Agraire) illustrates the shift of the Mosellan electorate towards the extreme. This 
polarisation saw the introduction of parties and organisations, which, to some 
extent, brought national politics closer to home. Almost twenty years after 
reintegrating France, the Moselle was finally accepting organisations whose 
interests were not mainly linked to the département.  
As for the PCF, a similar trend appeared, since although it was defeated in 
every seat it contested, it secured 3,302 more votes compared to 1932.439 The 
increase was particularly noticeable in the industrial areas around Thionville and 
Metz 1, where the PCF candidate came closer than ever to winning the seat 
thanks to the support of the Popular Front. But the additional votes proved 
insufficient and the results confirmed the left‟s poor performance in the region. At a 
party meeting in Metz on 17 May, a representative of the Central Committee 
declared, 'La jeunesse va aux Croix de Feu en masse, notamment en Moselle … 
[où] la propagande et le travail des militants ont fait défaut.'440 According to 
Thorez's calculations, of all France's industrial départements, but for the Loire-
Inférieure and Belfort, the Moselle came bottom in terms of new Communist votes. 
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More telling perhaps was the 17 percent increase of votes: the lowest in all 
France‟s industrial départements; hardly a promising omen for the future of the 
Popular Front in the Moselle.441  
Part Two: A New Social and Political Order? 
The Popular Front in office and the social explosion 
According to the police, the majority of Socialist activists, expecting the Radicals to 
win, were very anxious at the thought of entering or leading the new 
government.442 Always uneasy at the spectre of becoming the prisoner of non-
Socialist right-leaning allies, they believed Blum should not lead the new 
government because of his age and ill-health. Instead they favoured a SFIO-
backed Radical personality or Vincent Auriol, Socialist deputy for the Haute-
Garonne. Notwithstanding these concerns, Blum claimed the leadership of the 
future government as soon as the composition of the new Chamber was made 
official. The day after the elections, he wrote in a special edition of Le Populaire, 
Le Parti Socialiste est devenu le groupe le plus puissant non 
seulement de la majorité, mais de la Chambre entière. Nous tenons 
donc à déclarer sans perdre une heure que nous sommes prêts à 
remplir le rôle qui nous appartient, c'est-à-dire à constituer et diriger 
le gouvernement de Front Populaire.443 
While the Radicals, as the second largest party in the Chamber, were 
willing to enter the coalition government, the Communists refused to do so. They 
agreed, however, to support it fully. As Jacques Duclos, the senior Communist 
official recently elected in the Seine département, wrote in L'Humanité d'Alsace 
Lorraine: 'le parti communiste soutiendra loyalement le gouvernement qui 
appliquera le programme du Front Populaire.‟444 On 6 June, Blum presented his 
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new government, composed of eighteen Socialists, four Independent Socialists 
and thirteen Radicals, which the Chamber approved by 384 votes to 210.  In a 
radio speech, he promised to enact promptly the Popular Front's programme and 
to present the deputies with bills on forty-hour week, collective contracts and paid 
holidays before Parliament's summer break.445  
In Paris, the celebration of the victory of the Popular Front took place on 14 
July.  After originally opting for 14 June, the Parisian committee of the 
Rassemblement Populaire – the body overseeing the activities of the Popular 
Front - settled for 14 July. The date was highly symbolic as it commemorated not 
only the fall of the Bastille in 1789, but also the 14 July gathering that completed 
the formation of the Popular Front the previous year.446 Under the influence of the 
local Communist party, the Mosellan committee of the Rassemblement Populaire 
decided to celebrate the national electoral victory on 14 June. As a result, tens of 
thousands celebrated across the département, principally in the industrial areas. 
According to the Metzer Freies Journal, 5,000 demonstrators gathered in Forbach, 
10,000 in the Fensch valley and 10,000 in the Orne valley.447 In Sarreguemines, 
the police reported 4,000 demonstrators who, calmly, with their right fists 
clenched, carried the red flag and the tricolore over the Saar river towards the 
German border.448 In Metz, 5,000 men, women and children paraded through the 
streets, carrying banners that read 'Pain, Paix, Liberté' and 'Die Reichen sollen 
zahlen' (the rich must pay), to the sound of a brass band playing the Marseillaise 
and the Internationale. The Metzer Freies Journal claimed that it was the first time 
since the armistice of 1918 that Metz had experienced such a big demonstration 
and that the number of demonstrators largely exceeded the organisers' most 
optimistic predictions.  
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The départemental committee of the Rassemblement Populaire celebrated 
Béron's victory against the de Wendel-backed candidate Thomas in West-
Thionville. At a committee meeting, Schwob, the CGT's deputy leader, declared, 
'Le comité départemental réuni le 10 mai salue avec enthousiasme le succès du 
Front Populaire lors des récentes élections législatives‟.449 Eager to see the 
coalition's programme implemented without delay, he then affirmed that 'le Front 
Populaire de la Moselle interprète le silence … du Rassemblement Populaire sur 
la question d‟Alsace-Lorraine comme une nouvelle affirmation … d‟assurer 
immédiatement l‟assimilation totale des provinces recouvrées' and called for 'une 
réalisation rapide et complète de la charte du Front Populaire national'.450 But 
even before Blum became président du Conseil and had a chance to present his 
projects to the Chamber, a large wave of strikes with factory occupations swept 
across the country including the Moselle. 
The first signs of social protest, predating the elections, appeared in Paris 
soon after the reunification of the CGT in March 1936. The Parisian police 
reported that 'l'unité syndicale retrouvée … [a redoublé] la confiance des militants 
du mouvement ouvrier, les incitant à revendiquer plus vigoureusement.'451 The 
wave of factory occupations began in May and continued after Blum took office on 
5 June. With almost two million workers involved, almost all areas of industry were 
affected. In face of the government's refusal to evacuate the factories by force, the 
Confédération Générale de la Production Française, which represented mainly 
large businesses, had little choice but to negotiate with the CGT at the Hôtel 
Matignon - Blum's official residence in Paris – in the presence of the président du 
Conseil.452  
On 7 June, after one afternoon of negotiations, the patronat accepted the 
union's demands and signed an agreement referred to as the „Accords de 
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Matignon‟. The „Accords‟ comprised seven articles which promised the introduction 
of collective work contracts, acknowledged the workers' rights to join or form a 
trade union, granted pay increases of up to 15 percent, guaranteed the absence of 
penalties for strike action, and affirmed right to elect union representatives in firms 
whose workforce exceeded ten people.453 As agreed during the negotiations, the 
government introduced legislation on the paid holidays and the forty-hour week 
without loss of pay a few days later. But despite the unprecedented benefits 
granted to workers, the strikes continued. As a police report stated,  
D'une manière générale … les ouvriers sont mécontents de 
l'accord.… Nombreux sont les intéressés qui estiment que même en 
bénéficiant des dispositions les plus favorables … ils auront encore 
des salaires nettement insuffisants.454  
The agreement thus failed to contain the movement and the CGT leaders quickly 
realised, as the same report added, that 'ils vont avoir de sérieuses difficultés pour 
faire reprendre le travail aux grévistes.'  
Many contemporaries believed that the movement had become 
uncontrollable and that the CGT officials were losing control of its troops. It was 
not until Thorez, whose party had hitherto seemed equally unable to contain the 
movement, intervened and declared on 11 June, „il faut savoir terminer une grève 
dès que satisfaction a été obtenue', that the movement began to lose 
momentum.455 Blum's energetic declarations in the Chamber and his introduction 
of paid holidays on the same day doubtless contributed to the movement's decline. 
According to Blum, the patronat bore a heavy responsibility for the strike 
movement. Regarding the strikes in the steelworks, he blamed 'le refus prolongé 
par les organisations patronales chaque fois qu'un contact leur a été demandé par 
les organisations ouvrières.'456 He also believed the movement to be a natural 
progression of the victory of the Popular Front as he affirmed in the Chamber, 'Le 
mouvement revendicatif … a reçu, au lendemain des élections, une impulsion 
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sensible. Il était naturel'.457 Regardless of who was responsible for the impulse 
behind the movement, it is evident from the thousands of photographs of these 
events, that many workers felt, as Kedward puts it, 'a triumph over established 
social and political hierarchies.'458 This gave the workforce such confidence, and 
sometimes arrogance, that in some workplaces, as a police report stated, 'c'est la 
cellule [communiste] qui dicte … ses volontés … au syndicat et même à la 
direction de l'établissement.'459 By forcing the patronat to accept their demands, 
the strikers modified the existing social order. The question was, how long would 
these changes last before the patronat and the right-wing political forces reacted? 
Among the latter, the initial reactions to the strike movement were mixed 
though generally subdued. The Christian Parti Démocrate Populaire, while 
professing sympathy for the worker's demands, condemned 'les intolérables 
atteintes portées à la liberté des personnes et à la propriété par les occupations', 
and 'la trop longue inertie du gouvernement devant le désordre social'.460 The 
Catholics were divided with on one extreme the Catholic right, supported by the 
Pope and Castelnau's Fédération Nationale Catholique, and on the other Christian 
Communists of Terre Nouvelle.461 The former condemned the Communists and 
their influence on the working classes because of what the Vatican's newspaper 
L'Osservatore Romano described as 'l'accommodement [impossible] entre la 
vérité de notre sainte religion et cette négation de tous les droits humains et divins 
qu'on trouve dans le communisme.'462 The latter, on the other hand, praised the 
strikers by arguing that the movement was 'un mouvement de masses, instinctif et 
spontané', which sprang from 'trop de misères, de souffrances dans la classe 
ouvrière.'463 
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The Fédération Républicaine formally warned the government of 'les 
conséquences extrêmement graves que peuvent avoir … [les] occupations … 
d'usines et l'agitation révolutionnaire' and praised 'les chefs d'industrie qui … ont 
refusé de discuter, tant que leurs usines seraient occupées, avec des meneurs 
révolutionnaires'.464 On the whole, however, the right appears to have temporarily 
been cowed by the scale of the strike movement, for it generally displayed 
benevolence to the strikers. As Samuel Osgood writes, 'the right, and especially 
the extreme right, made a great show of its concern for the social problem and of 
its sympathies with the aspirations of the working class.'465 
Indeed, the ligues supported the workers' grievances, while asserting that 
the strikers had made the wrong choice by voting for the Popular Front. As the 
weekly Le Franciste put it, 'Le peuple de France a eu raison de se dresser contre 
les fléaux qui l'écrasent. Mais il s'est trompé sur le choix de ses nouveaux 
maitres.'466 As for the Croix de Feu, it condemned what its manifesto described as 
'un faux aspect de revendications légitimes' which would have disastrous 
consequences on 'les lendemains de l'économie nationale, pour la main d'œuvre, 
pour la famille, pour la paix‟.467 Keen to reassure the patronat and use the workers' 
discontent to his advantage, de la Rocque announced the creation of Syndicats 
professionnels. He explained their aims in the ligue's paper Le Flambeau: 
Dès à présent nos amis doivent [se] substituer aux plateformes 
révolutionnaires des Internationales.… Organisons-nous partout 
pour dégager notre doctrine: charte du travail minimum, le salaire 
tenant compte des charges de famille, association du travailleur 
fidèle au sort de son entreprise.… Nos camarades formeront dans 
chaque usine … des syndicats locaux inspirés de ces principes.468 
One event of particular importance to this study was the decree that banned 
the ligues on 23 June 1936. Their dissolution had been a priority of the common 
programme, but while this put an end to their paramilitary organisations, it could 
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not prevent them from re-organising into parties and re-entering the political 
system. While La Rocque's Croix de Feu became the Parti Social Français, the ex-
Communist Jacques Doriot created the Parti Populaire Français.469 The latter 
gathered mainly ex-Communists loyal to Doriot and disenchanted ex-ligueurs. Its 
manifesto, whose ultimate aim was to 'refaire la France', vowed to eliminate the 
PCF and the Popular Front and to fight against the free masons and the Jews.470 
As will be seen, both parties would play decisive roles in the transformation of the 
political right at the national level and in the Moselle. 
Even before the strike movement began in the Moselle in mid-June 1936, 
the first social repercussions of the Popular Front's victory occurred when the coal 
mining management and trade unions representatives agreed on a convention on 
12 May. Based on a similar agreement signed in the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais 
in April, it guaranteed workers‟ pay increases.471 But the miners, protesting that the 
increases were lower than those granted to their counterparts in the northern 
départements, rejected the convention. One month later, as the Mosellan patronat 
reluctantly agreed to the terms of the Matignon agreement, the trade unions 
representatives and mine managers signed a second convention.472 Once again 
the miners rejected it and, encouraged by the national movement and the 
départemental celebrations of the victory of the Popular Front of 14 June, they 
called for a strike on 16 June. Thus began in earnest the social movement with 
occupations in the Moselle.  
According to the préfet's statistics, over 16,000 stopped work and occupied 
the coal mines of the Société Houillère de Sarre et Moselle in Petite-Rosselle, 
Creutzwald and Merlebach on 16 June.473 As at the national level, the occupiers 
took control of their workplace to prevent being locked-out and maintained the 
equipment as if it belonged to them. As a commissaire spécial reported, all 
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commercial activity stopped, but 'le travail en cours d'exécution continue à être 
effectué. Les machines et fourneaux continuent à être entretenus.'474 The strikers 
blocked access to the shafts, and because they also blocked access to some 
neighbouring transformers, which delivered electricity to the large steelworks of 
Thionville and Briey, the préfet urged the trade unions and management to come 
to an agreement as soon as possible.475 Equally many mayors worried that their 
municipalities might run out of gas should the cocking plants not deliver theirs 
soon and urged the managers to enter negotiations with the workers. In the end, 
only after the mine managers agreed to enter negotiations with the trade unions on 
the establishment of collective agreements did work resume on 20 June.  
At the same time, a new wave of strikes affecting both industry and 
business swept across the whole of the département. Workers from the iron mines 
demanded the same pay increases as the coal miners and 400 of them stopped 
work and occupied the Ida mine in Sainte-Marie until the préfet intervened and a 
collective contract was signed. The movement also involved the ceramics and 
metal factories in Sarreguemines where thousands of protesters occupied their 
factories in mid-June. The CGT issued a list of demands on their behalf, including 
paid holidays to all, collective contracts, a 40-hour week as well as 'l'obligation 
pour les entreprises … de n'engager que du personnel syndiqué' and '[des] 
installations sanitaires telles que: infirmerie, bains, appareils pour chauffer la 
nourriture des ouvriers, installations de WC … [et] de systèmes de ventilation‟.476  
 Strikes in the large steelworks around Thionville and Metz amplified the 
scale of the movement with tens of thousands of workers participating at the end 
of June: 10,000 at the de Wendel factories in Moyeuvre, Rosselange and 
Hayange, 4,000 at the UCPMI in Hagondange, 4,000 at the Société Lorraine des 
Aciéries de Rombas, 3,000 at the Société Métallurgique in Knutange. In the 
construction industry, nearly 10,000 workers from 284 different companies 
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stopped work on 4 July, including 480 engaged on a Maginot Line site in 
Rohrbach-lès-Bitche in the French Saarland.477 Companies involved with the 
construction of military equipment for the Line were also affected when 1,500 
workers went on strike. In Metz, 200 poorly unionised shop assistants, many of 
whom were women, occupied the Prisunic and the Unifix shops on 27 June.  
Although workers in many small businesses, such as the hosieries in 
Sarreguemines and the paper bag manufacturers in Forbach, joined the 
movement, the vast majority of the strikers were to be found in the large mines 
and factories: 24,000 in the steelworks, 16,000 in the coal mines and 7,500 in the 
iron mines. In all, almost 65,000 were involved in strikes between June and July, 
representing almost 25 percent of the workforce.478 More telling perhaps was the 
fact that 80 percent of all industrial and commercial firms were occupied during 
May and June. But after a long and warm summer of strikes and negotiations, the 
movement lost momentum.  The last large strike of the summer took place in the 
ceramics factories in Sarreguemines when 1,700 stopped work in late August.479  
Notwithstanding a few unresolved disputes in small firms, where the prefectural 
authorities had to intervene in order to help with the negotiations, the préfet 
reported far fewer and smaller strikes in the autumn. 
As a result of the strike movement, the Mosellan CGT witnessed a sharp 
rise in its membership in what had hitherto been a poorly unionised département: 
from 10,600 in early January 1936 to almost 78,000 in late October, an eightfold 
increase.480 The numbers rose from 438 to 26,220 in the steelworks, from 150 to 
7,500 in the construction industry and from 1,150 to 24,000 in the mining sector. In 
the Sarreguemines ceramics factories, where no trade union existed prior to the 
summer strikes, 1,500 joined the CGT. These four industries alone accounted for 
more than 75 percent of the départemental trade union membership. Nothing 
                                            
 
477
 ADM, Rapport du commissaire spécial de Sarreguemines au sous-préfet, 20 juin 1936, 26Z3. 
478
 Statistique générale de la France, Résultats Statistiques du Recensement Général de la 
Population effectué le 8 mars 1931, Tome I, Troisième partie, p.13. 
479
 ADM, Rapport du préfet au ministre du Travail, Metz, 28 août 1936, 310M68. 
480
 ADBR, Rapport du préfet au ministre de l'Intérieur, Metz, 24 novembre 1936, 98AL696.  
164 
 
illustrated more clearly the hitherto dormant potential of the Mosellan industrial 
workforce than this rapid, large-scale movement towards unionisation.  
Albeit more dramatic, the trend in the Moselle reflected the national trend. 
As a Parisian police report stated, during a meeting of the CGT, Jouhaux affirmed 
that 'les adhésions parviennent à la CGT avec un rythme qui ne parait pas se 
ralentir.'481 According to the same report, the rise was so rapid and unexpected 
that Jouhaux and the federation secretaries recognised 'le manque évident de 
cadres' and 'le manque d'éducation de très nombreux travailleurs qui ne sont 
syndiqués qu'au moment des mouvements', which would pose serious problems 
for the application and the respect of the collective contracts.  
The Mosellan federations faced similar issues. Thus in August 1936, the 
metalworkers' federation newspaper urged the new trade unionists 'd'écouter les 
mots d'ordre du syndicat, de rester unis derrière la CGT.'482 According to a 
prefectural report, the regional secretary-general of the CGT issued a note to all 
the section heads, appealing to new members „dépourvus de traditions syndicales 
... [de] s‟abstenir de toute grève spontanée et irréfléchie, dans l‟intérêt même des 
travailleurs.‟483 The préfet was pessimistic about the amount of time it would take 
to discipline the new members as the cadres, recruited hastily, also needed 
educating. As he wrote,  
Il faudra, évidemment, qu‟un temps assez long s‟écoule ... avant 
qu‟une discipline vraiment satisfaisante s‟établisse, d‟autant plus que 
les cadres des délégués, recrutés en hâte, ont été fréquemment 
désignés, sans discernement suffisant.484   
Like the CGT, the Mosellan PCF enjoyed an increased membership: 
according to an internal party report, membership rose from 1,300 in June 1936 to 
4,200 by the end of the year.485 Marc Dupuy, a delegate from the Central 
Committee on visit in the Moselle, seemed satisfied with developments. As he 
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stated in a report „pour la première fois on peut dire que notre parti augmente ses 
effectifs en Lorraine'.486 According to Dupuy, the party could have done better in 
this industrial region had it not been for the unresolved issues of particularism and 
language. As he wrote, the two main obstacles to a successful implantation of the 
party in the Moselle remained 'de fortes survivances sectaires … chez un certain 
nombre de camarades du comité régional' as well as difficulties due to 'des 
interventions faites en allemand et des erreurs de traduction'.487 As he tried to rid 
the Mosellan federation of its sectarian legacy in order to attract new members, 
Anstett announced the creation of a party school designed to train 'de nouvelles 
forces dont notre parti a absolument besoin'.488 Another indication of the PCF‟s 
desire to develop its influence among the Mosellan industrial masses was its 
decision to organise a two-day propaganda campaign headed by Thorez in the 
region. 
 L’affaire d’Alsace-Lorraine: an example of the right’s unity and the left’s 
divisions? 
It was during the party's national conference on 10 and 11 July that the PCF 
leaders first mentioned the Communist deputies‟ plans to visit the Moselle and 
Alsace in October. The Mosellan police seemed to have first heard of the 
Communist plan in early August when a report mentioned that following the party‟s 
conference in July, 'Le parti envisagerait l'organisation de réunions, en Moselle, 
pour octobre prochain'.489 One month later, Anstett issued a circular, urging all 
regional party cells to do their best to accommodate the 127 meetings planned in 
the Moselle and in Alsace for October. Fearing clashes between Communist and 
far-right supporters as well as what the préfet described as 'des incidents de 
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frontière avec le Reich', he asked the government to ban all the meetings.490 In a 
report, he cited  'l'importance que … confère [au département] sa position 
frontalière, au point de vue de la Défense Nationale et de l'action à laquelle il est 
soumis de la part de la propagande allemande'.491 He also likened the situation of 
the Moselle to the events of 4 October when the Communist party organised a 
large rally at the Parc des Princes in Paris to promote French intervention in 
Spain, and the government posted a large number of police in order to prevent 
Communists from clashing with de la Rocque‟s supporters. Although the police 
succeeded in preventing the two sides from colliding on that occasion, the 
government ultimately decided to impose a temporary ban on public gatherings in 
Paris and its suburbs.  
Before the préfet's persistent reports, the government urged the PCF to 
reduce the number of meetings. Following talks between the government and 
Duclos, the Communists agreed to reduce the number to 52. But as the préfet and 
the sous-préfets insisted all meetings should be banned, Blum compromised and 
ordered the PCF to limit to 10 the number of meetings: 3 in the Moselle and 7 in 
Alsace.492 Blum explained his decision to Duclos in a letter: 
Le gouvernement … a la charge de l'ordre public, auquel on ne peut 
laisser porter la moindre atteinte dans les départements frontières 
sans favoriser et alimenter les propagandes hostiles au régime 
démocratique, ou même hostiles à notre pays.… En tenant compte 
de ces deux considérations, il a fixé et fixe encore à huit ou dix le 
nombre des réunions [en Alsace et en Lorraine].493 
 
A frustrated PCF issued a communiqué to the press in which it accused the 
government of denying the party its right to hold meetings and flouting the 
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programme of the Popular Front.494 Nonetheless it yielded to the government‟s 
injunction.  
The three authorised meetings took place in Metz, Hagondange and 
Creutzwald. Marcel Gitton, Communist deputy for the Seine and a high-ranking 
official within the party, was originally scheduled to speak in Thionville on 10 
October, but the right-wing mayor of the town issued a decree banning 'toutes 
réunions ou manifestations, tout rassemblement sur la voie publique … pour une 
durée de 4 jours sur le territoire de la ville de Thionville'.495 The largest meeting 
took place at the Palais de Cristal in Metz in the evening of 10 October. Before a 
crowd of approximately 1,000 supporters, local party officials, CGT leaders and 
the president of the départemental committee of the Popular Front welcomed 
Maurice Thorez and the party of Communist deputies that accompanied him.496 As 
chair of the gathering, Noizette, leader of the Metz cell, spoke of the difficulties the 
party faced with regards to meetings in the region in both German and French. 
Then he introduced Thorez, who spoke for one hour. During his speech, the party 
leader commented on the new social laws, the recent devaluation of the franc 
which the PCF backed, the embargo imposed on Spain which he condemned and 
generally restated his support to the Popular Front government and its policies.497  
But before Thorez could finish his allocution, the meeting suddenly 
darkened. The organisers installed some makeshift lighting. Despite the 
Communists' claims of the far right's involvement with the power failure, the préfet 
affirmed that the electrician brought on site found no evidence of sabotage. But 
almost thirty years later, Paul Durand, a disciple of Ritz and an ex-journalist at Le 
Lorrain, revealed that the power failure had in fact been the work of Emile Groff, 
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an electrical engineer antipathetic to the Communists.498 Unfortunately, it has not 
been possible to discover if Groff acted alone or in a group, or if he was instructed 
to cut the power by some third-party.   
But in any case, the damage had already been done: what was supposed 
to be simply a demonstration of the power of the Communist propaganda machine 
had turned into a public disagreement between the PCF and the Popular Front 
government. Thorez criticised Blum‟s decision to heed to what he called 'des 
injonctions fascistes'.499 The Socialist swiftly rejected Thorez‟s accusations and 
denied the right-wing press' prediction of the near end of the coalition by claiming 
that the Popular Front was as strong as ever.500 Nonetheless Le Populaire blamed 
the Communists' habitual practice 'd'annoncer publiquement leurs initiatives en 
plaçant souvent leurs alliés devant le fait accompli' and questioned the PCF's 
need 'de fournir aux ennemis des arguments faux … mais qui avaient l'apparence 
de la réalité'. Despite Thorez's public praise of the Popular Front in Metz, the left-
wing coalition was in crisis and l'affaire d'Alsace-Lorraine - as the event became 
known – deepened the rift between the PCF and the government.  L‟affaire is of 
particular interest to this study because it was also the catalyst for the Mosellan 
right's offensive against the Popular Front and the Communists. As shall be 
demonstrated in the next chapter, it was in reaction to the Communist meetings in 
the département that the hitherto quiescent right and far right began to work 
together. 
Conclusion 
Despite the victory of the Popular Front at the national level, election results in the 
Moselle reveal the left‟s persistent struggle to establish itself in the region. Yet it is 
also possible to say that the national trend of the electorate‟s shift towards the 
extremes was replicated in the Moselle. For the first time since the return of the 
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region to French sovereignty, new parties, especially on the far right, entered the 
local political arena and challenged the hegemony of the once-dominant Union 
Républicaine Lorraine.  At the same time, the latter showed signs of weakness as 
friction began to appear and multiple candidacies occurred in a few key 
constituencies. In view of the intense political, economic and social changes that 
France and the region experienced at the time, it is possible that the particularist 
views of the Union Républicaine Lorraine appeared somewhat outdated and 
irrelevant to some voters. What is more, it is also likely that the new right-wing 
parties‟ political culture (parades, rallies, picnics, dance parties and so on) 
attracted voters too young to have known the German domination and who envied 
Germany‟s new order. Regarding the strikes, it is clear that they gave the workers 
a new political and social identity. In the Moselle this new identity seemed to take 
precedence over that of regional identity. Indeed, for the first time since 1918 the 
Mosellan working masses massively participated in a national movement. 
Whereas the large strikes of 1919-1920 were intrinsically bound up with the 
difficulties arising from the département‟s assimilation into French sovereignty (see 
chapter One), those of 1936 were set in a national social and political context. 
As for the PCF campaign in the region, it revealed a deep fracture between 
the Communists and the Popular Front government and the latter‟s irritation over 
the former‟s hidden political agenda. While it is clear that the PCF wanted to 
remain in the Popular Front coalition – and if possible lead it - it also tried to 
capitalise on the success of the strikes and expand its influence among the 
workers of France and the Moselle. By following this dual policy, a clash with its 
allies in government appeared inevitable. As Blum ordered the Communist 
leadership to tone down its propaganda campaign and to limit the number of 
meetings to three in the Moselle, the PCF issued strongly worded communiqués to 
which the Socialist Le Populaire responded to in a similar fashion. By an 
unfortunate turn of events for the PCF and the left in general, the Communist 
campaign triggered the radicalisation of local right wingers and the rise of what 
appeared to be an organised right.  
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Chapter Four - Counter-offensive and Divisions, October 1936 - 
February 1937 
Introduction 
In October 1936, when the PCF launched its campaign in the Moselle, local right 
wingers began their counter-offensive. The Mosellan press, in particular Le Messin 
and Le Lorrain, intensified their opposition to the Popular Front and the 
Communist party. Local notables, fearing a „red‟ revolution, joined forces to create 
a movement that sought to draw together all the anti-Communist elements of 
society. As the fastest-growing political party in the Moselle, the Parti Social 
Français seized the opportunity to appear as the genuine anti-Communist force in 
the region. It created trade unions, which sought to combat the rising influence of 
the CGT and the Christian trade unions in the industrial sectors. As the right 
became more organised and began to work together, at least in appearance, the 
left confronted two other serious difficulties. The main one was the Spanish Civil 
War, which divided the left-wing political class throughout France between 
interventionists and non-interventionists. In the Moselle, the parties of the Popular 
Front coalition displayed similar divisions. Like the PCF national leaders, local 
Communists identified with the Spanish Popular Front and were actively engaged 
in the Republican cause. But while attempting a balancing act by organising 
support for the Spanish Republic and doing its best to appear as the guardians of 
the unity of the Popular Front coalition, the PCF also acted to challenge its unity by 
trying to gain control of the CGT.  
This chapter is divided into two parts. As the first part will demonstrate, it 
was the left‟s excesses, such as the Communist campaign in the Moselle and the 
recrudescence of strikes in 1937, which led Mosellan right wingers to work 
together albeit on certain restrictive conditions. The second part will examine how 
at the same time, the Popular Front coalition and the PCF in particular sought to 
address two major issues that threatened the unity of the coalition and the internal 
unity of the parties: the Spanish Civil War and the control of the CGT.   
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Part One: the Right’s Counter-Offensive 
The Press 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the victory of the Popular Front revealed 
a weakening of the moderates and a shift to the extremes for both the left and the 
right. During the summer of 1936, while the Mosellan patronat began negotiating 
collective contracts with trade union representatives, some right wingers thought 
that enough was enough and that something had to be done to counteract what Le 
Messin called 'les fauteurs de désordre, le communisme et le marxisme.'501 As a 
strong opponent of the government and the PCF, Frederic Certonciny, Le Messin‟s 
political editor, reported conversations he allegedly had with right wingers. 
According to him, they expressed their loathing of Communism by declaring,  
vivoter … dans une France amoindrie, révoltée, bolchevisée, non! 
S'il doit en être ainsi, nous préférons redevenir Allemands! Car 
l‟Allemagne a raison à l‟heure actuelle. Elle au moins sait se faire 
respecter.502  
Certonciny‟s article compared the situation in France where 'c'est toujours le 
chaos' to that of Germany 'dont l'ordre civique mérite d'être pris comme exemple.' 
As for Le Lorrain it blamed the Communists for abusing the workers' faith in some 
illusionary social progress and, with a reference to the period of the Reichsland, 
asked, 'Où étaient-ils [ces révolutionnaires], hier, quand il fallait lutter … pour 
rester ce que nous sommes?'503 It then vowed to act as the defender ‟des autels et 
foyers lorrains, des écoles et familles lorraines' and exclaimed, 'Faire de nous des 
serviteurs de Moscou? Jamais! Faire la révolution à la frontière pour détourner de 
Moscou et attirer sur nous la guerre allemande? Jamais!‟504 
It was during that time that Metz's third major Francophone daily first made 
its appearance. Victor Demange, owner of the Metzer Freies Journal, launched Le 
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Républicain Lorrain on 13 September 1936. According to Demange, the 
newspaper, 'ardemment désiré par les laborieuses populations de notre région 
frontière', would offer a form of journalism devoid of 'doctrine outrancière' and 
serve the cause of France with this motto: 'France d'abord'.505 It sought to serve 
the interests of 'la petite comme de la grande patrie' (Moselle and France), but 
was far less particularist than its two main competitors, Le Lorrain and Le Messin. 
And unlike the latter two it was not backed by the diocese. Compared to the violent 
diatribes vociferated against the Popular Front by Le Lorrain and Le Messin, the 
newcomer appeared sympathetic to the left-wing coalition. Following the CGT's 
large demonstration in Metz on 27 September, Le Républicain Lorrain described 
how the 15,000 CGT supporters who came to listen to Jouhaux 'ont defilé en bon 
ordre dans les rues de la ville' and how 'chacun se [conformait] strictement aux 
instructions qui avaient été données'.506 In comparison, Le Lorrain described the 
démonstration as 'un bien édifiant cortège' and compared the turnout, which it 
estimated at no more than 12,000, to 'ce que les pèlerins de Lourdes à longueur 
d'année contemplent au soir d'une journée creuse et dont on ne dit rien.'507  
Fearing a red revolution with the visit of the Communist deputies to the 
département in October, Le Lorrain reported that it was during Thorez's trip to the 
Soviet Union before the party‟s national conference in July that Stalin and Georgi 
Dimitrov, the secretary-general of the Comintern, demanded an intensification of 
the French Communists‟ propaganda in France's industrial regions.508 Although it 
has not been possible to verify this claim, the newspaper stated that this had led to 
the PCF‟s decision to launch meetings in the département for 10 and 11 October. 
But to many contemporary right wingers, the Communists' plans were simply 
unacceptable. Before the préfet‟s powerlessness to ban the meetings, Le Lorrain, 
Le Messin, Antoni's Christlich-Soziale Partei, Vautrin, Ritz, deputies Sérot (Metz 
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Campagne), Harter (Forbach) and Beaudouin (Château-Salins) and a long list of 
unnamed conseillers généraux, mayors, shop owners, businessmen, farmers, 
workers and teachers joined forces to create an anti-Marxist committee called the 
Front Lorrain in September 1936. 
The Front Lorrain 
Albert Eiselé, a young lawyer and the secretary-general of the association, 
described the Front Lorrain as 'un groupement politique des hommes, des partis, 
et des organisations qui en Moselle entendent collaborer au maintien de l'ordre et 
de la paix sociale par la parole et par l'action.'509 Despite the fact that the Front 
Lorrain was governed by one secretary-seneral and two presidents - Vautrin and 
the Union Républicaine Lorraine deputy Sérot - it is clear that Ritz, by using his 
journalistic skills and Le Lorrain to disseminate the committee's messages, was 
the driving force behind it. At the local level, comités locaux and comités 
d'arrondissements were created in order to represent „chaque parti politique 
constitué dans une commune' as well as 'des personnalités représentatives des 
ouvriers, des paysans, des employés, des commerçants, des artisans ainsi que 
des professions libérales … adhérents au Front Lorrain‟. At its head sat a self-
governing executive committee whose main duties were to administer the 
organisation and comprised one representative from each organisation. Soon after 
its creation, the committee published a five-point programme in which it criticised 
'la partialité du pouvoir central … [les] grèves a caractère révolutionnaire' which 
led to '[des] patrons désemparés, l'augmentation du coût de la vie … [la] nervosité 
croissante du peuple qui se divise en deux camps'.510 Above all it condemned „les 
progrès considérables du parti bolchevik qui envisage la prise du pouvoir par des 
moyens révolutionnaires.'  
Much like the Croix de Feu, the first point of the Front Lorrain's programme 
advocated, under the title „Lutte pour la défense de la famille‟, a return to the 
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traditional values of respect and protection of the family. Its second point, entitled 
„Collaboration harmonieuse des ouvriers et des patrons‟, promoted „un système 
économique adapté aux conditions modernes, avec, comme élément de base les 
syndicats débarrassés de tout caractère politique', 'la lutte contre le capitalisme 
anonyme et international', „[l‟]établissement d‟un ordre social nouveau préservant 
le faible contre les abus du capitalisme exploiteur et l‟emprise marxiste‟, and '[une] 
large amélioration du sort de l'ouvrier … et notamment protection ouvrière 
satisfaisante contre tous les risques (accident, mort, maladie, chômage…)'. Its 
third point encouraged the valorisation of peasantry and the products of the 
regional terroir. Its fourth promised to safeguard 'toutes nos traditions lorraines' 
without giving a clear explanation as to what those values referred to. Its fifth and 
final point supported the defence of domestic and foreign order and peace: 'Le 
Front Lorrain veut la paix intérieure et extérieure du pays, et proteste contre toute 
politique imprudente susceptible de diviser la France et l'Europe en deux camps 
dont la rivalité pourrait entraîner… la révolution, la guerre.' Although the 
programme made no mention of the Catholic Church, in private Ritz emphasised 
the organisation's role as defender of the Catholic faith. In a private meeting of the 
Action Catholique Lorraine in September 1936, he claimed to be one of the main 
architects of the Front Lorrain whose immediate aims were, in the préfet's words, 
'de lutter contre les théories communistes, s'efforce[r] de défendre, par tous les 
moyens, les particularités lorraines et la religion catholique.'511 
The Front Lorrain was also willing to ally with third party organisations with 
similar views to theirs as indicated in its programme: ' le Front Lorrain … se joindra 
aux groupements similaires créés dans d'autres régions de France.' The most 
important group it joined was the Rassemblement National Lorrain. Created in 
reaction to the rise of the PCF in neighbouring Meurthe-et-Moselle in July 1936, 
the Rassemblement National Lorrain benefited from the backing of Louis Marin 
and claimed tens of thousands of supporters across the département. With an 
official motto of 'Ordre, Paix, Travail', the movement's aim was 'la réconciliation 
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nationale … [et] combattre le Communisme qui mène notre pays à la ruine et à la 
guerre.'512 It also severely criticised the CGT, whose leader Jouhaux was 
portrayed as 'le bœuf gras qui gagne bien sa vie.' As a display of solidarity with the 
Mosellan formation, the Rassemblement National Lorrain published an anti-
Communist text co-signed by the Front Lorrain in its bi-monthly paper a few weeks 
before Thorez's visit to the Moselle. The text, which adorned the walls of Metz in 
early October, declared 'Non! M. Thorez. Vous n'aurez pas l'Alsace et la Lorraine. 
Et, malgré vous, nous resterons Français.'513  
Ritz was a strong supporter of the Rassemblement National Lorrain and at 
a private meeting organised by the Meurthe-et-Mosellan group in a Nancy suburb 
on 25 October, he was, as the Front Lorrain's representative, one of the guests 
and speakers of honour.514 If the two movements shared similar doctrines, why did 
they not unite in a large regional group that would have encompassed the anti-
Communists of the Moselle and the Meurthe-et-Moselle? After all, was their 
primary aim not to unite all nationaux in order to defeat Communism? Despite a 
lack of evidence, it seems likely that the old tacit agreement of Meurthe-et-
Mosellan right-wing politicians‟ of non-interference in Mosellan politics still 
prevailed and that both movements were willing to support each other as long as 
they did not intrude on each other's territory.  
Regarding the Communist meeting in Metz of October, the préfet reported 
that the Parti Social Français led the Front Lorrain and the Union Nationale des 
Combattants in an anti-Communist campaign. He wrote that thay manifested 'leurs 
fermes intentions de contre manifester et créer une perturbation violente', should 
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the Communist gathering take place.515 Vautrin, a central figure of the Front 
Lorrain, sent the préfet numerous letters and reports requesting a ban of the 
Communist Metz gathering but to no avail. Later, he sent Blum a telegram in which 
he threatened and implored France‟s Premier to intervene.  
Ma qualité de Français et ma charge de Maire de Metz m'imposent 
rendre gouvernement attentif au grand danger pour paix et sécurité 
dans ville frontière si manifestation communiste … n'est pas interdite 
de façon absolue. Par présent avertissement dégage ma 
responsabilité et supplie décider interdiction.516  
In one of his columns in L‟Humanité, Marcel Cachin made a reference to 
Vautrin‟s requests: „les amis de M. de la Rocque ... en Lorraine se déclarent 
opposés à notre propagande. Ils écrivent des lettres où ils annoncent des 
incidents graves, où  « ils dégagent leurs responsabilités ».517 Cachin‟s response 
to Vautrin and the Front Lorrain was: „Devant ce nouvel assaut des hitlériens 
français, qui sert de préparation à un nouveau 6 Février, nous pensons que … nos 
organisations … ne doivent [pas] reculer. Notre parti tiendra ses réunions en ... 
Lorraine‟.518 Before Blum‟s silence, Vautrin wrote a public letter to the inhabitants 
of Metz. Published by Le Lorrain and posted on the walls of Metz in the morning of 
10 October, Vautrin's letter urged the population to „garder un sang-froid et un 
calme réfléchi' towards „l'injure communiste voulue et ordonnée par des agitateurs 
étrangers.'519 It also mentioned the mayor's attempts to have the meeting 
cancelled: 'tout a été fait pour [nous] épargner ce fléau.... Nous n'avons pas 
réussi.' But despite the mayor's calls for calm, Thorez's visit in Metz ended in 
violent clashes between Communists and far right activists. Little is known of the 
influence of the Front Lorrain on the local political scene in the period following its 
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creation, but it is clear that the movement marked the readiness of some panic-
stricken right wingers for unity.520  
Echoing the celebrated right-wing slogan, 'Plutôt Hitler que Blum', Ritz 
wrote in one of his editorial columns, 'Plutôt Hitler que Moscou';521 thus joining Le 
Messin's 'nous préférons redevenir Allemands'. There is no denying that 
Communism stirred passions among Mosellan right wingers. Even Herriot's 
speech of 17 June 1924 on the gallicisation and secularisation of the département 
did not stir such passionate reactions.522 What is more, Ritz had spent four years 
in Germany as a political prisoner during the Great War and always been a strong 
supporter of the return to France during the German annexation and his views, 
close to Maurice Barrès‟s nationalism and revanchism, left no doubt as to his 
profound loathing of Germany. For him to claim that he chose Hitler over Stalin did 
not automatically imply sympathy towards Germany and the Nazi regime. Instead, 
it indicated his perception of where the immediate danger to France and the 
Moselle was: Communism and the Soviet Union.  
Interestingly enough, Jean-François Colas does not mention Ritz‟s 'Plutôt 
Hitler que Moscou' when describing the abbé‟s position towards Germany in his 
doctoral thesis.  Instead, Colas believes that Ritz distrusted both Germany and the 
Soviet Union and refused to join the groups of pacifist anti-Communist politicians 
who rated a war with the Soviet Union as the worst possible danger of all, and a 
rapprochement with Germany a lesser but necessary evil. Colas refers to two 
articles written by Ritz in Le Lorrain to prove his point. In the first, published in 
December 1935, Ritz wrote, „Ce n‟est point le but de cet article de défendre Berlin 
contre Moscou ou Moscou contre Berlin. Car nous mettons [le Communisme et le 
Nazisme] dans le même sac.‟523 In the second, published in August 1936, Ritz re-
affirmed this position by stating: „A l‟Est, dans le national-socialisme allemand, 
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s‟étend le danger qui nous guette.... Nous Lorrains, qui connaissons le nazisme, 
nous ne voulons pas plus de Hitler que de Staline. Nous abhorrons autant le 
nazisme que le bolchévisme.‟524  
Without denying the fact that Ritz did indeed write many articles criticising 
Nazi Germany as well as the Communist Soviet Union, Colas makes no mention 
of Ritz‟s increasingly radicalised views against Moscow and the PCF. Because the 
two articles Colas uses predated the October 1936 Communist propaganda 
campaign, which had led to the culmination of the radicalisation of the right, his 
work does not offer a true picture of Ritz as it does not reflect the latter‟s changed 
attitude. This attitude was not particular to Ritz or Mosellan politicians. At the 
national level, many right wingers considered the Soviet Union far more dangerous 
an enemy than Germany, therefore favouring an appeasement policy towards the 
latter. This changed attitude, which clearly marked the readiness of some right 
wingers to adopt views hitherto largely supported by some on the far right, was a 
strong indicator that the period of the Popular Front further deepened the rift 
between left and right.  
With only a few communiqués in the local press and irregular meetings, 
which occurred principally before the cantonal elections of October 1937, it would 
appear that the Front Lorrain did not achieve its aim of gathering all the nationaux 
in an anti-Communist movement. Perhaps because it refused to become a political 
organisation and remained what was in effect a loose association of disparate 
organisations and individuals who shared a common hatred of Communism, it 
lacked the direction and the impetus to become the true defender of '[les] autels et 
foyers lorrains, [les] écoles et familles lorraines.' Although Le Lorrain claimed it 
counted thousands of fee-paying adhérents and membres in the Francophone 
regions of Metz and Château-Salins, its audience was rather limited.525 Indeed, 
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apart from the readership of the Francophone dailies, it never really succeeded in 
attracting supporters in the predominantly German or dialect-speaking regions 
along the German border or in the rural and industrial areas. As revealed in a letter 
from the Front Lorrain's secretary-general, in spite of the backing of some local 
newspapers and notables in Sarrebourg and Forbach, the majority of followers 
were located around Metz.526 But most significantly, the largest obstacle for the 
Front Lorrain was possibly the appearance on the local political scene of a fast-
growing political force and future adversary, the Parti Social Français. 
The Parti Social Français 
As briefly mentioned earlier, de la Rocque created the Parti Social Français after 
the government banned the Croix de Feu and his other associations in June 1936. 
The new party, whose motto was Travail Ŕ Famille Ŕ Patrie, held its inaugural 
meeting in Paris on 12 July 1936. Concerning its position within France's polarised 
political arena, the party claimed it was neither left-wing nor right-wing as it 
claimed, 'Nous méprisons autant la droite que la gauche.'527 In its programme, 
published a few weeks later, the new party proclaimed its raison d'être to be 
patriotism and social aspiration based on Christian values: 'le patriotisme n'est pas 
le monopole de la droite et l'aspiration sociale n'est pas d‟avantage monopole de 
gauche.'528 According to Albert Kéchichian, within a few days of its creation the 
party could claim over 400,000 members, of which 150,000 came directly from the 
banned Croix de Feu and 200,000 from the Mouvement Social Français.529 De la 
Rocque did not hide the link between the banned ligue and his new organisation. 
As he boasted in his party's programme: 'On peut dissoudre une organisation, on 
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ne peut rien contre les âmes.… La mystique Croix de Feu éclaire, dirige, anime 
l'action du Parti Social Français.'530 
In the Moselle, the new party swiftly established itself as one of the largest 
political parties in terms of members and the principal rival to both left-wing and 
right-wing organisations. The préfet reported the first signs of its existence in the 
département in July 1936, when he noted that the Parti Social Français 'manifeste 
à Metz, depuis quelque temps, une certaine activité sous l'impulsion des anciens 
dirigeants départementaux… des Croix de Feu et Volontaires Nationaux'.531 He 
estimated its membership to be 8,500 for the whole département (the Croix de Feu 
counted 12,000 members in March 1936) and noted its activity particularly in 
Thionville and in Sarrebourg 'qui était un centre important de membres et 
sympathisants des associations dissoutes.' By November, the Mosellan federation 
was completely organised: it had headquarters in Metz, a president, Andrès (the 
last president of the dissolved Croix de Feu) and numerous local sections spread 
across the département. Its membership was estimated at approximately 17,600 
members for the département; 2,200,000 for the whole of France.532 By 
December, the préfet estimated that only 40 percent of the current members were 
ex-Croix de Feu; the remaining 60 percent had never before joined a political 
organisation. He also believed that, 'il est indiscutable que … [avec] ses cadres 
décidés et actifs ce parti aura … une influence importante sur la vie politique de 
notre région'.533  
According to the préfet, the party could rely on the support of many elected 
local officials, including Ritz and Le Lorrain's editor Paul Durand who also 
                                            
 
530
 Ascomemo, Parti Social Français, Parti Social Français, Une Mystique, Un Programme, 1936, 
p.4, 26EDG.   
531
 ADBR, Rapport du préfet au ministre de l'Intérieur, Metz, 24 juillet 1936, 98AL674-1. 
532
 ADBR, Rapport du commissaire spécial Gare Centrale Metz au préfet, 4 décembre 1936, 
98AL674-1. Sources on the membership of the Parti Social Français provide contradictory figures. 
By early 1937, the party claimed 1.5 million members; the police estimated the national 
membership at 700,000 members; in Kennedy, op.cit., pp.193-194. 
533
 ADBR, Rapport du commissaire spécial Gare Centrale Metz au préfet, 31 décembre 1936, 
98AL674-1. 
181 
 
happened to preside the Malgré-Nous veteran association.534 Barely a few weeks 
after the creation of the Parti Social Français, Vautrin attended a private meeting 
where Charles Vallin, member of the national executive committee, presented in 
front of a 2,500-strong audience the party's programme. The préfet noted that the 
mayor of Metz 'a été salué dès son arrivée par une chaleureuse ovation.'535 In 
Bitche, a commissaire spécial adjoint remarked that 'les maires de plusieurs 
communes sont inscrits au [Parti Social Français]‟ and the commissaire de police 
de Sarrebourg reported the same occurrence in his district.536 But the two 
commissaires also noted that the party, though very active, counted fewer 
members than the Croix de Feu.  
The commissaire in Sarrebourg had an explanation for this: many ex-Croix 
de Feu were disappointed in de la Rocque's reaction after the legislative elections 
and therefore decided not to follow him in the Parti Social Français. Kéchichian 
reports a similar occurrence in a Parisian section where one quarter of the 
members left the ligue after the May elections.537 In his opinion, the ligueurs 
seemed confused by de la Rocque's claim that the Popular Front won the 
elections on the Croix de Feu's programme while at the same time discrediting the 
political right for losing the elections. 
With a programme centred on the values of labour, family and love of the 
fatherland, the party made the government and the Communists its prime 
enemies. At a private meeting in the small village of Bliesbruck, Massart, a 
locksmith from Sarreguemines, criticised the government's actions based on its 
Pain-Paix-Liberté programme.538 Regarding peace, he claimed that the 
government's inability to contain the strike movement endangered peace at the 
domestic and international levels. He then condemned the factory occupations and 
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the recent restrictions imposed on the press as serious breaches to freedom.539 
He concluded by blaming the government for the price rises which nullified the pay 
increases workers received after June 1936. According to him, the government's 
sole aim was to apply the PCF's programme and the only party capable of 
preventing this was de la Rocque's. Although the Parti Social Français presented 
itself as neither left nor right and as the party of national reconciliation, which stood 
above the political conflict, its priority was anti-Communism. In December 1936, 
the section of Merten urged its members to prepare 'une lutte sans merci contre le 
communisme', as the préfet wrote in a report.540 
But it was before and after the PCF's meetings of 10 and 11 October that 
the party's anti-Communism became sharply apparent. Indeed, as police reports 
concluded, the Parti Social Français led the campaign against the the Communist 
tour in the département. In a letter to the préfet, the president of the départemental 
federation warned of 'les incidents graves … [qui] peuvent surgir' if the meetings 
were to take place.541 The party was not alone in asking for a ban: the Union 
Nationale des Combattants, the Front Lorrain, the Malgré-Nous and the Comité de 
Rassemblement Anti-Soviétique (CRAS) also wrote to the préfet.542 But while the 
Union Nationale des Combattants and the Front Lorrain responded favourably to 
the préfet's request to cancel their planned counter-manifestation in Metz on the 
evening of the 10th, the Parti Social Français refused to cede and decided to 
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proceed with its original plans. As a result, some of its members gathered around 
the Palais de Cristal impatiently waiting for Thorez to finish his speech (in near 
darkness) and for his supporters to come out. 
According to the préfet, around 3,000 anti-Communists gathered in the 
streets surrounding the Palais de Cristal at 8 o‟clock in the evening; many of 
whom, he believed, 'appartenant … à des groupements d'extrême-droite et au 
Parti Social Français.'543 As they attempted but failed to break through the police 
barricades during the meeting, the demonstrators threw stones at the police and 
army forces. The latter dispersed the protesters and created a safety cordon for 
the Communists. The cordon went from the Place Gambetta, where the meeting 
took place, to Metz train station; roughly 2 kilometres long. After the Communists 
left the hall, the far right supporters followed them to the train station taunting them 
with cries of 'La France aux Français!‟ and „Vive la Rocque!' Despite the police 
efforts to control the crowd, far right demonstrators burned red flags and 
exchanged blows with a few Communists.544 While some police officers 
succeeded in escorting the majority of Communists to the station platforms, others 
contained the far right supporters outside the station.  
Spurred by the Communists‟ departure, the far right demonstrators headed 
for the centre of Metz shouting and singing. On their way, they stopped outside the 
Palais du Gouverneur (the residence of the highest ranking military officer in Metz) 
where General Henri Giraud, the current military governor, lived. They waited for 
him to appear on his balcony, which he did to their great satisfaction. They 
cheered and gave him a long ovation before heading for the mayor‟s house. 
Vautrin, who was also happy to oblige, saluted them and received an enthusiastic 
response. They finished their tour by stationing themselves outside Le Lorrain and 
Le Messin's windows as a demonstration of solidarity. Soon after, police forces 
intervened in order to stop fights involving far right demonstrators against 
employees of Le Républicain Lorrain. After dispersing the crowd and emptying the 
rue Serpenoise, where the newspaper‟s office was located and where the scuffle 
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had occurred, the police proceeded to a few arrests and posted a permanent 
guard outside the office. According to some eye witnesses, the fights broke out 
after the newspaper's personnel derided the demonstrators by whistling at them 
and one employee doused them with water from a fire extinguisher. But Victor 
Demange, the owner of the newspaper, contested this version of events, insisting 
that his employees had never provoked the demonstrators.  
Despite these incidents, which resulted in some arrests and several injuries 
among the demonstrators and the police, the préfet concluded that 'malgré 
l'agitation … la soirée du 10 octobre … s'est déroulée… sans incident grave.'545 In 
Creutzwald, where one of the other two authorised meetings took place, the 
commissaire spécial stated that during the meeting, which attracted 600 people, 
'des boules puantes [ont] été jetées par quelques partisans du Parti Social 
Français disseminés dans la salle'.546 He also noted that 500 demonstrators, 
mainly 'des membres du Parti Social Français et partisans du Front Lorrain' 
gathered outside the meeting hall singing the Marseillaise and shouting 'Vive de la 
Rocque!' and 'Thorez à Moscou!' 
The significance of these events on the Parti Social Français was twofold. 
Firstly, they demonstrated the party‟s determination to fight the Communists‟ 
influence and its leadership in the anti „red‟ campaign in the Moselle. Despite de la 
Rocque‟s repeated claims that his party was legalist, a local party official declared 
that should the Communists wish to conquer power –which some believed they did 
on 10 October - the Parti Social Français‟ role was to seize power illegally. As a 
commissaire spécial reported : 'Nous [le Parti Social Français] sommes disposés à 
prendre le pouvoir mais par la voie légale … et par la voie illégale au cas où les 
Communistes voudraient s'en emparer.'547  
Secondly, the Parti Social Français seemed to have benefited from Blum‟s 
decision to authorise three meetings instead of the fifty-two originally planned and 
the ensuing disagreement between the PCF and the government. Ironically, while 
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the right and the far right in general gained a certain prestige after the Communist 
campaign, the unity of the Popular Front coalition appeared somewhat weakened. 
Ritz commented on the disagreement between the PCF and the government in the 
following terms, „Leon Blum a resisté de son mieux à ses tristes alliés.... C‟est le 
début de la cassure.‟548 As for the PCF, the Politburo published a manifesto that 
illustrated the mood of the party:   
La population laborieuse … de Lorraine a été indignée que, se 
soumettant aux exigences des factieux, le gouvernement ait cru 
devoir interdire les meetings de propagande du Parti communiste, 
sous prétexte d‟empêcher des troubles fascistes...549 
It is evident that de la Rocque‟s party succeeded in establishing itself as a 
strong political force and a credible anti-Communist organisation by the end of 
1936. At a party meeting in Metz in November 1936, over 15,000 activists 
gathered and celebrated their leader and the party‟s feats against the 
Communists. But, while the party‟s active propaganda continued its conquest of 
the Mosellan middle classes, it was also eager to conquer the working masses. 
The Syndicats Professionnels and the Christian trade unions  
Another area where the Parti Social Français was particularly aggressive and 
successful was the social arena with the creation of its own trade union, the 
Syndicats Professionnels Français. The first Syndicats appeared in the Moselle in 
March 1936. Designed to unite white and blue collar workers in the same trade 
union, the local patronat supported their creation. Indeed, as the préfet noted, 
„suscitées par les organisations Croix de Feu … [ces créations] ont bénéficié … de 
l‟appui tacite, mais très actif, du patronat.‟550 The trade unions were organised in a 
similar fashion to the CGT with professional federations gathered in a 
départemental union that belonged to the national Confédération des Syndicats 
Professionnels Français. The départemental union was presided by Jacques 
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Sicard, an engineer from Metz, who devoted every afternoon to his trade union 
work. The Syndicats Professionnels had the support of the well-established 
networks and sections of the Croix de Feu and, after June 1936, those of the Parti 
Social Français‟. 
According to the préfet, the majority of the members were „[des] ouvriers et 
employés sympathisants ou adhérents du “Parti Social Français” et aux 
mouvements de droite, comme le “Front Lorrain” et “l‟Action Catholique 
Lorraine”‟.551 A particularity of the Mosellan union was the desire of a certain 
number of its members to gain some independence from the Parti Social Français. 
As the préfet noted in the same report, „une certaine tendance se manifesterait au 
sein de la Fédération départementale, en vue de la dégager de l‟obédience directe 
du “Parti Social Français”‟. While it is unclear why some members of the local 
Syndicats Professionnels sought to remove themselves from the party‟s authority, 
it is possible that they hoped to hide their association with a party which locally 
competed directly with the notables and the Front Lorrain. It is also possible that 
some members of the Mosellan union had a different agenda and rejected de la 
Rocque‟s tolerance towards Jews and particular French Jewish veterans. 
Though Richard Millman‟s claim that the Moselle was one of the most 
antisemitic regions in 1930s France is debatable, antisemitism among supporters 
of the départemental section of the Parti Social Français was not uncommon.552 
Millman quotes the words of local followers of the Parti Social Français who 
highlighted the dual and not mutually exclusive dangers of Judaism and 
Communism. Quoting a police report, he observes, „dans le département de la 
Moselle, vers la fin de l‟année 1936, un orateur du mouvement dénonce la 
politique du Front Populaire qui ... est influencée par « Staline et les juifs 
internationaux ».‟553 Another follower affirmed, „« C‟est Léon Blum ou le juif Staline 
qui commande chez nous. »‟554 In his study on fascism in interwar Alsace, 
Goodfellow has demonstrated the indisputable contamination of the Alsatian 
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sections of the Parti Social Français with the viruses of Nazism and antisemitism. 
But despite the evidence presented by Millman, there is no evidence to suggest 
that the Mosellan federation of the party and the union of the Syndicats 
Professionnels suffered a similar fate. Though there is no doubt that some 
Mosellan supporters of the Parti Social Français were antisemitic (the exact 
numbers will probably remain unknown), this does not mean that the whole 
federation rejected Judaism. However commendable Millman‟s study of la 
question juive is, one should exercise caution when reading his interpretation of 
events in Alsace and the Moselle. Indeed, the author‟s failure to differentiate the 
three Parti Social Français federations (Moselle, Bas-Rhin and Haut-Rhin) and his 
reference to a political entity that never existed („le Parti Social Français d‟Alsace-
Lorraine‟) reflects the trend among historians which, until recently, inaccurately 
represented interwar Moselle a natural extension of Alsace. The Parti Social 
Français in the Moselle was attached to another federation in 1937, but it was that 
of neighbouring Meurthe-et-Moselle not those of Alsace.  
All the same, echoing the Parti Social Français‟s dislike of Communism, the 
trade union‟s fundamental mission was, in the préfet‟s words, „de combattre 
l‟influence des organisations cégétistes dont [elle rallie] tous les adversaires.‟555 
Following the strike movement of the summer of 1936, the Syndicats 
Profesionnels actively intensified their propaganda campaigns and succeeded in 
recruiting thousands of supporters. By April 1937, the préfet estimated their 
numbers at approximately 2,500, mainly in and around Metz; exactly where the 
CGT and the PCF were the weakest.556 The Syndicats were particularly successful 
among the female workforce (the Syndicat des gens de maison for example) and 
in small businesses. Even though they managed to create forty-seven new trade 
unions by the end of 1936, they failed to secure the support of the industrial 
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workers who followed the CGT or the rival Christian trade unions in their 
thousands.557  
The Catholic Syndicats Indépendants d‟Alsace-Lorraine, backed by the 
dicocese and the Union Républicaine Lorraine, opposed the strikes of the summer 
of 1936. Although they agreed with some of the workers‟ demands, they rejected 
the occupations. According to a police report, Braun, one of the leaders of the 
trade union, warned his colleagues to refrain from following what the author of the 
report described as „une masse d‟ouvriers imprégnés d‟idées révolutionnaires‟.558 
After the strikes, as both the Parti Social Français‟ Syndicats Professionnels and 
the CGT competed to recruit new members, the Christian union felt compelled to 
react. In order to re-affirm its Christian heritage among Catholic workers who might 
be tempted to join the Syndicats Professionnels, the trade union changed its name 
from Unabhängiger Gewerkschaftsbund (UGB) to Christlicher Gewerkschaftsbund 
(CGB); Independent Trade Union to Christian Trade Union. As the CGT sought to 
capitalise on the strike movement, claiming it was the only organisation capable of 
uniting and representing the workers effectively, the left-wing trade union and the 
CGB clashed in what was to become a long conflict.  
Backed by the Action Catholique Lorraine and many right-wing politicians, 
the Catholic trade union‟s regional secretary-general, Henri Meck, and five 
deputies co-wrote a letter to the préfet. In it, they complained of „la prétention [de 
la CGT] d‟être l‟unique organisation ouvrière … depuis le début du mouvement 
revendicatif qui a suivi l‟accord  dit “de Matignon”.‟559 Above all, they wrote the 
letter in order to complain about the CGT‟s threatening tactics against some 
members of the Catholic trade union. As they wrote,  
nous avons l‟honneur de vous prier de vouloir bien intervenir 
énergiquement auprès … de la CGT, pour mettre fin aux cas de 
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pression et de terreur exercés par certains dirigeants locaux de la 
CGT sur les membres des Syndicats Chrétiens‟.  
Quoting a few examples of recent occurrences, they mentioned the case of 
Charles Leininger, a miner and a leading member of the Christian union in 
Moyeuvre-Grande, who received death threats and of a few workers who were 
thrown out of their workplaces because they refused to leave their union and join 
the CGT. They concluded by mentioning the names of a few workers who were 
able to keep their jobs only because they resigned from the Christian union and 
joined the CGT. 
In reaction to what many Catholics considered violent and unlawful 
methods, the clergy and the Action Catholique Lorraine organised meetings in 
support of the Christian union. During those meetings, priests, abbés and other 
clergymen strongly advised Catholic workers to join the Christian trade union. At a 
meeting in Boulay on 13 February 1937, Robert Godel, the local representative of 
the Action Catholique Lorraine, praised his organisation‟s attention to the 
amelioration of the working masses‟ future.560 He explained that because of that 
the Action Catholique Lorraine naturally supported the Christian trade union. At the 
end of the meeting, archpriest Collignon and abbé Schweitzer encouraged 
workers in French and in German to join the Christian trade union. In another 
meeting organised by the Action Catholique Lorraine, Paul Harter, the deputy-
mayor of Forbach, asked workers to, in the préfet‟s words, „se désolidariser de la 
CGT et à donner [leur] adhésion au syndicat chrétien.‟561 The Action Catholique 
Lorraine organised similar meetings across the département, in French as well as 
German- and Platt-speaking cantons. To be sure, the Action Catholique Lorraine‟s 
efforts denote the fear many Catholics felt before the scale of the strike movement 
and the rise and radicalisation of the CGT. Above all, like the majority of right 
wingers many Catholics believed that France was on the brink of a revolution that 
would see the uprising of the proletariat and to the killings of priests and nuns; 
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crimes the „reds‟ were allegedly committing in Spain where the revolution had, so 
they thought, already started.  
Part Two: the Left’s Divisions  
The Spanish Civil War 
On 18 June 1936, Spanish military rebels launched a coup against the Popular 
Front government, which had won the elections in Spain in February.562 The 
conspirators, who sought to overthrow the Republic and establish a military 
dictatorship in its place, counted on a swift victory. But as Paul Preston writes, 
„[w]hat was supposed to be a quick coup left Spain geographically and politically 
divided for a lengthy war.‟563 The conflict, which ended three years later with the 
rebels‟ victory, saw the confrontation of two ideologically-opposed groups: on the 
right, General Francisco Franco‟s Nationalists; on the left, the Loyalists or 
Republicans. Broadly speaking, the first group comprised Spain‟s elites such as 
land and business owners, Catholic small landowners, the clergy and the army, 
and the second included landless labourers, industrial workers, supporters of the 
left and the trade unions and Republicans. Shortly after the military uprising, the 
new Spanish Premier José Giral appealed to Blum for French military assistance. 
Initially Blum agreed to send military equipment to the Spanish Republic. But 
following talks with his own government and British representatives, and facing 
pressure from the Radical-Socialist party, the Senate and the right-wing press, 
which accused him of fomenting a war against Italy and Germany, Blum refused to 
help the sister regime in Spain. Instead, France signed a non-intervention pact that 
imposed among other things an arms embargo on Spain. However, when it 
became apparent that two of the pact co-signatories, Italy and Germany, were 
flouting the agreement by providing the Nationalists with essential military 
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equipment and troops, France turned a blind eye to illegal arms shipments across 
its southern border.  
The Spanish Civil War is doubly interesting to this study on account of its 
effect on the Popular Front coalition and its exploitation by the right and the far 
right against the Popular Front and the Communists. In August 1936, after Blum 
had officially agreed to a policy of non-intervention, the PCF became the de facto 
defender of the Spanish Republic in France. Both contemporary observers and 
historians agree that the Spanish war revealed profound divisions within the 
governing coalition as well as within its constituent parties. In his memoirs, 
Depreux stated that „la guerre d‟Espagne avait profondément divisé le 
gouvernement‟,564 to which Wolikow adds „[l]a question espagnole a profondément 
ébranlé le Front populaire dans la mesure où elle a ravivé les dissensions entre 
les partis de gauche et brisé sa dynamique unitaire.‟565 The PCF position was 
unequivocal. It flatly rejected the government‟s policy of non-intervention and the 
arms embargo. In a letter to the SFIO, the Communist party voiced its indignation 
before what it considered an injustice: „C‟est une chose véritablement intolérable 
que de voir les rebelles ravitaillés par l‟Italie et l‟Allemagne, tandis que le 
gouvernement légal se voit appliquer une politique de blocus‟.566 Before what 
Thorez later described as „une sinistre duperie‟ and „une véritable trahison de la 
démocratie, de l‟Espagne républicaine et de la France‟, the PCF began to 
organise fund collections and convoys of voluntary fighters for Spain in September 
1936.567  
The positions of the Radicals and the SFIO were not as clear as that of the 
PCF. Within the Radical party, two opposing groups emerged: the pro-
interventionists led by Pierre Cot, the Air Minister, and the non-interventionists led 
by Yvon Delbos, Minister for Foreign Affairs, who represented the majority within 
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the party. As for the SFIO, it was equally divided: while the majority supported 
Blum‟s policy, others such as Vincent Auriol, Finance Minister, and Zyromski 
contested it. The latter even created a committee in support of the Spanish 
Republic, the Comité d‟Action Socialiste pour l‟Espagne. It is clear that those 
differences deepened the rift within the coalition parties and the coalition itself, 
notably between the government and the PCF. During a speech he gave at the 
National Assembly in December 1936, Thorez declared: „Nous demandons 
instamment au gouvernement ... d‟écarter de lui et de nous le plus grand risque de 
dissociation du Front populaire.‟ But Blum defended his policy consistently by 
arguing that, as Julian Jackson puts it, „it prevented the escalation of the Spanish 
conflict into an international war‟.568 Blum‟s refusal to yield to the PCF‟s calls to 
end the embargo led the Communist deputies to abstain from voting for the 
government‟s foreign policy on 5 December 1936. This prompted the right-wing Le 
Figaro to declare, „Le Front populaire est virtuellement rompu.‟569  
By and large, the right favoured a policy of neutrality towards the Spanish 
War. Both the Fédération Républicaine and the Alliance Démocratique opposed 
intervention. The former, as Irvine suggests, did so for two main reasons: 1) 
because it believed that helping the Spanish Republic would lead to a war with 
Germany, and 2) because of its antipathy to the Spanish Popular Front which 
Octave Lavalette, the propaganda delegate for the Rhône federation, described as 
the embodiment of „Communist brutality and the tyranny of Moscow.‟570 Regarding 
the attitude of the Alliance Démocratique, François Audigier writes that, „les 
députés refusèrent toute ingérence dans la guerre d‟Espagne‟,571 possibly 
because of  the party‟s „culture politique qui privilégiait par principe le compromis 
au conflit‟.572 The position of the Catholic Parti Démocrate Populaire was 
somewhat less obvious. Although the party officially supported non-intervention, 
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some, such as Jean Raymond-Laurent, the co-founder and secretary-general of 
the party, denounced the involvement of Germany and Italy on the Nationalists‟ 
side and were sympathetic to the Republican cause.573 
On the far right, all parties opposed French intervention in Spain principally 
because they thought it would increase the chances of provoking a war with 
Germany. Regarding the Parti Social Français, Soucy writes that the party „not 
only opposed French intervention in Spain to save its new Republic but also 
denounced calls for France to go to war against Nazi Germany‟.574 At the head of 
his new Parti Populaire Français, Doriot claimed that France should not intervene 
in a foreign conflict that had been secretly plotted by the Soviet Union in order to 
start a war between France and Germany. He also strongly criticised the PCF‟s 
organisation and recruitment of the International Brigades - military units formed of 
French and foreign antifascist volunteers who fought for the Republic in Spain 
between 1936 and 1939.575  
For Doriot and many on the right and far right, the PCF‟s involvement in the 
Spanish conflict conveniently confirmed what they had repeatedly preached since 
the victory of the Popular Front: „le communisme, c‟est la guerre‟. As the party 
whose raison d‟être rested on anti-Communism, the Parti Populaire Français was 
particularly involved in the action against the PCF‟s recruitment of volunteers. 
According to the party‟s newspaper, L‟Emancipation Nationale, „[le Parti Populaire 
Français a] agi pour faire cesser la traite des blancs à laquelle se livrait le parti 
communiste. [Son] action a sauvé la vie de milliers de jeunes Français.‟576 It is 
worth noting that while the Parti Populaire Français and the other parties of the 
right and the far right consistently denounced the PCF‟s involvement in Spain they 
tended to pass over in silence that of Germany and Italy.  
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One of the most notable effects of the Spanish war in France was its effect 
upon the right. As Osgood correctly notes, „The impact of the Spanish Civil War on 
the French right cannot be exaggerated. For here was living proof ... of the logical 
and inevitable outcome of the Popular Front experiments.‟577 Indeed, the Spanish 
events confirmed the conservatives‟ worst fears of revolution and war. By 
publicising the Republicans‟ desecration of churches and the murders of priests 
and nuns to its conservative readers, the French right-wing press played an 
important role in alarming public opinion and politicians. Occurring just when 
France faced a social upheaval that heralded fundamental changes to the 
traditional conservative values of order, respect, social hierarchy and so on, the 
Spanish Civil War confronted right wingers with what appeared to be a stark 
choice: either to assist the Spanish left-wing government with the help of the 
Soviet Union but risk a civil war at home and a war with Germany, or to abandon 
Spain to its fate, let Germany put an end to the Popular Front Republic, restore 
order in France and save peace in Europe. Not surprisingly, the vast majority 
opted for the second choice. Even though one must not ignore the real pacifism 
that existed among right wingers at the time, it is clear that ideology played a 
decisive role in the right‟s perception of events. As Osgood puts it, the French right 
perceived the events in Spain as a simple contest between „”anti-Communist and 
pro-Communist forces.”‟578    
In the Moselle, the divisions within the left-wing coalition and the parties 
appeared somewhat similar to those observed at the national level.  Although little 
is known of the local Radicals‟ position, many Socialists such as Ralph Konopnicki 
openly contested Blum‟s policy. Konopnicki became heavily involved in the 
collection of funds for the Spanish Republic. Alongside members of the PCF, the 
CGT and the Secours Rouge International, he organised the tour of a Republican 
Catalan music band, Cobla Barcelona, in the summer of 1937. The latter played 
concerts all over the département in order to raise awareness and funds for the 
Republican cause. The first concert, which took place in Metz, attracted a large 
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crowd of supporters as well as the attention of the far right. As Pierre Schill writes, 
„[l]e premier concert organisé à Metz attire une foule nombreuse parmi laquelle 
des militants d‟extrême droite qui lancent des boules puantes‟.579 
As at the national level, the Mosellan Communists disagreed with Blum‟s 
policy in Spain. Despite the claim that they wholly supported the Popular Front 
government and coalition, local Communists displayed certain signs of frustration 
towards Blum and his government. At a party meeting at the Palais de Cristal in 
Metz in August 1936, local Communist officials claimed that „A l‟heure actuelle, le 
Parti Communiste soutient sans restriction le Gouvernement‟.580 They blamed the 
right for trying to split the coalition over the issues of Spain and declared, „Le parti 
... est vigilant et se gardera bien de provoquer une scission.‟ But as events in 
Spain unfolded and Blum continued to resist the PCF‟s calls to lift the arms 
embargo on Spain, the Mosellan federation supported the Communist deputies‟ 
decision not to vote for the government‟s policy in the National Assembly. 
Like the national Central Committee, it identified with the plight of the 
Spanish Popular Front. In its determination to help the sister regime, it played a 
decisive role in the pro-Republican campaign. Along with the CGT, Mosellan 
Communists organised regular meetings in support of the Spanish Republic. They 
also collected food, clothes and funds and became particularly involved in the 
organisation of the International Brigades. During one of the collection campaigns 
in the industrial canton of the Vallée de l‟Orne the préfet reported that „le Parti 
Communiste a organisé ... des équipes de quêteurs qui visitent les particuliers et 
sollicitent des subventions pour les Républicains espagnols.‟581 They also 
organised regular collections among industrial workers. According to the 
metalworkers‟ CGT-sponsored newspaper Le Métallurgiste, fund collectors 
gathered almost 30,000 francs in the steelworks around Thionville by the end of 
September 1936.582  
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Regarding the International Brigades, the Moselle played a particularly 
active role in the recruitment and transit of the volunteers. According to Rémi 
Skoutelsky, of all France's départements, the Moselle ranked fourth in the 
provision of volunteers for the Brigades.583 As he writes, „La région parisienne est 
… le lieu de résidence de près de la moitié des Brigadistes français [41,6%]. Le 
département provincial fournissant le plus fort contingent est ... le Nord : 5,8%. Il 
est suivi du Rhône (4,8%), de la Moselle (3,7%)‟. Numerous prefectural and police 
reports acknowledged the Moselle‟s significant role in the organisation of the 
Brigades. Although the Brigades were officially created on 22 October 1936, 
Mosellan Communists wasted no time in organising convoys of French and foreign 
volunteers for Spain. A few weeks after Franco‟s military uprising, Emile 
Cossoneau, the Communist deputy for the Seine-et-Oise, declared during one of 
his visits to the Moselle that „la classe ouvrière française a le devoir de soutenir de 
tous ses efforts la République espagnole.‟584 Although Cossoneau did not explicitly 
urge workers to go to Spain to fight for the Republic, the préfet stated that „le parti 
communiste avait lancé des appels pour que des volontaires, adhérant à ses 
cellules, se rendent en Espagne‟.585 As a result, „une quinzaine de volontaires ... 
seraient partis, pour l‟Espagne, dans le courant du mois d‟Août.‟586 In October, the 
regional section of the PCF took control of the recruitment of volunteers and ran 
recruitment offices in three industrial towns: Hagondange, Thionville and 
Sarreguemines. Throughout 1937 and 1938, regular convoys of volunteers 
continued to leave the département. 
Why did the Moselle participate in the recruitment of volunteers? According 
to Skoutelsky, various social, economic and political factors may explain the 
Brigades‟ geographical origins in France. Firstly, the regions that provided the 
largest numbers of volunteers tended to be heavily industrialised and urbanised.587 
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Secondly, the largest contingents left from areas where the PCF had a strong 
presence.588 As this thesis has demonstrated, however, the Moselle was no 
ordinary industrial region. Hence, Skoutelsky‟s affirmations, though possibly valid 
for other regions, do not apply well to the Moselle. After all, the département‟s 
working-class population had demonstrated its immunity to left-wing political and 
social activism for the largest part of the interwar period. This immunity had largely 
contributed to the PCF‟s poor implantation in the region. Could a different factor, 
such as the strikes of the summer of 1936, have instilled the département with a 
new political and social consciousness? Though the strikes did contribute to the 
formation of the workers‟ new social and political identity, the main explanation of 
the active participation of the Moselle in the Brigades may well have been its 
position on France‟s north-eastern borders.  
As one of the largest centres in Europe for the recruitment of volunteers, 
the central offices of the PCF in Paris attracted many European antifascists. 
Indeed, as Stéphane Courtois and Marc Lazar note in their study of the PCF, 
„Paris devient la plaque tournante où arrivent et sont « vérifiés » des milliers de 
volontaires … avant d‟être expédiés vers la frontière espagnole.‟589 It appears 
therefore that a large number of Central and East European Communists, on their 
way to Paris, used the Moselle as their point of entry into French territory: mainly 
Germans and Poles but also Czechoslovaks, Luxembourgers, Belgians, Russians 
and Bulgarians. Although it has not been possible to verify this claim, it is also 
probable that a certain number of Italian antifascist immigrants who came to the 
département after Mussolini rose to power may have joined some convoys. The 
presence of foreign fighters in the region alarmed the préfet who decided to take 
action. Indeed, faced with what the préfet described as „le flux incessant de 
combattants étrangers qui partent pour l‟Espagne‟, he urged the Minister of the 
Interior to grant him the right to expel all foreigners from the département in order 
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to set an example.590 It is clear that the government did not consent to the préfet‟s 
request.591  
According to a commissaire de police, foreign Communists fleeing their 
home countries had long used the Moselle as a gateway to France. As he wrote in 
a report,  
Le passage par Metz, de nombreux Communistes étrangers … 
principalement de nationalité allemande qui, fuyant leur pays, se 
rendent à Paris, existe depuis de nombreuses années, en particulier 
depuis l‟avènement de Hitler.592  
Those foreign Communists and later the volunteers for Spain were able to enter 
France through two particularly poorly guarded areas of the département‟s 
borders: near Hettange-Grande on the Luxembourg side and near Forbach on the 
German side. Once in the Moselle, they were looked after by local Communists 
and the head of the local committee of the Secours Rouge International, 
Guillaume Klein. Then, they boarded trains to Paris-Gare de l‟Est where 
Communist officials would greet them and take them to the PCF‟s offices on rue 
Lafayette. Finally, Parisian Communists provided them with false French 
identification documents that would enable them to cross the Spanish border. 
Whereas very few volunteers travelling from Metz to Paris were native Mosellans, 
the new recruits‟ documents often indicated the Moselle as their place of origin in 
France. This points to the Moselle‟s geographical location as the main factor in the 
département role in the transfer of foreign volunteers to Paris.  
To be sure, the role of native Mosellan fighters should not be ignored, as 
some indisputably originated from the département. But since so many foreigners 
with no fixed address or without national papers happened to specify „Moselle‟ as 
their place of residence in the administrative documents of the Brigades, it is 
difficult to evaluate the real number of Mosellan fighters. The préfet seemed to 
have felt this difficulty as he argued that the presence of so many foreign 
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antifascists travelling through the Moselle made the task of identifying the 
volunteers particularly difficult. As he wrote in a report in December 1936, 
„L‟effectif global de la Moselle est 319 recrues plus 150 à 200 enrôlés dont 
l‟identification est imprécise.‟593 Interestingly, neighbouring Alsace, which was also 
conveniently located for the recruitment of foreign volunteers and whose borders 
with Germany exceeded that of the Moselle, provided fewer fighters than the latter. 
Skoutelsky estimates that between 1 and 1.9 percent of the fighters recruited in 
France originated or transited via Alsace; half the percentage of the Moselle.594 
Too little is known of the Alsatian Communist federation and its role with regard to 
the Spanish war to advance any hypothesis, but it is likely that the Moselle‟s 
history as a chosen land of immigration played a certain part. Another factor that 
might have contributed to the Moselle‟s active part was the local Communists‟ 
sheer commitment and determination to help the Spanish Republic.  
On the right, the Mosellans‟ attitude echoed that observed at the national 
level. As organisations that claimed to defend the interests of Catholics and the 
Church, the Union Républicaine Lorraine, the Front Lorrain and the Action 
Catholique Lorraine strongly opposed intervention. They were particularly sensitive 
to the right-wing press reports of the Communists‟ alleged crimes against the 
Spanish Catholic clergy, which they widely condemned. Following a meeting of the 
Action Catholique Lorraine in Sarreguemines, the local section published a 
resolution that read,  
Les membres de l‟Action Catholique Populaire Lorraine expriment 
leur profonde sympathie à tous leurs frères victimes des crimes 
sacrilèges, commis par les attaques bolchévistes en Espagne, 
contre la vieille civilisation chrétienne... 595  
In Le Lorrain, Ritz regularly reminded his readers that the duty of all Catholics was 
to defend Christianity against the hordes of Communist murderers, thus 
suggesting the moral authority of the Nationalists‟ cause. Schuman‟s pacifist and 
Catholic values led him naturally on the path of non-intervention. The leaders of 
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the Parti Social Français‟ regional federation endorsed de la Rocque‟s policy of 
neutrality. As Andres stated in a party meeting in Metz: „Les membres de la 
fédération départementale du Parti Social Français … [r]éclament … une 
neutralité absolue en ce qui concerne la politique intérieure des pays voisins.‟596  
By exposing the fragility of the political consensus on which the Popular 
Front rested, the Spanish Civil War revealed real divisions which cut across the 
constitutive parties, the coalition and the government. Although those who 
disagreed with the government‟s non-intervention policy never openly challenged 
Blum‟s leadership, they contested a policy that proved advantageous to the 
Nationalists, who greatly benefited from German and Italian military assistance. 
On the right and far right, a large majority supported neutrality. Thus, while the 
Spanish War divided the left, it appeared that it united a hitherto divided right. At 
the départemental level, the Spanish conflict revealed the PCF‟s organisational 
skills and a certain political maturity. By embracing the cause of the Spanish 
Republic and successfully organising the convoys of hundreds of volunteers, the 
federation appeared to have moved away from the difficulties and the internal 
crises that had characterised it during the formative years of the Popular Front. 
Although some SFIO activists such as Konopnicki were heavily involved in the pro-
Republican campaign, a lack of sources makes it extremely difficult to assess the 
reaction and position of the Mosellan Socialist and Radical parties. But something 
which has not been addressed yet in this study, and which would have long lasting 
consequences on the French and Mosellan left, was the PCF‟s conquest of the 
CGT leadership from the ex-confédérés.  
The Conquest of the CGT and the Trotskyites 
In his history of the CGT in the late 1930s, Jules Chazoff, a leading figure of the 
French anarchist movement, wrote:  
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Ce n‟est un secret pour personne que depuis le Congrès de 
Toulouse, en mars 1936 … le parti communiste n‟a cessé de placer 
ses créatures à tous les postes dirigeants [de la CGT].597 
According to him, the ex-CGTU leaders worked consistently at bolshevising the 
unified CGT in order to, as he put it, „exploiter les « masses » de travailleurs qui 
dans le passé … avaient refusé de se rallier au parti communiste.‟598  In his view, 
the most notable illustration of the CGT‟s loss of independence was the Parisian 
union, which in his own words, „est entièrement sous l‟obédience du parti 
communiste.‟599 By and large, historians share Chazoff‟s views on the Communist 
conquest of the CGT. Lazar and Courtois note that, „Nombre de documents 
prouvent l‟intérêt essentiel que le PCF porte à sa pénétration dans la CGT et au 
contrôle de ses syndicalistes‟.600 The two historians believe that the PCF 
effectively controlled the CGT in 1937 when it commanded 2.6 million members; 
its opponents, the non-unitaires, counted roughly 1.6 million members. It also 
controlled the majority of unions and federations including the majority of industrial 
federations and the départemental union of the Moselle.601  
This is particularly interesting as at the height of its success in mid-1937 the 
Mosellan CGT counted roughly 80,000 members: almost 50 percent of the 
industrial workforce and 30 percent of the total workforce. The new influence of the 
CGT was most visible in the recrudescence of social unrest that affected many 
Mosellan industries and businesses. Indeed, despite the Matignon Agreements 
and the ensuing collective contracts, large strikes again took place in 1937. To 
name but a few: 900 ceramic workers in Sarreguemines in January,602 1,500 
miners at the Terres-Rouges mines near Algrange and Audun-leTiche and 300 at 
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the de Wendel steelworks in Hayange in August603. But as 1937 drew to an end, 
there was a sharp decline in the number of large strikes in the département. The 
most noticeable example was that witnessed at the Houillières de Wendel in 
Petite-Rosselle where on two separate occasions workers went on strike for the 
same reason: to defend a worker who had been involved in an altercation with a 
supervisor. On 27 April, 10,000 workers went on strike;604 they were 400 on 13 
November.605   
This episode is telling of what was occurring throughout the département: a 
certain disillusionment among workers towards left-wing political activism leading 
to a stagnation of the CGT membership in 1937. One particular factor that might 
also explain the CGT‟s loss of prestige was the fundamental differences that 
opposed the old CGT leaders with the newly-recruited younger leaders, who the 
préfet described as „dépourvus de traditions syndicales.‟606 While the former 
favoured negotiations first and strikes second, the latter, who had been hastily 
recruited to help the CGT cope with its fast-growing numbers, often lacked 
discipline. It often employed strike action and other radical means to achieve what 
appeared as politically-driven goals that had little to do with the workforce‟s 
legitimate interests and welfare. At the Bata shoe-manufacturing plant in 
Hellocourt (known today as Maizieres-lès-Vic), management dismissed 227 
workers who, exasperated at their co-workers‟ lack of support in a spontaneous 
strike (roughly 90 percent refused to join the movement), had cut the water supply 
to the industrial workshops and homes in Bataville, the neighbouring cité ouvrière 
built by the company.607 Conscious of the damaging consequences the affair had 
on the image of his union and keen to re-assert his authority, the secretary-general 
of the départemental CGT issued a note urging all local section leaders to put a 
halt to spontaneous strikes.608  
                                            
 
603
 ADM, Rapport du préfet au ministre du Travail, Metz, 6 septembre 1937, 310M68. 
604
 ADBR, Rapport du préfet au ministre de l‟Intérieur, Metz, 24 mai 1937, 98AL634.   
605
 ADM, Rapport du préfet au ministre du Travail, Metz, 4 décembre 1937, 310M68. 
606
 ADBR, Rapport du préfet au ministre de l‟Intérieur, Metz, 24 mai 1937, 98AL634. 
607
 Ibid. 
608
 Ibid.  
203 
 
It is not known how his note affected the development of strikes in the 
Moselle, but police records show only two strikes in 1938. The first one, which 
occurred at Hagondange‟s Société des Aciers Fins de l‟Est on 24 February, lasted 
forty-five minutes. The second was the nation-wide strike of 30 November, which 
shall be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Even the lengthy and difficult 
negotiations between the patronat and the CGT over the collective contracts of 
steelwork companies ended with negotiations and without a strike. It is interesting 
to note that the drop in 1938 coincided with the culmination of the internal struggle 
over the control of the CGT as well as the fall of the PCF‟s prestige and the rise of 
a hitherto dormant party, the SFIO. 
A commissaire spécial from Metz noted that during a meeting of the Metz 
section of the PCF, Anstett declared, „L‟activité du parti communiste doit ... être 
poussée activement sous l‟étiquette du Front Populaire, mais dans l‟esprit du parti 
communiste‟.609 As the other constituent parties of the Mosellan Popular Front 
were nearly insignificant in terms of officials and voting base, they represented 
little threat to the hegemony of the PCF within the coalition. The CGT, however, 
was different. With almost 80,000 members, it represented a sizeable gain for the 
PCF. As a first step towards the colonisation of the trade union, many Communists 
believed that their party‟s regional offices should move from Hagondange to rue 
Lafayette in Metz as the street also hosted the offices of the CGT. By moving 
closer to the trade unions‟ offices, some Communists believed that they would be 
able to control the CGT activities more closely. While the party rank and file 
seemed to favour this option, the secretary-general of the départemental 
federation of the PCF, Anstett, was keen to keep the party‟s regional headquarters 
close to where he lived and under his sole control. 
In late 1936, the ex-Unifiés‟ attempts to control the CGT intensified. 
Following the steelworks federation‟s request for an extraordinary congress, all the 
local union officials met on 22 November. It appeared that those who had called 
for the congress had some hidden political agenda. Indeed, by questioning Rieth, 
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the current regional secretary-general, on his attitude during the recent talks with 
the patronat, the ex-Unifiés deliberately tried to topple him. As an ex-Confédéré, 
Rieth had headed the trade union since its reunification in January 1936. During 
the congress, they repeatedly criticised him and accused him, in the préfet‟s 
words, „de tiédeur et d‟avoir déployé dans tous les pourparlers bipartites qui se 
sont écoulés lors des récents conflits sociaux un large esprit de conciliation.‟610 By 
portraying Rieth as a person who lacked the necessary skills to lead the trade 
union and negotiate with the patronat, the ex-Unifiés hoped to create a crisis that 
would lead to the election of a new leader. As their numbers exceeded those of 
the ex-Confédérés, they counted on an easy victory for one of their party. As the 
Communist trade unionists continued their attacks on Rieth, an apparent fracture 
split the CGT into two opposing groups: the Communist-backed ex-Unifiés on the 
one side and the ex-Confédérés on the other.  
At the head of the first were a group of local Communists and ex-CGTU 
leaders: Schwob, Friedrich, Knecht and Waroqui. At the head of the second were 
trade unionists Kirsch, Jobard and Billes. During the extraordinary congress of 22 
November, as the two rival parties were unable to agree on Rieth‟s leadership, 
Simon, the Communist mayor of Saint-Julien-lès-Metz, suggested the creation of a 
commission whose task would be to decide if Rieth should remain in his position 
or if the union should elect a new secretary-general. Even though the commission 
confirmed Rieth in his position, the disagreement between the two parties 
continued. By the end of December and less than one year since the unification of 
the CGT and the CGTU, the ex-Unifiés challenged openly the trade union‟s 
leadership and returned to what the préfet described as „[des] méthodes 
franchement révolutionnaires de l‟action directe‟.611 In another report, he affirmed 
that the PCF was responsible for the ex-Unifiés‟ attempts to control the CGT. As 
he noted: 
Lorsque l‟on constate que [l]es adversaires se recrutent tous parmi 
les militants les plus actifs du Parti communiste, on ne peut se 
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retenir de conclure que leur action … paraît répondre à une doctrine 
générale tendant  à l‟obédience totale et définitive de la 
Confédération Générale du Travail à l‟autorité de ce parti.612 
 
The CGT leaders were aware of Communist attempts to control the trade 
union. If truth be told, many trade unionists believed that the PCF had organised 
the 10 and 11 October Communist meetings in order to turn the workers away 
from the ex-Confédérés and capitalise on the success of the trade union. As the 
préfet wrote: 
 Certains dirigeants du syndicalisme ne s‟expliquent pas les motifs 
d‟ordre corporatif qui peuvent justifier de telles manifestations … si 
ce n‟est le désir de faire échec ... à leur influence … dans les milieux 
sidérurgiques ou miniers.613  
With the recrudescence of the strikes in 1937 and the rising membership of the 
CGT, the PCF‟s attempt to control the trade union became even more hard-
pressed. As Rieth lost his seat as regional secretary during the CGT‟s regional 
congress on 4 April 1937, the ex-CGTU activists seemed to have finally achieved 
what they had set out to do: take control of the Mosellan union and appoint one of 
their own at its head. But the new leader, Louis Nillès, was no Communist 
sympathiser. In actual fact, Nillès supported Rieth and the ex-Confédérés group 
within the unified CGT. What is more, he was a member of the SFIO. Does this 
mean that the ex-Unitaires failed in their attempts to take over the trade union?  
According to the préfet, it was a partial victory only. As he wrote in a report : 
„si [les éléments communistes] obtiennent satisfaction avec le départ de M. Rieth 
... on ne pourrait dire que la nomination de M. Nillès soit pour eux un succès 
total.‟614 He also noted that even though Nillès and Rieth were both ex-
Confédérés, the former „rencontre plus de sympathie et de confiance‟ among 
industrial workers. The préfet explained Nillès‟ election by suggesting that the 
trade union‟s départemental administrative commission made sure the position 
went to an ex-Confédéré. This was made easy by the fact that the commission 
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comprised twenty-seven members, fourteen of whom were ex-Confédérés and 
thirteen ex-Unitaires. What is more, the préfet added, many among the thirteen ex-
Unitaires disapproved of what he described as „certaines outrances des militants 
... du Parti Communiste.‟ As this vote demonstrates, even Communists were wary 
of their own party‟s doings.  
While the PCF‟s regional federation was busy trying to organise support for 
Spain and gain control of the CGT, it entered another crisis. The latter led to a rift 
between a radical wing and a moderate one. The fracture pertained to the Central 
Committee‟s directives, which instructed the regional cells not to recruit new 
members who might jeopardise the PCF‟s image as a moderate and national 
party. In the Moselle, this meant no Germans, Autonomists or Trotskyites should 
be allowed to join the party. Indeed, fearing the possible infiltration of Gestapo 
agents, the Central Committee banned the recruitment of any German. As the 
préfet noted, „ 
il aurait été décidé que les adhésions de tous les Allemands, se 
présentant comme refugiés politiques, seraient impitoyablement 
refusées. Cette mesure répondrait au souci d‟éviter l‟immixtion dans 
les cadres de la Gestapo.615  
Similarly, „le parti voudrait se débarrasser de l‟aspect autonomisant qu‟ont revêtus, 
pendant fort longtemps … la propagande et ses méthodes‟ since „ces dernières 
seraient dirigées selon un esprit plus national‟.616 
As secretary-general of the départemental federation, Anstett conformed to 
the party‟s line. But Friedrich disagreed and argued that in order to increase the 
party‟s influence, the latter ought to consider allying with Trotsky‟s followers and 
should in fact offer them la main tendue as it had offered to the Catholics.617 Even 
though the Trotskyites counted very few members in the département, many older 
and leading officials of the PCF supported Friedrich: Rubeck, the mayor of 
Mondelange, Rau, the mayor of Amnéville and Barbian, the ex-Mayor of 
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Rombas.618 Sensing that the party might lose touch with some of the Mosellan 
sections loyal to Friedrich and his associates, the party decided to infiltrate the 
Trotskyite Association des Anciens Combattants Républicains. The latter had links 
to the Spanish Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista (POUM), the Spanish 
workers‟ revolutionary party which fought in the Spanish civil war and which Stalin 
would later seek to eliminate. Although the divisions affecting the Mosellan 
federation were real and indicative of the effect of international events on the unity 
of the party, the issue did not create a split. Nonetheless, it is clear that the 
federation was torn. As in the 1920s and early 1930s, it was torn between its 
obedience to the Central Committee and its particularist ways, which, this time, 
involved the party‟s inclusion of Catholics and exclusion of fellow revolutionaries.  
Conclusion  
Like the right‟s excesses in 1934 had led the left on the path of unity, so did the 
left‟s excesses and the accompanying social upheaval led right wingers to 
consider joint action. But unlike the parties of the left, which had succeeded in 
overcoming ideological and political differences, the right remained largely divided. 
Despite a common loathing of Communism and their public displays of unity 
against the „reds‟, right wingers proved unable to set aside their differences largely 
because of political ambitions that included the conquest of the conservative 
masses for the next legislative elections. At the national level, groups who had 
initially formed as apolitical associations sought to create their own alliances to 
defeat Communism and therefore politicised. For example, the Union Nationale 
des Combattants launched the Rassemblement Français in July 1936. Designed 
to win the support of parties such as the Fédération Républicaine, the Parti 
Démocrate Populaire and the Parti Social Français, the Rassemblement Français 
sought to unite what Jean Goy, the president of the veterans‟ association, 
described as: „tous les Français désireux de ne pas voir leur pays devenir une 
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colonie de Moscou.‟619 This was not the right‟s first attempt at uniting, but the fact 
that the initiative came from a veterans‟ association reflected the deep crisis of the 
political right.620 Nor was it the last as a few months later Doriot attempted to unite 
France‟s conservative forces in his alliance known as the Front de la Liberté.  
Similarly, relations between the various elements of the Mosellan right were 
far from harmonious. This was particularly true of the Parti Social Français, which 
considered the Front Lorrain as a useful yet suspicious ally. As for the Front 
Lorrain, it considered the hegemonic and exclusive ambitions of the Parti Social 
Français difficult to accept. As shall be demonstrated in the next chapter, tensions 
between the two right-wing organisations did not wane in 1937-1938. In fact, when 
the Popular Front government announced its plan to reform education in the 
recovered provinces, something which the population and the right had vigorously 
opposed in 1924, relations between the Parti Social Français and the Front Lorrain 
deteriorated even further.  
On the left, the Spanish Civil War and the PCF‟s attempt to control the CGT 
challenged the unity of the Popular Front. In the Moselle, where the PCF 
continued to dominate the Popular Front départemental committee, the latter 
focused on helping the Spanish Republic. Thanks to its border position, its 
historical role as a land of immigration and the determination of local Communists, 
trade unionists and a few Socialists, the département played a central role in the 
transit of volunteers for Spain. As at the national level, local Communists also 
sought to control the CGT, thereby challenging the unity of the Popular Front. The 
local PCF‟s attempt to control the trade union and the workers‟ new political 
ambitions left many new CGT members disillusioned. As a result, confronted with 
the PCF‟s old sectarian ways, many decided to desert the CGT and the 
Communist party. As the next chapter will establish, these mass desertions largely 
contributed to the decline of the PCF and the Popular Front coalition as well as the 
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rise of a hitherto small political party on the Mosellan political scene, the SFIO. 
Undoubtedly, the issue that ultimately accelerated the fall of the Popular Front and 
the right‟s return to power was Germany. In the Moselle, the prospect of another 
war with Germany, which took centre stage in 1937-1938, went beyond class and 
ideological differences and created much fear and anxiety among the local 
population. As the préfet wrote in a report,  
L‟opinion publique ... suit ... avec une attention qui n‟exclut pas 
l‟anxiété l‟activité diplomatique…. Elle a … le sentiment que dans un 
avenir assez proche, des problèmes graves sont susceptibles de se 
poser et n‟aperçoit pas clairement les solutions qui pourront leur être 
données…. [E]lle a la conviction que la complexité toujours plus 
accrue de la situation internationale … est en grande partie la 
marque de l‟intervention du troisième Reich, dont la politique 
audacieuse l‟effraie a bon droit.621 
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Chapter Five - Domestic and International Challenges: the Return 
of the Right and the Fall of the Popular Front, February 1937- 
November 1938 
Introduction 
When Blum publicly announced a pause in social reforms in February 1937, 
reactions were felt on both sides of the political spectrum. On the left, some felt 
Blum betrayed the common programme and questioned their support for, or 
participation in, the Popular Front. On the right, many perceived Blum‟s 
announcement as a major ideological shift and a sign of the failure of the Popular 
Front policies. In March, the violent clashes that opposed left-wing protesters and 
police forces in Clichy, a Socialist town in the north of Paris, tested the unity of the 
Popular Front and gave some right wingers the impetus to unite in a coalition. On 
22 June, when Blum resigned from his post at the head of the government, the 
Popular Front end appeared all but inevitable. Following two short-lived 
governments headed by the Radical-Socialist Chautemps and another by Blum, 
Daladier formed the fifth Popular Front government in April 1938. Daladier sealed 
the fate of the left-wing coalition by forsaking some of its most highly ideologically-
charged social reforms. Instead, he unequivocally committed his government to 
restore social order and augment industrial production in order to prepare France 
morally, economically and militarily for a war against Germany. As he declared in 
May 1938: „La Paix à l‟intérieur condition de la Paix au dehors, voilà ce que nous 
voulons.‟622  
Coincidentally, this sentence echoed Metz‟s official centennial motto: „Si 
nous avons Paix dedans, nous avons Paix dehors‟. Peace in Metz and the Moselle 
was to be disturbed when the government decreed a new school reform. The 
reform, which dominated public debate in the Moselle until the fall of Blum‟s 
second government in June 1937, met with serious opposition within Mosellan 
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Catholic circles, in particular those of the Action Catholique Lorraine and the Union 
Républicaine Lorraine. But the subject that preoccupied France and the Moselle in 
the final months of the Popular Front was the emergence of the German threat. 
Because the possibility of a war with the latter presaged another potential 
annexation, anxious Mosellans sought the protection of the only elite that had 
remained in the region during the last German occupation and which the 
population implicitly trusted, the Catholic clergy. Consequently, the Mosellan 
political character operated a shift away from the extremes towards the centre, 
both on the left and the right. On the left, while the SFIO saw its membership rise 
for the first time since the split of the party in 1921, the PCF appeared to lose its 
influence in some industrial centres. On the right, the rise of the Parti Social 
Français halted as the Union Républicaine Lorraine and the Action Catholique 
Lorraine became the favourites of the conservative masses.   
By examining the domestic and international events that surrounded the fall 
of the Popular Front and the rise of the right, this chapter will seek to answer two 
main questions. Firstly, how did domestic events redefine the Mosellan political 
character? Secondly, how did the rising German threat affect Mosellan society and 
politics?  
Part One: Radicalisation and Disunity  
School reform and the Clichy riots  
As established in the previous chapter, relations between Mosellan right-wing 
organisations, notwithstanding public displays of mutual support, were far from 
harmonious. The most noticeable example was the feud that opposed the Front 
Lorrain and the Parti Social Français. According to a prefectural report, the 
quarrels between the two movements began in the autumn of 1936.  As the préfet 
wrote, „[le Parti Social Français] est contrarié dans son développement par l‟action 
de « rassemblements » [ndlr the Front Lorrain] qui, tout en promettant leurs 
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possibilités d‟interpénétration, créent le doute dans l‟esprit des sympathisants.‟623 
Despite publicly supporting the Front Lorrain, the Parti Social Français saw the 
formation of the Front as a threat to its ambition to dominate the right. This is 
hardly surprising since both organisations competed for the support of the same 
share of the electorate, namely the Catholic, conservative, middle-classes. When 
the government announced a decree on school reform, tensions between the two 
organisations intensified.   
The decree of 10 August 1936 extended school leaving age by one 
additional year from thirteen to fourteen for all children in France. Because the 
education system in the recovered provinces differed – they combined laws from 
the French Second Empire with a few additions made during the period of the 
Reichsland - the decree did not apply in Alsace and the Moselle. There, local laws 
stipulated that girls should be educated between six and thirteen and boys 
between six and fourteen. Aware of this disparity, Blum‟s government published 
another decree on 10 October. It stipulated that the one-year prolongation should 
also apply to children in the three départements, thus extending the school leaving 
age to fourteen for girls and fifteen for boys. The fact that girls were required to 
stay at school for one additional year did not stir any particular reaction among the 
local population, but the extension for boys angered many, particularly on the 
Catholic right. Thus began a long battle between the government on the one side 
and local elected officials and right-wing parties and organisations on the other.  
The Union Républicaine Lorraine deputies and senators, led by Schuman, 
became the most vocal opponents of the reform. Alongside their Alsatian 
counterparts, Mosellan right-wing parliamentarians challenged the legality of the 
decree in a letter to the government. Local elected officials from the Union 
Républicaine Lorraine who sat at the right-wing Conseil Général de la Moselle also 
condemned the decree. During the council‟s assembly on 19 November 1936, Ritz 
claimed that it penalised mainly large families who needed their children to work in 
order to supplement the family income. Foule, a conseiller général, developed 
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what the Perfect called „un plan d‟action d‟ordre confessionnel en demandant à 
toutes les masses paysannes de soutenir leurs prêtres et leurs curés et de se 
conformer strictement dans le domaine politique à leurs directives.‟624  
The Action Catholique Lorraine was less confrontational but equally critical.  
As it stated in a resolution:  
Persuadés de la nécessité de l‟éducation chrétienne de la jeunesse, 
les catholiques lorrains déclarent s‟en tenir fermement au maintien 
du caractère exceptionnel des écoles primaires et ne sauraient 
admettre aucun sabotage dans cet ordre d‟idées.… Ils protestent 
contre la prorogation scolaire illégale et indésirable en Alsace-
Lorraine.625  
The Catholic organisation became heavily involved in the anti-reform campaign 
and organised several meetings across the département. In Bouzonville, a large 
village situated in Schuman‟s constituency, Harter (deputy for Forbach) proclaimed 
the 10 October decree illegal. According to a prefectural report, „[Harter] 
développa la même thèse que la majorité de ses collègues de la Moselle, 
protestant contre le décret du 10 Octobre qu‟il qualifia d‟illégal.‟626 The Forbach 
deputy went so far as to „[conseiller] publiquement aux parents de ne pas se 
conformer aux nouvelles prescriptions et d‟opposer une résistance passive aux 
menaces qui pourraient leur être adressées par l‟Inspection académique.‟627  
Following fruitless meetings between a delegation of Mosellan and Alsatian 
parliamentarians and the sous-secrétaire d‟état aux affaires d‟Alsace-Lorraine, 
Blum agreed to meet the delegation on 20 January 1937; Béron was the only 
Mosellan parliamentarian not to attend the meeting or participate in the anti-decree 
campaign. Afterwards, Blum issued a statement urging Alsatian and Mosellan 
senators and deputies to choose between two alternatives: A) maintain the current 
system (with bilingual and religious education) in place with the addition of one 
extra year for both sexes; B) conform to the system in place in the rest of the 
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country, in other words maintain boys in school until the age of fourteen but adopt 
the national curriculum deprived of religious and bilingual education. Not 
surprisingly, Mosellan and Alsatian parliamentarians regarded this as a Hobson‟s 
choice and angrily promised free legal representation to any parents who chose to 
challenge the decree and face legal penalties.  
Alongside the Action Catholique Lorraine, elected Mosellan officials 
organised a petition to maintain the current education system. With the help of the 
influential Ligue Féminine de l‟Action Catholique Lorraine, headed by Madame 
Guy de Wendel, the petition succeeded in gathering over 126,000 signatures 
across the département.628 Aware of the rising tensions in the recovered 
provinces, Blum wrote to the bishop of Strasbourg, stating that he was not seeking 
a religious conflict and that his government would guarantee the rights of the local 
Catholic clergy.629 Following several other inconclusive meetings between the 
government and the Mosellan parliamentarians, numerous declarations of protest 
and repeated assurances from the government, tensions slowly decreased, 
ultimately ending when Blum resigned from his position as président du Conseil in 
June.  
The crisis highlighted the strength of the département‟s conservative forces 
and their ability to mobilise large sections of the population. A rather telling 
example was the rise in membership of the Action Catholique Lorraine, which at 
the height of the crisis in February 1937 had shot up to 95,000 members,630 almost 
30 percent of the adult population.631 Additionally, Mosellan politicians could count 
on the support of conservatives from other regions of France. During a private 
meeting of the Action Catholique Lorraine in May, François Valentin, a Fédération 
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Républicaine deputy from neighbouring Meurthe-et-Moselle, assured the 600-
strong audience that the deputies of the Moselle and Alsace could rely on the 
support of the national parliamentary opposition who supported their campaign 
against the decree.632 But in spite of the protests of the right and its determination 
to abrogate the decree, the decree was applied in Mosellan schools in October 
1937. Interestingly enough, the police noted no resistance among parents or 
teachers.  
One of the most likely explanations for the lack of reaction to the decree in 
October 1937 lay in the fact that by then Blum had ceased to be France‟s Premier 
and that Chautemps, his successor, took steps to reassure Catholics. In 
December 1937, the Conseil d‟Etat cancelled the decree, claiming Blum‟s 
government had abused its legislative power. Another plausible explanation is that 
the people of the Moselle were simply uninterested in the issue. Despite the 
hundreds of thousands of signatures collected during the petition campaign, the 
movement against the decree was almost wholly the work of the Action Catholique 
Lorraine and the Union Républicaine Lorraine. This contrasted with the Mosellans‟ 
spontaneous reaction in 1924 to Herriot‟s announcement of plans to integrate the 
recovered provinces into the secular Republic. Then, the anti-Cartel movement 
was largely driven by popular support and new right-wing militant organisations 
such as the Fédération Nationale Catholique were created in response to this 
popular support. These contrasted reactions raise two questions: 1) had the 
Mosellans‟ attachment to their distinct school system diminished by 1937; and 2) 
was la question scolaire in 1937 merely an instrument used by parties in need of 
political legitimacy?  
Whereas it is possible that affirmative answers to these two questions are 
both valid, the préfet interpreted the population‟s acceptance of the decree as 
follows: „les populations lorraines ... ont conservé de la loi un sens trop aigu, fait 
de respect et de crainte, pour que puissent être commises … des infractions‟.633 
Whether or not the préfet‟s explanation was correct, the conflict between the 
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government and the protesters, which Julian Jackson calls a „somewhat artificial 
controversy‟, succeeded in providing what he also describes as „temporary 
ammunition for Catholic anti-Semites and other opponents of the Popular Front.‟634 
In the case of the Moselle, one should add that it provided ammunition chiefly to 
the Parti Social Français, which used it against both the Popular Front and its 
political rivals on the right. 
Indeed, as the préfet wrote in a report, 
en ce qui concerne les rapports du Parti Social Français avec les 
autre formations politiques … dont les doctrines sont susceptibles de 
s‟apparenter aux siennes, il semble que la question de la scolarité ait 
contribué à aviver une certaine tension.635  
The row between the Parti Social Français and its rivals on the right seems to 
have started when the Parti Social Français launched its own anti-school reform 
campaign without consulting the Action Catholique Lorraine or the other 
départemental right-wing organisations. Indeed, on 8 February 1937, de la 
Rocque‟s party organised its own referendum urging the public to vote on two 
issues: „A) contre la prolongation de la scolarité et la suppression du bilinguisme‟ ; 
„B) contre la suppression de l‟école confessionnelle en Alsace et en Lorraine‟.636 
Published in a one-page document in both French and German and carrying the 
emblem of the Parti Social Français, the referendum was carried out by keen party 
members and followers who visited thousands of households across the 
département.  
At the party‟s monthly general assembly in Metz on 11 February 1937, 
which de la Rocque attended, Andres reported to the 3,000-strong audience that 
25,000 signatures had been collected in only thirty-six hours.637 As for de la 
Rocque, he boldly claimed that since the opening of the party‟s general assembly 
one hour before, another 5,000 signatures had been collected; although the 
evidence for his assertion remains to be established. By May, the préfet estimated 
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the number of signatures collected to be roughly 75,000 „sans qu‟il soit possible 
d‟affirmer qu‟elles ne figurent pas également sur les listes de l‟Action 
Catholique.‟638 Because the Parti Social Français failed to consult any of the other 
right-wing organisations and organised its own referendum in parallel to that of the 
Action Catholique Lorraine, the Front Lorrain and the right-wing press retaliated by 
halting the publication of any articles reporting the party‟s activities in the 
département. De la Rocque‟s supporters in turn reacted swiftly by publicly 
criticising the Front Lorrain for accepting the support of Antoni and his 
Germanophile, autonomous Christlich-Soziale Partei. 
Sensing that this conflict might be detrimental to the party‟s image, the 
central committee of the Parti Social Français highlighted the importance of a 
rapprochement with similar-minded organisations and urged the départemental 
section to come to an agreement with the Front Lorrain. When relations between 
the two organisations failed to improve, Jean Ybarnégaray, the leader of the Parti 
Social Français‟ group at the National Assembly, travelled to the Moselle to 
reconcile his party with the Front Lorrain. During a party meeting in Metz on 15 
June, he declared: ‟il ne faut pas croire que nous combattons des hommes comme 
... l‟abbé Ritz…. L‟accord [avec le Front Lorrain] est amical. Bien qu‟il y ait des 
hommes qui combattent le PSF, cela doit cesser à partir d‟aujourd‟hui même.‟639 
Despite Ybarnégaray‟s best intentions, the quarrels continued. In July, the préfet 
reported that the Mosellan federation of the Parti Social Français published a 
communiqué denouncing the Front Lorain‟s alleged formation of self-defence 
paramilitary units.  Although de la Rocque‟s supporters knew that the Front Lorrain 
would never endorse the formation of such units, the préfet believed that the 
communiqué „était indirectement dirigé contre le Front Lorrain, qui ... parait [au 
PSF] déployer des efforts préjudiciables à l‟influence du Parti Social Français.‟ As 
it became evident that the Parti Social Français‟ goal was political domination and 
electoral hegemony in the 1940 legislative elections, right-wing unity in the Moselle 
appeared unfeasible. Almost one year after the first Popular Front government 
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took office, the right proved unable to recreate what the left had achieved a few 
years earlier. The failure of Doriot‟s attempt in May 1937 to unite the centre-right 
and the right in a broad coalition, known as Front de la Liberté, vividly illustrated 
the difficulty. 
Before studying the Front de la Liberté in more detail, it is worth mentioning 
the violent riots which occurred in Clichy on 16 March 1937. These riots are of 
particular interest to this study as they revealed the rising tensions within the 
Popular Front and the growing desire of some right wingers to accelerate the fall of 
the left-wing coalition by uniting all anti-Communist parties in a broad coalition.  
When the Parti Social Français announced it would hold a private meeting 
in Clichy on 16 March 1937, the local Popular Front committee and the town‟s 
Socialist mayor, Charles Auffray, claimed that since Clichy was a left-wing town 
located in the heart of the Paris „red belt‟ the meeting ought to be banned by the 
government.640 Following the government‟s refusal to ban a meeting it considered 
lawful,  local left wingers led by Auffray and the local Communist deputy Maurice 
Honel decided to hold a counter-demonstration on Clichy‟s place de la Mairie on 
the same day.641 Seeking to avoid violent clashes erupting between the Parti 
Social Français supporters and the Popular Front counter-demonstrators, Marx 
Dormoy, the Socialist Minister of the Interior, sent a large force of police to Clichy. 
Nonetheless a street battle took place between police forces and Popular Front 
supporters after left-wing demonstrators tried to force their way into the Olympia 
cinema, where the Parti Social Français were meeting. Despite Honel and 
Auffray‟s repeated calls for calm, the violence escalated and by 10 o‟clock Clichy 
became a battlefield. Stones and glass bottles were thrown at police forces, who 
retaliated by firing shots into the crowd. Later police reports claimed six dead (five 
Communists and one Socialist who died from her injuries two weeks later) and at 
least two hundred wounded on both sides including Mayor Auffray and André 
Blumel, Blum‟s directeur de cabinet. 
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The Clichy riots had a significant effect upon the Popular Front coalition. As 
Kedward writes, „The Popular Front was never the same after Clichy‟.642 Before 
the judicial enquiry ordered by the government was even launched, the PCF 
severely criticised Dormoy for having failed to ban the Parti Social Français 
meeting in Clichy. During a Communist meeting at the Vélodrome d‟Hiver on 18 
March, a Communist leader declared,  
Nous avons effectué plusieurs démarches auprès du Ministre de 
l‟Intérieur pour lui demander d‟interdire la provocation fasciste. Cette 
interdiction n‟est pas venue. Nous avons fait notre devoir, les 
sphères dirigeantes n‟ont pas cru devoir accomplir le leur.643  
The PCF demanded the immediate arrest of de la Rocque and Doriot, „le maire 
hitlérien de Saint-Denis qui a partie liée avec de la Rocque‟, as Duclos put it.644 It 
also blamed the police forces, which, it believed, harboured Parti Social Français‟ 
supporters and Chiappistes.645 Alongside the CGT, the Communists called for a 
half-day strike of mourning and solidarity with the victims of Clichy. A few days 
later, around 250,000 mourners gathered in Paris to commemorate the funerals of 
those who died during the riots.646  
Despite the PCF‟s evident irritation towards Dormoy, Thorez‟s party 
reiterated its full support to the Popular Front government, albeit on a much more 
conditional basis. At the Vélodrome d‟Hiver meeting on 18 March, Duclos 
declared, „Nous resterons autour du gouvernement à direction socialiste dans la 
mesure où il dirigera ses coups contre les ennemis du régime et non contre la 
classe ouvrière.‟647 According to the police, Duclos‟ words were received 
favourably by the Communist audience, who cheered and applauded their leader. 
But despite Duclos‟ declaration, the collaboration between Communists and 
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Socialists within the context of a Popular Front was clearly strained. Following the 
crisis of the Spanish War and the PCF‟s refusal to endorse the government‟s 
foreign policy in parliament in December 1936, the Clichy events revealed the 
growing tensions within the coalition. The fragility of the Popular Front did not go 
unnoticed on the right.  
On the right, politicians reacted swiftly and violently to the Clichy riots. 
Confronted by the left‟s accusations of maintaining the philosophy and violent 
methods of the banned Croix de Feu, Ybarnégaray, for the Parti Social Français, 
insisted the party had nothing in common with the proscribed ligue. And in 
response to the Communists‟ attacks on his leader, he declared, „l‟émeute de 
Clichy ... a été montée contre le néo-poincarisme du ministère Blum. Il annonçait 
au ciel de France une période de paix, de tranquillité. Cela a paru intolérable aux 
communistes.‟648 
The term néo-poincarisme referred to Blum‟s recent call for a pause in 
political reforms. The main cause for Blum‟s decision to call for a pause was the 
state‟s dire financial situation. Despite the devaluation of the franc in September 
1936, Blum was unable to avoid a further unsettling decline of the franc: hence his 
decision to initiate a pause in order to restore confidence in the financial markets. 
During the pause, the government sharply reduced public spending on grands 
travaux and other items, and appointed three experts to assist the Governor of the 
Banque de France, Emile Labeyrie, in the management of the fonds d‟égalisation 
des changes. At the eve of the Clichy riots, Blum had also secured a special loan 
for national defence, which, he believed, would benefit the monetary and financial 
stability of the country and consequently „consolider et accélérer la reprise 
économique.‟649 
The right largely mocked his financial policy, with one of Le Temps‟s 
columns reading „Ce n‟est pas une pause, c‟est une conversion‟ and Paul 
Reynaud, deputy for Paris, claiming, „On adore maintenant ce qu‟on a brûlé: la 
                                            
 
648
 Grandmougin, op.cit., p.315. 
649
 Blum, L‟Œuvre 1934-1937, p.487. 
221 
 
liberté de l‟or et l‟équilibre budgétaire‟.650 Significantly, however, some on the far 
left were equally severe. A headline in the Trotskyite Jeunesses Socialistes 
newspaper read, „8 milliards pour l‟emprunt, 5 morts à Clichy: l‟argent de la 
bourgeoisie se paie avec le sang des ouvriers.‟651 And in a tract published by the 
revolutionary left, Pivert asked, „Les forces de police tirant sur les ouvriers 
antifascistes, sous un gouvernement de Front Populaire à direction socialiste, est-
ce la rançon de la politique de confiance exigée par les banques?‟652 Blum 
defended the pause and financial reforms by retorting to his numerous critics: „ce 
n‟est ni un renoncement, ni un reniement, ni une abjuration, mais la nécessité de 
souffler, d‟arrêter la course entre les prix et les salaires, d‟agir contre les prix 
excessifs avec des armes répressives‟.653 Attacked from the left and the right, the 
government appeared weakened: the Clichy crisis could not have come at a worse 
time for the government.  
Sensing a major ideological shift on the part of the government and a 
weakening of the relations between the constituent parties of the Popular Front, 
the right intensified its attacks. Passmore suggests that the Parti Social Français‟ 
anti-Communism reached its peak after the Clichy riots in March when, as he 
writes, 'the PSF campaigned noisily for [the PCF's] dissolution.'654 But even more 
critical of the Communist party was Doriot, the founder and leader of the Parti 
Populaire Français, who launched the idea of a Front de la Liberté in March 1937. 
The Front de la Liberté and the Mosellan anti-Marxist front  
By creating the Front de la Liberté, Doriot sought to gather all right wingers into a 
rassemblement that aimed to, in his own‟s words, „[e]nrayer la bolchévisation 
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intérieure de la France,‟655 and to „lutter contre le communisme qui, actuellement, 
impose ses volontés au gouvernement socialiste.‟656 Doriot had first talked publicly 
of a Front de la Liberté in the Parti Populaire Français‟ newspaper, L‟Emancipation 
nationale, in March, but revived the idea at a party meeting on 7 May. The 
movement's programme focused on two main principles: 1) restore the various 
freedoms the Communists had allegedly destroyed such as „la liberté de travail ... 
la liberté de penser...la liberté de la presse‟;657 2) form a new government based 
upon - and Doriot insisted on this - „les règles constitutionnelles de la troisième 
République.‟658 When Doriot created the Front de la Liberté, what he really had in 
mind was to offer a right-wing alternative to the Popular Front in time for the 
October 1937 local elections. The parties it called upon to join the Front included 
the Fédération Républicaine, the Parti Républicain National et Social, the Parti 
Social Français, the Alliance Démocratique and the Parti Démocrate Populaire.659 
Although the Fédération Républicaine and the Parti Républicain National et Social 
immediately accepted the invitation, the Parti Social Français, the Alliance 
Démocratique and the Parti Démocrate Populaire rejected it.   
According to Irvine, „neither the Alliance Démocratique nor the Parti 
Démocrate Populaire seriously contemplated joining the Front de la Liberté ... [n]ot 
only because it involved “the politics of the two blocs”, which they were determined 
to avoid, but it also represented a highly unsavoury union‟ with what they 
considered „the representatives of “a reactionary conservatism.”‟660To those who 
criticised the Fédération Républicaine for joining a movement created by a former 
Communist, Xavier Vallat, deputy for the Ardèche, declared, „On a pu s‟étonner 
que nous ayons adhéré au « Front de la Liberté », dont le chef, Jacques Doriot, 
est un ancien communiste; or, nous ne sommes pas rangés derrière Doriot, mais 
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à côté de lui.‟661 He then added, „Ce n‟est pas parce que la Fédération 
Républicaine adhère au Front de la Liberté qu‟elle abandonne le programme qui 
lui est propre, d‟ailleurs, on ne le lui a pas demandé.‟662 Irvine states that the 
Fédération Républicaine‟s eagerness to ally with what he called „the most sordid 
elements of the extreme, antirepublican Right was indicative of the anxiety of 
some conservatives during the years of the Popular Front.‟663 What is more, as 
Irvine affirms, it also presented the Fédération Républicaine „with an opportunity to 
defend itself against the attacks of its too ambitious rival, the Parti Social 
Français.‟664  
Doriot repeatedly invited the Parti Social Français to join the Front de la 
Liberté, but each time de la Rocque insisted on new conditions only to reject them 
thereafter. On 9 June, the Parti Social Français‟ national committee publicly 
rejected Doriot‟s invitation. One reason it gave was fear of provoking civil conflict:  
Considérant que [l]‟adhésion des deux millions de membres du PSF 
à un « Front » risquerait d‟enlever à la masse du parti son caractère 
de réconciliation française et de la faire apparaitre, malgré lui, 
comme un appareil de lutte civique … [le Parti Social Français] 
[d]écide ne pas adhérer au Front de la Liberté...665  
The party also sent a communiqué to all its cadres in which it condemned the 
formation of a right-wing bloc, which it believed, could only favour the Popular 
Front. Convinced that, as the communiqué put it, „certains de ces électeurs 
n‟accepteront jamais de donner leur confiance à un bloc de droite‟, the national 
committee believed it was in the party‟s interest to remain outside such a group.666 
Although he did not admit it publicly, de la Rocque also believed that by keeping 
out of the right-wing alliance his party would benefit from the disillusioned middle-
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classes‟ change of allegiance in the wake of the Popular Front‟s inability to solve 
the economic crisis.  
While this was almost certainly true, historians agree that de la Rocque‟s 
main reason for refusing to join the Front de la Liberté was to maintain his party‟s 
independence. According to Irvine, de la Rocque feared Doriot‟s ambitions. As he 
writes, „De la Rocque distrusted Doriot, whom he correctly suspected of designs 
on the Parti Social Français.‟667 Passmore shares Irvine‟s view, as he states, „The 
[Parti Social Français] rejected an initiative that it rightly saw as an attempt to 
neutralise it.‟668 Regarding the Parti Social Français, Irvine writes that de la 
Rocque did not wish his party „to be reduced to the role of a „league‟ at the 
disposal of the conservatives and modérés.‟669 Similarly, he wanted to portray his 
party as legalist and Republican rather than subversive and Fascist; something the 
Parti Populaire Français was often accused of by its detractors. Indeed, despite 
Doriot‟s left-wing political background and his best efforts to present the Parti 
Populaire Français as legalist and Republican, many contemporaries regarded 
him as, what Soucy calls, „a proponent of the very fascism that he had previously 
denounced.‟670  
Doriot‟s reaction to the Parti Social Francais‟ refusal was swift. On 10 June, 
he declared to some of his associates,  
Je pourrais désormais écraser [de la Rocque], mais je veux le laisser 
s‟enferrer lui-même.… Je ne veux … rien faire pour l„instant car il 
faut laisser venir à nous ceux qui, en grand nombre, vont 
abandonner Casimir [de la Rocque].671  
He later condemned the Parti Social Français as „torpilleurs de l‟union 
nationale‟.672 The Fédération Républicaine contrasted de la Rocque‟s „arrogance‟ 
with the humility he had displayed when he formed his own political group at the 
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National Assembly and solicited the Fédération deputies‟ support in 1936.673 
Within de la Rocque‟s own party, many were confused and disappointed by their 
leader‟s decision and, according to the police, approximately 5,000 Parisian party 
members subsequently left to join the Parti Populaire Français.674 Pozzo di Borgo, 
one of the founding members of the Croix de Feu and once a close associate of 
de la Rocque, was highly critical of the Parti Social Français‟ leader. According to 
a police informer,  he  predicted, „des démissions nombreuses ... au profit du Parti 
Populaire Français‟ particularly „dans certaines régions acquises au Parti Social 
Français ... [telles que] Metz‟.675 
In Metz, following a Parti Populaire Français party meeting on 28 June, 
Doriot‟s supporters distributed hundreds of leaflets to the people who came to hear 
Gilbert Bayer, a leader of the Mosellan party federation. The leaflet read : „Front de 
la Liberté! Le Français a le droit de s‟exprimer librement même s‟il n‟a pas le 
catéchisme stalinien dans sa poche!‟676 Despite the Front de la Liberté‟s attempt to 
establish itself in the Moselle, it suffered the same fate as its parent party, the Parti 
Populaire Français. Because the latter was rather weak in terms of sections and 
supporters, it was unable to push the Front de la Liberté forward. Consequently, 
the latter failed to establish itself as a political organisation. As the Parti Populaire 
Français, it counted only three sections in the Moselle at the time of the creation of 
the Front de la Liberté: 200 members in Metz, 200 in Thionville and 200 in Basse-
Yutz.677 Despite a programme that had the potential to attract many Mosellans, 
with its call for „la division du pays en régions autonomes avec des chambres 
régionales qui enverront à Paris des délégués pour construire une chambre 
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unifiée‟, the party failed to gain the support of the local population.678 Even Doriot‟s 
much-publicised visit in Metz on 22 May 1937 – his first to the Mosellan capital – 
which, judging by the large crowd waiting for him may have heralded a success, 
did not lead to a rise in party membership. According to the police, the audience 
was far more curious to see the party leader than to listen to his speech or join his 
party.679 
According to the préfet‟s records, the Mosellan federation was headed 
mainly by ex-Communists such as Eugène Mathis, who once worked as a 
journalist at L‟Humanité d‟Alsace-Lorraine, and ex-ligueurs from the dissolved 
Jeunesses Patriotes and Solidarité Française.680 It had a small office in the centre 
of Metz and tried to hold, albeit unsuccessfully, monthly meetings. But despite an 
active propaganda campaign, the Parti Populaire Français failed to attract the 
support of the Mosellan masses. According to a prefectural report, „il semble se 
confirmer ... que les doctrines de ce parti n‟ont pas pénétré dans la masse de la 
population et qu‟elles restent  l‟apanage d‟un groupe restreint d‟anciens militants 
de ligues dissoutes.‟681 Unlike in some parts of Paris, the Parti Populaire Français 
did not seem to benefit from any defections from members of the Parti Social 
Français. In fact, the latter‟s decision to discard the Front de la Liberté appeared 
inconsequential judging by its continuous growth in the Moselle. Indeed, the Parti 
Social Français counted over 20,000 members by May 1937, almost 3,000 more 
than in January.682 What is more, the regional offices of la Région de l‟Est du PSF 
had recently been moved from Nancy to Metz, thus highlighting the strength and 
leading role of the Mosellan section over neighbouring sections.683  
Why did the Front de la Liberté fail in the Moselle? Firstly, it is likely that the 
Parti Social Français‟ popularity and aggressive propaganda eclipsed it. According 
                                            
 
678
 ADBR, Rapport du commissaire divisionnaire de Strasbourg au préfet du Bas-Rhin, 21 mai 
1938, 98AL673-2. 
679
 ADBR, Rapport du préfet au ministre de l‟Intérieur, Metz, 24 mai 1937, 98AL634 
680
 ADBR, Rapport du préfet au ministre de l‟Intérieur, Metz, 2 avril 1937, 98AL673-2. 
681
 Ibid. 
682
 ADBR, Rapport du préfet au ministre de l‟Intérieur, Metz, 15 mai 1937, 98AL674-1. 
683
 The Région de l‟Est du PSF included the Moselle, the Meurthe-et-Moselle, the Vosges and the 
Meuse. 
227 
 
to the préfet, the Mosellan leaders of the Parti Social Français feared and resented 
the creation of a rival movement and were rather bitter at Doriot‟s relative success 
during his visit to Metz on 22 May. As he wrote in a report, „les éléments dirigeants 
du “Parti Social Français” auraient conçu quelque rancœur d‟un résultat aussi 
soudain, dont ils croyaient avoir, jusqu‟ici, l‟apanage exclusif.‟684 Secondly, 
Mosellans already had their own rassemblement de nationaux in the Front Lorrain, 
which, incidentally, the Parti Populaire Français joined. As a result, the local 
population, faced with yet another rassemblement, chose to ignore a movement 
that also happened to come from what Irvine describes as „a former Communist 
enragé‟ de l‟Intérieur.685  
Thirdly, as shall be seen later in this chapter, the Mosellan right created its 
own electoral bloc for the October elections under the leadership of the Front 
Lorrain. Consistent with its refusal to co-operate with non-Mosellan organisations, 
such as the Meurthe-et-Mosellan Rassemblement National Lorrain, the Front 
Lorrain did not accept to be chaperoned by a movement de l‟Intérieur. Could the 
Union Républicaine Lorraine have helped the Front de la Liberté? Unfortunately, 
too little is known of the relations between the Mosellan Catholic party and the 
Front de la Liberté as sources are scarce. Nonetheless, given what this study has 
revealed of the Union Républicaine Lorraine and its refusal to associate with any 
organisation beyond Mosellan borders, it is safe to argue that it would probably 
have rejected Doriot‟s calls. Be that as it may, it is not even clear whether the Parti 
Populaire Français called on the Union Républicaine Lorraine‟s support. One 
thing, however, remains certain: the Front de la Liberté‟s failure to ally French and 
Mosellan right-wing forces in an anti-Communist bloc demonstrated, once more, 
the right‟s inability to overcome its divisions. It also illustrated a certain lack of 
political judgement on the part of some right wingers, who instead of capitalising 
on the evident breakdown of the Popular Front by presenting a united front to the 
electorate, preferred to wait to see the left-wing coalition fail.   
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Following the terrorist attacks carried out by the secret extreme right-wing 
Comité Secret d‟Action Révolutionnaire (CSAR) in Paris on 11 September and 
fearing an eruption of violence on the streets of his département, the préfet of the 
Moselle published an arrêt which proscribed all public gatherings and 
demonstrations until the end of the elections.686 The CSAR, also known as the 
Cagoule, reflected a virulent right-wing reaction to Communism and marked the 
extreme radicalisation of a fraction of conservative society. It was a secret 
organisation founded by dissident members of the royalist Action Française shortly 
after the electoral victory of the Popular Front in May 1936. Convinced that the 
Action Française was no match to the imminent Communist revolution that was to 
take place in France, the Cagoule leaders believed the situation required what 
Warner Geoffrey calls, „a more efficient and ruthless organization‟.687  
The Cagoule‟s attacks in Paris, which targeted the offices of two employers‟ 
unions, the Confédération Générale du Patronat Français and the Union des 
Industries Métallurgiques, made instant headlines in the press. While the right-
wing press attributed the explosions to foreign Communists and Anarchists, 
L‟Humanité blamed foreign fascists. As an article in the right-wing Le Jour claimed, 
„C‟est dans les milieux anarchistes, et plus spécialement parmi les terroristes qui 
ont fait leur apprentissage en Espagne rouge, qu‟il faut chercher les coupables.‟688 
For Pierre-Laurent Darnar from L‟Humanité, „Le fascisme hitlérien et mussolinien, 
lui qui ne cesse de menacer en paroles et an actes la France, voilà le 
coupable.‟689 Although the terrorist organisation appeared to have had no 
supporters in the Moselle, the explosions, the ensuing police investigation and the 
arrests in December had a certain effect in the département.  
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As the préfet noted in a report, Mosellans „ont suivi le développement de 
cette affaire [de la Cagoule] avec un intérêt des plus vifs‟.690 Even though he 
claimed that overall the population remained relatively calm during the police 
investigation, an article published in L‟Echo de Metz, the Francophone bi-monthly 
publication of the Communist section of Metz, suggested otherwise. According to 
the newspaper, local Communists protested against the meeting planned by the 
Comité de Défense des Patriotes on 14 January 1938. The committee was an 
association of right wingers opposed to Communism which included General Henri 
Giraud, the military commander of Metz. Protesting against the public gathering of 
men who defended, as L‟Echo de Metz put it, the „Cagoulards complotant avec 
l‟aide de Hitler, Mussolini et Franco, attentats terroristes [et] assassinats‟, the 
Communists asked the Préfecture to ban the meeting.691 As the Parti Social 
Français did not appear on the list of the meeting, the préfet rejected the 
Communist request arguing that there was no risk of violence. In the words of 
L‟Echo de Metz,  „Coup de téléphone à la Préfecture. On répond: “Ce n‟est pas 
grave, puisque le Parti Social Francais ne participe pas.“‟692 However, when the 
left planned a counter-demonstration in Metz on the 13th, which could have led to 
a confrontation between Communists and supporters of the right, the préfet 
cancelled the gathering of the Comité de Défense des Patriotes. Although L‟Echo 
de Metz published many articles on this particular event, there is no trace of it in 
any of the police reports consulted.  
What the préfet did report, however, was the spread of a general 
atmosphere of suspicion and denunciations emanating directly from the Cagoule 
affair. Authors sent letters of denunciation to the police, accusing some of 
concealing arms and ammunitions or pointing the police towards secret caches. 
As the police found no arms and made no arrests, the authorities concluded that 
the denunciations, anonymous for the most part, were the fabrication of individuals 
eager to settle old personal feuds.  
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During the police investigation of the Cagoule, the Mosellan right-wing 
press, in particular Le Messin, published a series of alarming headlines against the 
Communist party and the Popular Front candidates at the local elections. On 4 
October, Le Messin reported the story of 300 Communists who allegedly attacked 
supporters of the local Parti Social Français candidate, Jean Philippe Grange, 
during one of his electoral meetings in Hayange.693 Described as foreigners 
carrying razors and knives, the attackers wounded several people leaving two in a 
critical state. Grange‟s version of events, as reported by Le Messin, described the 
attack as „cette sauvage agression‟ organised by „des gens qui n‟ont pas quitté le 
conseiller sortant [Béron] depuis le début de la campagne‟.694 The latter statement, 
which sought to discredit Béron, was categorically refuted by the police. In a 
report, the préfet noted that „l‟incident [de Hayange] a été grossi et déformé, dans 
une partie de la presse‟ and that „les déclarations de M. Grange se révèlent 
manifestement exagérées‟.695 He concluded, „les partisans de Béron y sont 
absolument étrangers, contrairement aux assertions de M. Grange.‟  
As for Le Lorrain, its interpretation of the events in the mining town of 
Stiring-Wendel, where supporters of the Parti Social Français clashed with the 
Popular Front‟s, led the préfet to order the Mosellan press to print a formal 
démenti. In reaction to the Parti Social Français‟ announcement of a meeting in 
Stiring-Wendel on 29 August, the local Popular Front committee decided to hold a 
counter-reunion in a nearby hall. As the first members of the Parti Social Français 
arrived, the Popular Front supporters made abusive comments and shouted 
insults. Determined to avoid an escalation of violence, the sous-préfet urged the 
left-wing supporters to leave for their hall, which they did. According to the préfet, 
the police arrested two men, who, upon verification of their identification papers, 
were released within the hour.696 In comparison, Le Lorrain‟s report presented a 
radically different and much more dramatic interpretation of events.  It claimed 
among other things that the Popular Front demonstrators were led by „des 
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semeurs de haine étrangers.... Italiens, Polonais, Tchèques etc‟ and how „la bande 
communiste … littéralement déchainée … bris[a] les vitres des autos [des 
membres du Parti Social Français] à coups de cailloux … et les maltraitèrent 
sauvagement.‟697 Whereas the préfet reported two arrests, Le Lorrain told of eight 
arrests among the Popular Front protesters and one wounded police officer; the 
latter „fut arraché des son cheval, jeté par terre et sauvagement piétiné.‟ To be 
sure, the right-wing dailies of Metz did not wait for the Cagoule affair to publish 
scaremongering stories about the Communists, but with the approaching local 
elections, they seized the opportunity to remind the population of the violence and 
disregard for legality of the Popular Front and the Communists. 
It was within this context that the local elections of 10 and 17 October 1937 
took place. As The Times correspondent in Paris noted on the eve of the first 
round of the election, „An unusual degree of political interest attaches to the 
Cantonal Elections‟ as „[t]this time the conflict is on a frankly partisan basis, and 
both Government and Opposition have marshalled their forces on an imposing 
scale.‟698  
At the national level, the Fédération Républicaine, the Parti Populaire 
Français and the Parti Républicain National et Social agreed to present a single 
candidate in each canton and arrondissement under the banner of the Front de la 
Liberté. But despite the determined efforts of party leaders to create a united front, 
divisions and personal ambitions prevailed, resulting in a large number of dissident 
candidates who refused the patronage of the Front de la Liberté at the first round. 
In the end, the Front de la Liberté had to settle for an alliance similar to that of the 
Popular Front whereby each candidate would enter the first round separately, 
while agreeing not to stand against a fellow right winger in a second round if he 
were the stronger candidate. On the left, the three main parties agreed to adhere 
to the Popular Front, although as in 1936 some Radical-Socialist candidates 
refused.  
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In the Moselle, even though the préfet took pride in claiming that the 
elections in his département did not take the form of a plebiscite on the Popular 
Front, the divide between right and left was clear. On the right, local right-wing 
parties and organisations did not unite in the Front de la Liberté. Instead, they 
agreed to present one single candidate whenever possible by creating their own 
local anti-Communist bloc under the auspices of the Front Lorrain. The parties 
which joined the bloc included the Parti Social Français, the Parti Populaire 
Français, the Christian-Social party and the Francistes.699 Although most 
candidates agreed to stand down in favour of fellow right wingers, others flatly 
refused to do so.  
In many cantons such as Metz 3, Pange and Verny, right wingers competed 
against one another. In Cattenom, the three right-wing candidates, two Union 
Républicaine Démocratique and one Républicain de Gauche, rejected the 
principle of a single candidacy and, despite the Front Lorrain‟s intervention, 
competed against one another at the first round.700 Determined not to let the left 
benefit from the right‟s divisions, the Front Lorrain intervened and persuaded 
Schuman, whom the local population knew as their deputy, to run as the official 
candidate of the anti-Communist coalition at the second round. On the left, the 
parties agreed to follow the line of the Popular Front and present their own 
candidates at the first round. While the PCF succeeded in presenting candidates 
in every canton, the SFIO only managed to present candidates in the canton of 
industrial Moyeuvre, near west Thionville, and in Cattenom, Schuman‟s fiefdom.   
With a turnout of roughly 70 percent of the electorate, Mosellans voted for 
the right-wing bloc en masse.701 Unlike the national results, which gave the 
Popular Front a clear majority, the Mosellan elections confirmed the conservatives‟ 
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supremacy in the Conseil Général.702 In terms of votes, the right won 65 percent 
and the left 35 percent.703 In terms of seats, the right‟s domination was even 
greater: thirty-two cantons compared to only four won by the left. All four of the 
left‟s seats were located in industrial areas.704 Both Hoffman (SFIO in Forbach) 
and Béron (Independent Socialist in Hayange) were re-elected. The two 
newcomers on the left were Communists Muller and Anstett, who respectively won 
cantons in Saint-Avold and in Metz. In the mining canton of Saint-Avold, Muller, 
who could barely speak French and communicated mainly in German, benefited 
from the support of the miners as well as the right‟s disunity. As the Front Lorrain 
had tried to impose its own candidate, Neu, a leading member of the Bauernbund, 
Alex Wiltzer, the local URD deputy, also ran for election. Wiltzer disagreed with the 
Front Lorrain, insisting that the anti-Popular Front camp should not be led by an 
extremist renowned for his autonomous and fascist views as well as his leading 
position within the Bauernbund.  
The Bauernbund, known in French as Union Paysanne, was a union of 
farmers who sought initially, as Goodfellow writes, „to protect and defend peasant 
interests at a time when economic development was undermining traditional 
life.‟705 Founded around milk cooperatives in the Haut-Rhin in early 1924, the 
Bauernbund gradually engaged in political action under the leadership of Joseph 
Bilger who succeeded the movement‟s founder, André Gestermann, in 1928. 
Clearly affiliated with the autonomous and clerical Germanophile camp, the 
organisation condemned Communism, big business and liberal capitalism. In 
1935, the Bauernbund became radicalised. It published its own newspaper, Die 
Volk and employed a motto reminiscent of the Christlich-Soziale Partei and the 
Parti Social Français‟, Familie Ŕ Arbeit Ŕ Heimat Ŕ Christentum. Bilger integrated 
the Bauernbund into his new Volksstandischen Arbeiterfront (Front National du 
                                            
 
702
 According to Kergoat, the Popular Front won roughly 4.5 million votes and the right just over 3 
million; in Kergoat, op.cit., p.225. 
703
 ADBR, Rapport du préfet au ministre de l‟Intérieur, Metz, 11 octobre 1937, 98AL1069-1. 
704
 ADBR, „Situation politique du Conseil Général avant et après le renouvellement d‟octobre 1937‟, 
Cabinet du préfet, Metz, 19 octobre 1937, 98AL1069-1. 
705
 Goodfellow, Between the Swastika and the Cross of Lorraine, p.89.  
234 
 
Travail) alongside two new groups: the Werkbund, a collective union of blue- and 
white-collar workers, and the Kampforganisationen, shock troops comprising 
young activists from the Jung-Front who wore distinctive green shirts.706 Robert 
Paxton notes that Henri Dorgères‟ Front Paysan - a particularly militant right-wing 
movement most popular in western France during the 1930s – also known as the 
Chemises Vertes, adopted the green shirt uniforms for its own youth organisation 
(Jeunesses Paysannes or Chemises Vertes) after meeting Bilger in 1935. As he 
writes, „The Greenshirt idea seems to have crystallized on 10 June 1935, when 
Dorgères made his one visit to Alsace to speak at a meeting organized [in the 
Haut-Rhin] ... by Joseph Bilger‟s Bauernbund.‟707  
Following the Popular Front electoral victory in June 1936, the Mosellan 
Bauernbund became heavily involved in local anti-Communist activities and 
quickly joined the Front Lorrain under the auspices of its parent organisation, the 
Front National du Travail. The latter, which by including blue- and white-collar 
workers, sought to create a socially varied political organisation, remained largely 
a peasant movement popular among small landowners. Geographically speaking, 
it was rather limited and was successful in mobilising rural discontent mostly in the 
Haut-Rhin, where it had originated. As Goodfellow writes, „Well over half of the 
Bauernbund‟s membership came from the Haut-Rhin; the rest were thinly spread 
out over Bas-Rhin and Lorraine.‟708 
In the Moselle, where a local section, the Lothringer Bauernbund (Union 
Paysanne Lorraine), was created in 1932, the organisation had relatively few 
members, drawing most of them from the German- and dialect-speaking rural 
cantons around Sarrebourg and Saint-Avold: precisely where the Autonomist 
movement had emerged in the 1920s. Despite their attempt to associate blue- and 
white-collar workers with the peasant world by creating the Werkbund, the 
Bauernbund and the Front National du Travail focused largely on serving the 
interests of a small minority made up of German and dialect-speaking small 
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landowners. Thus, by excluding a large section of Mosellan society such as the 
Francophone elites as well as the urban and industrial masses, the Bauernbund 
failed to develop a popular base in the Moselle. 
A second factor that could have contributed to the Bauernbund lack of 
growth was the Moselle‟s resistance to autonomist movements. As demonstrated 
in chapter One, the Moselle, though particularist and eager to maintain its special 
laws and customs, did not share Alsace‟s inclination for separatist movements. But 
the re-integration of the Moselle into French sovereignty was now nearly eighteen 
years old, during which a new generation had come of age under the French state, 
and the département‟s particularism, which once defined its political character and 
preferences, was now less prominent. Indeed, while language and culture and the 
defence of the region‟s particular laws had largely shaped Mosellan society and 
politics up to 1936, new divisions along political, and to some extent socio-
economic, lines emerged in the wake of the Popular Front victory in 1936. While 
the strike movement of 1936 and the collective contracts provided Mosellan 
workers with a hitherto unknown political and social identity and sense of unity, so 
the question of regional identity and particularism moved from centre stage among 
workers. Consequently, the latter began to look beyond the boundaries of their 
cultural and linguistic heritage and identify themselves within the wider national 
political context. Though it is certain that other factors such as the economic crisis 
and the rise of Nazi Germany contributed to alter Mosellan politics, for the first 
time since the return of the province to French sovereignty, the question of political 
identity took precedence over that of regional identity; a trend confirmed by the 
October 1937 local elections.  
The local elections and the return of the right 
Despite the apparent status quo demonstrated by the right‟s victory at the 
elections, a closer examination of the results reveals important changes in 
Mosellan electoral behaviour. The first notable change appeared on the left with 
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the rise of the PCF and SFIO votes. While the Independent Socialists decreased 
from 14,500 in 1936 to just under 7,000 in October 1937, both the Communist and 
the Socialist votes increased.709 After two new PCF candidates were elected at the 
Conseil Général, Thorez observed that the Moselle was the only industrial 
département where the party was succeeding in wining seats in the local assembly 
for the first time.710 But despite the  two Communist candidates, the SFIO 
appeared as the clear winner.  
Having never won more than 7 percent of the vote since the split with the 
Communists in 1920, the Socialist vote increased from roughly 1,500 in 1936 (1 
percent) to almost 12,500 in 1937 (10 percent). In comparison, the Communists 
totalled 23,000 votes (20 percent).711 These figures led the préfet to note that the 
increase of the SFIO vote was the elections‟ most significant outcome. As he 
wrote, „le fait essentiel qui se dégage de ces chiffres est incontestablement les 
gains considérables enregistrés par le parti socialiste SFIO.‟712 The préfet‟s initial 
reaction was to link the rise of the SFIO to the decline of the Independent 
Socialists, whose vote halved since 1936. As he wrote,  
Les changements apportés à la situation numérique des formations 
de gauche … autre que la Parti Communiste, est due, semble-t-il, 
beaucoup plus à une évolution interne dans le cadre d‟une même 
doctrine, marquée, notamment, par les écarts entre les suffrages 
socialistes indépendants et socialistes SFIO de 1936 à 1937, qu‟à 
une accentuation véritable des opinions du corps électoral tout 
entier.713 
 
But in a subsequent report, he appeared to have changed his mind as he 
linked the Socialist party‟s rise with the decline of the PCF. As he noted, „il faut 
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retenir...l‟évolution des électeurs d‟extrême-gauche abandonnant le parti 
communiste pour la parti socialiste SFIO.‟714 And,  
Le parti communiste … reste certes l‟élément majoritaire du 
Rassemblement Populaire en Moselle…. Mais s‟il a enregistré des 
gains dans ... les centres industriels du  bassin sidérurgique et minier 
de Thionville, il a par contre subi dans certains … cantons … 
industriels des pertes [qui] ont profité au parti socialiste S.F.I.O.715  
Even though it is impossible to determine with certainty which of the Communist or 
the Independent Socialist electorate boosted the SFIO‟s results, the préfet was 
correct to claim that the PCF was in decline by late 1937. Despite the election of 
two new Communist councillors, the Mosellan Communist federation was slowly 
losing supporters in some industrial centres.  
During a meeting of the Communist section of the Vallée de l‟Orne, 
Augustin Warocquy, a leading member of the départemental CGT and PCF, 
acknowledged that despite the recent Communist gains at the local elections, 
there was no denying the rise of the SFIO. As the préfet reported, „M. Warocquy ... 
déclara ... le Parti Socialiste grandit et cette poussée n‟est pas sans danger.‟716 
Later, during his tour of some of the département‟s industrial towns, Warocquy 
reported to the party‟s Central Committee that the SFIO and Béron ran successful 
campaigns against the party in the region of West Thionville. As he wrote, „En ce 
qui concerne les socialistes, avec Flocart, secrétaire de la fédération de la 
Moselle, … [ils]  mènent une grande campagne contre nous en accord avec 
Béron‟.717 According to Warocquy, the only way the PCF could counteract the 
Socialists‟ recent successes were to recruit new local officials who could speak 
French. As he noted, „J‟insiste tout particulièrement que dans la région de la 
Moselle, il nous faut (sic) des camarades sachant bien le français, car c‟est 
justement cela qui est une force pour le PS.‟718  
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The extent to which German was used by Mosellan activists and whether or 
not its use by party leaders was detrimental to the party remains unknown. To 
complicate matters further, of the two candidates elected at the cantonal elections, 
one was in Metz in the Francophone zone, the other in Saint-Avold, which was 
predominantly German-speaking. It is therefore difficult to determine how much of 
the Communist support was French or German-speaking. What remains certain, 
however, is that after almost twenty years since the return of the Moselle to French 
sovereignty, the question of language and the associated difficulties it had created 
for the PCF had not disappeared. Throughout the interwar period, local authorities 
compiled language tables and according to their figures, 25 percent of the 
Mosellan population spoke only French in 1936.719 Those who spoke only German 
found mostly in the zones around Forbach and along the border with the Saarland, 
represented 8 percent of the population. The vast majority of Mosellans used the 
local Platt dialect which, according to where it was used, was Latin or German. 
The authorities estimated the total number of dialect speakers at roughly 422,000; 
60 percent of the total population.  
Although useful, these statistics should be used with caution, since they fail 
to address the issue of multilingualism and the vast numbers who could speak 
more than one language – often French and Platt or German and French and Platt 
- which is an essential part of the linguistic map of the region in the mid-1930s. Be 
that as it may, the decline of the PCF in the region of Hayange cannot be 
attributed solely to a lack of Francophone leaders. In the region of Cattenom, 
where dialect speakers dominated, and in Forbach, a largely dialect and German-
speaking area, the influence of the SFIO also grew, thus suggesting that 
Warocquy‟s claim that the PCF could counteract the SFIO by recruiting French-
speaking officials was not entirely valid. The reasons for the rise of the SFIO and 
the decline of the PCF were to be found elsewhere, as Warocquy himself later 
acknowledged.  
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By 1937-38, the Mosellan Communist federation was once again going 
through a series of internal crises. The first crisis had to do with the leadership of 
the federation who, according to the préfet, was disorganised, apathetic and 
incoherent.720 Warocquy‟s view confirmed the préfet‟s as he wrote in an internal 
report, „Il y a certaines sections comme Audun-le-Tiche ou Florange, dont les 
responsables sont absolument incapables, qui demandent à être modifiées.‟721 He 
also criticised the Metz section, which he called „la plus défectueuse [des 
sections]‟, and the section of Ban Saint-Martin, where „règne le doriotisme.‟722 
Following the 1936 elections and the emergence of left-wing political militancy in 
the Moselle, the départemental federation appeared in agreement with the Central 
Committee and seemed to have forsaken its old separatist and particularist 
tendencies. Gone were the days when the regional federation sought to operate 
as an independent entity, separate from the PCF. After the Mosellan section broke 
with Alsace in 1935, thus becoming a regional federation, local leaders largely 
followed the party‟s strategy and effectively led the départemental Popular Front. 
But in reaction to the dislocation of the national Popular Front, which they 
interpreted as a failure of the Popular Front strategy, some Mosellan Communists 
seemed to revert to their old particularist ways, thus threatening the unity of the 
départemental federation.  
During the federation‟s annual Congress in Hagondange on 11 and 12 
December 1937, party delegates appeared confused and at odds. While some 
believed the federation should strictly follow the Central Committee‟s directives, 
others questioned the validity of the Popular Front tactics suggesting the party 
should return to its sectarian ways in order to avoid a split. As the préfet noted,  
Il apparait que les dirigeants mosellans hésitent à donner des 
directives précises. Sans doute, sont-ils ... pris entre la nécessité 
d‟une politique de temporisation et de satisfaction mitigées dans le 
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cadre du programme du Rassemblement Populaire, et les exigences 
d‟une doctrine rigide à laquelle tiennent encore des militants 
convaincus … [des risques] d‟une éclatante rupture.723   
The Mosellan leadership‟s inability to agree on a clear line led to a lack of 
direction, the absence of which was stated in Warocquy and the préfet‟s 
aforementioned reports. Because of its lack of direction, the party was unable to 
lead its cells and sections, which led to a certain loss of coherence and unity. 
Another explanation for the Communist decline was the financial difficulties it 
faced in 1937-38. The préfet, whose hostility towards the PCF was no secret, 
accused section leaders of stealing from the party‟s coffers and blamed them for 
the federation‟s financial difficulties. As he wrote, „des cadres ... auraient la 
fâcheuse propension à ne pas distinguer entre la Caisse de la Cellule et leurs 
ressources personnelles, pour le plus grand préjudice de celle-là.‟724  
How accurate the préfet‟s accusations were may possibly never be known. 
The fact remains, however, that the federation was in real financial troubles. With 
the operating costs of L‟Humanité d‟Alsace-Lorraine spiralling out of control, the 
federation faced losing its bilingual publication and called for the Central 
Committee to help. According to the préfet, the federation faced a 25,000 franc 
deficit in late 1937.725 While the préfet accused local leaders of stealing from the 
party, Warocquy revealed that the difficulties faced by L‟Humanité d‟Alsace-
Lorraine originated largely from the fact that some sections did not pay their 
contributions to the newspaper. He cited the example of the section of Florange, 
who owed 500 francs.726 Before the federation‟s inability to raise the money 
needed to save L‟Humanité d‟Alsace-Lorraine, Warocquy asked for the party‟s 
help, claiming that „les camarades se fatiguent, et il est grand temps que le parti 
                                            
 
723
 ADBR, Rapport mensuel du préfet au ministre de l‟Intérieur, Metz, 25 décembre 1937, 
98AL634. 
724
 Ibid. 
725
 Ibid. 
726
 ADSSD, Rapport d‟Augustin Warocquy sur sa tournée du 7 au 26 juin 1938, Moyeuvre-Grande 
le 27 juin 1938, 3 Mi6/137 séquence 844. 
241 
 
vienne à notre secours autrement tout ce que nous avons construit risque de 
s‟écrouler.‟727  
Sensing the gravity of the situation, the Central Committee responded 
favourably and sent Emile Dutilleul, Communist deputy for the Seine, to 
Strasbourg. By the time Dutilleul arrived in July 1938, the company who published 
L‟Humanité d‟Alsace-Lorraine, the Société d‟Edition et de Distribution d‟Alsace-
Lorraine, was accumulating monthly losses of roughly 9,000 francs.728 According 
to the préfet of the Bas-Rhin, the deficit was largely due to the rising operational 
costs of the Communist newspaper.729 During his visit, Dutilleul informed local 
Communist leaders that they would have to cut the newspaper‟s operating costs 
by reducing the headcount, raising the price of the daily by 10 centimes and that of 
the subscription by 75 centimes as well as removing two pages of the newspaper 
twice a week. More to the point, he declared that the Alsatian federation would 
have to solve the crisis itself as the Central Committee was not prepared to 
support a newspaper written in German. As the préfet noted, „M. Dutilleul aurait 
informé les dirigeants alsaciens du Parti communiste, qu‟aucune subvention ne 
serait plus accordée par le Comité Central aux organes de langue allemande.‟730  
Even though the Mosellan federation did not depend on the Bas-Rhin 
federation, Dutilleul made his comments to the latter because it was responsible 
for the publication of the Strasbourg-based newspaper. The party‟s decision not to 
help L‟Humanité d‟Alsace-Lorraine because of its use of German was in keeping 
with its decision not to admit Germans into the Mosellan sections in late 1936 (see 
chapter Four). Trying to rid the party of its past links with autonomous 
Germanophile elements and eager to demonstrate its rejection of anything 
German, and therefore fascist, the Central Committee was prepared to abandon 
the local newspaper to its fate. This is particularly interesting because it brings to 
mind the troubled relations between the party‟s national federation and the local 
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sections in the late 1920s and early 1930s, when the party split in Strasbourg in 
1929 and when Friedrich wrote to the Comintern asking for the independence of 
the regional federation. It is also interesting to note that while the Central 
Committee refused to support its German-speaking readership, it still actively 
sought the support of Mosellan Catholics, regardless of their linguistic habits.  
The policy of the main tendue was very much advocated by the Central 
Committe, but in the Moselle, the Action Catholique Lorraine and the Union 
Républicaine Lorraine repeatedly warned Catholic workers against it. As a devout 
Catholic, Schuman was one the most vocal opponents of the main tendue. After 
the Action Catholique Lorraine‟s annual congress in Metz in March 1938, the 
préfet reported that „M. Schuman mit en garde la classe ouvrière croyante contre 
la politique de la main tendue‟.731 Thus, while the PCF sent messages of unity to 
the population at large, the sectarianism it practiced internally challenged its own 
unity and stability. 
Although it has not been possible to establish how the Central Committee‟s 
decision not to support L‟Humanité d‟Alsace-Lorraine affected the Mosellan 
federation, three conclusions may be drawn from it. Firstly, it denotes a certain 
lack of understanding of local realities on the Central Committee‟s part. After all, 
unlike the Socialists, the Communists had always preferred to communicate in 
German. The fact that L‟Humanité d‟Alsace-Lorraine was still largely published in 
German indicated that the editorial team as well as the readership were probably 
more comfortable with German than French. What is more, in some parts of the 
Moselle, Communist candidates seemed to prefer using German. As a matter of 
fact, Muller, the newly-elected councillor in the canton of Saint-Avold, spoke very 
little French and communicated mainly in German. Secondly, by abandoning the 
regional newspaper to its own fate, the Central Committee was denying the 
linguistic and cultural specificity of the Alsatian and Mosellan federations, thus 
running the risk of resuscitating the latter‟s old particularist ways. The third 
conclusion that may be drawn also carried heavy political consequences. By 
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deciding not to help the regional newspaper, the Central Committee‟s decision 
may have led to the decline of the Mosellan federation and aggravated the crisis of 
confidence that shook it. As the préfet noted, this may have led to the rise of its 
traditional political rival, the SFIO. As he wrote in a report, „Il n‟est pas exclu … de 
penser que le Parti socialiste pourra profiter dans une certaine mesure de cette … 
désagrégation…. Son influence  s‟accroît lentement, mais surement semble-t-il.‟732  
As the Mosellan Communist federation appeared weakened by its financial 
and internal difficulties, the other two parties comprising the Popular Front, the 
Radical-Socialist party and the SFIO, began to question their association with the 
Popular Front. In no doubt as to the doomed future of the left-wing coalition, they 
dissociated themselves from both the Communists and the Popular Front.  For the 
small Mosellan Radical-Socialist section, like the national party, associating with 
the Communists signified working against the current Radical-led government of 
Daladier. After Blum resigned in June 1937, the Radical Chautemps headed two 
different Popular Front governments until March 1938, when Blum briefly returned 
to office, only to be replaced by Daladier in April. Right-wing Radicals had always 
opposed their party‟s association with the Communists. But Daladier, after having 
led the party on the path of unity with the PCF and the SFIO within the Popular 
Front at the risk of alienating some within the party, had sincerely supported the 
coalition. As he declared during a party meeting in July 1936, „Le parti Radical-
socialiste ... a la fierté ... d‟avoir scellé l‟alliance du Tiers-Etat avec les 
prolétaires…. Il est décidé à demeurer fidèle à son serment.‟733 Two years later, 
facing the Sudeten crisis and the threat of an imminent war with Germany, 
Daladier‟s oath to the Popular Front appeared outdated, as his attitude towards 
the coalition and the Communists in particular gradually changed.  
Since events in Central Europe threatened an imminent war in Europe, 
Daladier believed that France needed urgently to alter course. Consequently, his 
main objective was to pacify the country and increase the production of 
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armaments in order to prepare the country for war, both materially and 
psychologically. As he stated during a party meeting on 15 June 1938,  
nous ne pouvons accepter que dans les périls de l‟heure présente, 
notre pays risque d‟être mis en état d‟infériorité par une diminution 
croissante de sa capacité de production. Il n‟y pas de progrès social 
durable s‟il n‟est point affermi et fortifié par le progrès 
économique.734 
Without going into detail, as the subject of Germany and its effect on French and 
Mosellan politics shall be examined later in this chapter, it is fair to say that 
Daladier‟s policies and his propensity to legislate by decrees effectively broke the 
already fragile Popular Front. Following the Socialists‟ refusal to enter his 
government in April, Daladier gave ministries to fellow Radicals, including Jean 
Zay, a strong supporter of the Popular Front, and Georges Bonnet, a notorious 
opponent. But he also gave the right the opportunity to return to government by 
including Paul Reynaud from the Alliance Démocratique, Champetier de Ribes 
from the Parti Démocrate Populaire and Georges Mandel from the Républicains 
Indépendants. As Wolikow writes, „Le gouvernement constitué le 10 avril sous la 
Présidence de Daladier marquait à l‟évidence une ouverture à droite‟.735 
By August 1938, when Daladier declared that „il faut remettre la France au 
travail‟ and „aménager la loi de quarante heures‟ in the national defence industry, 
he was clearly prepared to take on the CGT.736 As Julian Jackson writes, „by 
announcing the necessity to end the forty-hour week on the grounds that it was 
hindering rearmament…. Daladier‟s main objective was to pick a fight with the 
unions and win.‟737 Not surprisingly, the CGT reacted vigorously to his declaration. 
The Confédération argued that the Radical leader was forsaking the oath he had 
made on 14 July 1935 and the programme of the Popular Front.738 Blum, keen to 
maintain the unity of the coalition but not at any cost, declared,  
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Nous ne chercherons pas exploiter contre M. Daladier les difficultés 
qu‟il vient de se créer lui-même; l‟heure est trop grave pour cela. 
Mais... [p]our un recul de la législation sociale ... qu‟il ne compte pas 
sur le Parti socialiste.739  
 
Although the Communists did not condemn Daladier directly, they criticised 
his alleged concession to the 200 familles by amending what they considered one 
of the hallmarks of the 1936 social laws: the 40-hour week. As a document 
published by the Politburo stated on 8 September,  
On peut s‟étonner de l‟empressement avec lequel le Président du 
Conseil a déféré à la volonté des 200 familles, qu‟il fustigeait 
naguère et qui veulent abolir une des principales conquêtes du Front 
populaire: la semaine de quarante heures.740 
 
As was often the case with the PCF, its position was ambivalent. Torn between its 
goal of uniting the working classes in a single party under its command and its 
commitment to the Popular Front, it urged the working masses to follow the 
instructions of the CGT, thus challenging the government‟s labour policies, while at 
the same time remaining united behind the Popular Front. As the same document 
affirmed,  
C‟est … un appel à l‟union … des communistes, des socialistes, des 
radicaux, des démocrates, des chrétiens, union de la Nation 
Française contre ses ennemis de l‟intérieur et de l‟extérieur, pour 
sauvegarder le progrès social...741  
When the left and the right unanimously endorsed Daladier in office at the 
National Assembly, thus creating what appeared to be a broad political consensus, 
the Mosellan Radicals grew confident that time was ripe for them to detach 
themselves from the Popular Front.742 In early 1937, when the Radical party still 
largely supported the Popular Front, the préfet reported the formation of a new 
                                            
 
739
 Grandmougin, op.cit., p.413.  
740
 „Pour la défense de la paix et des conquêtes sociales‟, Procès-verbal du Bureau Politique du 
Parti Communiste Français, séance du 8 septembre 1938, Cahiers du Bolchévisme, documents du 
parti, No 10, octobre 1938, p.707. 
741
 Ibid.  
742
 The National Assembly invested Daladier with 575 votes against 5. The Senate granted him the 
full financial powers they had previously denied Blum by 508 votes against 12. Grandmougin, 
op.cit., p.403.  
246 
 
Radical section in Dieuze, a small town located in rural Francophone Moselle.743 
Upon the creation of the section, members sent Blum, the then Premier, a motion 
affirming their confidence in the Popular Front. But in July 1938, as relations 
between the three coalition parties seriously deteriorated, the Radical federation of 
the Moselle decided to boycott Popular Front meetings, which, more often than 
not, were organised by the Communists.  
In Thionville, leaders of the local section rejected the Communists‟ invitation 
to a meeting of the départemental committee of the Popular Front. They refused 
on the basis that, as the préfet reported, they no longer wished to associate with 
„les représentants d‟un parti qui ne cesse de se livrer à de multiples attaques 
contre le Gouvernement actuel.‟744 Even though the SFIO did not formally reject 
the Communist invitation, it followed a similar line and stopped participating in the 
départemental reunions.745 Thus, the PCF found itself isolated and in charge of a 
coalition now comprised largely of Communists and CGT trade unionists.  
Although the latter still supported the Popular Front, its decreasing influence 
among the workers meant that the coalition reached fewer and fewer people. As 
industry bosses regained their confidence and did not hesitate to dismiss 
troublesome workers, the latter, fearing for their jobs and having tired of what 
seemed like endless political action, began to distance themselves from the CGT.  
The Confédération, keen to maintain its central role in the workplace and its 
ascendency over the workforce and to a certain extent management, intensified its 
propaganda by organising meetings across the département. But faced with the 
possibility of losing their jobs and being accused of harbouring antipatriotic 
feelings by refusing to participate in the national effort, very few workers 
responded to the CGT‟s calls. As the préfet noted in a report, „divers meetings 
syndicaux ... n‟ont été suivis ... que par de faibles auditoires, en rien comparables 
de ceux de 1936‟.746  
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The small number of workers present at the Confédération‟s meetings 
reflected its declining influence in the Moselle. After its rapid rise in 1936 and 
despite the fact that it counted 82,000 fee-paying members in 1938, the 
Confédération struggled to motivate its troops.747 On the rare occasions that it 
succeeded in mobilising support, the stakes were high enough for workers to 
become involved in union activities. For example, after having renewed its 
collective contracts in May 1938, the Thionville-based steelworkers union 
succeeded in mobilising the support of 30,000 workers in disputes over pay. No 
strike was called, but unable to negotiate a deal between the bosses and the union 
representatives, the préfet referred the matter to the minister of Labour. As he 
reported,  
Je vous serais très obligé de bien vouloir envisager la possibilité de 
déférer le différend à la Commission Nationale de conciliation, eu 
égard à l‟importance du conflit et au nombre important de travailleurs 
entrant en compte (plus de 30.000).748 
Episodes as this one, however, were rare and in August 1938 the préfet 
noted that the CGT‟s calls for a large strike movement in October met with much 
indifference and even some hostility. As he wrote, „Leurs déclarations ont 
rencontre l‟apathie générale si ce n‟est même une certaine hostilité‟.749 In 
September, following Daladier‟s declaration that France should return to work, the 
CGT protested against the Premier‟s plans to amend the forty-hour week 
legislation and warned workers against the government‟s plans.750 But it found a 
general lack of interest and apathy within its own ranks. To make matters worse, 
the CGT also faced the rising popularity of the Christian trade unions in industrial 
centres.  
In 1936, the Christian unions counted roughly 5,000 members.751 By 
October 1938, the number had shot up to 22,000.752 Supported by the Action 
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Catholique Lorraine, the Union Républicaine Lorraine and the clergy at large, they 
were particularly interested in removing workers from the influence of the CGT. 
Invited by the Action Catholique Lorraine to speak at its annual congress in March 
1938, Jean Le Cour Grandmaison, the vice-president of the Fédération Nationale 
Catholique, claimed that, as the préfet put it in a report, „le syndicalisme chrétien 
permet d‟agir sur le terrain professionnel en restaurant la famille et la 
corporation.‟753 He was backed by Schuman who proclaimed „qu‟il y avait une 
incompatibilité absolue entre la foi chrétienne et les tendances de … certains 
syndicats.‟ Although the CGT could do little against public attacks, it became 
particularly frustrated to hear that priests made similar attacks during their private 
dominical sermons.    
In a letter to the préfet, the Mosellan CGT expressed its  „indignation contre 
l‟attaque que mène ... le clergé de l‟église catholique contre la Confédération 
Générale du Travail, profitant de la chaire et de l‟église pour inviter nos camarades 
à sortir de la CGT.‟754 Citing the example of the canton of Bitche, where priests 
refused to give absolution to women whose husbands refused to leave the CGT, 
the author of the letter protested that the clergy used unlawful means to press their 
flock to leave the CGT and join the Christian unions. As fonctionnaires – the clergy 
in the Moselle and Alsace was, and still is, paid by the French state – the letter 
complained of the fact that „des fonctionnaires payés par la République aient le 
droit pendant leurs heures de travail de faire de la propagande contre une 
organisation quelconque en faveur des syndicats chrétiens.‟755 As the union 
claimed that its previous letters had remained unanswered, the author warned the 
préfet that „nous sommes bien décidés ... de sortir de la ligne de conduite que 
nous avons eue jusqu‟à présent si cette activité de la part du clergé lorrain ne doit 
pas cesser.‟ What „sortir de la ligne de conduite‟ referred to remains unclear, but 
as the local CGT evidently received no answer from the préfet, it escalated the 
matter to the central offices of the trade union in Paris, who sent a copy of the 
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letter to Chautemps, the then Vice-Premier and head of the Direction générale des 
services d‟Alsace et de Lorraine.756  
Alerted by a letter from Chautemps, the préfet replied that he was aware of 
the situation and that he had contacted the new bishop of Metz, Monseigneur 
Heintz, and the secretary-general of the local CGT in late October.757 In his letter 
to Heintz, he recommended the bishop inform his missionaries to „maintenir la 
religion au-dessus des préoccupations temporelles, d‟ordre politique ou 
syndical.‟758 In his letter to CGT official, the préfet affirmed that he had heard of the 
clergy‟s abuses in Bitche and that he would urge the bishop to investigate the 
trade union‟s claims.759 In his long response to the préfet, the bishop posed as the 
apostle of the Catholic Church‟s social doctrine. Without refuting the accusations 
made against his priests, whose actions he defended, he claimed that they had a 
moral duty to enlighten workers who came to the Church for moral guidance.  
Quoting the Church‟s view on professional associations and in line with 
Pope Pie XI‟s recent encyclical letter, Divini redemptoris, which defined 
Communism as destructive, he affirmed that „la question sociale, et avant tout, la 
question du travail, n‟est pas une question purement matérielle et économique, 
mais aussi une question humaine, intéressant la dignité, la conscience humaine et 
la morale.‟760 What the Vatican and Heintz meant was that the Church had the 
moral duty to keep the Catholic masses, in particular workers, away from the virus 
of Socialism and Communism. As one of the advanced posts of Communism in 
the professional world, the CGT had to be fought. As Heintz wrote,  
c‟est le devoir d‟un évêque et de son clergé d‟éclairer les 
Catholiques qui attendent d‟eux lumière et direction, en déclarant 
que les syndicats d‟inspiration socialiste ou communiste ne sont pas 
faits pour eux et de les engager à choisir … des syndicats conformes 
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à l‟esprit et à la morale du christianisme. Tant que la C.G.T. sera ce 
qu‟elle est, ils ne peuvent pas agir autrement, sans faillir à leur 
mission.761 
Due to the lack of sources, it has not been possible to establish the 
conclusion of this confrontational story. It is therefore difficult to say how the 
relations between the CGT and the diocese and the Christian unions subsequently 
developed. How much direct influence the clergy had on Mosellan Catholic 
workers in 1937-1938 is also difficult to measure, but it is clear that the local CGT, 
which was losing support among industrial workers, took the clergy‟s propaganda 
seriously. While the attitude of the diocese towards the Socialist and Communist 
doctrines should come as no surprise, the Church and the clergy having long 
condemned the influence of left-wing trade unions on workers, the tone employed 
by Heintz in his letter expressed remarkable confidence. Indeed, compared to 
Monseigneur Pelt‟s previous exchanges with the préfet on the troubled relations 
between the clergy and the CGT, Heintz appeared more assertive and prepared to 
defend his clergy. In September 1936, the préfet reported to Pelt, the then bishop, 
the case of a priest who used his pulpit to attack the Popular Front government.762 
Pelt, who initially defended his priest for promoting the Church‟s social doctrine, 
concluded his letter by conceding that he „n‟[a] pas manqué de recommander 
sérieusement à ce prêtre d‟éviter ... ce qui pourrait être considéré comme une 
allusion politique‟.763  
Why the changed attitude? Even though the different personalities of the 
two bishops certainly played a part, other factors may explain the diocese‟s new 
assurance. In 1936 the bishop‟s expectations of the first Popular Front government 
with regards to the Church – given that the new majority was left-wing and 
supported by the Communists, would there be plans to laicise the département? – 
possibly led him to treat the new government with caution, hence his readiness to 
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compromise. By 1938, however, things were different. The school reform, which 
stirred much reaction among Mosellan politicians, had been scrapped by the 
Conseil d‟Etat in December 1937, giving local Catholics the sentiment to have won 
a victory over the Popular Front and having the implicit support of the guards of 
the French Constitution. What is more, Daladier‟s government appeared more 
sympathetic to Catholics than it did to the godless CGT. While the Premier was 
eager to normalise France‟s relations with the Vatican, even talking of a second 
Concordat, he was bent on breaking the labour movement. Added to this was the 
fact that the right in general, including the Church, grew more confident vis-à-vis 
the labour movement and the weakened Popular Front. 
Interestingly, Heintz‟s attack on the CGT was written on 30 November 
1938. That same day the trade union launched a fateful general strike in reaction 
to the Minister of Finances‟ decrees that constituted a repudiation of the 
programme of the Popular Front. As a conservative, Reynaud, the Finance 
Minister, was adamant that the only way to increase the production of armament 
and restore confidence in the government was to extend the forty-hour week to 
forty-eight hours, thus ending what he called „la semaine des deux dimanches‟.764 
On the day of the strike, the government and the patronat, who were much more 
organised than in 1936, treated the strikers severely.765 As the police forcibly 
evacuated occupied factories, bosses sacked 15,000 strikers.766 The French 
philosopher Simone Weil described the patronat‟s treatment of the strikers on 30 
November as „la bataille de la Marne des patrons‟.767 For Prost, „La répression ... 
est délibérée, systématique, massive et d‟une rare sévérité.‟768 
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In the Moselle, official sources pertaining to the general strike are scarce as 
many reports dated between October 1938 and February 1939 are missing – 
according to local archivists, this was the work of the new German rulers who, 
after annexing the département in July 1940, used police reports to locate local 
„reds‟. A small number of prefectural reports, however, give an indication as to 
what happened in the département on 30 November. As at the national level, 
Mosellan bosses treated the strikers severely.  A few days before the strike, they 
gathered their workforce and threatened them with dismissal should they be 
absent from work on 30 November without a valid reason.769 Even though he did 
not provide exact numbers, the préfet stated that „la grève ... n‟a ... connu, dans 
mon Département, qu‟un succès relatif.‟770 The day after the strike, bosses invited 
all the workers who had gone on strike and lost their jobs for an individual 
interview. Of those workers, whose number is also unknown, 146 were not re-
hired and lost their jobs definitively.  
In one of his studies of the strike, Prost writes that „cette procédure permet 
surtout d‟effecteur un tri, et donc de licencier tous les meneurs‟.771 Pressed by the 
CGT, the préfet tried to persuade management to re-hire the sacked workers but 
they refused. As at the national level, Mosellan bosses seized the opportunity to 
break the CGT and rid their factories of unwanted elements. The préfet‟s report 
confirmed this, as he wrote: „étant donné qu‟il s‟agit d‟ouvriers dont, depuis 
longtemps, les Entreprises cherchaient à se débarrasser et qu‟elles considéraient 
comme des meneurs et des violents, je me suis heurté … à des refus.‟772   
Although the CGT in late 1938 was larger in terms of unions and individual 
members than in June 1936, it was soon broken by the government and the 
patronat. Dreyfus writes that the CGT rapidly lost one quarter of its members after 
30 November.773 Prost notes that there were no strikes in 1939. This was true for 
the Moselle. Since the number of workers who left the Mosellan trade union 
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remains unknown, it is difficult to comment on the effect of the strike on the local 
union. What remains certain, however, is that the CGT began to lose its influence 
on the workers long before 30 November. It is therefore likely that the national 
CGT‟s fast-declining membership after December 1938 was mirrored in the 
Moselle.  
As for the local patronat, it appeared to act as one. Back in May 1938, 
bosses had shown their intransigence and self-confidence by opposing the CGT 
during the negotiations over pay in the Thionville steelworks. As mentioned earlier 
in this chapter, the steelworks union represented 30,000 workers. If workers had 
decided to go on strike, a large share of French steel production would have 
stopped and without doubt the factories would have lost revenue. But in 1938, 
there was more at stake than revenue and profit for bosses. The latter wanted to 
regain their authority and restore social order in their factories and in society in 
general. For this reason they treated the workers severely. Although it is not 
known if the local patronat really worked in concert prior and during the strike, the 
dismissals of union leaders gave the CGT and workers a strong signal that the 
days when the unions controlled the shop floors were over. On the right, reactions 
were unanimous: social order was restored and 30 November was a success. 
Almost five years since the last general strike of 12 February, which had led to the 
uniting of the left in the Popular Front, the right appeared to have defeated the left.   
Of particular significance was the fact that the right did not even need to 
unite to defeat the left. In the Moselle, the Front Lorrain had ceased to function in 
early 1938. Eiselé, the young lawyer in charge of the movement, left Metz to 
complete his military service in March. As for Ritz, his poor health kept him away 
from politics and the Front Lorrain until his untimely death in January 1939. By late 
1938, it had no reason to be as its nemesis, the PCF, was in the opposition and in 
crisis.774 Once the fastest growing political force in the Moselle, the Parti Social 
Français was in difficulty in 1938. As internal dissensions began to appear in 
conjunction with the affair of the secret funds, its growth slowed down in late 1937.  
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In July 1937, one month after de la Rocque had rejected the Front de la 
Liberté, Pozzo di Borgo accused de la Rocque of having accepted secret 
government funds for the Croix de Feu in the early 1930s. De la Rocque, who 
repeatedly claimed that the Croix de Feu and the Parti Social Français were above 
the political conflict, sued his former deputy. The trial, which took place in Lyon 
offered, what Julian Jackson describes as, „the spectacle of the right washing its 
dirty linen in public.‟775 The effect of the trials was felt in the Moselle where Andres, 
the regional leader of the Parti Social Français, told his followers to trust de la 
Rocque and warned them against Pozzo di Borgo‟s lies. After the Metz section‟s 
annual gathering on 16 December, the préfet wrote in a report that Andres 
„s‟efforça de démontrer que le Président du Parti n‟avait jamais émargé aux fonds 
secrets et conclut que … [les accusations de Pozzo di Borgo] étaient 
mensongères.‟776 Criticising Marin, Henriot and Vallat for supporting Pozzo di 
Borgo, Andres added that the regional federation would never allow them to speak 
in the Moselle again. He then concluded that anyone in disagreement with him or 
suspicious of de la Rocque should leave the party within a fortnight. It appears that 
this was just what happened as by late 1937 many decided to leave the federation.  
According to the préfet, the link to the Lyon secret funds trials was clear as he 
mentioned „les symptômes consécutifs au procès de Lyon.‟777 What is more, those 
who left the Parti Social Français joined its arch-rival on the right, Doriot‟s Parti 
Populaire Français.  
Although he never admitted publicly, one of de la Rocque‟s main reasons 
for not joining the Front de la Liberté was his fear that some of his troops might 
quit for Doriot‟s party. Ironically, his decision to remain outside the Front de la 
Liberté had just that effect, as defectors left the Parti Social Français for the Parti 
Populaire Français. As the préfet wrote in a report, „il semble que les progrès 
numériques enregistrés par le Parti Populaire Français, au préjudice du Parti 
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Social Français … aient tendance à se confirmer.‟778 By February 1938, the préfet 
confirmed the Parti Social Français‟ decline. As he noted,  „le Parti Social Français 
n‟a fait preuve … que d‟une activité très ralentie. Il semble que son rayonnement 
soit moins vif et que des défections soient à enregistrer au profit du “Parti 
Populaire Français”‟.779 In order to halt the defections to the Parti Populaire 
Français and attract new supporters, Emile Peter, the Parti Social Français deputy 
for Sarrebourg, even founded a new local paper called Sarrebourg 1938.  
Still the largest party in terms of membership, the Parti Social Français 
ceased to grow in 1938. Although the secret funds affair slowed down the party‟s 
growth in the Moselle, it is fair to say that the breakdown of the Popular Front as 
well as Daladier and Reynaud‟s conservative policies modestly strengthened the 
right. As a political consensus emerged after Daladier took office in April, thus 
narrowing the left-right divide, there was little room for radical and extreme politics; 
this was true for the left and for the right. In the Moselle, this was seen during the 
October 1938 municipal by-election when the Parti Social Français came head to 
head with the Metz conservative notables: those who had created the Front 
Lorrain and ran the Metz Francophone dailies, Le Lorrain and Le Messin.  
Following Vautrin‟s untimely death in September 1938, Metz had to elect a 
new mayor. As the mayor was elected by the municipal council, the city was to 
hold complementary municipal elections on 23 October. What should have been a 
seamless election - Vautrin had left instructions with the municipal council to elect 
the deputy-mayor Gabriel Hocquard as new mayor - resulted in bitter feuds 
between the Parti Social Français and the Metz right-wing municipal council.780 
Two right-wing candidates chose to put their names forward on a joint list: Durand, 
the editor of Le Lorrain and a member of the Parti Social Français, and Wolff, a 
local leader of the Parti Populaire Français. Because Durand presented his 
candidacy without his party‟s approval and allied with a rival Parti Populaire 
Français candidate, he was dismissed from the Parti Social Français. Determined 
                                            
 
778
 Ibid. 
779
 ADBR, Rapport du préfet au ministre de l‟Intérieur, Metz, 24 février 1938, 98AL634. 
780
 Thibaud de la Corbière, Les Maires de Metz, Metz: Editions Serpenoises, 1995, p.185. 
256 
 
to present its own candidates at the elections, the Parti Social Français nominated 
Georges Thouveny, Andres‟ deputy at the party‟s regional offices, and Henri 
Velter, a local conseiller d‟arrondissement.  
As a sign of protest against the dismissal of Durand, twelve municipal 
councillors announced their resignation from the Parti Social Français – almost a 
third of the council. In a communiqué published by Le Lorrain, they criticised the 
party‟s sectarian policy which, as they wrote, „divisent les Français de bonne 
volonté.‟781 Supported by the two Francophone right-wing dailies, Le Messin and 
Le Lorrain, Wolff and Durand won the election. The first won a majority at the first 
round. But the second did not, and it was the Parti Social Français‟ decision to 
remove its candidates at the second round that gave him the election. Not 
surprisingly, the two new municipal councillors and the majority of the council 
voted for Hocquard. A few weeks later, a by-election for a seat of conseiller 
général in the third canton of Metz resulted in a similar conflict between the Parti 
Social Français on the one side and the Parti Populaire Français and the Metz 
notables on the other. As in the Metz municipal election, the Parti Social Français 
was defeated and the Metz notables secured the election of their preferred 
candidate.  
Relations between the Parti Social Français and the local notables had 
seldom been harmonious. Despite the public displays of friendship and the fact 
that they shared common values - anti-Communism being the most obvious – 
political rivalry opposed the two organisations as they both sought the control of 
the conservative masses. The Parti Social Français‟ national electoral policy was 
clear: no alliances with third-party political parties. In a speech he made in late 
1938, de la Rocque explained the party‟s policy:  
Nous ne connaissons point d‟adversaires parmi ceux qui sont eux-
mêmes les adversaires du marxisme. Mais l‟histoire de l‟après-
guerre nous a enseigné un tel scepticisme à l‟égard de tous les 
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anciens partis, que nous ne sommes disposés à conclure aucune 
alliance générale et permanente avec l‟un quelconque d‟entre eux.782  
Such inflexible policies sometimes prove difficult to apply in the regions. It is one 
thing to dictate a national policy, it is quite another to apply it at the local level. This 
is exactly what occurred in Metz when Durand, a prominent member of the Parti 
Social Français, chose to run a joint list with a member of the Parti Populaire 
Français. 
In the Moselle, the conflict between the Parti Social Français and the 
notables was aggravated by the decision of the Metz right-wing press to portray de 
la Rocque‟s party as, in Colas‟ words, „étranger à l‟esprit ... lorrain.‟783 Because the 
Parti Social Français blamed the „anciens partis‟ for virtually all the ills befalling 
post-war France, by extension it criticised the old conservative elites of Metz. The 
latter succeeded in maintaining their political and economic ascendency by 
cultivating the particularism they had developed prior to and after 1918, and by 
controlling the press and the majority of businesses. When one of them passed 
away, they made sure to appoint a loyal successor to carry the torch forward. For 
example, Collin appointed Ritz and Vautrin, Hocquard. Because the Parti Social 
Français disturbed the notables‟ world, from which ironically it drew a large 
number of supporters, the Mosellan notables described it as non-Lorrainer and 
therefore foreign. Similar to the national right‟s description of the Popular Front as 
„un-French‟ – an insinuation that the left-wing coalition was, in Wardhaugh‟s 
words, essentially „incapable of attracting the real French people‟ – the Mosellan 
right-wing notables portrayed the Parti Social Français as un-Lorrainer.784 
Obviously, the term „foreign‟ did not have the connotation it had when applied to 
the „reds‟. But as they did with the Communists, it appeared that the notables used 
the term against any party threatening their political and social supremacy. By late 
1938, the Popular Front had ceased to exist, leaving the left disunited and 
weakened. As such, it no longer represented a threat to local right wingers. It is 
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therefore possible that as the Popular Front faded, it left a vacuum behind which 
the Parti Social Français filled albeit involuntarily. 
Despite the fact that the local right-wing press tried to play the particularist 
card by describing the Parti Social Français as foreign, this conflict reveals to 
some extent the notables‟ resistance to letting national politics enter the Moselle. 
Indeed, one of the most noticeable effects of the Popular Front in the Moselle was 
the intrusion of national politics on the local political scene. This was particularly 
visible among the working masses who participated in the strikes and joined the 
CGT in record numbers in 1936-37.  The increased membership of the latter 
reflected the working classes‟ new definition of their social and political identities. 
For that reason, it is fair to say that for the first time Mosellan workers entered 
what Benoît Kermoal called „un espace de contestation conforme à la tradition des 
luttes ouvrières françaises.‟785  
Reflected in the results of the 1937 local elections, new divisions cutting the 
département in two diametrically-opposed zones appeared along political and 
ideological lines. Because the Popular Front led to the culmination of the 
polarisation of society along those lines, it added a political and ideological 
dimension to the Moselle‟s old cultural and linguistic divisions and helped to 
assimilate the Mosellan working masses into national politics. Without renouncing 
their regional identity, many began to look beyond the boundaries of their region 
and identify themselves in terms of class within the wider national political context. 
But as seen earlier, with the decline of the CGT and the PCF in 1938, this new 
class identity was largely ephemeral.  
This new political identity also existed among the conservative masses. The 
emergence of new right-wing parties, in particular the Parti Social Français, 
revealed the population‟s desire for new politics. As the particularist Union 
Républicaine Lorraine seemed unable to foster a sense of action and unity in 
response to the perceived threat of a Communist revolution, many turned towards 
the dynamic new right. But as the Popular Front broke down and the threat of a 
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Communist revolution waned, so did the people‟s enthusiasm for the far right and 
extremist politics. As the October 1937 election results indicate, the Mosellan right-
wing electorate voted en masse for the conservative Union Républicaine 
Démocratique as it received 57,000 votes; roughly 75 percent of the right-wing 
vote.786 By comparison, the Parti Social Français, whose first election it was, 
received 13,100 (15 percent).  As the school reform episode also demonstrated, 
the opposition to the government‟s decree was largely organised by the Union 
Républicaine Lorraine and the Action Catholique Lorraine. In 1924, Mosellan 
Catholics had impulsively rejected the Cartel des Gauche‟s plans to laicise the 
recovered provinces without the need of organised action. In 1937, however, they 
were led by organisations whose raison d‟être rested on the defence of the 
particularisme mosellan. Eager to protect what they saw as key values of Mosellan 
distinct regional identity, Catholic politicians and the Action Catholique Lorraine 
probably sought to capitalise on the population‟s growing interest in political action. 
Unfortunately for them, and despite the fact that they collected hundreds of 
thousands of signatures in their anti-reform petition, other pressing matters pre-
occupied Mosellans. Without doubt, that which caused the most concern was the 
issue of war against Germany.  
Part Two: the German Threat and Domestic Antisemitism  
The rise of the German threat 
Because of the Moselle‟s past relationship with Germany and the fact that the two 
shared common borders, Hitler‟s military and foreign policy had an acute effect on 
the region. In order to examine the rise of the German threat and its effect upon 
French and Mosellan politics and society in the final months of the Popular Front, it 
is necessary to understand how the German issue gradually took centre stage in 
France.  
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Shortly after Germany‟s President Paul Von Hindenburg nominated Hitler 
as the new Chancellor on 30 January 1933, the French ambassador to Berlin, 
André François-Poncet, recommended caution but remained confident that should 
the new Chancellor claim the revision of the peace treaties with the help of 
Hungary and Italy, France was in a strong position. As he wrote to the French 
minister of the Interior in a diplomatic note, 
Nous devons prévoir le cas où, le fascisme hitlérien ayant lié partie 
avec le fascisme italien et hongrois … réclamer[ait] en commun la 
révision des traités…. Une dictature de droite telle que le Reich n‟en 
a pas connue depuis l‟armistice vient de s‟installer en Allemagne.… 
C‟est un événement grave…. En face de cette dictature la France 
n‟a pas de raison de perdre son calme; elle doit … garder confiance 
dans la force matérielle et morale qu‟elle représente, avec ses amis 
et ses alliés, et qui lui permettra d‟affronter toutes les éventualités.787 
By the time Daladier returned to power in April 1938, the preparation for war aginst 
Germany permeated all aspects of French and Mosellan society and became 
inextricably connected to the Popular Front‟s economic, financial and social 
policies. What had happened during those five years?  
It is fair to say that the general attitude in France towards Germany, 
whether before or immediately after 1933, remained unchanged. In the French 
collective consciousness, Germany, and before it Prussia, was France‟s natural 
and hereditary enemy. During the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, French 
Premier Clémenceau, whom the British economist John Maynard Keynes 
described as a „French Bismarck‟, had insisted that German military capabilities be 
limited in order to curb Prussian militarism and assure France‟s security. In order 
to further protect France from any future German aggression, he also favoured the 
creation of one or several independent states on the left bank of the Rhine to act 
as a buffer zone.788 As a compromise between the French demands and the 
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American and British plans, the Versailles Treaty enjoined Germany to reduce its 
armies to 100,000 men (Part V, Section I, Article 160) but allowed a demilitarised 
Rhineland to remain under German domination. The articles relating to the new 
status of the Rhineland (Part III, Section III, Articles 42 and 43) stipulated that 
Germany was forbidden to maintain or construct fortifications or maintain and 
assemble armed forces on the left bank of the Rhine. Article 44 stated that „In case 
Germany violates in any manner ... Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded as 
committing a hostile act against the Powers signatory of the present Treaty and as 
calculated to disturb the peace of the world.‟789  Later, as a co-signatory of the 
1925 Locarno Treaties, Germany officially recognised its western frontiers with 
Belgium and France and agreed to maintain the Rhineland demilitarised.790  
Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, Germany largely adhered to 
Versailles, albeit regularly asking for its revision. In the first years of Hitler‟s 
chancellorship, the Nazi regime sought the revisions of the peace treaties 
peacefully just as the Weimar Republic had done previously; hence Germany was 
not immediately perceived as a threat to French security. What is more, Robert J. 
Young writes, „in the early years of power the Nazis were no more capable of 
waging full-scale war than the last Weimar government which they had 
succeeded‟.791 Christian Leitz corroborates Young‟s view as he states, „In 1933 ... 
Germany was not even in a position to win a war against its despised eastern 
neighbour, Poland, let alone against its arch-enemy, France.‟792 The latter was 
hopeful that the restrictions imposed on the German army as well as the collective 
security system on which it relied for much of the 1920s and 1930s would suffice 
to control Germany.  
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But as the Nazi regime began to transform Germany„s economy and society 
in order to prepare for territorial expansion and war, Hitler‟s military and foreign 
policy became steadily bolder.793 Using the French parliament‟s ratification vote of 
the Franco-Soviet pact as a pretext, German troops entered the Rhineland on 7 
March 1936. By posting troops in the demilitarised zone Germany violated not only 
the Locarno treaty but also affirmed its intention to annul Versailles and regain 
some of its pre-1918 military and territorial status.794 As Peter Jackson writes, it 
also signalled „the end of the clandestine phase of German rearmament.‟795 The 
French ambassador to Berlin recommended that France should strongly resist „le 
fait accompli délibérément créé par le gouvernement allemand‟ and that Hitler 
„devrait être signifié dans les plus brefs délais ... que la dignité de la France lui 
interdit d‟engager avec lui une négociation sous les pressions militaires‟.796 Albert 
Sarraut, the French Premier who initially proclaimed in a radio broadcast speech, 
„Nous ne laisserons pas Strasbourg sous le feu des canons ennemis‟, decided to 
respond to Hitler‟s military feat merely with a letter of protest and by referring the 
matter to the League of Nations. France was to react with equal feebleness when 
Germany annexed Austria two years later.  
France‟s decision not to act militarily against Germany does not signify that 
it appreciated neither the political consequences of the situation nor the 
implications to its own security. Nor does it imply, as some historians have argued, 
that France did not possess adequate leadership or was fundamentally incapable 
of conducting foreign policy in a determined manner.797 Since it is not the purpose 
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of this study to discuss historiographical interpretations of French foreign affairs in 
the interwar period, suffice it to say that after the Rhineland coup, France 
embarked on a resolute course of remilitarisation beginning with Blum‟s 
nationalisation of the armament industry in August 1936. As Martin Alexander 
notes, „the Popular Front set the foundations to do more for guns than for 
butter.‟798 Although in all probability the Popular Front did more for butter than 
guns, Alexander‟s claim is broadly sound. The Popular Front did indeed initiate 
France‟s military rearmament after years of financial cutbacks. Similarly, the 
Popular Front‟s foreign policy resolutely focused on Germany.799   
Following his feat in Austria, which occurred just as France was embroiled 
in a serious political and financial crisis in March 1938, Hitler began to encourage 
the German minority in the Czechoslovakia‟s Sudeten region to make separatist 
demands.800 After months of concerted diplomatic efforts between the Soviet 
Union, France, Britain, Italy, Germany and other east European countries, the 
Sudeten crisis as it became known was resolved in Munich on 30 September 
1938.801 There, France, Italy, Britain and Germany signed an agreement that 
allowed Hitler to take possession of the Sudetenland region and signified the 
dismemberment of one of France‟s key allies. The Munich agreement was to have 
a divisive effect on French and Mosellan politics.  
At the national level, divisions over the Munich agreement cut across 
parties and split the French political class between pro- and anti-Munich 
supporters (munichois and antimunichois). The first, who considered themselves 
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pacifists, were generally but not exclusively found on the right. By combining a 
genuine fear of war and a visceral loathing of Communism and the Soviet Union, 
which they blamed for trying to instigate a war between France and Germany, the 
right-wing munichois included the Parti Populaire Français, the Fédération 
Républicaine and the Alliance Démocratique. A few notable exceptions included 
Georges Mandel, Paul Reynaud and François de Wendel. De Wendel criticised 
the right-wing appeasers for their inability to differentiate between the internal and 
external threats facing France and for their obsession with Communism. As he 
wrote in his diary the day before the Munich agreement was signed,  
Il y a actuellement un danger bolchevique intérieur et un danger 
allemand extérieur. Pour moi, le second est plus grand que le 
premier et je désapprouve nettement ceux qui règlent leur attitude 
sur la conception inverse. Il ne tient qu‟à la France elle-même 
d‟échapper au bolchévisme. Le danger allemand est là, à côté de 
nous, et nous n‟y pouvons rien...802  
The Parti Social Français‟ official position was as was often the case 
ambiguous. At the party‟s national congress in December 1938, Ybarnégaray 
summarised the official position on Munich: „Pour les accords de Munich parce 
que dans la situation où se trouvait la France, il était impossible de faire 
autrement. Contre … parce qu‟ils constituent une profonde défaite 
diplomatique.‟803 Within the Popular Front, the majority of the CGT, the SFIO and 
the Radical-Socialist party supported appeasement.  
The anti-munichois, who supported military action against Germany and 
whom the pro-Munich supporters considered bellicose, included the PCF, 
members of the SFIO and the CGT, some Radicals such as Jean Zay and Pierre 
Cot and parts of the Parti Démocrate Populaire behind Champetier de Ribes. 
Thus, having to choose between peace and war on the one side, and fascism and 
anti-Communism on the other, French politicians faced a choice that led to 
divisions across the traditional left-right divide. It is interesting to note that while 
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the methods and ideology of the two opposing camps differed, with some 
favouring appeasement and others persuasive military action, they shared a 
common objective: the long-term preservation of peace by keeping Germany 
under control.  
There is a consensus among historians that Munich sounded the death-
knell for the Popular Front. As the three coalition parties disagreed over Munich, 
differences of opinion eroded the already fragile unity of the Popular Front as well 
as the internal unity of the constituent parties. Additionally, by unanimously voting 
against Munich in parliament, the PCF excluded itself from the coalition and gave 
Daladier the impetus to renounce the Popular Front at the October 1938 Radical 
party congress in Marseille.  Thus, when the CGT called for a general strike on 30 
November, with the aim of opposing Reynaud‟s recent decrees as well as the 
government‟s appeasement policy towards Germany, Daladier was prepared to 
force the labour movement to evacuate the occupied factories. Ironically, while the 
idea of a united left was born in the wake of a general strike in February 1934, it 
ended in the wake of another, albeit unsuccessful general strike four years later. 
Moreover, while the Popular Front was borne of a domestic antifascist imperative, 
it ended largely because of its inability to remain united in the face of the foreign 
fascist threat; firstly with the divisions over Spain and lastly with Germany. Thus, 
Moscow‟s strategy of the popular front, which aimed to contain the European 
fascist threat, collapsed when the PCF entered opposition and the French left 
became disunited again.  
Due to its common borders with Germany, the Moselle witnessed the rise of 
the German threat at first hand. A few weeks before the Saarland plebiscite of 13 
January 1935, the sous-préfet in Sarreguemines, wrote that,  
Les événements qui préoccupent actuellement le plus l‟opinion 
publique sont évidemment les événements sarrois. Quelques 
inquiétude (sic) s‟étaient manifesté (sic) en Novembre à ce sujet et 
nombreux étaient ceux qui craignaient un coup de force des 
hitlériens.804 
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After 90 percent of Saarlanders voted for the return of their province to the 
German fatherland and less than 0.5 percent voted for unification with France, the 
Moselle gained an additional frontier with Germany.805 Hitler‟s speech after the 
plebiscite stated that he was fully satisfied at the results and that he only sought a 
peaceful resolution to the wrongs inflicted on Germany at Versailles.806 In secret, 
however, events, as seen from the Moselle, contradicted Hitler‟s public 
expressions of peace and reconciliation.  
Indeed, eighteen months after the Saarland‟s return to German domination, 
a commissaire spécial noted that Germany had already begun militarising the 
region and Nazifying the local population.807 According to his report, the Reich was 
slowly increasing the number of troops in the Palatinate region by sending soldiers 
in increments of twenty at a time so as not to attract attention. It also reported the 
presence of military trenches disguised as shallow ditches along the French 
borders, the installation of anti-aircraft guns in Saarbrucken and Saarlouis and the 
construction of a landing field near Saarbrucken. It then described the replacement 
of SS troops sent on military training by feldgendarmes and the regular rounds of 
watchful SA men near the French frontier village of Blies-Guersviller. The 
commissaire spécial concluded his report by mentioning the much-publicised visit 
of Werner Von Blomberg, the Reich‟s minister of War and Field Marshall, to the 
Saarland and the Palatinate. With regards to the Nazification of society, he 
described how the Nazi party organised regular propaganda parades in the region. 
He estimated a 40,000-strong turnout during a recent Nazi-sponsored singing 
festival in Saarbrucken.   
As the German threat became more and more perceptible in the Moselle, 
the local population became increasingly anxious. The préfet reported, „Les 
raisons d‟intérêt et d‟inquiétude sont plutôt venues de la situation internationale et 
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plus spécialement de la … politique extérieure allemande.‟808 Despite what the 
préfet called „la naturelle et profonde méfiance à l‟égard de l‟Allemagne … dans 
cette région frontière‟, it appeared that Mosellans approved France‟s appeasement 
policy towards Germany.809 As he wrote, „l‟idée d‟une détente dans les relations 
franco-allemandes commence à trouver audience et apparaît comme le seul 
moyen possible d‟écarter la menace de conflit.‟810 One of the chief reasons behind 
the Moselle‟ desire for appeasement seemed to have stemmed from its political 
inclination. Indeed, as anti-Communism pervaded conservative society and 
political parties, it appears that Mosellans, like right-wing Munich supporters at the 
national level, worried more of a French alliance with the Soviet Union than a 
conciliatory approach towards Germany. The préfet‟s interpretation supports this 
theory, as he wrote, „L‟hostilité des partis de droite à l‟égard d‟une politique 
d‟alliance avec la Russie soviétique ... semble avoir beaucoup contribué à … 
réviser [la] position traditionnelle en face du problème allemand‟.811  
This is particularly revealing of the region‟s political shift in the mid-1930s 
when the Soviet Union and Communism replaced Germany as the prime threat to 
Mosellan security. As mentioned earlier in this study, by exacerbating the 
ideological rift between left and right and bringing national politics to the Moselle, 
the Popular Front forced the population to identify within a wider national political 
context. The fact that Mosellans now favoured a rapprochement with Germany 
reflects the deep-seated fear and loathing of Communism in the region. It also 
demonstrated that Mosellans were willing to risk domination by Germany in order 
to avoid the suspected Communist revolution and a European war which, as many 
right wingers thought, was promoted by Moscow. It also reveals, to some extent, 
the influence of pacifism on the French and Mosellan conservatives.  
Once a tenet of left-wing ideology as well as French foreign policy in the 
second half of the 1920s, pacifism was widely adopted by conservatives in the 
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1930s.812 For example, Pierre Laval‟s foreign policy as the minister of Foreign 
Affairs in 1934-1935 was largely driven by his loathing and fear of war.813 The 
same may be said of some Mosellan political leaders such as Schuman. As Roth 
writes in his recent biography of Schuman, „Ce qui motivait Schuman [dans les 
affaires internationales] c‟était la conservation de la paix.‟814 As the Czechoslovak 
crisis progressed and war appeared all but inevitable, the Mosellan Catholic right 
generally advocated peace and conciliation with Germany. A few days after 
Daladier called for the army‟s partial mobilisation, Schuman led the delegation of 
Mosellan and Alsatian parliamentarians to a meeting with Daladier. The Mosellan 
deputy warned Daladier that should the latter decide to call for general 
mobilisation and declare war on Germany, the group of parliamentarians he 
represented would refuse to vote for war credits at the National Assembly.815 A 
few days before, Schuman had written an article in Die Lothringer Volkszeitung 
against launching a war for the benefit of Czechoslovakia. Supported by legalistic 
arguments, Schuman, a qualified lawyer, wrote that should France decide not to 
rush to Czechoslovakia‟s help and let Hitler acquire the Sudeten region, the 
country would not breach any contract.816  
In December, after Munich had been signed and ratified by the French 
parliament, the Moselle‟s right-wing deputies unanimously voted in favour of the 
motion of confidence in the Daladier government.817 Thus, they demonstrated their 
public approval of Daladier‟s foreign as well as domestic policies. Because Béron 
did not participate in the vote, it is difficult to tell how the sole Mosellan 
representative of the Popular Front interpreted Munich. A few days before Hitler 
invaded what remained of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, the local right‟s position 
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towards Germany was unchanged. At a public meeting in Sierck-lès-Bains, a 
village in his constituency and close to the German and Luxembourger frontiers, 
Schuman declared, in the préfet‟s words, „combien il fut humain et même prudent 
de ne pas être intervenu par les armes dans le conflit tchécoslovaque.‟818 He told 
his audience that France was now much better prepared militarily and politically 
should a conflict with Germany arise. In order to reassure the population, he cited 
as examples the alliance with Britain and the restoration of social order in France. 
With regards to the position of the Moselle in France‟s military strategy, he 
mentioned some of the measures that would be taken in the case of war. For 
example, the population living in the red zone – the area between the Maginot Line 
fortifications and the German and Luxembourger borders - would be evacuated 
and given gas masks, mayors and their secretaries would remain to assist military 
authorities and all motorised vehicles would be requisitioned and distributed to the 
evacuation commissions. Schuman nonetheless concluded by repeating that there 
was no danger of a war against Germany.819  
Schuman may have spoken for most Mosellan parliamentarians. 
Unfortunately, due to a severe lack of sources, too little is known of their attitudes. 
What remains unclear is why Mosellan Catholics supported appeasement with a 
regime which had forced German Catholics into a restrictive Concordat and which 
terrorised and sent thousands to concentration camps. According to Bonafoux-
Verrax, the Fédération Nationale Catholique was aware of the treatment of 
Catholics in Germany. She quotes an article in La France Catholique in May 1938; 
„Les camps de concentration sont peuplés d‟innombrables jeunesses catholiques 
... les sévices que les jeunes gens y subissent provoquent notre dégoût.‟820 Unlike 
Jean-Claude Delbreil who argues that the Fédération Nationale Catholique was 
pro- and later anti-munichoise, Bonafoux-Verrax argues that the Catholic 
association‟s position on Munich resembled that of the Parti Social Français: 
General de Castelnau, the leader of the Fédération Nationale Catholique, was 
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neither for or against Munich but urged for a rapid remilitarisation as the issue was 
not if France would go to war against Germany but rather when. Unfortunately, 
there are no sources on the positions of the Action Catholique Lorraine or the 
other local right-wing political parties.  
In all likelihood, local right wingers would have followed the orders of their 
respective parties. In the name of the Parti Social Français, Emile Peter, the 
deputy for Sarrebourg, was neither pro- or anti-munichois but advocated the 
creation of a central body to oversee the much-needed rise in the production of 
armament.821 Judging by Andres‟ infallible loyalty to de la Rocque, it is highly 
probable that the Mosellan leader of the Parti Social Français followed the party‟s 
official same line, which was neither for nor against Munich. The same could be 
said of the Parti Populaire Français though too little is known of its local leadership 
and the direction of the sections. On the left, local Socialists‟ reaction and the 
ensuing divisions that split the national party between and pro- and anti-Munichois 
remains unknown. So far as the PCF was concerned, local Communists applied 
the party‟s line and rejected Munich. Thus, as at the national level, Germany and 
Munich divided politicians in forcing them to choose between peace and war.  
 
Xenophobia and antisemitism  
One of the paradoxical effects that occurred within the context of the Popular Front 
and the ascension of Nazi Germany was the rise of antisemitism in Mosellan 
politics. Indeed, while the Popular Front was created to fight the far right, some of 
the latter‟s world views, such as antisemitism, appeared to have permeated 
mainstream politics and society during the coalition‟s four years.  
Antisemitism in Mosellan politics did not emerge as a direct result of the 
left-wing coalition victory in 1936, since it already existed with the openly 
antisemitic Action Française and the Francistes. In September 1936, a group of 
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unidentified people covered the homes of Jews with racist tracts in 
Sarreguemines.822 In March 1937, some members of the Mosellan Catholic clergy 
demonstrated their antisemitism by supporting the clearly antisemitic speech of the 
editor of the Colmar-based Elsasser Kurier. Indeed, during a meeting of the Action 
Catholique Lorraine in Sarreguemines, the editor of the newspaper condemned 
the presence of Jews in the government. According to a commissaire spécial, he 
proclaimed that the population of Alsace and Lorraine would never accept that 
„cette race qui ne représente même pas 2% de la population de la France ... nous 
impose sa loi.‟823 The 450-strong audience who attended the meeting and who 
comprised largely local clergymen, including Sarreguemines‟ archpriest evidently 
welcomed the racist remarks since they gave the speaker a long applause.   
By the end of 1938, antisemites attacked Jews on racial and cultural 
grounds and increasingly for economic reasons. As Jewish refugees, mainly from 
the Saarland, began to settle in the département, anti-Jewish diatribes based on 
economic and racial grounds became commonplace among certain social and 
political classes. On the right, a group of artisans and small shop owners created 
the Front Anti-juif de la Moselle in November 1938. Based in the centre of Metz, 
the committee of the Front Anti-juif included a greengrocer as president, Rodolphe 
Leuner, and a goods salesman as vice-president, Eugène Hoffmann.824 The 
organisation‟s aim, as quoted by Philippe Wilmouth, was to „sauvegarder les 
intérêts des commerçants et artisans français contre l‟invasion des Juifs immigrés 
… qui causent un préjudice sensible aux commerçants et artisans de notre 
département‟.825  
Whereas the majority of the French political right almost certainly held racial 
and cultural prejudices against Jews whom they associated with Communism, 
Blum and a worldwide complot, the Mosellan Front Anti-juif viewed them 
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differently. It mainly described Jews as foreigners who had come to the Moselle to 
steal work from Christian Frenchmen. In fact, the Front Anti-juif accepted any 
Socialist, Communist, Autonomist or right winger as long as they were prepared to 
eradicate the département of Jews. With an approximately 1,700-strong 
membership in Metz alone, the movement also counted supporters in Thionville, 
Boulay, Sarreguemines and Hagondange.826 It published a bi-monthly newspaper, 
La Rafale Anti-Juive, which, according to Wilmouth, took its inspiration from 
national antisemitic newspapers such as Gringoire and L‟Action Française. 
Unfortunately for this study, sources pertaining to the Front Anti-juif are sparse. 
Therefore it has not been possible to learn of its relation or influence on the local 
political right and population.  
However antisemitism based on economic grounds did not emanate solely 
from disaffected middle-class shop owners or artisans, but also involved some on 
the left. The préfet, however, expressed surprise to learn of antisemitism among 
local Communists. As he wrote in a report,  
un phénomène curieux vient de se produire particulièrement au sein 
de la section de Metz … : l‟animosité qui entoure quelques uns des 
dirigeants de confession israélite, paraît s‟inspirer d‟une sorte 
d‟antisémitisme...827  
 
In a subsequent report, he wrote that the internal crisis befalling the départemental 
federation of the PCF was due to a lack of leadership and funds as well as the 
recent upsurge of xenophobia and antisemitism among the rank and file.  As he 
wrote,  
le parti communiste traversait une crise très pénible. Crises de 
cadres et d‟effectif…. [ainsi que] de très sérieuses difficultés 
financières. Ce marasme … s‟accompagne … aussi à une tendance 
qu‟il est curieux, a mon sens, d‟enregistrer dans de tels milieux et qui 
est faite à la fois de xénophobie et d‟antisémitisme.828 
 
The local SFIO appeared just as affected, as some of its rank and file harboured 
similar feelings towards one of their Jewish leaders. As the préfet noted,  
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l‟erreur commise récemment par la Fédération départementale du 
Parti socialiste S.F.I.O. en déléguant [au Congres national du parti] à 
Royan un naturalisé de fraîche date, M. Konopnicki, a soulevé 
l‟amertume de tous les militants et sympathisants, qui ont déploré … 
que l‟intéressé … ait pu prendre place dans un congrès national, au 
nom des populations françaises de la Lorraine.829  
It is not clear to what extent the Socialist and Communist rank and file‟s 
antisemitic feelings influenced the party‟s direction or even if they led to divisions 
within the local federations. It is true that on the face of it, left-wing antisemitism 
might appear inconsistent with the Socialist and Communist doctrines – even if in 
nineteenth-century France some theorists of Socialism such as Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon and Auguste Blanqui identified Jewish capitalists and usurers as 
enemies of the working masses. But the form of antisemitism witnessed among 
left-wingers in interwar France had nothing to do with doctrine and everything to 
do with the escalation of xenophobia and racism that occurred in French society 
and politics in the late 1930s. This arose in part from the recent influx of refugees, 
mainly Spanish, Italian, German and East-European, who arrived in France during 
the period of the Popular Front.830  
With regards to the PCF, Michael Marrus and Robert Paxton state that the 
leadership of the PCF „considered antisemitism a bourgeois diversion tactic‟ and 
„although many militants were unhappy about immigrants ... the party‟s hands, 
officially, were clean.‟831 Vicky Caron agrees with this theory and adds an 
economic dimension to the PCF‟s antisemitism as she writes that „much of the 
rank and file was openly anti-semitic, fearing economic competition from Jewish 
immigrant workers.‟832 While the Socialist leadership rejected antisemitism and 
condemned the Nazis‟ attacks on the Reich‟s Jews on Kristallnacht, some within 
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the party publicised their dislike of Blum and Jews in general.833 Ralph Schor 
quotes the example of Armand Chouffet, Socialist deputy for the Rhone, who 
exclaimed, „J‟en ai assez de la dictature juive sur le parti. Le socialisme n‟est pas 
un ghetto. Je ne marche pas, moi, pour la guerre juive.‟834  
Marrus and Paxton are correct when they state that „French antisemitism 
was no mere import, a hothouse plant artificially nurtured by German secret 
funds.‟835 The authors argue that 1930s xenophobia and antisemitism in France 
were linked to the recent influx of foreigners, including Jews, and the threat the 
latter represented culturally, economically and politically to French natives. They 
also claim that xenophobia and the situation for Jews worsened in 1938 when 
France operated a crackdown on foreigners.836 This was undeniably true for 
France in general. But due to the Moselle‟s shared border with Germany, could the 
escalation of antisemitism in the département be the result of Nazi influence? 
Goodfellow argues that a number of Alsatian political organisations such as 
the Bauernbund, the Parti Social Français and the Catholic Union Populaire 
Républicaine (the political heir of the Elsass-Lothringisches Zentrum and 
counterpart of the Moselle‟s Union Républicaine Lorraine) were influenced by Nazi 
antisemitism.837 While the Moselle‟s political character differed from that of Alsace 
at many levels – the most noticeable examples being the popularity of pro-German 
autonomist ideas in Alsace and their near absence in the Moselle – it is tempting 
to posit that the Nazi antisemitic propaganda extended to the département and 
contributed to the development of xenophobia.   
While the préfet underscored the general emergence of antisemitism in his 
département and its association with foreign propagandists posing as refugees, 
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the causal relations between Nazism and xenophobia in the Moselle are not clear. 
The préfet wrote that the antisemitic contagion affecting the Mosellan sections of 
the PCF „souligne toute la virulence d‟une tendance devenue générale en ces 
régions.‟838 He also added that the contagion „semble atteindre les classes les plus 
diverses de la société et ne laisse pas d‟inquiéter les chefs des Consistoires 
[israélites]‟.839 While it was clear to him that the recent arrival of foreign refugees 
wrongfully claiming refugee status was responsible for the propagation of 
antisemitic ideas in the Moselle, he did not specifically blame German influence in 
his report. As for Marrus and Paxton, they point out the secret activities of German 
secret agents in neighbouring Alsace, but do not state whether these activities 
extended to the Moselle. Thus, the Moselle‟s relationship with Nazi agents and the 
extent to which the département‟s social and political arena were influenced by 
German propaganda remains unclear.  
 
Conclusion 
During the Radical-Socialist annual congress in Marseille in late October 1938, 
party delegates agreed that the Communists‟ attacks against Daladier effectively 
signalled the end of the Popular Front. Blaming the coalition‟s breakdown on the 
Communists, a motion voted at the congress stated,  
le parti communiste, par l‟agitation qu‟il entretient à travers le Pays, 
par les difficultés qu‟il a créées aux gouvernements qui se sont 
succédés depuis 1936, par son opposition agressive et injurieuse de 
ces derniers mois a rompu la solidarité qu‟il l‟unissait aux autres 
partis du Rassemblement Populaire.840 
 
A few days later, the Radical-Socialists and the Socialists left the national 
committee of the Rassemblement Populaire, thus leaving the Communists at the 
head of a phantom coalition. Why did the PCF remain committed to the Popular 
Front after being abandoned by its old allies? According to Courtois and Lazar, the 
                                            
 
838
 ADBR, Rapport mensuel du préfet au ministre de l‟Intérieur, Metz, 2 mai 1938, 98AL634.   
839
 Ibid. 
840
 CHSPo, Genebrier papers, „Le Front Populaire‟, nd, signé Genebrier, GE5. 
276 
 
French Communist leadership genuinely believed that the antifascist axis 
supported by the Soviet Union would thrive again in France. They write of Thorez‟s 
euphoria and optimism before the Central Committee in May 1939:  
gommant les déchirures apparues en octobre et novembre 1938, il 
en appelle à nouveau à la ronde de la paix capable d‟empêcher les 
agresseurs fascistes d‟atteindre leurs buts et à la constitution d‟un 
gouvernement de défense nationale et de salut public...841 
Without a doubt, domestic events such as the Clichy riots and the 
Communists‟ refusal to accept Daladier‟s repudiation of the 40-hour week 
legislation deepened divisions that gradually eroded the unity of the Popular Front. 
As Daladier managed to restore the old social order by defeating the labour 
movement led by the CGT, French right wingers largely supported his policies. 
Paradoxically, Daladier, who would receive full legislative powers with the support 
of the right in March 1939, was the same man whom the right had forced to resign 
in February 1934. But the right‟s inability to unite throughout the period of the 
Popular Front and particularly under the banner of the Front de la Liberté reveals 
deep personal and party divisions as well as a clear lack of direction.  
In the Moselle, the right organised the opposition to Blum‟s school reform 
for political ends. It is clear that compared to the unplanned demonstrations of 
1924, there was very little popular reaction against Blum‟s reforms in 1936-1937. 
This indicates a disjunction between right-wing politicians and the conservative 
masses. But it also demonstrates the local politicians‟ unwillingness to accept 
some of the Republic‟s secular laws and their belief in particularist politics. 
Mirroring the national right‟s inability to form alliances, local conservatives had 
difficulty uniting. Despite the union of the right in an anti-Marxist front at the 1937 
local elections, Mosellan right wingers never succeeded in creating what the left 
had achieved with the Popular Front. Political rivalry between the Front Lorrain 
and the Parti Social Français was by far the main source of contention.  
But it was foreign policy, and the German issue in particular, that 
undermined the Popular Front and brought the return of the right. By the time the 
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government began to prepare France for a conflict against Germany, Daladier felt 
he had to control the labour movement, achieve social peace and attract capital 
back into the country. Only if France was at peace with itself, could it then be 
united in the joint effort of remilitarisation and war. As he declared in a speech: „La 
Paix à l‟intérieur condition de la Paix au dehors, voilà ce que nous voulons.‟842 The 
fact that this sentence echoed Metz‟s official motto to this day: „Si nous avons Paix 
dedans, nous avons Paix dehors‟, reflected the conservative character of the 
region. In the Moselle, Schuman and the other right-wing parliamentarians largely 
supported Daladier‟s foreign policy and the Munich agreement. Although Schuman 
rejected war largely on pacifist grounds, it is possible that the ideological 
reasoning that led many French right wingers to believe that Moscow was 
attempting to foment a war between France and Germany might also have 
influenced him. Similarly, within the context of the end of the Popular Front, 
Mosellans appear to have contributed to the general attitude of xenophobia and 
antisemitism that prevailed in France in the late 1930s. This led some of the 
Communist and Socialist rank and file to reject their Jewish party leaders. 
Interestingly, while the Popular Front was born of an antifascist imperative, it also 
contributed to the resurgence of racism and xenophobia, thus deepening the 
divisions that already existed in French society and politics, and not least in the 
Moselle.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis has examined the dual political, linguistic and cultural heritage and 
well-organised political clergy in the border region of the Moselle, and the 
successes and failures of the right in the highly charged atmosphere of the 
Popular Front. By focusing upon the relationship between the Catholic Union 
Républicaine Lorraine and its associates (Front Lorrain and Action Catholique 
Lorraine) and other right-wing political groups, mainly the Parti Social Français, the 
thesis has underscored the effect of the national political and social crisis upon 
local left-wing as well as right-wing political parties. It has examined the 
achievements and difficulties of the French and Mosellan right and demonstrated 
how local conservatives reacted to (a) the social and political change introduced 
by the Popular Front and (b) the implementation of right-wing national political 
parties in the region. In doing so, the thesis has described how the local right 
responded to the challenge by organising an anti-Communist bloc which however 
failed to unite the region‟s conservative forces in an effective alliance. Despite 
sharing common moral and social values, not least anti-Communism and the 
preservation of social order, it failed to do so for political and personal reasons, 
much like its counterpart at the national level.  
On the left, the working class masses united in the Popular Front and 
challenged the established social order. They developed a new political and social 
identity, which, in the Moselle, led to the workers‟ participation in the strike 
movement of 1936 and the rapid rise of the CGT. The fact that a new generation 
of Mosellans born after 1918 came of age in a period of heightened tensions 
between left and right also contributed to the integration of workers into national 
left-wing politics. But, with the rise of the German threat and Daladier‟s new 
economic and social policies as well as his determination to break the labour 
movement, many Mosellans retreated from organised political and social 
movements or turned to less radical parties such as the SFIO and the Union 
Républicaine Lorraine. Thus, the thesis concludes that while, by the end of 1938, a 
large proportion of Mosellans remained largely conservative, a smaller section 
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located in the region‟s industrial centres participated, albeit briefly, in the national 
movement of left-wing activism which developed in the period of the Popular Front.  
A Border Region 
The first conclusion of this thesis is that the region‟s position at the border of two 
historic European powers largely influenced its inclination towards particularist and 
conservative politics. Situated between two great nations, both of which claimed 
ownership of the territory, the disputed region underwent a repetitive cycle of 
military conquest and occupation and changed sovereignty three times between 
1870 and 1918. When the Germans acquired the eastern part of Lorraine and 
attached it to the region of Alsace to form the Reichsland in 1871, they fabricated 
Alsace-Lorraine, a province devoid of political, social, linguistic or cultural 
homogeneity. Unlike other German lands which enjoyed some form of legislative 
and executive autonomy, the Reichsland was treated differently and remained 
under the direct authority of the Kaiser. Because it rejected Germany‟s cultural and 
political domination as well as that of Alsace, with which it had no historic and 
cultural bonds, Lothringen therefore looked inwards and constructed a regional 
and political identity distinct from that of Germany, France and Alsace. Though it 
accepted subordination to the national state, it favoured a particularist approach 
which mobilised the population into political action in defence of their distinct 
linguistic, religious and cultural traditions.  
The main architect and beneficiary of this particular identity was the 
Catholic right, which mobilised the population‟s discontent against the German 
state before 1918 and the French thereafter. By the interwar period, the Catholic 
right was represented by the Union Républicaine Lorraine and the Christlich-
Soziale Partei. As it had done during the period of the Reischland, the leadership 
of both parties did not hesitate to question and challenge the central state 
whenever it threatened the region‟s local laws and culture; hence their success 
among the Mosellan voters who watched anxiously as they changed sovereignty 
once more. As historiography on disputed territories has demonstrated, 
particularist politics are by no means unusual in borderlands and irredentist lands. 
In a recent study of ethnic conflict management in borderlands, the political 
280 
 
scientist Stefan Wolff uses the case of the Reichsland and Alsace to exemplify his 
theories. As he states, political particularism, represented in interwar Alsace by the 
Union Populaire Républicaine, was successful because it expressed „the distinct 
Alsatian identity that had developed over the centuries and gave Alsatians a sense 
of community and feeling of solidarity beyond class and ideological borders.‟843 
Though the Moselle developed a different political character to that of Alsace, le 
particularisme mosellan, which permeated interwar Mosellan politics, was also the 
result of a distinctive historical context that cultivated a sense of belonging, 
solidarity and a common past among the population.  
The Right  
The second conclusion of the thesis is that, despite their participation in national 
politics, Mosellan right wingers and the Metz notables in particular were still firmly 
grounded in their particularist roots. The Union Républicaine Lorraine‟s 
parliamentarians belonged to the groups of the Fédération Républicaine, the Parti 
Démocrate Populaire, the Parti Social Français, the Indépendants Républicains 
and the Indépendants d‟Action Populaire at the National Assembly and the 
Senate. It is true that the Fédération Républicaine, which was particularly 
successful in neighbouring Meurthe-et-Moselle where many Mosellans chose to 
live after 1871, never crossed the borders of the Moselle. But Marin‟s party 
financed the electoral campaign of a number of Union Républicaine Lorraine 
deputies and senators such as Sérot, Moncelle and Hirschauer in exchange for 
their adhesion to his parliamentary group.844  
What is more, in spite of  its particularist traditions and the fact that its 
culture was rooted in a different context to that of the French right, the Union 
Républicaine Lorraine and the associated Front Lorrain behaved like the majority 
of French conservatives in the interwar period: they were divided and associated 
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with the anti-parliamentarian right against the Popular Front. They combated the 
left and campaigned for trade unions opposed to the godless CGT. Like their 
national peers, local conservatives attempted to form alliances against the 
Communists. Like them, they failed to do so largely for political reasons.  
But despite these similarities, the Mosellan right was fundamentally a 
regional force. Unlike parties such as the Parti Social Français and the Fédération 
Républicaine, it did not take its orders from Paris and was run by local notables 
who, for the most part, had entered politics when the region was under German 
domination. Thus, while participating in the national movement that challenged the 
Popular Front, the PCF and the CGT, the Union Républicaine Lorraine and its 
associates also resisted the nationalisation of local politics. Individuals such as 
Ritz exemplified this duality. He supported the Meurthe-et-Mosellan anti-
Communist Rassemblement National Lorrain but never formally adhered to it. 
Instead he promoted the Front Lorrain at the départemental level. Other right-wing 
politicians in the département displayed a similar attitude. As mentioned in chapter 
Five, the Metz municipal councillors who resigned from the Parti Social Français 
did so because they refused the diktat imposed by Paris. Instead, they favoured 
the local notables‟ decisions, even if it meant supporting a candidate from the rival 
Parti Populaire Français. 
The Popular Front 
The third conclusion of the thesis is that despite the right‟s counter-offensive and 
the left‟s history of failures in the Moselle, the Popular Front gave Mosellan 
workers the opportunity to participate in a collective movement with national and 
international ramifications. Because of the turbulent domestic and international 
context, the period of the Popular Front marked the culmination of the 
radicalisation of French politics and their polarisation between left and right. In the 
Moselle this polarisation led the working masses to join the national labour 
movement in unprecedented numbers, and to look beyond the boundaries of their 
region and identify themselves with the wider national political scene. The 1919 
strikes, which Millerand described as an expression of linguistic favouritism in 
favour of native German and dialect- speakers, gave a good indication of the 
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priorities of Mosellan workers in the immediate post-war period. They also 
revealed the importance of linguistic and cultural factors in the shaping of the 
workers‟ identity: on the one side the Français de l‟Intérieur who did not 
understand local customs and could only communicate in French, and on the other 
the indigenous workers who felt threatened by the arrival of French workers. This 
division between French speakers and German or dialect speakers facilitated to 
some extent the development of the Autonomist movement and the PCF‟s 
separatist agenda in the 1920s.  
By contrast, the 1936 strikes showed Mosellan workers under a different 
light as they mobilised in a national socio-political movement. By and large, those 
who participated in the movement did not contest the presence of Français de 
l‟Intérieur or asked recognition for their particular roots and traditions. In the coal-
mining canton of Forbach, local supporters of the Popular Front even demanded 
that their participation in the national movement be officially acknowledged. As a 
sign of gratitude for Blum‟s role in the Matignon agreements, they telegraphed the 
Premier asking permission to change the name of their town from Stiring-Wendel – 
a mining town built by the de Wendels - to Stiring-Jaurès.845 That a community 
located at the heart of the German-speaking part of the département 
communicated with one of France‟s historic Socialist leaders indicates a certain 
shift in the way some perceived France. Other factors such as the economic crisis 
and the fact that by 1936-1938 a new generation of Mosellans had come of age 
under French domination should not be ignored. Though little is known of the 
combined effect of these two factors on the shaping of local politics, they certainly 
played an important role in the definition of the workers‟ new identity.   
 
The challenge for every historian is to offer an impartial yet critical view of 
their subject. The study of the Popular Front in France is doubly challenging as it 
remains a highly ideologically- and emotionally-charged symbol of the political and 
social tensions in the country. Even today, it occupies an important place in the 
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French collective memory and reflects the divisions which to some extent continue 
to define French politics and society between left and right. The former, the Parti 
Socialiste (PS) and the PCF in particular, declare they are the Popular Front‟s 
direct descendants and claim credit for the 1936 social laws (paid holidays and the 
40-hour week). At the 2008 national congress of the French Socialist party in 
Reims, Ségolène Royal, the Socialist party‟s candidate in the 2007 presidential 
elections, declared that the time had come to create a new Popular Front to 
overcome the left‟s current difficulties and defeat the right. As she suggested to 
Bertrand Delanoë, the Socialist mayor of Paris, „Un nouveau Front populaire, ça 
ne vous tente pas?‟ More recently, Marie-Georges Buffet, the current leader of the 
PCF, created a new coalition that sought to gather all the forces of the left. The 
coalition, called the Front de Gauche, claims its descendance from the Popular 
Front.  
Generally speaking, the right has still not forgiven the left, combined within 
the Popular Front, for the humiliation of the strikes and the Matignon agreements. 
There are some right wingers, however, who do not hesitate to claim they are the 
heirs of the Popular Front. During his campaign for the 2007 presidential elections, 
Nicolas Sarkozy, the leader of the right-wing Union pour un Mouvement Populaire 
(UMP) declared, „La droite d‟aujourd‟hui [a] … le droit de revendiquer l‟héritage 
des conquêtes sociales du Front Populaire‟.846 Sarkozy‟s fifteen-point electoral 
programme was entitled „Ensemble tout devient possible‟, a clear reference to 
Marceau Pivert‟s famous article „Tout est Possible‟, published by the Socialist 
leader at the height of the strike movement in May 1936. Is this a sign that the old 
ideological confrontations that opposed pro- and anti-Popular Front supporters 
have lost meaning for right wingers such as Sarkozy? Judging by the words of 
Jean-Marie Rausch, the right-wing mayor of Metz who claims to be a Schumanien 
and who recently lost his mayoral position to a Socialist after thirty-seven years in 
office, this is highly unlikely. Asked in an interview with the author of this thesis if 
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Metz would hold celebrations to commemorate the seventieth anniversary of the 
Popular Front, Rausch responded, „La ville de Metz n‟organisera pas de 
manifestations pour célèbrer cette victoire de la gauche.‟847 Will the Mosellan 
capital‟s municipal council, which elected a Socialist mayor for the first time in its 
history in 2007, celebrate the eightieth anniversary of the Popular Front in 2016? 
This remains to be seen. It is, however, more than likely that when Metz and the 
Moselle celebrate the centenary of the end of the Great War they will also 
celebrate the province‟s return to French sovereignty. 
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Legislative Election Results – Moselle, 1919-1936 
(in percentage of total votes cast) 
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1919 Union Républicaine Lorraine
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Francaise
51
26
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7
1924 Union Républicaine Lorraine 
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Source: Lachapelle, Elections Législatives du 16 Novembre 1919, Résultats Officiels, pp.233-235; 
Elections Législatives du 11 mai 1924, Résultats Officiels, pp.152-153; Elections Législatives 22-29 
Avril 1928, Résultats Officiels, pp.175-179; Elections Législatives 1
er
 et 8 mai 1932, Résultats 
Officiels, pp.175-179; Elections Législatives 26 avril et 3 mai 1936, Résultats Officiels, pp.166-170. 
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The deputies of the Moselle, 1919-1936 
 
1919 – départemental single-round electoral list ballot (8 deputies) 
Elected candidate Political affiliation 
Charles François Union Républicaine Lorraine  
Guy de Wendel  Union Républicaine Lorraine  
Louis Hackspill Union Républicaine Lorraine  
Jean-Pierre Jean Union Républicaine Lorraine  
Louis de Maud‟huy Union Républicaine Lorraine  
Louis Meyer Union Républicaine Lorraine  
Robert Schuman Union Républicaine Lorraine  
Robert Sérot Union Républicaine Lorraine  
 
1924 - départemental single-round electoral list ballot (8 deputies) 
Elected candidate Political affiliation 
Robert Schuman Union Républicaine Lorraine  
Robert Sérot Union Républicaine Lorraine  
Guy de Wendel Union Républicaine Lorraine  
Louis Meyer Union Républicaine Lorraine  
Charles François Union Républicaine Lorraine  
Edouard Moncelle Union Républicaine Lorraine  
Gaston Louis Union Républicaine Lorraine  
Théodore Paquet Union Républicaine Lorraine  
 
1928 - arrondissement-level two-round single candidate ballot (9 deputies)  
Elected candidate Political affiliation Arrondissement 
Jean Labach Union Républicaine Lorraine Boulay 
Jules Wolff Union Républicaine Démocratique Château-Salins 
Victor Doeblé Bloc Ouvrier et Paysan (PCF) Forbach 
Edouard Moncelle Union Républicaine Démocratique Metz 1 
Robert Sérot Union Républicaine Démocratique Metz 2 
Louis Meyer Union Républicaine Lorraine Sarrebourg 
Henri Nominé Union Républicaine Démocratique Sarreguemines 
Robert Schuman Union Républicaine Lorraine Thionville Est 
Emile Béron Bloc Ouvrier et Paysan (PCF) Thionville Ouest 
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1932 - arrondissement-level two-round single candidate (9 deputies) 
Elected candidate Political affiliation Arrondissement 
Alex Wiltzer Union Républicaine Lorraine Boulay 
Jules Wolff Union Républicaine Démocratique Château-Salins 
Victor Doeblé Indépendant Socialiste (ex-
Communiste) 
Forbach 
Edouard Moncelle Union Républicaine Démocratique  Metz 1 
Robert Sérot Union Républicaine Démocratique Metz 2 
Emile Peter Union Républicaine Lorraine Sarrebourg 
Henri Nominé Union Républicaine Démocratique Sarreguemines 
Robert Schuman Union Républicaine Lorraine-Parti 
Démocrate Populaire 
Thionville Est 
Emile Béron Indépendant Socialiste (ex-
Communiste) 
Thionville Ouest 
 
1936 - arrondissement-level two-round single candidate ballot (9 deputies) 
Elected candidate Political affiliation Arrondissement 
Alex Wiltzer Alliance Démocratique Boulay 
François Beaudoin Parti Agraire et Paysan Français Château-Salins 
Paul Harter Indépendant Conservateur - 
supported by the Croix de Feu 
Forbach 
Edouard Moncelle Union Républicaine Démocratique  Metz 1 
Robert Sérot Union Républicaine Démocratique Metz 2 
Emile Peter Indépendant Conservateur - 
supported by the Croix de Feu 
Sarrebourg 
Henri Nominé Union Républicaine Démocratique Sarreguemines 
Robert Schuman Union Républicaine Lorraine – Parti 
Démocrate Populaire 
Thionville Est 
Emile Béron Indépendant Socialiste - Popular 
Front  
Thionville Ouest 
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Electoral Map of the Moselle - 1936 
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